- Devel - libvirt List Archives

[libvirt] PATCH: Mark <seclabel> as dynamic generated, or statically pre-defined
by Daniel P. Berrange 03 Mar '09

03 Mar '09

This patch implements the behaviour I was refering to earlier, whereby the domain XML explicitly says whether the security label is a statically pre-defined one, or dynamically generated on VM boot by libvirtd So when creating a new guest, apps like virt-install have 2 options: - Leave out the <seclabel> tag completely -> If no security driver is active, just works as normal unconfined VM -> If a security driver is active, a dynamic seclabel is generated <seclabel type='dynamic' model='selinux'> <label>system_u:system_r:qemu_t:s0:c424,c719</label> <imagelabel>system_u:object_r:virt_image_t:s0:c424,c719</imagelabel> </seclabel> - Add an explicit <seclabel> tag with type='static' attribute -> Security driver uses the defined label & imagelabel <seclabel type='static' model='selinux'> <label>system_u:system_r:qemu_t:s0:c25,c100</label> <imagelabel>system_u:system_r:virt_image_t:s0:c25,c100</imagelabel> </seclabel> A static seclabel is visible in the XML, at all times, whether the VM is active or inactive. A dynamic seclabel is only visible when the VM is running, since it is auto-generated at VM boot. If you migrate the VM, or save/restore it, the dynamic seclabel will change on each boot. The seclabel isn't visible when not running, or if asking for the inactive XML dump This patch implements parsing of the 'type' attribute, and makes the seclabel generation key off this attribute. It also adds the 'imagelabel' XML element, since that was being used internally, but was not including in the XML output, or parsing routines, making it impossible to specify a pre-defined image label or see the dyanmic one domain_conf.c | 65 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------- domain_conf.h | 9 +++++++ qemu_driver.c | 13 ++++++++-- security_selinux.c | 1 4 files changed, 73 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-) Daniel Index: src/domain_conf.c =================================================================== RCS file: /data/cvs/libvirt/src/domain_conf.c,v retrieving revision 1.70 diff -u -p -r1.70 domain_conf.c --- src/domain_conf.c 3 Mar 2009 09:44:42 -0000 1.70 +++ src/domain_conf.c 3 Mar 2009 15:36:02 -0000 @@ -168,6 +168,10 @@ VIR_ENUM_IMPL(virDomainState, VIR_DOMAIN "shutoff", "crashed") +VIR_ENUM_IMPL(virDomainSeclabel, VIR_DOMAIN_SECLABEL_LAST, + "dynamic", + "static") + #define virDomainReportError(conn, code, fmt...) \ virReportErrorHelper(conn, VIR_FROM_DOMAIN, code, __FILE__, \ __FUNCTION__, __LINE__, fmt) @@ -1847,24 +1851,46 @@ static int virDomainLifecycleParseXML(vi static int virSecurityLabelDefParseXML(virConnectPtr conn, const virDomainDefPtr def, - xmlXPathContextPtr ctxt) + xmlXPathContextPtr ctxt, + int flags) { char *p; if (virXPathNode(conn, "./seclabel", ctxt) == NULL) return 0; - p = virXPathStringLimit(conn, "string(./seclabel/label[1])", + p = virXPathStringLimit(conn, "string(./seclabel/@type)", VIR_SECURITY_LABEL_BUFLEN-1, ctxt); if (p == NULL) goto error; - def->seclabel.label = p; - - p = virXPathStringLimit(conn, "string(./seclabel/@model)", - VIR_SECURITY_MODEL_BUFLEN-1, ctxt); - if (p == NULL) + if ((def->seclabel.type = virDomainSeclabelTypeFromString(p)) < 0) goto error; - def->seclabel.model = p; + VIR_FREE(p); + + /* Only parse details, if using static labels, or + * if the 'live' VM XML is requested + */ + if (def->seclabel.type == VIR_DOMAIN_SECLABEL_STATIC || + !