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[libvirt] [PATCH] apparmor: fix vfio usage without initial hostdev
by Christian Ehrhardt 12 Jun '18

12 Jun '18

The base vfio has not much functionality but to provide a custom container by opening this path. See https://www.kernel.org/doc/Documentation/vfio.txt for more. Systems with static hostdevs will get /dev/vfio/vfio by virt-aa-hotplug right from the beginning. But if the guest initially had no hostdev at all it will run into the following deny before the security module labelling callbacks will make the actual vfio device (like /dev/vfio/93) known. Access by qemu is "wr" even thou in theory it could maybe be "r": [ 2652.756712] audit: type=1400 audit(1491303691.719:25): apparmor="DENIED" operation="open" profile="libvirt-17a61b87-5132-497c-b928-421ac2ee0c8a" name="/dev/vfio/vfio" pid=8486 comm="qemu-system-x86" requested_mask="wr" denied_mask="wr" fsuid=64055 ouid=0 Bug-Ubuntu: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1678322 Bug-Ubuntu: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1775777 Signed-off-by: Christian Ehrhardt <christian.ehrhardt(a)canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader(a)canonical.com> --- examples/apparmor/libvirt-qemu | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/examples/apparmor/libvirt-qemu b/examples/apparmor/libvirt-qemu index 2c47652250..874aca2092 100644 --- a/examples/apparmor/libvirt-qemu +++ b/examples/apparmor/libvirt-qemu @@ -193,6 +193,9 @@ deny /dev/shm/lttng-ust-wait-* r, deny /run/shm/lttng-ust-wait-* r, + # for vfio hotplug on systems without static vfio (LP: #1775777) + /dev/vfio/vfio rw, + # required for sasl GSSAPI plugin /etc/gss/mech.d/ r, /etc/gss/mech.d/* r, -- 2.17.1

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[libvirt] [PATCH] qemu: Check for existing hostdev address for cold attach device
by John Ferlan 12 Jun '18

12 Jun '18

https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1559867 Add a check if the incoming <hostdev ...> with specified <address> already exists and if so fail the attach. Signed-off-by: John Ferlan <jferlan(a)redhat.com> --- src/qemu/qemu_driver.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) diff --git a/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c b/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c index 38ea865ce3..7b4cdbcdcf 100644 --- a/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c +++ b/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c @@ -8014,6 +8014,12 @@ qemuDomainAttachDeviceConfig(virDomainDefPtr vmdef, _("device is already in the domain configuration")); return -1; } + if (dev->data.hostdev->info->type != VIR_DOMAIN_DEVICE_ADDRESS_TYPE_NONE && + virDomainDefHasDeviceAddress(vmdef, dev->data.hostdev->info)) { + virReportError(VIR_ERR_CONFIG_UNSUPPORTED, "%s", + _("a device with the same address already exists ")); + return -1; + } if (virDomainHostdevInsert(vmdef, hostdev)) return -1; dev->data.hostdev = NULL; -- 2.14.4

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[libvirt] [PATCH v2 0/5] Require GnuTLS
by Michal Privoznik 12 Jun '18

