- Devel - libvirt List Archives

[libvirt] [PATCH] docs: fix a typo in hacking.html.in
by Wangrui (K) 10 Jun '14

10 Jun '14

Signed-off-by: Wang Rui <moon.wangrui(a)huawei.com> --- docs/hacking.html.in | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/docs/hacking.html.in b/docs/hacking.html.in index b2ef85a..9c6dd26 100644 --- a/docs/hacking.html.in +++ b/docs/hacking.html.in @@ -122,7 +122,7 @@ Some tests are skipped by default in a development environment, based on the time they take in comparison to the likelihood that those tests will turn up problems during incremental builds. - These tests default to being run when when building from a + These tests default to being run when building from a tarball or with the configure option --enable-expensive-tests; you can also force a one-time toggle of these tests by setting VIR_TEST_EXPENSIVE to 0 or 1 at make time, as in: -- 1.7.12.4

3 2

[libvirt] IPv6 in Libvirt LXC
by Thomas Maddox 10 Jun '14

10 Jun '14

Hey all, According to a discussion last week in the Nova-Libvirt subgroup meeting, it was advised, by danpb, that I bring this issue up on the Libvirt mailing list for discussion and resolution. So, here goes - I'm currently using config drive from Nova to generate network configurations for LXC guests that are spun up via Libvirt. Unfortunately, when doing some IPv6 testing, I ran into a snag (with a couple work arounds detailed below). Due to the read-only mount of /proc/sys (http://libvirt.org/drvlxc.html#fsmounts) I am unable to get expected behavior from IPv6 static network configurations. I did some poking around and found this bug from a couple years ago that pretty well outlines the problem: https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/libvirt/+bug/964882. I wasn't sure how we might go about correcting this, but it seems like something we'll need to address in Libvirt. Maybe with the user namespaces working, we can begin to provide some read/write mounts instead of read-only with clear documentation on the security implications? =] When using static IPv6 addressing it was attempting the following command: 'sysctl -q -e -w net.ipv6.conf.eth0.autoconf=0'. I tested to see whether the host and the guest share this value. I was able to change it in the host without it being reflected in the guest. The work arounds I've tried that seemed to allow IPv6 to get configured properly: 1. Use the post-up hook on an IPv4 static configuration to configure IPv6 via ifconfig/routes (example: http://paste.openstack.org/show/82446/) 2. Patch Libvirt to include a /proc/sys/net mount as read/write. Cheers! -Thomas

3 2

[libvirt] [PATCH RFC] network: Bring netdevs online later
by Matthew Rosato 10 Jun '14

