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Re: [libvirt] VMware support and libcurl on rhel-u1
by Shahar Klein 27 Jul '09

27 Jul '09

I'll try with 7.15 can I test with ESX4i? Shahar ________________________________ From: Matthias Bolte <matthias.bolte(a)googlemail.com> To: Shahar Klein <shaharklein(a)yahoo.com> Sent: Sunday, July 26, 2009 5:56:18 PM Subject: Re: [libvirt] VMware support and libcurl on rhel-u1 2009/7/26 Shahar Klein <shaharklein(a)yahoo.com>: > It doesn't because I built libcurl on a different path (/usr/local/lib) > So I won't damage other stuff on this box. > I thought that this is what the LIBCURL_LIBS and LIBCURL_CFLAGS env vars are > for. No, but installing in the /usr/local prefix should also work with pkg-config. The .pc for libcurl should be located at /usr/local/lib/pkgconfig/libcurl.pc and pkg-config should find it. Maybe you have to set PKG_CONFIG_PATH in order to have pkg-config pick it up. Check the output of: pkg-config libcurl --modversion It should output 7.18 or what ever your version is, if installed correctly. > btw - Do I really need libcurl 7.18? trying to install it pushing me into > the depnendncy hell: [...] Hm... I just looked at the changelist of libcurl and something older like version 7.15 may also work, but I haven't tested it. You could give it a try and edit the configure.in file and change 7.18 to 7.15 and see if that works out. Regards, Matthias

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[libvirt] [PATCH] Power Hypervisor support
by Eduardo Otubo 27 Jul '09

27 Jul '09

Hello everyone, This should be the official patch for the libvrt-0.7.0 release. Here I'll comment all the features already implemented and the roadmap we have ahead: Features supported: * Connects to HMC/VIOS or IVM systems. * Life cycle commands (resume and shutdown). * dumpxml * 'list' and 'list --all' What is being implemented: * better and centralized control for UUID * definexml * CPU management commands Any comment are always welcome. []'s -- Eduardo Otubo Software Engineer Linux Technology Center IBM Systems & Technology Group Mobile: +55 19 8135 0885 otubo(a)linux.vnet.ibm.com

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[libvirt] [PATCH] test: Implement BlockStats and InterfaceStats
by Cole Robinson 27 Jul '09