12 Jun '18

v2 of: diff to v1: - Reworded commit message of 1/3 - Broken 2/3 into three separate patches: 1) removing WITH_GNUTLS conditional from src/ 2) removing libvirt_gnutls.syms 3) removing WITH_GNUTLS conditional from tests/ Michal Privoznik (5): configure: Require GnuTLS src: Always build virnettlscontext into libvirt-net-rpc.la src: Dissolve libvirt_gnutls.syms in libvirt_remote.syms tests: Always build TLS related tests src: Drop most of #ifdef WITH_GNUTLS configure.ac | 2 -- m4/virt-gnutls.m4 | 4 --- src/Makefile.am | 6 ---- src/libvirt_gnutls.syms | 48 ------------------------------- src/libvirt_remote.syms | 25 ++++++++++++++++ src/locking/lock_daemon.c | 4 --- src/logging/log_daemon.c | 4 --- src/lxc/lxc_controller.c | 2 -- src/qemu/qemu_migration_cookie.c | 12 +++----- src/remote/remote_daemon.c | 23 --------------- src/remote/remote_daemon_dispatch.c | 2 -- src/rpc/Makefile.inc.am | 14 ++------- src/rpc/virnetdaemon.h | 4 +-- src/rpc/virnetserver.c | 6 ---- src/rpc/virnetserver.h | 6 +--- src/rpc/virnetserverclient.c | 57 +++---------------------------------- src/rpc/virnetserverclient.h | 8 ------ src/rpc/virnetserverservice.c | 24 ---------------- src/rpc/virnetserverservice.h | 10 ------- src/util/vircrypto.c | 43 ++-------------------------- tests/Makefile.am | 12 ++------ tests/qemuxml2argvtest.c | 15 ---------- tests/vircryptotest.c | 24 +++++----------- tests/virfilecachetest.c | 18 +++--------- tests/virnetdaemontest.c | 8 ------ tests/virnetserverclienttest.c | 2 -- tests/virrandommock.c | 8 ++---- 27 files changed, 56 insertions(+), 335 deletions(-) delete mode 100644 src/libvirt_gnutls.syms -- 2.16.4

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[libvirt] [PATCH v9 00/11] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (AMD)
by Brijesh Singh 12 Jun '18