10 Jun '14

Defer MAC registration until net devices are actually going to be used by the guest. This patch does so by setting the devices online just before starting guest CPUs. This approach is an alternative to my previously proposed 'network: Defer online of macvtap during qemu migration' Laine/Wangrui, is this the sort of thing you had in mind? Previous thread: https://www.redhat.com/archives/libvir-list/2014-May/msg00427.html Associated BZ: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1081461 Signed-off-by: Matthew Rosato <mjrosato(a)linux.vnet.ibm.com> --- src/qemu/qemu_command.c | 45 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ src/qemu/qemu_command.h | 3 +++ src/qemu/qemu_process.c | 3 +++ src/util/virnetdevmacvlan.c | 5 ----- src/util/virnetdevtap.c | 3 --- 5 files changed, 51 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/qemu/qemu_command.c b/src/qemu/qemu_command.c index e6acced..c161d73 100644 --- a/src/qemu/qemu_command.c +++ b/src/qemu/qemu_command.c @@ -571,6 +571,51 @@ qemuNetworkPrepareDevices(virDomainDefPtr def) return ret; } +void +qemuNetworkIfaceUp(virDomainNetDefPtr net) +{ + if (virNetDevSetOnline(net->ifname, true) < 0) { + ignore_value(virNetDevTapDelete(net->ifname)); + } + return; +} + +void +qemuPhysIfaceUp(virDomainNetDefPtr net) +{ + if (virNetDevSetOnline(net->ifname, true) < 0) { + ignore_value(virNetDevVPortProfileDisassociate(net->ifname, + virDomainNetGetActualVirtPortProfile(net), + &net->mac, + virDomainNetGetActualDirectDev(net), + -1, + VIR_NETDEV_VPORT_PROFILE_OP_MIGRATE_IN_FINISH)); + ignore_value(virNetDevMacVLanDelete(net->ifname)); + } + return; +} + +void +qemuNetworkInitializeDevices(virDomainDefPtr def) +{ + size_t i; + + for (i = 0; i < def->nnets; i++) { + virDomainNetDefPtr net = def->nets[i]; + switch(virDomainNetGetActualType(net)) { + case VIR_DOMAIN_NET_TYPE_BRIDGE: + case VIR_DOMAIN_NET_TYPE_NETWORK: + qemuNetworkIfaceUp(net); + break; + case VIR_DOMAIN_NET_TYPE_DIRECT: + qemuPhysIfaceUp(net); + break; + } + } + + return; +} + static int qemuDomainDeviceAliasIndex(const virDomainDeviceInfo *info, const char *prefix) { diff --git a/src/qemu/qemu_command.h b/src/qemu/qemu_command.h index afbd6ff..4a44464 100644 --- a/src/qemu/qemu_command.h +++ b/src/qemu/qemu_command.h @@ -206,6 +206,9 @@ int qemuOpenVhostNet(virDomainDefPtr def, int *vhostfdSize); int qemuNetworkPrepareDevices(virDomainDefPtr def); +void qemuNetworkIfaceUp(virDomainNetDefPtr net); +void qemuPhysIfaceUp(virDomainNetDefPtr net); +void qemuNetworkInitializeDevices(virDomainDefPtr def); /* * NB: def->name can be NULL upon return and the caller diff --git a/src/qemu/qemu_process.c b/src/qemu/qemu_process.c index d719716..bbc11f3 100644 --- a/src/qemu/qemu_process.c +++ b/src/qemu/qemu_process.c @@ -2765,6 +2765,9 @@ qemuProcessStartCPUs(virQEMUDriverPtr driver, virDomainObjPtr vm, qemuDomainObjPrivatePtr priv = vm->privateData; virQEMUDriverConfigPtr cfg = virQEMUDriverGetConfig(driver); + /* Bring up netdevs before starting CPUs */ + qemuNetworkInitializeDevices(vm->def); + VIR_DEBUG("Using lock state '%s'", NULLSTR(priv->lockState)); if (virDomainLockProcessResume(driver->lockManager, cfg->uri, vm, priv->lockState) < 0) { diff --git a/src/util/virnetdevmacvlan.c b/src/util/virnetdevmacvlan.c index cb85b74..3748527 100644 --- a/src/util/virnetdevmacvlan.c +++ b/src/util/virnetdevmacvlan.c @@ -898,11 +898,6 @@ int virNetDevMacVLanCreateWithVPortProfile(const char *tgifname, goto link_del_exit; } - if (virNetDevSetOnline(cr_ifname, true) < 0) { - rc = -1; - goto disassociate_exit; - } - if (withTap) { if ((rc = virNetDevMacVLanTapOpen(cr_ifname, 10)) < 0) goto disassociate_exit; diff --git a/src/util/virnetdevtap.c b/src/util/virnetdevtap.c index 0b444fa..09b9c12 100644 --- a/src/util/virnetdevtap.c +++ b/src/util/virnetdevtap.c @@ -574,9 +574,6 @@ int virNetDevTapCreateInBridgePort(const char *brname, goto error; } - if (virNetDevSetOnline(*ifname, !!(flags & VIR_NETDEV_TAP_CREATE_IFUP)) < 0) - goto error; - return 0; error: -- 1.7.9.5

2 2

[libvirt] [PATCH] Report an clear error when try to build lvm2 type pool
by Shanzhi Yu 10 Jun '14