27 Jul '09

We fake stats values based on the current time, similar to how it's done for cpu time. --- src/test.c | 116 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 1 files changed, 114 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/test.c b/src/test.c index f02b58b..6db3825 100644 --- a/src/test.c +++ b/src/test.c @@ -2093,6 +2093,118 @@ cleanup: return ret; } +static int testDomainBlockStats(virDomainPtr domain, + const char *path, + struct _virDomainBlockStats *stats) +{ + testConnPtr privconn = domain->conn->privateData; + virDomainObjPtr privdom; + struct timeval tv; + unsigned long long statbase; + int i, found = 0, ret = -1; + + testDriverLock(privconn); + privdom = virDomainFindByName(&privconn->domains, + domain->name); + testDriverUnlock(privconn); + + if (privdom == NULL) { + testError(domain->conn, VIR_ERR_INVALID_ARG, __FUNCTION__); + goto error; + } + + for (i = 0 ; i < privdom->def->ndisks ; i++) { + if (STREQ(path, privdom->def->disks[i]->dst)) { + found = 1; + break; + } + } + + if (!found) { + testError(domain->conn, VIR_ERR_INVALID_ARG, + _("invalid path: %s"), path); + goto error; + } + + if (gettimeofday(&tv, NULL) < 0) { + virReportSystemError(domain->conn, errno, + "%s", _("getting time of day")); + goto error; + } + + /* No significance to these numbers, just enough to mix it up*/ + statbase = (tv.tv_sec * 1000UL * 1000UL) + tv.tv_usec; + stats->rd_req = statbase / 10; + stats->rd_bytes = statbase / 20; + stats->wr_req = statbase / 30; + stats->wr_bytes = statbase / 40; + stats->errs = tv.tv_sec / 2; + + ret = 0; +error: + if (privdom) + virDomainObjUnlock(privdom); + return ret; +} + +static int testDomainInterfaceStats(virDomainPtr domain, + const char *path, + struct _virDomainInterfaceStats *stats) +{ + testConnPtr privconn = domain->conn->privateData; + virDomainObjPtr privdom; + struct timeval tv; + unsigned long long statbase; + int i, found = 0, ret = -1; + + testDriverLock(privconn); + privdom = virDomainFindByName(&privconn->domains, + domain->name); + testDriverUnlock(privconn); + + if (privdom == NULL) { + testError(domain->conn, VIR_ERR_INVALID_ARG, __FUNCTION__); + goto error; + } + + for (i = 0 ; i < privdom->def->nnets ; i++) { + if (privdom->def->nets[i]->ifname && + STREQ (privdom->def->nets[i]->ifname, path)) { + ret = 0; + break; + } + } + + if (!found) { + testError(domain->conn, VIR_ERR_INVALID_ARG, + _("invalid path, '%s' is not a known interface"), path); + goto error; + } + + if (gettimeofday(&tv, NULL) < 0) { + virReportSystemError(domain->conn, errno, + "%s", _("getting time of day")); + goto error; + } + + /* No significance to these numbers, just enough to mix it up*/ + statbase = (tv.tv_sec * 1000UL * 1000UL) + tv.tv_usec; + stats->rx_bytes = statbase / 10; + stats->rx_packets = statbase / 100; + stats->rx_errs = tv.tv_sec / 1; + stats->rx_drop = tv.tv_sec / 2; + stats->tx_bytes = statbase / 20; + stats->tx_packets = statbase / 110; + stats->tx_errs = tv.tv_sec / 3; + stats->tx_drop = tv.tv_sec / 4; + + ret = 0; +error: + if (privdom) + virDomainObjUnlock(privdom); + return ret; +} + static virDrvOpenStatus testOpenNetwork(virConnectPtr conn, virConnectAuthPtr auth ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED, int flags ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED) { @@ -4117,8 +4229,8 @@ static virDriver testDriver = { NULL, /* domainMigratePrepare */ NULL, /* domainMigratePerform */ NULL, /* domainMigrateFinish */ - NULL, /* domainBlockStats */ - NULL, /* domainInterfaceStats */ + testDomainBlockStats, /* domainBlockStats */ + testDomainInterfaceStats, /* domainInterfaceStats */ NULL, /* domainBlockPeek */ NULL, /* domainMemoryPeek */ testNodeGetCellsFreeMemory, /* nodeGetCellsFreeMemory */ -- 1.6.0.6

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[libvirt] VMware support and libcurl on rhel-u1
by Shahar Klein 26 Jul '09

26 Jul '09

I'm trying to play with the new ESX driver on a rhel5-u1 x86_64 but I get this: checking for libcurl libraries >= 7.18.0... configure: error: libcurl >= 7.18.0 is required for the ESX driver according to http://curl.haxx.se/download.html there is no rpm for rhel x86_64 so I built it and tried: export LIBCURL_LIBS="-L/usr/local/lib -lcurl -L/usr/kerberos/lib64" export LIBCURL_CFLAGS="-I/usr/local/include" but configure didn't care about it am I doing something wrong here? tnx Shahar Klein

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[libvirt] How to get access to QEMU monitor?
by Jun Koi 26 Jul '09

26 Jul '09

Hi, I am running QEMU via libvirt (using virsh & virt-manager). Now I want to get access to the monitor interface of QEMU, so I can issue some commands to monitor. Is there anyway to do that? Thanks, J

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[libvirt] VMware ESX driver progress
by Matthias Bolte 25 Jul '09