12 Jun '18

This patch series provides support for launching an encrypted guest using AMD's new Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) feature. SEV is an extension to the AMD-V architecture which supports running multiple VMs under the control of a hypervisor. When enabled, SEV feature allows the memory contents of a virtual machine (VM) to be transparently encrypted with a key unique to the guest VM. At very high level the flow looks this: 1. mgmt tool calls virConnectGetDomainCapabilities. This returns an XML document that includes the following <feature> ... <sev supported='yes'> <cbitpos> </cbitpos> <reduced-phys-bits> </reduced-phys-bits> </sev> </feature> If <sev> is provided then we indicate that hypervisor is capable of launching SEV guest. mgmt tool can call virNodeGetSEVCapabilities() to get the additional informations like PDH and certificate chain etc. 2. (optional) mgmt tool can provide the PDH and Cert-chain to guest owner in case if guest owner wish to establish a secure connection with SEV firmware to negotiate a key used for validating the measurement. 3. mgmt tool requests to start a guest calling virCreateXML(), passing \ VIR_DOMAIN_START_PAUSED. The xml would include <launch-security type='sev'> <cbitpos>47</cbitpos> <reduced-phys-bits>1</reduced-phys-bits> <policy>0x1</policy> (optional) <dh-cert> </dh-cert> /* Guest owners Diffie-Hellman key */ <session> </session> /* Guest owners Session blob */ </launch-security> 4. Libvirt generate the QEMU cli arg to enable the SEV feature, a typical args looks like this: # $QEMU .. -machine memory-encryption=sev0 \ -object sev-guest,id=sev0,dh-cert-file=<file>.... 5. Libvirt generates lifecycle VIR_DOMAIN_EVENT_SUSPENDED_PAUSED event 6. mgmt tool gets the VIR_DOMAIN_EVENT_SUSPENDED_PAUSED and calls \ virDomainGetLaunchSecretInfo() to retrieve the measurement of encrypted memory. 7. (optional) mgmt tool can provide the measurement value to guest owner, which can validate the measurement and gives GO/NO-GO answer. If mgmt tool gets GO then it resumes the guest otherwise it calls destroy() to kill the guest. 8. mgmt tool resumes the guest TODO: * SEV guest require to use DMA apis for the virtio devices. In order to use the DMA apis the virtio devices must have this tag <driver iommu=on ats=on> It is a bit unclear to me where these changes need to go. Do we need to modify the libvirt to automatically add these when SEV is enabled or we ask mgmt tool to make sure that it creates XML with right tag to enable the DMA APIs for virtio devices. I am looking for some suggestions. Using these patches we have succesfully booted and tested a guest both with and without SEV enabled. SEV Firmware API spec is available at: https://support.amd.com/TechDocs/55766_SEV-KM%20API_Specification.pdf Changes sicne v8: * rename qemuGetSEVInfo -> qemuGetSEVInfoToParams * use virQEMUCapsCacheLookupByArch to get qemuCaps Change since v7: * rename virNodeSEVCapability() -> virNodeSEVInfo() * rebase the series Changes since v6: * add API to get SEV PDH and Certificate chain data * drop virsh command changes. We can revisit this later when we have more visibility on setter. Change since v5: * drop the seperate test patch and merge the code with other patches. * rename the xml from sev -> launch-security-sev * make policy field mandatory * address multiple feedback from previous reviews. Changes since v4: * add /dev/sev in shared device list Changes since v3: * rename QEMU_CAPS_SEV -> QEMU_CAPS_SEV_GUEST * update caps_2.12.0.x86_64.replies to include query-sev-capabilities data Changes since v2: * make cbitpos, policy and reduced-phys-bits as unsigned int * update virDomainGetLaunchSecurityInfo to accept virTypedParameterPtr *params instead of virTypedParameterPtr params. Changes since v1: * rename <sev> -> <launch-security> for domain * add more information about policy and other fields in domaincaps.html * split the domain_conf support in two patches * add virDomainGetLaunchInfo() to retrieve the SEV measurement * extend virsh command to show the domain's launch security information * add test cases to validate newly added <launch-security> element * fix issues reported with 'make check' and 'make syntax-check' The complete git tree is available at: https://github.com/codomania/libvirt/tree/v9 Brijesh Singh (11): qemu: provide support to query the SEV capability conf: expose SEV feature in domain capabilities libvirt: Introduce virNodeGetSEVInfo public API remote: implement the remote protocol for virNodeGetSEVInfo() qemu: Implement the driver backend for virNodeGetSEVInfo() conf: introduce launch-security element in domain qemu/cgroup: add /dev/sev in shared devices list qemu: add support to launch SEV guest libvirt: Introduce virDomainGetLaunchSecurityInfo public API remote: implement the remote protocol for launch security qemu: Implement the driver backend for virDomainGetLaunchSecurityInfo docs/drvqemu.html.in | 3 +- docs/formatdomain.html.in | 115 ++++++++++++++++ docs/formatdomaincaps.html.in | 30 ++++ docs/schemas/domaincaps.rng | 14 ++ docs/schemas/domaincommon.rng | 37 +++++ include/libvirt/libvirt-domain.h | 17 +++ include/libvirt/libvirt-host.h | 42 ++++++ src/conf/domain_capabilities.c | 30 ++++ src/conf/domain_capabilities.h | 13 ++ src/conf/domain_conf.c | 133 ++++++++++++++++++ src/conf/domain_conf.h | 27 ++++ src/driver-hypervisor.h | 14 ++ src/libvirt-domain.c | 48 +++++++ src/libvirt-host.c | 49 +++++++ src/libvirt_private.syms | 1 + src/libvirt_public.syms | 2 + src/qemu/qemu.conf | 2 +- src/qemu/qemu_capabilities.c | 90 +++++++++++- src/qemu/qemu_capabilities.h | 6 + src/qemu/qemu_capspriv.h | 4 + src/qemu/qemu_cgroup.c | 2 +- src/qemu/qemu_command.c | 41 ++++++ src/qemu/qemu_driver.c | 151 +++++++++++++++++++++ src/qemu/qemu_monitor.c | 18 +++ src/qemu/qemu_monitor.h | 6 + src/qemu/qemu_monitor_json.c | 121 +++++++++++++++++ src/qemu/qemu_monitor_json.h | 5 + src/qemu/qemu_process.c | 62 +++++++++ src/qemu/test_libvirtd_qemu.aug.in | 1 + src/remote/remote_daemon_dispatch.c | 91 +++++++++++++ src/remote/remote_driver.c | 80 +++++++++++ src/remote/remote_protocol.x | 39 +++++- src/remote_protocol-structs | 23 ++++ tests/genericxml2xmlindata/launch-security-sev.xml | 24 ++++ tests/genericxml2xmltest.c | 2 + .../caps_2.12.0.x86_64.replies | 10 ++ tests/qemucapabilitiesdata/caps_2.12.0.x86_64.xml | 3 +- tests/qemuxml2argvdata/launch-security-sev.args | 29 ++++ tests/qemuxml2argvdata/launch-security-sev.xml | 37 +++++ tests/qemuxml2argvtest.c | 4 + 40 files changed, 1420 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) create mode 100644 tests/genericxml2xmlindata/launch-security-sev.xml create mode 100644 tests/qemuxml2argvdata/launch-security-sev.args create mode 100644 tests/qemuxml2argvdata/launch-security-sev.xml -- 2.7.4