10 Jun '14

STORAGE_POOL_DISK_LVM2 can't be created by "parted mklabel", so report an error when build such type pool Signed-off-by: Shanzhi Yu <shyu(a)redhat.com> --- src/storage/storage_backend_disk.c | 10 +++++++++- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/src/storage/storage_backend_disk.c b/src/storage/storage_backend_disk.c index 8e12974..5b5a1fa 100644 --- a/src/storage/storage_backend_disk.c +++ b/src/storage/storage_backend_disk.c @@ -414,13 +414,21 @@ virStorageBackendDiskBuildPool(virConnectPtr conn ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED, goto error; } - if (flags & VIR_STORAGE_POOL_BUILD_OVERWRITE) + if (flags & VIR_STORAGE_POOL_BUILD_OVERWRITE && + pool->def->source.format != VIR_STORAGE_POOL_DISK_LVM2) ok_to_mklabel = true; else { int check; check = virStorageBackendDiskFindLabel( pool->def->source.devices[0].path); + + if (pool->def->source.format == VIR_STORAGE_POOL_DISK_LVM2){ + virReportError(VIR_ERR_OPERATION_INVALID, "%s", + _("Invalid disk label: lvm2")); + goto error; + } + if (check > 0) { ok_to_mklabel = true; } else if (check < 0) { -- 1.9.3

1 0

[libvirt] [PATCH] qemu: Properly label FDs while saving domain for successful restores in case of static labelling.
by Shivaprasad G Bhat 10 Jun '14

10 Jun '14

Static labelling has the relabel set to no by default and restore of a saved image file fails when the selinux context is static. This is because the saved file doesnt have the context set during the saving. The libvirt has to set the conext of save image file to that of the guest during save. The fix applies to both managedsave and save codepath. The managedsave works as is without the fix as well since the files are saved in the directory having viable default context. Signed-off-by: Shivaprasad G Bhat <shivaprasadbhat(a)gmail.com> --- src/qemu/qemu_driver.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c b/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c index 3a7622a..e4390ee 100644 --- a/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c +++ b/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c @@ -2966,6 +2966,9 @@ qemuDomainSaveMemory(virQEMUDriverPtr driver, if (fd < 0) goto cleanup; + if (asyncJob == QEMU_ASYNC_JOB_SAVE) + virSecurityManagerSetImageFDLabel(driver->securityManager, vm->def, fd); + if (!(wrapperFd = virFileWrapperFdNew(&fd, path, wrapperFlags))) goto cleanup;

1 0

[libvirt] [PATCH] SELinux: don't silently fail when no label is present
by Ján Tomko 10 Jun '14