(flags & VIR_DOMAIN_XML_INACTIVE)) { + p = virXPathStringLimit(conn, "string(./seclabel/@model)", + VIR_SECURITY_MODEL_BUFLEN-1, ctxt); + if (p == NULL) + goto error; + def->seclabel.model = p; + + p = virXPathStringLimit(conn, "string(./seclabel/label[1])", + VIR_SECURITY_LABEL_BUFLEN-1, ctxt); + if (p == NULL) + goto error; + def->seclabel.label = p; + + p = virXPathStringLimit(conn, "string(./seclabel/imagelabel[1])", + VIR_SECURITY_LABEL_BUFLEN-1, ctxt); + if (p == NULL) + goto error; + def->seclabel.imagelabel = p; + + } return 0; @@ -2458,7 +2484,7 @@ static virDomainDefPtr virDomainDefParse VIR_FREE(nodes); /* analysis of security label */ - if (virSecurityLabelDefParseXML(conn, def, ctxt) == -1) + if (virSecurityLabelDefParseXML(conn, def, ctxt, flags) == -1) goto error; return def; @@ -3480,9 +3506,24 @@ char *virDomainDefFormat(virConnectPtr c virBufferAddLit(&buf, " </devices>\n"); if (def->seclabel.model) { - virBufferEscapeString(&buf, " <seclabel model='%s'>\n", def->seclabel.model); - virBufferEscapeString(&buf, " <label>%s</label>\n", def->seclabel.label); - virBufferAddLit(&buf, " </seclabel>\n"); + const char *sectype = virDomainSeclabelTypeToString(def->seclabel.type); + if (!sectype) + goto cleanup; + if (!def->seclabel.label || + (def->seclabel.type == VIR_DOMAIN_SECLABEL_DYNAMIC && + (flags & VIR_DOMAIN_XML_INACTIVE))) { + virBufferVSprintf(&buf, " <seclabel type='%s' model='%s'/>\n", + sectype, def->seclabel.model); + } else { + virBufferVSprintf(&buf, " <seclabel type='%s' model='%s'>\n", + sectype, def->seclabel.model); + virBufferEscapeString(&buf, " <label>%s</label>\n", + def->seclabel.label); + if (def->seclabel.imagelabel) + virBufferEscapeString(&buf, " <imagelabel>%s</imagelabel>\n", + def->seclabel.imagelabel); + virBufferAddLit(&buf, " </seclabel>\n"); + } } virBufferAddLit(&buf, "</domain>\n"); Index: src/domain_conf.h =================================================================== RCS file: /data/cvs/libvirt/src/domain_conf.h,v retrieving revision 1.39 diff -u -p -r1.39 domain_conf.h --- src/domain_conf.h 3 Mar 2009 09:44:42 -0000 1.39 +++ src/domain_conf.h 3 Mar 2009 15:36:02 -0000 @@ -410,6 +410,13 @@ struct _virDomainOSDef { char *bootloaderArgs; }; +enum virDomainSeclabelType { + VIR_DOMAIN_SECLABEL_DYNAMIC, + VIR_DOMAIN_SECLABEL_STATIC, + + VIR_DOMAIN_SECLABEL_LAST, +}; + /* Security configuration for domain */ typedef struct _virSecurityLabelDef virSecurityLabelDef; typedef virSecurityLabelDef *virSecurityLabelDefPtr; @@ -417,6 +424,7 @@ struct _virSecurityLabelDef { char *model; /* name of security model */ char *label; /* security label string */ char *imagelabel; /* security image label string */ + int type; }; #define VIR_DOMAIN_CPUMASK_LEN 1024 @@ -650,5 +658,6 @@ VIR_ENUM_DECL(virDomainInputBus) VIR_ENUM_DECL(virDomainGraphics) /* from libvirt.h */ VIR_ENUM_DECL(virDomainState) +VIR_ENUM_DECL(virDomainSeclabel) #endif /* __DOMAIN_CONF_H */ Index: src/qemu_driver.c =================================================================== RCS file: /data/cvs/libvirt/src/qemu_driver.c,v retrieving revision 1.213 diff -u -p -r1.213 