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[libvirt] KVM Forum 2018: Call For Participation
by Paolo Bonzini 12 Jun '18

12 Jun '18

================================================================ KVM Forum 2018: Call For Participation October 24-26, 2018 - Edinburgh International Conference Centre - Edinburgh, UK (All submissions must be received before midnight June 14, 2018) ================================================================= KVM Forum is an annual event that presents a rare opportunity for developers and users to meet, discuss the state of Linux virtualization technology, and plan for the challenges ahead. We invite you to lead part of the discussion by submitting a speaking proposal for KVM Forum 2018. At this highly technical conference, developers driving innovation in the KVM virtualization stack (Linux, KVM, QEMU, libvirt) can meet users who depend on KVM as part of their offerings, or to power their data centers and clouds. KVM Forum will include sessions on the state of the KVM virtualization stack, planning for the future, and many opportunities for attendees to collaborate. After more than ten years of development in the Linux kernel, KVM continues to be a critical part of the FOSS cloud infrastructure. This year, KVM Forum is joining Open Source Summit in Edinburgh, UK. Selected talks from KVM Forum will be presented on Wednesday October 24 to the full audience of the Open Source Summit. Also, attendees of KVM Forum will have access to all of the talks from Open Source Summit on Wednesday. https://events.linuxfoundation.org/events/kvm-forum-2018/program/cfp/ Suggested topics: * Scaling, latency optimizations, performance tuning, real-time guests * Hardening and security * New features * Testing KVM and the Linux kernel: * Nested virtualization * Resource management (CPU, I/O, memory) and scheduling * VFIO: IOMMU, SR-IOV, virtual GPU, etc. * Networking: Open vSwitch, XDP, etc. * virtio and vhost * Architecture ports and new processor features QEMU: * Management interfaces: QOM and QMP * New devices, new boards, new architectures * Graphics, desktop virtualization and virtual GPU * New storage features * High availability, live migration and fault tolerance * Emulation and TCG * Firmware: ACPI, UEFI, coreboot, U-Boot, etc. Management and infrastructure * Managing KVM: Libvirt, OpenStack, oVirt, etc. * Storage: Ceph, Gluster, SPDK, etc.r * Network Function Virtualization: DPDK, OPNFV, OVN, etc. * Provisioning =============== SUBMITTING YOUR PROPOSAL =============== Abstracts due: June 14, 2018 Please submit a short abstract (~150 words) describing your presentation proposal. Slots vary in length up to 45 minutes. Also include the proposal type -- one of: - technical talk - end-user talk Submit your proposal here:http://events.linuxfoundation.org/cfp Please only use the categories "presentation" and "panel discussion" You will receive a notification whether or not your presentation proposal was accepted by August 10, 2018. Speakers will receive a complimentary pass for the event. In the instance that case your submission has multiple presenters, only the primary speaker for a proposal will receive a complimentary event pass. For panel discussions, all panelists will receive a complimentary event pass. TECHNICAL TALKS A good technical talk should not just report on what has happened over the last year; it should present a concrete problem and how it impacts the user and/or developer community. Whenever applicable, focus on work that needs to be done, difficulties that haven't yet been solved, and on decisions that other developers should be aware of. Summarizing recent developments is okay but it should not be more than a small portion of the overall talk. END-USER TALKS One of the big challenges as developers is to know what, where and how people actually use our software. We will reserve a few slots for end users talking about their deployment challenges and achievements. If you are using KVM in production you are encouraged submit a speaking proposal. Simply mark it as an end-user talk. As an end user, this is a unique opportunity to get your input to developers. HANDS-ON / BOF SESSIONS We will reserve some time for people to get together and discuss strategic decisions as well as other topics that are best solved within smaller groups. These sessions will be announced during the event. If you are interested in organizing such a session, please add it to the list at http://www.linux-kvm.org/page/KVM_Forum_2018_BOF Let people you think who might be interested know about your BOF, and encourage them to add their names to the wiki page as well. Please try to add your ideas to the list before KVM Forum starts. PANEL DISCUSSIONS If you are proposing a panel discussion, please make sure that you list all of your potential panelists in your the abstract. We will request full biographies if a panel is acceped. =============== HOTEL / TRAVEL =============== This year's event will take place at the Edinburgh International Conference Centre. For information about discounted hotel room rate for conference attendees at the nearby Sheraton Grand Hotel & Spa, Edinburgh, please visit https://events.linuxfoundation.org/events/kvm-forum-2018/attend/venue-trave… =============== IMPORTANT DATES =============== Submission deadline: June 14, 2018 Notification: August 10, 2018 Schedule announced: August 16, 2018 Event dates: October 24-26, 2018 Thank you for your interest in KVM. We're looking forward to your submissions and seeing you at the KVM Forum 2018 in October! -your KVM Forum 2018 Program Committee Please contact us with any questions or comments at kvm-forum-2018-pc(a)redhat.com