10 Jun '14

This fixes startup of a domain with: <seclabel type='none' model='dac'/> on a host with selinux and dac drivers and security_default_confined = 0 https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1105939 --- src/security/security_selinux.c | 98 ++++++++++++----------------------------- 1 file changed, 29 insertions(+), 69 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/security/security_selinux.c b/src/security/security_selinux.c index 8380bba..008c58c 100644 --- a/src/security/security_selinux.c +++ b/src/security/security_selinux.c @@ -585,7 +585,7 @@ virSecuritySELinuxGenSecurityLabel(virSecurityManagerPtr mgr, seclabel = virDomainDefGetSecurityLabelDef(def, SECURITY_SELINUX_NAME); if (seclabel == NULL) - return rc; + return 0; data = virSecurityManagerGetPrivateData(mgr); @@ -739,11 +739,7 @@ virSecuritySELinuxReserveSecurityLabel(virSecurityManagerPtr mgr, virSecurityLabelDefPtr seclabel; seclabel = virDomainDefGetSecurityLabelDef(def, SECURITY_SELINUX_NAME); - if (seclabel == NULL) { - return -1; - } - - if (seclabel->type == VIR_DOMAIN_SECLABEL_STATIC) + if (!seclabel || seclabel->type == VIR_DOMAIN_SECLABEL_STATIC) return 0; if (getpidcon_raw(pid, &pctx) == -1) { @@ -1060,7 +1056,7 @@ virSecuritySELinuxSetSecurityTPMFileLabel(virSecurityManagerPtr mgr, seclabel = virDomainDefGetSecurityLabelDef(def, SECURITY_SELINUX_NAME); if (seclabel == NULL) - return -1; + return 0; switch (tpm->type) { case VIR_DOMAIN_TPM_TYPE_PASSTHROUGH: @@ -1102,7 +1098,7 @@ virSecuritySELinuxRestoreSecurityTPMFileLabelInt(virSecurityManagerPtr mgr, seclabel = virDomainDefGetSecurityLabelDef(def, SECURITY_SELINUX_NAME); if (seclabel == NULL) - return -1; + return 0; switch (tpm->type) { case VIR_DOMAIN_TPM_TYPE_PASSTHROUGH: @@ -1136,7 +1132,7 @@ virSecuritySELinuxRestoreSecurityImageLabelInt(virSecurityManagerPtr mgr, seclabel = virDomainDefGetSecurityLabelDef(def, SECURITY_SELINUX_NAME); if (seclabel == NULL) - return -1; + return 0; disk_seclabel = virDomainDiskDefGetSecurityLabelDef(disk, SECURITY_SELINUX_NAME); @@ -1256,10 +1252,7 @@ virSecuritySELinuxSetSecurityImageLabel(virSecurityManagerPtr mgr, cbdata.manager = mgr; cbdata.secdef = virDomainDefGetSecurityLabelDef(def, SECURITY_SELINUX_NAME); - if (cbdata.secdef == NULL) - return -1; - - if (cbdata.secdef->norelabel) + if (!cbdata.secdef || cbdata.secdef->norelabel) return 0; if (virDomainDiskGetType(disk) == VIR_STORAGE_TYPE_NETWORK) @@ -1279,7 +1272,7 @@ virSecuritySELinuxSetSecurityHostdevLabelHelper(const char *file, void *opaque) secdef = virDomainDefGetSecurityLabelDef(def, SECURITY_SELINUX_NAME); if (secdef == NULL) - return -1; + return 0; return virSecuritySELinuxSetFilecon(file, secdef->imagelabel); } @@ -1397,7 +1390,7 @@ virSecuritySELinuxSetSecurityHostdevCapsLabel(virDomainDefPtr def, secdef = virDomainDefGetSecurityLabelDef(def, SECURITY_SELINUX_NAME); if (secdef == NULL) - return -1; + return 0; switch (dev->source.caps.type) { case VIR_DOMAIN_HOSTDEV_CAPS_TYPE_STORAGE: { @@ -1447,10 +1440,7 @@ virSecuritySELinuxSetSecurityHostdevLabel(virSecurityManagerPtr mgr ATTRIBUTE_UN virSecurityLabelDefPtr secdef; secdef = virDomainDefGetSecurityLabelDef(def, SECURITY_SELINUX_NAME); - if (secdef == NULL) - return -1; - - if (secdef->norelabel) + if (!secdef || secdef->norelabel) return 0; switch (dev->mode) { @@ -1635,10 +1625,7 @@ virSecuritySELinuxRestoreSecurityHostdevLabel(virSecurityManagerPtr mgr, virSecurityLabelDefPtr secdef; secdef = virDomainDefGetSecurityLabelDef(def, SECURITY_SELINUX_NAME); - if (secdef == NULL) - return -1; - - if (secdef->norelabel) + if (!secdef || secdef->norelabel) return 0; switch (dev->mode) { @@ -1667,14 +1654,14 @@ virSecuritySELinuxSetSecurityChardevLabel(virDomainDefPtr def, int ret = -1; seclabel = virDomainDefGetSecurityLabelDef(def, SECURITY_SELINUX_NAME); - if (seclabel == NULL) - return -1; + if (!seclabel || seclabel->norelabel) + return 0; if (dev) chr_seclabel = virDomainChrDefGetSecurityLabelDef(dev, SECURITY_SELINUX_NAME); - if (seclabel->norelabel || (chr_seclabel && chr_seclabel->norelabel)) + if (chr_seclabel && chr_seclabel->norelabel) return 0; if (chr_seclabel) @@ -1738,13 +1725,13 @@ virSecuritySELinuxRestoreSecurityChardevLabel(virSecurityManagerPtr mgr, int ret = -1; seclabel = virDomainDefGetSecurityLabelDef(def, SECURITY_SELINUX_NAME); - if (seclabel == NULL) - return -1; + if (!seclabel || seclabel->norelabel) + return 0; if (dev) chr_seclabel = virDomainChrDefGetSecurityLabelDef(dev, SECURITY_SELINUX_NAME); - if (seclabel->norelabel || (chr_seclabel && chr_seclabel->norelabel)) + if (chr_seclabel && chr_seclabel->norelabel) return 0; switch (dev_source->type) { @@ -1864,7 +1851,7 @@ virSecuritySELinuxRestoreSecurityAllLabel(virSecurityManagerPtr mgr, secdef = virDomainDefGetSecurityLabelDef(def, SECURITY_SELINUX_NAME); if (secdef == NULL) - return -1; + return 0; if (secdef->norelabel || data->skipAllLabel) return 0; @@ -1925,7 +1912,7 @@ virSecuritySELinuxReleaseSecurityLabel(virSecurityManagerPtr mgr, secdef = virDomainDefGetSecurityLabelDef(def, SECURITY_SELINUX_NAME); if (secdef == NULL) - return -1; + return 0; if (secdef->type == VIR_DOMAIN_SECLABEL_DYNAMIC) { if (secdef->label != NULL) { @@ -1953,10 +1940,7 @@ virSecuritySELinuxSetSavedStateLabel(virSecurityManagerPtr mgr ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED, virSecurityLabelDefPtr secdef; secdef = virDomainDefGetSecurityLabelDef(def, SECURITY_SELINUX_NAME); - if (secdef == NULL) - return -1; - - if (secdef->norelabel) + if (!secdef || secdef->norelabel) return 0; return virSecuritySELinuxSetFilecon(savefile, secdef->imagelabel); @@ -1971,10 +1955,7 @@ virSecuritySELinuxRestoreSavedStateLabel(virSecurityManagerPtr mgr, virSecurityLabelDefPtr secdef; secdef = virDomainDefGetSecurityLabelDef(def, SECURITY_SELINUX_NAME); - if (secdef == NULL) - return -1; - - if (secdef->norelabel) + if (!secdef || secdef->norelabel) return 0; return virSecuritySELinuxRestoreSecurityFileLabel(mgr, savefile); @@ -1989,7 +1970,7 @@ virSecuritySELinuxSecurityVerify(virSecurityManagerPtr mgr ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED, secdef = virDomainDefGetSecurityLabelDef(def, SECURITY_SELINUX_NAME); if (secdef == NULL) - return -1; + return 0; if (!STREQ(SECURITY_SELINUX_NAME, secdef->model)) { virReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR, @@ -2018,10 +1999,7 @@ virSecuritySELinuxSetSecurityProcessLabel(virSecurityManagerPtr mgr ATTRIBUTE_UN virSecurityLabelDefPtr secdef; secdef = virDomainDefGetSecurityLabelDef(def, SECURITY_SELINUX_NAME); - if (secdef == NULL) - return -1; - - if (secdef->label == NULL) + if (!secdef || !secdef->label) return 0; VIR_DEBUG("label=%s", secdef->label); @@ -2055,10 +2033,7 @@ virSecuritySELinuxSetSecurityChildProcessLabel(virSecurityManagerPtr mgr ATTRIBU virSecurityLabelDefPtr secdef; secdef = virDomainDefGetSecurityLabelDef(def, SECURITY_SELINUX_NAME); - if (secdef == NULL) - return -1; - - if (secdef->label == NULL) + if (!secdef || !secdef->label) return 0; VIR_DEBUG("label=%s", secdef->label); @@ -2088,10 +2063,7 @@ virSecuritySELinuxSetSecurityDaemonSocketLabel(virSecurityManagerPtr mgr ATTRIBU int rc = -1; secdef = virDomainDefGetSecurityLabelDef(def, SECURITY_SELINUX_NAME); - if (secdef == NULL) - return -1; - - if (secdef->label == NULL) + if (!secdef || !secdef->label) return 0; if (!STREQ(SECURITY_SELINUX_NAME, secdef->model)) { @@ -2138,10 +2110,7 @@ virSecuritySELinuxSetSecuritySocketLabel(virSecurityManagerPtr mgr ATTRIBUTE_UNU int rc = -1; secdef = virDomainDefGetSecurityLabelDef(vm, SECURITY_SELINUX_NAME); - if (secdef == NULL) - return -1; - - if (secdef->label == NULL) + if (!secdef || !secdef->label) return 0; if (!STREQ(SECURITY_SELINUX_NAME, secdef->model)) { @@ -2179,10 +2148,7 @@ virSecuritySELinuxClearSecuritySocketLabel(virSecurityManagerPtr mgr ATTRIBUTE_U virSecurityLabelDefPtr secdef; secdef = virDomainDefGetSecurityLabelDef(def, SECURITY_SELINUX_NAME); - if (secdef == NULL) - return -1; - - if (secdef->label == NULL) + if (!secdef || !secdef->label) return 0; if (!STREQ(SECURITY_SELINUX_NAME, secdef->model)) { @@ -2264,7 +2230,7 @@ virSecuritySELinuxSetSecurityAllLabel(virSecurityManagerPtr mgr, secdef = virDomainDefGetSecurityLabelDef(def, SECURITY_SELINUX_NAME); if (secdef == NULL) - return -1; + return 0; if (secdef->norelabel || data->skipAllLabel) return 0; @@ -2337,10 +2303,7 @@ virSecuritySELinuxSetImageFDLabel(virSecurityManagerPtr mgr ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED, virSecurityLabelDefPtr secdef; secdef = virDomainDefGetSecurityLabelDef(def, SECURITY_SELINUX_NAME); - if (secdef == NULL) - return -1; - - if (secdef->imagelabel == NULL) + if (!secdef || !secdef->imagelabel) return 0; return virSecuritySELinuxFSetFilecon(fd, secdef->imagelabel); @@ -2358,10 +2321,7 @@ virSecuritySELinuxSetTapFDLabel(virSecurityManagerPtr mgr, int rc = -1; secdef = virDomainDefGetSecurityLabelDef(def, SECURITY_SELINUX_NAME); - if (secdef == NULL) - return rc; - - if (secdef->label == NULL) + if (!secdef || !secdef->label) return 0; if (fstat(fd, &buf) < 0) { -- 1.8.3.2