qemu_driver.c --- src/qemu_driver.c 3 Mar 2009 15:18:24 -0000 1.213 +++ src/qemu_driver.c 3 Mar 2009 15:36:02 -0000 @@ -1314,9 +1314,9 @@ static int qemudStartVMDaemon(virConnect hookData.vm = vm; hookData.driver = driver; - /* If you are using a SecurityDriver and there was no security label in - database, then generate a security label for isolation */ - if (vm->def->seclabel.label == NULL && + /* If you are using a SecurityDriver with dynamic labelling, + then generate a security label for isolation */ + if (vm->def->seclabel.type == VIR_DOMAIN_SECLABEL_DYNAMIC && driver->securityDriver && driver->securityDriver->domainGenSecurityLabel && driver->securityDriver->domainGenSecurityLabel(conn, vm) < 0) @@ -1525,6 +1525,13 @@ static void qemudShutdownVMDaemon(virCon if (driver->securityDriver) driver->securityDriver->domainRestoreSecurityLabel(conn, vm); + /* Clear out dynamically assigned labels */ + if (vm->def->seclabel.type == VIR_DOMAIN_SECLABEL_DYNAMIC) { + VIR_FREE(vm->def->seclabel.model); + VIR_FREE(vm->def->seclabel.label); + VIR_FREE(vm->def->seclabel.imagelabel); + } + if (qemudRemoveDomainStatus(conn, driver, vm) < 0) { VIR_WARN(_("Failed to remove domain status for %s"), vm->def->name); Index: src/security_selinux.c =================================================================== RCS file: /data/cvs/libvirt/src/security_selinux.c,v retrieving revision 1.2 diff -u -p -r1.2 security_selinux.c --- src/security_selinux.c 3 Mar 2009 15:18:24 -0000 1.2 +++ src/security_selinux.c 3 Mar 2009 15:36:02 -0000 @@ -161,6 +161,7 @@ SELinuxGenSecurityLabel(virConnectPtr co char *scontext = NULL; int c1 = 0; int c2 = 0; + if ( ( vm->def->seclabel.label ) || ( vm->def->seclabel.model ) || ( vm->def->seclabel.imagelabel )) { -- |: Red Hat, Engineering, London -o- http://people.redhat.com/berrange/ :| |: http://libvirt.org -o- http://virt-manager.org -o- http://ovirt.org :| |: http://autobuild.org -o- http://search.cpan.org/~danberr/ :| |: GnuPG: 7D3B9505 -o- F3C9 553F A1DA 4AC2 5648 23C1 B3DF F742 7D3B 9505 :|

3 3

[libvirt] [PATCH] config: fix a typo
by Jim Meyering 03 Mar '09

03 Mar '09

>From 5cdfbefc15f81b3be7e2d60b3d173fdb2352a83c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jim Meyering <meyering(a)redhat.com> Date: Tue, 3 Mar 2009 15:58:49 +0100 Subject: [PATCH] config: fix a typo * src/qemu_conf.c (CHECK_TYPE): Fix typo: s/security_river/security_driver/ --- src/qemu_conf.c | 2 +- 1 files changed, 1 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/qemu_conf.c b/src/qemu_conf.c index 71fed5a..03f710f 100644 --- a/src/qemu_conf.c +++ b/src/qemu_conf.c @@ -152,7 +152,7 @@ int qemudLoadDriverConfig(struct qemud_driver *driver, } p = virConfGetValue (conf, "security_driver"); - CHECK_TYPE ("security_river", VIR_CONF_STRING); + CHECK_TYPE ("security_driver", VIR_CONF_STRING); if (p && p->str) { if (!(driver->securityDriverName = strdup(p->str))) { virReportOOMError(NULL); -- 1.6.2.rc1.285.gc5f54

2 1

[libvirt] Updated James Morris patch to apply to libvirt-0.6.0 version
by Daniel J Walsh 03 Mar '09

03 Mar '09