25 Jul '09

Hi, the development was hindered by our testing cluster being offline since 2 weeks due to server room cooling system maintenance. But I finally got a basic version of dump-XML done, that fills all fields of the virDomainDef that the VMX file contains data for. Changes since first announcement: - Move code into esx subdirectory - Add esxNodeGetInfo() - Fix esxDomainGetInfo() to report the correct value for memory - Add memory and max-memory getter/setters - Add CPU scheduler getter/setters - Validate a migration before trying to perform it - Replace esxUtil_Strdup() with strdup() and remove esxUtil_MigrateStringFromLibXML() - Add esxVI_EnsureSession() to handle expiring sessions - Separate VI client code into multiple files and generate most of the type handling code with macros - Add esxDomainDumpXML() based on esxVMX_ParseConfig() The ESX driver isn't complete yet, currently it supports: - domain lookup by ID, UUID and name - domain listing - domain info retrieval - domain suspend and resume - domain start and destroy - domain reboot and shutdown, if the VMware tools are installed inside the domain - domain migration with previous validation - domain memory configuration - domain CPU amount and scheduler configuration - domain XML-dump - domain XML-from-native (VMX) - node info retrieval - node hostname retrieval The next milestone is creating/defining a new domain from a domain XML config, but this will not be finished until feature freeze for 0.7.0 on friday. Regards, Matthias

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[libvirt] [PATCH 1/1] Support for Callbacks and VirtualBox Version 3.
by Pritesh Kothari 24 Jul '09

24 Jul '09

Hi All, I have added support for callbacks and VirtualBox version 3. I have attached the patch for the same, it is made against the head as of today. To check if the callbacks work you can run the example from examples/domain- events/events-c directory and then start a domain to see if you get any callback events. Regards, Pritesh

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Re: [libvirt] [PATCH 0/9] Add support for (qcow*) volume encryption
by Miloslav Trmac 24 Jul '09