2 2

[libvirt] [RFC][PATCH]QEMU: Parse -device vfio-pci commandline
by Olivia Yin 09 Jun '14

09 Jun '14

Signed-off-by: Olivia Yin <Hong-Hua.Yin(a)freescale.com> --- src/qemu/qemu_command.c | 67 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ tests/qemuargv2xmltest.c | 2 +- 2 files changed, 68 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/src/qemu/qemu_command.c b/src/qemu/qemu_command.c index e6acced..4db4a1d 100644 --- a/src/qemu/qemu_command.c +++ b/src/qemu/qemu_command.c @@ -10239,6 +10239,59 @@ qemuParseCommandLinePCI(const char *val) return NULL; } +/* + * Tries to parse a QEMU vfio-pci device + */ +static virDomainHostdevDefPtr +qemuParseCommandLineVFIOPCI(const char *val) +{ + int bus = 0, slot = 0, func = 0; + const char *start; + char *end; + virDomainHostdevDefPtr def = virDomainHostdevDefAlloc(); + + if (!def) + goto error; + + if (!STRPREFIX(val, "host=")) { + virReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR, + _("unknown PCI device syntax '%s'"), val); + goto error; + } + + start = val + strlen("host="); + if (virStrToLong_i(start, &end, 16, &bus) < 0 || *end != ':') { + virReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR, + _("cannot extract PCI device bus '%s'"), val); + goto error; + } + start = end + 1; + if (virStrToLong_i(start, &end, 16, &slot) < 0 || *end != '.') { + virReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR, + _("cannot extract PCI device slot '%s'"), val); + goto error; + } + start = end + 1; + if (virStrToLong_i(start, &end, 16, &func) < 0 || *end != ',') { + virReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR, + _("cannot extract PCI device function '%s'"), val); + goto error; + } + + def->mode = VIR_DOMAIN_HOSTDEV_MODE_SUBSYS; + def->managed = true; + def->source.subsys.type = VIR_DOMAIN_HOSTDEV_SUBSYS_TYPE_PCI; + def->source.subsys.u.pci.backend = VIR_DOMAIN_HOSTDEV_PCI_BACKEND_VFIO; + def->source.subsys.u.pci.addr.bus = bus; + def->source.subsys.u.pci.addr.slot = slot; + def->source.subsys.u.pci.addr.function = func; + return def; + + error: + virDomainHostdevDefFree(def); + return NULL; +} + /* * Tries to parse a QEMU USB device @@ -11351,6 +11404,20 @@ qemuParseCommandLine(virCapsPtr qemuCaps, virDomainHostdevDefFree(hostdev); goto error; } + } else if (STREQ(arg, "-device")) { + WANT_VALUE(); + if (STRPREFIX(val, "vfio-pci,")) { + const char *start; + start = val; + virDomainHostdevDefPtr hostdev; + start += strlen("vfio-pci,"); + if (!(hostdev = qemuParseCommandLineVFIOPCI(start))) + goto error; + if (VIR_APPEND_ELEMENT(def->hostdevs, def->nhostdevs, hostdev) < 0) { + virDomainHostdevDefFree(hostdev); + goto error; + } + } } else if (STREQ(arg, "-soundhw")) { const char *start; WANT_VALUE(); diff --git a/tests/qemuargv2xmltest.c b/tests/qemuargv2xmltest.c index 0fc9fcb..b4ba97a 100644 --- a/tests/qemuargv2xmltest.c +++ b/tests/qemuargv2xmltest.c @@ -251,8 +251,8 @@ mymain(void) DO_TEST("watchdog"); DO_TEST("hostdev-usb-address"); - DO_TEST("hostdev-pci-address"); + DO_TEST("hostdev-vfio"); DO_TEST("smp"); -- 1.8.5