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Is this acceptable to upstream? Dan -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.9 (GNU/Linux) Comment: Using GnuPG with Fedora - http://enigmail.mozdev.org iEYEARECAAYFAkma48EACgkQrlYvE4MpobMSBwCfXJnrlgoM0CuwdxF8BzcoQVvr 5pIAoNcKSrh+YsxNMjk8RgM4E7feUc4R =iLJG -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- diff -up libvirt-0.6.0/include/libvirt/libvirt.h.in.svirt libvirt-0.6.0/include/libvirt/libvirt.h.in --- libvirt-0.6.0/include/libvirt/libvirt.h.in.svirt 2009-01-20 08:48:27.000000000 -0500 +++ libvirt-0.6.0/include/libvirt/libvirt.h.in 2009-02-17 10:07:06.215686000 -0500 @@ -111,6 +111,68 @@ typedef enum { } virDomainCreateFlags; /** + * VIR_SECURITY_LABEL_BUFLEN: + * + * Macro providing the maximum length of the virSecurityLabel label string. + * Note that this value is based on that used by Labeled NFS. + */ +#define VIR_SECURITY_LABEL_BUFLEN (4096 + 1) + +/** + * virSecurityLabel: + * + * a virSecurityLabel is a structure filled by virDomainGetSecurityLabel(), + * providing the security label and associated attributes for the specified + * domain. + * + */ +typedef struct _virSecurityLabel { + char label[VIR_SECURITY_LABEL_BUFLEN]; /* security label string */ + int enforcing; /* 1 if security policy is being enforced for domain */ +} virSecurityLabel; + +/** + * virSecurityLabelPtr: + * + * a virSecurityLabelPtr is a pointer to a virSecurityLabel. + */ +typedef virSecurityLabel *virSecurityLabelPtr; + +/** + * VIR_SECURITY_MODEL_BUFLEN: + * + * Macro providing the maximum length of the virSecurityModel model string. + */ +#define VIR_SECURITY_MODEL_BUFLEN (256 + 1) + +/** + * VIR_SECURITY_DOI_BUFLEN: + * + * Macro providing the maximum length of the virSecurityModel doi string. + */ +#define VIR_SECURITY_DOI_BUFLEN (256 + 1) + +/** + * virSecurityModel: + * + * a virSecurityModel is a structure filled by virNodeGetSecurityModel(), + * providing the per-hypervisor security model and DOI attributes for the + * specified domain. + * + */ +typedef struct _virSecurityModel { + char model[VIR_SECURITY_MODEL_BUFLEN]; /* security model string */ + char doi[VIR_SECURITY_DOI_BUFLEN]; /* domain of interpetation */ +} virSecurityModel; + +/** + * virSecurityModelPtr: + * + * a virSecurityModelPtr is a pointer to a virSecurityModel. + */ +typedef virSecurityModel *virSecurityModelPtr; + +/** * virNodeInfoPtr: * * a virNodeInfo is a structure filled by virNodeGetInfo() and providing @@ -417,6 +479,9 @@ char * virConnectGetCap unsigned long long virNodeGetFreeMemory (virConnectPtr conn); +int virNodeGetSecurityModel (virConnectPtr conn, + virSecurityModelPtr secmodel); + /* * Gather list of running domains */ @@ -506,6 +571,8 @@ int virDomainSetMaxM int virDomainSetMemory (virDomainPtr domain, unsigned long memory); int virDomainGetMaxVcpus (virDomainPtr domain); +int virDomainGetSecurityLabel (virDomainPtr domain, + virSecurityLabelPtr seclabel); /* * XML domain description diff -up libvirt-0.6.0/include/libvirt/libvirt.h.svirt libvirt-0.6.0/include/libvirt/libvirt.h --- libvirt-0.6.0/include/libvirt/libvirt.h.svirt 2009-01-31 04:20:10.000000000 -0500 +++ libvirt-0.6.0/include/libvirt/libvirt.h 2009-02-17 10:07:32.421570000 -0500 @@ -111,6 +111,68 @@ typedef enum { } virDomainCreateFlags; /** + * VIR_SECURITY_LABEL_BUFLEN: + * + * Macro providing the maximum length of the virSecurityLabel label string. + * Note that this value is based on that used by Labeled NFS. + */ +#define VIR_SECURITY_LABEL_BUFLEN (4096 + 1) + +/** + * virSecurityLabel: + * + * a virSecurityLabel is