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[libvirt] [PATCH] qemu: add qemu_monitor_priv.h to sources list
by Daniel P. Berrangé 12 Jun '18

12 Jun '18

Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange(a)redhat.com> --- Pushed as a build fix src/qemu/Makefile.inc.am | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/src/qemu/Makefile.inc.am b/src/qemu/Makefile.inc.am index 46797af4be..2afa67f195 100644 --- a/src/qemu/Makefile.inc.am +++ b/src/qemu/Makefile.inc.am @@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ QEMU_DRIVER_SOURCES = \ qemu/qemu_migration_paramspriv.h \ qemu/qemu_monitor.c \ qemu/qemu_monitor.h \ + qemu/qemu_monitor_priv.h \ qemu/qemu_monitor_text.c \ qemu/qemu_monitor_text.h \ qemu/qemu_monitor_json.c \ -- 2.17.0

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[libvirt] [PATCH] conf: remove duplicated typedefs for virDomainSevDef
by Daniel P. Berrangé 12 Jun '18

12 Jun '18

The typedefs were present twice in the header file which causes failures with some compilers, eg FreeBSD 10 CLang: ../../src/conf/domain_conf.h:2330:33: error: redefinition of typedef 'virDomainSevDef' is a C11 feature +[-Werror,-Wtypedef-redefinition] typedef struct _virDomainSevDef virDomainSevDef; ^ ../../src/conf/domain_conf.h:145:33: note: previous definition is here typedef struct _virDomainSevDef virDomainSevDef; ^ Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange(a)redhat.com> --- Pushed as a build fix src/conf/domain_conf.h | 3 --- 1 file changed, 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/conf/domain_conf.h b/src/conf/domain_conf.h index fe7a6bb21b..ea8ddb2b39 100644 --- a/src/conf/domain_conf.h +++ b/src/conf/domain_conf.h @@ -142,9 +142,6 @@ typedef virDomainPanicDef *virDomainPanicDefPtr; typedef struct _virDomainMemoryDef virDomainMemoryDef; typedef virDomainMemoryDef *virDomainMemoryDefPtr; -typedef struct _virDomainSevDef virDomainSevDef; -typedef virDomainSevDef *virDomainSevDefPtr; - /* forward declarations virDomainChrSourceDef, required by * virDomainNetDef */ -- 2.17.0

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[libvirt] [PATCH] AppArmor: allow virt-aa-helper read access to Nova's qcow backing files.
by intrigeri+libvirt＠boum.org 12 Jun '18