4 14

[libvirt] [PATCHv2] QEMU: Modify qemuParseCommandLinePCI() to parsee '-device vfio-pci'
by Olivia Yin 09 Jun '14

09 Jun '14

Signed-off-by: Olivia Yin <Hong-Hua.Yin(a)freescale.com> Modify qemuParseCommandLinePCI() to support parsing '-device vfio-pci,host=bus:slot.func'. Add test case 'hostdev-vfio' into qemuargv2xmltest to validate this function. The case related to QEMU_CAPS_HOST_PCI_MULTIDOMAIN which uses '-device vfio-pci,host=domain:bus:slot.func' is not supported yet. --- src/qemu/qemu_command.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------ tests/qemuargv2xmltest.c | 2 +- 2 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/qemu/qemu_command.c b/src/qemu/qemu_command.c index 3cf279e..ae7f94e 100644 --- a/src/qemu/qemu_command.c +++ b/src/qemu/qemu_command.c @@ -10193,7 +10193,7 @@ qemuParseCommandLineNet(virDomainXMLOptionPtr xmlopt, * Tries to parse a QEMU PCI device */ static virDomainHostdevDefPtr -qemuParseCommandLinePCI(const char *val) +qemuParseCommandLinePCI(const char *val, bool vfio) { int bus = 0, slot = 0, func = 0; const char *start; @@ -10222,10 +10222,20 @@ qemuParseCommandLinePCI(const char *val) goto error; } start = end + 1; - if (virStrToLong_i(start, NULL, 16, &func) < 0) { - virReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR, - _("cannot extract PCI device function '%s'"), val); - goto error; + + if (!vfio) { + if (virStrToLong_i(start, NULL, 16, &func) < 0) { + virReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR, + _("cannot extract PCI device function '%s'"), val); + goto error; + } + } else { + if (virStrToLong_i(start, &end, 16, &func) < 0 || *end != ',') { + virReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR, + _("cannot extract PCI device function '%s'"), val); + goto error; + } else + def->source.subsys.u.pci.backend = VIR_DOMAIN_HOSTDEV_PCI_BACKEND_VFIO; } def->mode = VIR_DOMAIN_HOSTDEV_MODE_SUBSYS; @@ -11347,12 +11357,26 @@ qemuParseCommandLine(virCapsPtr qemuCaps, } else if (STREQ(arg, "-pcidevice")) { virDomainHostdevDefPtr hostdev; WANT_VALUE(); - if (!(hostdev = qemuParseCommandLinePCI(val))) + if (!(hostdev = qemuParseCommandLinePCI(val,0))) goto error; if (VIR_APPEND_ELEMENT(def->hostdevs, def->nhostdevs, hostdev) < 0) { virDomainHostdevDefFree(hostdev); goto error; } + } else if (STREQ(arg, "-device")) { + WANT_VALUE(); + if (STRPREFIX(val, "vfio-pci,")) { + const char *start; + start = val; + virDomainHostdevDefPtr hostdev; + start += strlen("vfio-pci,"); + if (!(hostdev = qemuParseCommandLinePCI(start,1))) + goto error; + if (VIR_APPEND_ELEMENT(def->hostdevs, def->nhostdevs, hostdev) < 0) { + virDomainHostdevDefFree(hostdev); + goto error; + } + } } else if (STREQ(arg, "-soundhw")) { const char *start; WANT_VALUE(); diff --git a/tests/qemuargv2xmltest.c b/tests/qemuargv2xmltest.c index 0fc9fcb..b4ba97a 100644 --- a/tests/qemuargv2xmltest.c +++ b/tests/qemuargv2xmltest.c @@ -251,8 +251,8 @@ mymain(void) DO_TEST("watchdog"); DO_TEST("hostdev-usb-address"); - DO_TEST("hostdev-pci-address"); + DO_TEST("hostdev-vfio"); DO_TEST("smp"); -- 1.8.5