a structure filled by virDomainGetSecurityLabel(), + * providing the security label and associated attributes for the specified + * domain. + * + */ +typedef struct _virSecurityLabel { + char label[VIR_SECURITY_LABEL_BUFLEN]; /* security label string */ + int enforcing; /* 1 if security policy is being enforced for domain */ +} virSecurityLabel; + +/** + * virSecurityLabelPtr: + * + * a virSecurityLabelPtr is a pointer to a virSecurityLabel. + */ +typedef virSecurityLabel *virSecurityLabelPtr; + +/** + * VIR_SECURITY_MODEL_BUFLEN: + * + * Macro providing the maximum length of the virSecurityModel model string. + */ +#define VIR_SECURITY_MODEL_BUFLEN (256 + 1) + +/** + * VIR_SECURITY_DOI_BUFLEN: + * + * Macro providing the maximum length of the virSecurityModel doi string. + */ +#define VIR_SECURITY_DOI_BUFLEN (256 + 1) + +/** + * virSecurityModel: + * + * a virSecurityModel is a structure filled by virNodeGetSecurityModel(), + * providing the per-hypervisor security model and DOI attributes for the + * specified domain. + * + */ +typedef struct _virSecurityModel { + char model[VIR_SECURITY_MODEL_BUFLEN]; /* security model string */ + char doi[VIR_SECURITY_DOI_BUFLEN]; /* domain of interpetation */ +} virSecurityModel; + +/** + * virSecurityModelPtr: + * + * a virSecurityModelPtr is a pointer to a virSecurityModel. + */ +typedef virSecurityModel *virSecurityModelPtr; + +/** * virNodeInfoPtr: * * a virNodeInfo is a structure filled by virNodeGetInfo() and providing @@ -417,6 +479,9 @@ char * virConnectGetCap unsigned long long virNodeGetFreeMemory (virConnectPtr conn); +int virNodeGetSecurityModel (virConnectPtr conn, + virSecurityModelPtr secmodel); + /* * Gather list of running domains */ @@ -506,6 +571,8 @@ int virDomainSetMaxM int virDomainSetMemory (virDomainPtr domain, unsigned long memory); int virDomainGetMaxVcpus (virDomainPtr domain); +int virDomainGetSecurityLabel (virDomainPtr domain, + virSecurityLabelPtr seclabel); /* * XML domain description diff -up libvirt-0.6.0/include/libvirt/virterror.h.svirt libvirt-0.6.0/include/libvirt/virterror.h --- libvirt-0.6.0/include/libvirt/virterror.h.svirt 2008-11-25 08:42:33.000000000 -0500 +++ libvirt-0.6.0/include/libvirt/virterror.h 2009-02-17 10:07:06.223677000 -0500 @@ -61,6 +61,7 @@ typedef enum { VIR_FROM_UML, /* Error at the UML driver */ VIR_FROM_NODEDEV, /* Error from node device monitor */ VIR_FROM_XEN_INOTIFY, /* Error from xen inotify layer */ + VIR_FROM_SECURITY, /* Error from security framework */ } virErrorDomain; @@ -154,6 +155,7 @@ typedef enum { VIR_WAR_NO_NODE, /* failed to start node driver */ VIR_ERR_INVALID_NODE_DEVICE,/* invalid node device object */ VIR_ERR_NO_NODE_DEVICE,/* node device not found */ + VIR_ERR_NO_SECURITY_MODEL, /* security model not found */ } virErrorNumber; /** diff -up libvirt-0.6.0/po/POTFILES.in.svirt libvirt-0.6.0/po/POTFILES.in --- libvirt-0.6.0/po/POTFILES.in.svirt 2009-01-31 04:04:17.000000000 -0500 +++ libvirt-0.6.0/po/POTFILES.in 2009-02-17 10:07:06.226679000 -0500 @@ -22,6 +22,8 @@ src/proxy_internal.c src/qemu_conf.c src/qemu_driver.c src/remote_internal.c +src/security.c +src/security_selinux.c src/storage_backend.c src/storage_backend_disk.c src/storage_backend_fs.c diff -up libvirt-0.6.0/python/generator.py.svirt libvirt-0.6.0/python/generator.py --- libvirt-0.6.0/python/generator.py.svirt 2008-11-21 07:47:32.000000000 -0500 +++ libvirt-0.6.0/python/generator.py 2009-02-17 10:07:06.230676000 -0500 @@ -342,6 +342,8 @@ skip_function = ( 'virCopyLastError', # Python API is called virGetLastError instead 'virConnectOpenAuth', # Python C code is manually written 'virDefaultErrorFunc', # Python virErrorFuncHandler impl calls this from C + 'virDomainGetSecurityLabel', # Needs investigation... + 'virNodeGetSecurityModel', # Needs investigation... 