24 Jul '09

----- "Daniel P. Berrange" <berrange(a)redhat.com> wrote: > > Not quite: the main case of a "dumb" client would be a large-scale > > virtualization management software that contains a primary store > > of encryption information, and gives each node access only to those > > keys that are currently necessary by the node to run its domains; > > the fact that each node has access to only a limited set of keys > > prevents an attacker that compromises a single node from reading > > disk images of all domains managed in the entire site, even if > > the disk image storage (e.g. unencrypted NFS) does not allow > > managing access by each node separately. > > > > Such a client must be able to transfer the actual secrets, not only > > identifiers, to libvirt. (The idea of a "dumb" client, that does > > not know the specifics of the format, is an additional feature on > > top, but one that implies that the client does send the actual > secrets.) > > This implies a flow of secrets > > Key server --\ > +-> libvirt client -> libvirt daemon -> qemu > MGMT server --/ > > This does not in fact guarentee that secrets for a particular > node are only used on the node for which they are intended, > because the key server cannot be sure of what libvirt daemons > the libvirt client is connected to. A client in this case is the central, fully trusted, management system (e.g. oVirt), there is no need to protect against it. A more likely flow is MGMT client (no knowledge of secrets) | v MGMT server + key server (integrated or separate but cooperating) | v libvirt daemon | v qemu > What I am suggesting is that libvirt daemon should communicate > with the key server directly in all cases, and take the client > out of the loop. The client should merely indicate whether it > wants encryption or not, and never be able to directly access > any key material itself. With a direct trust relationship > between the key server and each libvirtd daemon, you do now > have a guarentee that keys are only ever used on the node for > which they are intended. You also have the additional guarentee > that no libvirt client can ever see any key secrets or passphrases > since it has been taken completely out of the loop. As far as I understand it, the whole point of virtual machine encryption is that the nodes are _not_ trusted, and different encryption keys protect data on different nodes. If all nodes are trusted, what additional functionality does volume encryption with per-volume keys provide? If the nodes are trusted to read only data from the domains they currently host, the nodes could just as well use an encrypted local hard drive to store all images, or share a single key to encrypt all images stored on a NFS/SAN. > Key server > | > V > MGMT server -> libvirt client -> libvirt daemon -> qemu > > > Storage of secrets in a separate keystore is more important for "local" > > libvirt deployments, where libvirt manages the primary, long-term, > > store of the secrets. > > Nope, I think that having a keystore for all scenarios is the > desirable end goal. Passing secrets around in the XML should > ideally never be done at all - we should aim to always have a > keystore that can be used. Secrets in the XML would just be a > fallback for a rarely used niche cases, or disaster recovery, > or experimentation. That means that any deployment of more than one node with migration requires a separate server providing a shared keystore, even if there is only one client to manage the nodes. The N nodes x N "management consoles" case requires a centralized key store, but it's not necessary to impose it on the "1 management console" case. > > > 2. A desktop key agent (eg gnome-keyring) > > > > > > This would be useful for the unprivileged libvirtd instances > > > that run in the context of the desktop login session. Users > > > already have SSH, GPG, website keys stored here, so having > > > keys for their VM disks is obviously desirable > > > > Another option here is to let the client store the secrets in > > gnome-keyring, and transfer them to libvirt only when starting > > a domain (especially when there are no persistent domains). > > That doesn't affect the design in any way, though. > > This is undesriable because it lets requires that any client which > wishes to start the guest must have access to the secrets. We really > need to be able to have separation of this, so that when we introduce > fine grained access control, you can setup separate roles for users > who can access / work with secrets, vs users who can start/define > guests. > > > > 3. A off-node key management server > > > > > > This would be useful for a large scale data center / cluster > > > cloud deployment. This is good to allow management > scalability > > > and better separation of responsiblities of adminstration. > > > > > > If no keystore is in use, then I clearly all keys must go in & > out > > > of libvirt using the XML, which is pretty much what you're doing > > > in this series. I would say though, there is no point in clearing > > > the secret from the virStorageVolDefPtr instance/XML after volume > > > creation, since the secret is going to be kept in memory forever > > > for any guest using the volume. By not clearing the secret, an > > > app could create a volume, requesting automatic key generation, > > > then just do virStorageVolDumpXML(vol, > VIR_STORAGE_VOL_XML_SECURE) > > > to extract it and pass to onto the XML for the guest that's > created > > > > That is unreliable with current implementation, because a pool refresh > > creates all information about volumes anew by reading the volume files; > > therefore, after any pool refresh libvirt "forgets" the secrets directly > > associated with a volume (not secrets associated with an use of a volume > > in a domain). If client A creates a volume, client B can refresh the > > pool before