2 1

[libvirt] [PATCH] parallels: Avoid possible leak of "cpu" from parallelsBuildCapabilities
by Peter Krempa 09 Jun '14

09 Jun '14

4d06af97d38c3648937eb8f732704379b3cd9e59 introduced a possible memory leak of the memory allocated into the "cpu" pointer in parallelsBuildCapabilities in the case "nodeGetInfo()" would fail right after the allocation. Rearrange the code to avoid the possibility of the leak. Found by Coverity. --- src/parallels/parallels_driver.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/parallels/parallels_driver.c b/src/parallels/parallels_driver.c index 153961b..411527c 100644 --- a/src/parallels/parallels_driver.c +++ b/src/parallels/parallels_driver.c @@ -151,10 +151,10 @@ parallelsBuildCapabilities(void) "parallels", NULL, NULL, 0, NULL) == NULL) goto error; - if (VIR_ALLOC(cpu) < 0) + if (nodeGetInfo(&nodeinfo)) goto error; - if (nodeGetInfo(&nodeinfo)) + if (VIR_ALLOC(cpu) < 0) goto error; cpu->arch = caps->host.arch; -- 1.9.3

2 2

Re: [libvirt] [Qemu-devel] Question about how to distinguish a usb device in usb pass-through feature
by Gonglei (Arei) 09 Jun '14

09 Jun '14

Hi, Qemu has supported 3rd method for USB passthrough except two ways that you have pointed: hostbus+hostport -- match for a specific physical port in the host, any device which is plugged in there gets passed to the guest. The method can resolve your all problems. AFAICT, libvirt do not support this way at present. Any Plan? CC'ing libvirt developer mailist. Best regards, -Gonglei From: qemu-devel-bounces+arei.gonglei=huawei.com(a)nongnu.org [mailto:qemu-devel-bounces+arei.gonglei=huawei.com@nongnu.org] On Behalf Of Yuanjing (D) Sent: Monday, June 09, 2014 11:37 AM To: qemu-devel(a)nongnu.org Cc: Liuji (Jeremy) Subject: [Qemu-devel] Question about how to distinguish a usb device in usb pass-through feature Hi, I want to provide feature that pass-through host's usb device to guest os in Openstack. I have question about how to distinguish a usb device. I have read some introductions and made some tests. I think qemu supports two ways to identify a host usb device: (1)host:bus.addr (2)host:vendor_id:product_id I think they both have restriction on some use cases: (1) 'host:bus.addr' is not appropriate if more than one usb devices with the same 'host:bus.addr' in a host. (2) The addr(device number) may change every time unplug/plug usb device of a host. One this happen the guest may reboot failed with wrong host:bus.addr. I noticed that Vmware supports technology 'autoconnection', they pass-through usb device by using usb path of the device on the host(physical topology and port location). Once unplug usb device and plug usb device again with the same usb path, the new device appears and is connected to the guest. I am not a qemu/system programmer and I apologize if I am missing something very obvious. Hope somebody can help me to find the best way to distinguish a usb device? Thanks in advance

1 0