12 Jun '18

From: intrigeri <intrigeri+libvirt(a)boum.org> As reported on https://bugs.debian.org/892431, without this rule, when launching a QEMU KVM instance, an error occurs immediately upon launching the QEMU process such as: Could not open backing file: Could not open '/var/lib/nova/instances/_base/affe96668a4c64ef380ff1c71b4caec17039080e': Permission denied The other instance disk images are already covered by the existing rule: /**/disk{,.*} r --- examples/apparmor/usr.lib.libvirt.virt-aa-helper | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/examples/apparmor/usr.lib.libvirt.virt-aa-helper b/examples/apparmor/usr.lib.libvirt.virt-aa-helper index 6869685c05..e32402a904 100644 --- a/examples/apparmor/usr.lib.libvirt.virt-aa-helper +++ b/examples/apparmor/usr.lib.libvirt.virt-aa-helper @@ -50,6 +50,7 @@ profile virt-aa-helper /usr/{lib,lib64}/libvirt/virt-aa-helper { @{HOME}/** r, /var/lib/libvirt/images/ r, /var/lib/libvirt/images/** r, + /var/lib/nova/instances/_base/* r /{media,mnt,opt,srv}/** r, # For virt-sandbox /{,var/}run/libvirt/**/[sv]d[a-z] r, -- 2.17.1

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[libvirt] [python PATCH 0/4] Random fixes
by Pavel Hrdina 12 Jun '18

12 Jun '18

Pavel Hrdina (4): libvirt-utils: remove unused py_str function typewrappers: Fix libvirt_charPtrUnwrap to set an exception if it fails libvirt-override: Reset exception if the error is ignored libvirt_charPtrUnwrap: remove unnecessary check of returned string libvirt-override.c | 16 +++++++--------- libvirt-utils.c | 24 +++--------------------- libvirt-utils.h | 1 - typewrappers.c | 5 ++++- 4 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-) -- 2.17.1

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[libvirt] [dbus PATCH] util: Introduce virtDBusUtil(En|De)codeStr helpers
by Pavel Hrdina 12 Jun '18