client A is able to read the automatically generated secrets. > > One of the reasons the patch is clearing the information immediately is > > to make sure a {virStorageVolCreateXML; virStorageVolGetXMLDesc) always > > fails and no client is written depending on this racy operation sequence. > > > There is another, more important, reason why the node should never return > > encryption data to anyone who can connect to it. Consider the above- > > described situation of a large-scale virtualization deployment that uses > > volume image encryption to restrict access of nodes to volume data: If > > domain migration is supported, the nodes (all of them, or at least nodes > > within some groups) must be able to connect "read-write" to other nodes. > > This is just another argument for taking clients out of the loop completely > and having libvirt daemon always talk directly with keystores. > > > With a keystore we'd likely need a handful of APIs > > > > > > - create a secret providing a passphrase > > > - list all known secret UUIDs > > > - get the passphrase assoicated with a secret > > > - delete a secret based on UUID > > > - lookup a secret UUID based on the a disk path > > > > We might not need all of these. There are three main use > > cases for storing keys outside of XML: > > > > 1) This is a "small-scale deployment", where libvirt is the > > primary key store, and anyone that is able to connect to > > libvirtd is implicitly allowed to use the secrets. In this > > case the keystore can be managed completely automatically - > > creating a volume, or perhaps using it for the first time, > > implies storing a secret, and deleting a volume implies > > deleting a secret. Secrets are identified using a volume- > > unique object (is that a path, or an UUID?), which is > > completely transparent to the client. As long as the volume > > is "known" to libvirt, the client does not even need to > > specify any <encryption> element when creating a domain. > > > > (1a, a "small-scale deployment" where there are multiple > > clients that should be protected against each other, and > > libvirt is the primary key store, does not make sense > > unless a client account system is added to libvirt. > > > 2) The secrets are primarily stored outside libvirt (to > > restrict node access to image data), and libvirt stores > > only secrets for currently defined persistent domains (to > > support domain autostart). In this case the keystore can > > be managed completely automatically - persistent domain > > definition implies storing a secret, deleting the domain > > implies deleting a secret. Secrets are identified using > > a (domain, volume) pair, and this identifier is never > > exposed to the client. > > Deleting the domain does not imply deleting a secret, since > secrets are really associated with disks, not domains. It does, in this case - if the domain is not running on the node, the secret should not be stored on the node at all. > A disk may be shared by multiple domains. If a disk is shared, there will be multiple (domain volume) key ID pairs, and deleting one instace of the secret does not delete the other. > In addition, when you delete > a domain, libvirt does not delete the disk. It is the clients > responsiblity to delete disks after the fact. In this scenario the client does the long-term key storage. libvirt does not need to - and shouldn't - store the key merely because a volume exists. > In any case items 1 & 2 are really just 2 different implementations > of the same concept. There is a keystore, and libvirt talks to > it. Whether the keystore is local, or remote from the node is a > minor impl detail. Whether libvirt can request any secret, even if does not need to know it, is not a minor detail. > Use of a keystore of some format should be our primary goal here, > since it takes the client out of the loop. When libvirt does ACLs > on clients this is even more important, because when you revoke a > clients' access to libvirt you can be sure they don't have a > record of any of the secrets, since they never had any opportunity > to see / use them during the time they were authenticated > > 3) An external key store (such as a KMIP server) is used. In this > > case the management of access rights, listing and deleting secrets, > > would be performed by interacting with the external key store > > directly. Secrets are identified by using the external key store > > identifiers, and the client and libvirtd send these identifiers to > > each other. > > As long as we allow for secrets to be passed in the XML it will always > be possible for a client to talk to a keystore, obtain the secrets and > pass them in the XML. This is really not a desirable model to aim for > by default though, because it requires clients to know about all the > different types of keystore. If a client does not know about a particular > type of keystore, then it becomes unable to manage guests on that > libvirtd. > Not to mention the issue of trust of the client & revocation of > access. > Yes, libvirt will grow the concept of a user in the future, as well as > access controls on (user, object, operation) tuples Overall, it seems this all boils down to one thing - is libvirt intended to be a simple "virtualization server" that locally performs requested operations, managed by a separate "virtualization management" client that has full knowledge about the site (nodes, storage, secrets, access rights), with clients connecting to the "virtualization management" software instead of libvirtd, or a complete "virtualization management solution" that integrates all site-wide knowedge, accessed by dumb clients using the libvirt protocol? My reading of http://www.libvirt.org/goals.html implies the former; you seem to talk about the latter model. Have I misunderstood the role of libvirt in a large-scale deployment? Thank you, Mirek