12 Jun '18

D-Bus object path element can contain only [a-zA-Z0-9_] characters so we need to encode existing unique IDs. In case of UUID it's simple, we just change '-' into '_' but in case of storage volumes we need to use 'key' which is arbitrary string. This helpers encode the string using this algorithm: [a-zA-Z0-9] > [a-zA-Z0-9] anything else > _XX where XX is hex representation Signed-off-by: Pavel Hrdina <phrdina(a)redhat.com> --- .gitignore | 4 ++- src/util.c | 64 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ src/util.h | 6 +++++ tests/Makefile.am | 20 +++++++++++++++ tests/test_util.c | 47 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 5 files changed, 140 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 tests/test_util.c diff --git a/.gitignore b/.gitignore index 0bf09cf..c5e16a9 100644 --- a/.gitignore +++ b/.gitignore @@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ *Makefile *Makefile.in *~ +.deps __pycache__ vgcore.* @@ -31,6 +32,7 @@ vgcore.* /docs/*.1 -/src/.deps/ /src/libvirt-dbus /src/org.libvirt.service + +/tests/test_util diff --git a/src/util.c b/src/util.c index 53dbc57..1268736 100644 --- a/src/util.c +++ b/src/util.c @@ -181,6 +181,70 @@ virtDBusUtilDecodeUUID(const gchar *uuid) return g_strdelimit(ret, "_", '-'); } +static guchar +virtDBusUtilNumToHexchar(const guchar c) +{ + if (c < 10) + return '0' + c; + return 'a' + (c & 0x0f) - 10; +} + +static guchar +virtDBusUtilHexcharToNum(const guchar c) +{ + if (c >= 'a') + return 10 + c - 'a'; + return c - '0'; +} + +gchar * +virtDBusUtilEncodeStr(const gchar *str) +{ + gint len = strlen(str); + gint j = 0; + gchar *ret = g_new(gchar, len * 3 + 1); + + for (gint i = 0; i < len; i++) { + guchar c = str[i]; + if ((c >= 'A' && c <= 'Z') || + (c >= 'a' && c <= 'z') || + (c >= '0' && c <= '9')) { + ret[j++] = c; + } else { + ret[j] = '_'; + ret[j + 1] = virtDBusUtilNumToHexchar(c >> 4); + ret[j + 2] = virtDBusUtilNumToHexchar(c); + j += 3; + } + } + ret[j] = 0; + + return ret; +} + +gchar * +virtDBusUtilDecodeStr(const gchar *str) +{ + gint len = strlen(str); + gint j = 0; + gchar *ret = g_new(gchar, len + 1); + + for (gint i = 0; i < len; i++) { + gchar c = str[i]; + if (c != '_' || (i + 2) >= len) { + ret[j++] = c; + } else { + guchar a = virtDBusUtilHexcharToNum(str[i + 1]); + guchar b = virtDBusUtilHexcharToNum(str[i + 2]); + ret[j++] = (a << 4) + b; + i += 2; + } + } + ret[j] = 0; + + return ret; +} + gchar * virtDBusUtilBusPathForVirDomain(virDomainPtr domain, const gchar *domainPath) diff --git a/src/util.h b/src/util.h index 4d87549..56e0409 100644 --- a/src/util.h +++ b/src/util.h @@ -42,6 +42,12 @@ virtDBusUtilGVariantToTypedParams(GVariantIter *iter, void virtDBusUtilSetLastVirtError(GError **error); +gchar * +virtDBusUtilEncodeStr(const gchar *str); + +gchar * +virtDBusUtilDecodeStr(const gchar *str); + gchar * virtDBusUtilBusPathForVirDomain(virDomainPtr domain, const gchar *domainPath); diff --git a/tests/Makefile.am b/tests/Makefile.am index 5e224f8..4cae303 100644 --- a/tests/Makefile.am +++ b/tests/Makefile.am @@ -3,11 +3,31 @@ test_helpers = \ conftest.py test_programs = \ + $(check_PROGRAMS) \ test_connect.py \ test_domain.py \ test_network.py \ test_storage.py +check_PROGRAMS = \ + test_util + +test_util_SOURCES = \ + test_util.c $(top_srcdir)/src/util.c +test_util_CFLAGS = \ + -I$(top_srcdir)/src \ + $(GIO2_CFLAGS) \ + $(GLIB2_CFLAGS) \ + $(LIBVIRT_CFLAGS) +test_util_LDFLAGS = \ + $(GIO2_LDFLAGS) \ + $(GLIB2_LDFLAGS) \ + $(LIBVIRT_LDFLAGS) +test_util_LDADD = \ + $(GIO2_LIBS) \ + $(GLIB2_LIBS) \ + $(LIBVIRT_LIBS) + EXTRA_DIST = \ $(test_helpers) \ $(test_programs) \ diff --git a/tests/test_util.c b/tests/test_util.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9611192 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/test_util.c @@ -0,0 +1,47 @@ +#include "util.h" + +static gint +virtTestEncodeStr(const gchar *input, + const gchar *expected) +{ + g_autofree gchar *encoded = virtDBusUtilEncodeStr(input); + + if (!g_str_equal(encoded, expected)) { + g_printerr("encode failed: expected '%s' actual '%s'\n", + expected, encoded); + return -1; + } + + return 0; +} + +static gint +virtTestDecodeStr(const gchar *input, + const gchar *expected) +{ + g_autofree gchar *decoded = virtDBusUtilDecodeStr(input); + + if (!g_str_equal(decoded, expected)) { + g_printerr("decode failed: expected '%s' actual '%s'\n", + expected, decoded); + return -1; + } + + return 0; +} + +gint +main(void) +{ +#define TEST_ENCODE_DECODE(input, output) \ + if (virtTestEncodeStr(input, output) < 0) \ + return EXIT_FAILURE; \ + if (virtTestDecodeStr(output, input) < 0) \ + return EXIT_FAILURE; + + TEST_ENCODE_DECODE("foobar", "foobar"); + TEST_ENCODE_DECODE("_", "_5f"); + TEST_ENCODE_DECODE("/path/to/some/file.img", "_2fpath_2fto_2fsome_2ffile_2eimg"); + + return EXIT_SUCCESS; +} -- 2.17.1

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