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[libvirt] [PATCH] test: Generate net interface names when assigning XML.
by Cole Robinson 24 Jul '09

24 Jul '09

We need interface names to implement InterfaceStats. --- src/test.c | 76 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------ 1 files changed, 68 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/test.c b/src/test.c index 098d235..f02b58b 100644 --- a/src/test.c +++ b/src/test.c @@ -228,6 +228,66 @@ static const unsigned long long defaultPoolAlloc = 0; static int testStoragePoolObjSetDefaults(virConnectPtr conn, virStoragePoolObjPtr pool); +static char * +testDomainGenerateIfname(virConnectPtr conn, + virDomainDefPtr domdef) { + int maxif = 1024; + int ifctr, i; + + for (ifctr = 0; ifctr < maxif; ++ifctr) { + char *ifname; + int found = 0; + + if (virAsprintf(&ifname, "testnet%d", ifctr) < 0) { + virReportOOMError(conn); + return NULL; + } + + /* Generate network interface names */ + for (i = 0 ; i < domdef->nnets ; i++) { + if (domdef->nets[i]->ifname && + STREQ (domdef->nets[i]->ifname, ifname)) { + found = 1; + break; + } + } + + if (!found) + return ifname; + } + + testError(conn, VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR, + _("Exceeded max iface limit %d"), maxif); + return NULL; +} + +static virDomainObjPtr +testDomainAssignDef(virConnectPtr conn, + virDomainObjList *domlist, + virDomainDefPtr domdef) +{ + virDomainObjPtr domobj = NULL; + int i = 0; + + for (i = 0; i < domdef->nnets; i++) { + char *ifname; + if (domdef->nets[i]->ifname) + continue; + + ifname = testDomainGenerateIfname(conn, domdef); + if (!ifname) + goto error; + + domdef->nets[i]->ifname = ifname; + } + + if (!(domobj = virDomainAssignDef(conn, domlist, domdef))) + goto error; + +error: + return domobj; +} + static int testOpenDefault(virConnectPtr conn) { int u; struct timeval tv; @@ -282,7 +342,7 @@ static int testOpenDefault(virConnectPtr conn) { defaultDomainXML, VIR_DOMAIN_XML_INACTIVE))) goto error; - if (!(domobj = virDomainAssignDef(conn, &privconn->domains, domdef))) { + if (!(domobj = testDomainAssignDef(conn, &privconn->domains, domdef))) { virDomainDefFree(domdef); goto error; } @@ -608,7 +668,7 @@ static int testOpenFromFile(virConnectPtr conn, goto error; } - if (!(dom = virDomainAssignDef(conn, &privconn->domains, def))) { + if (!(dom = testDomainAssignDef(conn, &privconn->domains, def))) { virDomainDefFree(def); goto error; } @@ -920,8 +980,8 @@ testDomainCreateXML(virConnectPtr conn, const char *xml, VIR_DOMAIN_XML_INACTIVE)) == NULL) goto cleanup; - if ((dom = virDomainAssignDef(conn, &privconn->domains, - def)) == NULL) { + if ((dom = testDomainAssignDef(conn, &privconn->domains, + def)) == NULL) { virDomainDefFree(def); goto cleanup; } @@ -1471,8 +1531,8 @@ static int testDomainRestore(virConnectPtr conn, if (!def) goto cleanup; - if ((dom = virDomainAssignDef(conn, &privconn->domains, - def)) == NULL) + if ((dom = testDomainAssignDef(conn, &privconn->domains, + def)) == NULL) goto cleanup; dom->state = VIR_DOMAIN_RUNNING; @@ -1763,8 +1823,8 @@ static virDomainPtr testDomainDefineXML(virConnectPtr conn, VIR_DOMAIN_XML_INACTIVE)) == NULL) goto cleanup; - if ((dom = virDomainAssignDef(conn, &privconn->domains, - def)) == NULL) { + if ((dom = testDomainAssignDef(conn, &privconn->domains, + def)) == NULL) { goto cleanup; } def = NULL; -- 1.6.0.6

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[libvirt] [PATCH] Don't allow NULL paths for BlockStats and InterfaceStats
by Cole Robinson 24 Jul '09

24 Jul '09

Do the check in libvirt.c, to save drivers from the burden. This changes behavior slightly in the qemu driver: we no longer explictly error if passed an empty string. An error will still be thrown when the device lookup fails. --- src/libvirt.c | 4 ++-- src/qemu_driver.c | 6 ------ 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/libvirt.c b/src/libvirt.c index 0e6d88f..d086052 100644 --- a/src/libvirt.c +++ b/src/libvirt.c @@ -3578,7 +3578,7 @@ virDomainBlockStats (virDomainPtr dom, const char *path, virLibDomainError (NULL, VIR_ERR_INVALID_DOMAIN, __FUNCTION__); return -1; } - if (!stats || size > sizeof stats2) { + if (!path || !stats || size > sizeof stats2) { virLibDomainError (dom, VIR_ERR_INVALID_ARG, __FUNCTION__); goto error; } @@ -3636,7 +3636,7 @@ virDomainInterfaceStats (virDomainPtr dom, const char *path, virLibDomainError (NULL, VIR_ERR_INVALID_DOMAIN, __FUNCTION__); return -1; } - if (!stats || size > sizeof stats2) { + if (!path || !stats || size > sizeof stats2) { virLibDomainError (dom, VIR_ERR_INVALID_ARG, __FUNCTION__); goto error; } diff --git a/src/qemu_driver.c b/src/qemu_driver.c index c4683ae..c8f451d 100644 --- a/src/qemu_driver.c +++ b/src/qemu_driver.c @@ -5329,12 +5329,6 @@ qemudDomainInterfaceStats (virDomainPtr dom, goto cleanup; } - if (!path || path[0] == '\0') { - qemudReportError(dom->conn, dom, NULL, VIR_ERR_INVALID_ARG, - "%s", _("NULL or empty path")); - goto cleanup; - } - /* Check the path is one of the domain's network interfaces. */ for (i = 0 ; i < vm->def->nnets ; i++) { if (vm->def->nets[i]->ifname && -- 1.6.0.6

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