'virConnectDomainEventRegister', # overridden in virConnect.py 'virConnectDomainEventDeregister', # overridden in virConnect.py ) diff -up libvirt-0.6.0/qemud/Makefile.am.svirt libvirt-0.6.0/qemud/Makefile.am --- libvirt-0.6.0/qemud/Makefile.am.svirt 2009-01-31 04:04:17.000000000 -0500 +++ libvirt-0.6.0/qemud/Makefile.am 2009-02-17 10:07:06.237678000 -0500 @@ -130,6 +130,7 @@ libvirtd_LDADD += ../src/libvirt_driver_ endif endif +libvirtd_LDADD += ../src/libvirt_driver_security.la libvirtd_LDADD += ../src/libvirt.la if HAVE_POLKIT diff -up libvirt-0.6.0/qemud/remote.c.svirt libvirt-0.6.0/qemud/remote.c --- libvirt-0.6.0/qemud/remote.c.svirt 2009-01-31 04:04:17.000000000 -0500 +++ libvirt-0.6.0/qemud/remote.c 2009-02-17 10:07:06.246680000 -0500 @@ -1340,6 +1340,76 @@ remoteDispatchDomainGetMaxVcpus (struct } static int +remoteDispatchDomainGetSecurityLabel(struct qemud_server *server ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED, + struct qemud_client *client ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED, + virConnectPtr conn, + remote_error *rerr, + remote_domain_get_security_label_args *args, + remote_domain_get_security_label_ret *ret) +{ + virDomainPtr dom; + virSecurityLabel seclabel; + + dom = get_nonnull_domain(conn, args->dom); + if (dom == NULL) { + remoteDispatchConnError(rerr, conn); + return -1; + } + + memset(&seclabel, 0, sizeof seclabel); + if (virDomainGetSecurityLabel(dom, &seclabel) == -1) { + virDomainFree(dom); + remoteDispatchFormatError(rerr, "%s", _("unable to get security label")); + return -1; + } + + ret->label.label_len = strlen(seclabel.label) + 1; + if (VIR_ALLOC_N(ret->label.label_val, ret->label.label_len) < 0) { + virDomainFree(dom); + remoteDispatchOOMError(rerr); + return -1; + } + strcpy(ret->label.label_val, seclabel.label); + ret->enforcing = seclabel.enforcing; + virDomainFree(dom); + + return 0; +} + +static int +remoteDispatchNodeGetSecurityModel(struct qemud_server *server ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED, + struct qemud_client *client ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED, + virConnectPtr conn, + remote_error *rerr, + void *args ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED, + remote_node_get_security_model_ret *ret) +{ + virSecurityModel secmodel; + + memset(&secmodel, 0, sizeof secmodel); + if (virNodeGetSecurityModel(conn, &secmodel) == -1) { + remoteDispatchFormatError(rerr, "%s", _("unable to get security model")); + return -1; + } + + ret->model.model_len = strlen(secmodel.model) + 1; + if (VIR_ALLOC_N(ret->model.model_val, ret->model.model_len) < 0) { + remoteDispatchOOMError(rerr); + return -1; + } + strcpy(ret->model.model_val, secmodel.model); + + ret->doi.doi_len = strlen(secmodel.doi) + 1; + if (VIR_ALLOC_N(ret->doi.doi_val, ret->doi.doi_len) < 0) { + remoteDispatchOOMError(rerr); + return -1; + } + strcpy(ret->doi.doi_val, secmodel.doi); + + return 0; +} + +static int remoteDispatchDomainGetOsType (struct qemud_server *server ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED, struct qemud_client *client ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED, virConnectPtr conn, diff -up libvirt-0.6.0/qemud/remote_dispatch_args.h.svirt libvirt-0.6.0/qemud/remote_dispatch_args.h --- libvirt-0.6.0/qemud/remote_dispatch_args.h.svirt 2008-12-19 09:00:02.000000000 -0500 +++ libvirt-0.6.0/qemud/remote_dispatch_args.h 2009-02-17 10:07:06.250678000 -0500 @@ -99,3 +99,4 @@ remote_node_device_get_parent_args val_remote_node_device_get_parent_args; remote_node_device_num_of_caps_args val_remote_node_device_num_of_caps_args; remote_node_device_list_caps_args val_remote_node_device_list_caps_args; + remote_domain_get_security_label_args val_remote_domain_get_security_label_args; diff -up libvirt-0.6.0/qemud/remote_dispatch_prototypes.h.svirt libvirt-0.6.0/qemud/remote_dispatch_prototypes.h --- libvirt-0.6.0/qemud/remote_dispatch_prototypes.h.svirt 2008-12-19 09:00:02.000000000 -0500 +++ libvirt-0.6.0/qemud/remote_dispatch_prototypes.h 2009-02-17 10:07:06.255676000 -0500 @@ -184,6 +184,13 @@ static int remoteDispatchDomainGetSchedu remote_error *err, remote_domain_get_scheduler_type_args *args, remote_domain_get_scheduler_type_ret *ret); +static int remoteDispatchDomainGetSecurityLabel( + struct qemud_server *server, + struct qemud_client *client, + virConnectPtr conn, + remote_error *err, + remote_domain_get_security_label_args *args, + remote_domain_get_security_label_ret *ret); static int remoteDispatchDomainGetVcpus( struct qemud_server *server, struct qemud_client *client, @@ -576,6 +583,13 @@ static int remoteDispatchNodeGetInfo( remote_error *err, void *args, remote_node_get_info_ret *ret); +static int remoteDispatchNodeGetSecurityModel( + struct qemud_server *server, + struct qemud_client *client, + virConnectPtr conn, + remote_error *err, + void *args, + remote_node_get_security_model_ret *ret); static int remoteDispatchNodeListDevices( struct qemud_server *server, struct qemud_client *client, diff -up libvirt-0.6.0/qemud/remote_dispatch_ret.h.svirt libvirt-0.6.0/qemud/remote_dispatch_ret.h --- libvirt-0.6.0/qemud/remote_dispatch_ret.h.svirt 2008-12-19 09:00:02.000000000 -0500 +++ libvirt-0.6.0/qemud/remote_dispatch_ret.h 2009-02-17 10:07:06.259676000 -0500 @@ -86,3 +86,5 @@ remote_node_device_get_parent_ret val_remote_node_device_get_parent_ret; remote_node_device_num_of_caps_ret val_remote_node_device_num_of_caps_ret; remote_node_device_list_caps_ret val_remote_node_device_list_caps_ret; + remote_domain_get_security_label_ret val_remote_domain_get_security_label_ret; + remote_node_get_security_model_ret val_remote_node_get_security_model_ret; diff -up libvirt-0.6.0/qemud/remote_dispatch_table.h.svirt libvirt-0.6.0/qemud/remote_dispatch_table.h --- libvirt-0.6.0/qemud/remote_dispatch_table.h.svirt 2008-12-19 09:00:02.000000000 -0500 +++ libvirt-0.6.0/qemud/remote_dispatch_table.h 2009-02-17 10:07:06.263676000 -0500 @@ -592,3 +592,13 @@ .args_filter = (xdrproc_t) xdr_remote_node_device_list_caps_args, .ret_filter = (xdrproc_t) xdr_remote_node_device_list_caps_ret, }, +{ /* DomainGetSecurityLabel => 118 */ + .fn = (dispatch_fn) remoteDispatchDomainGetSecurityLabel, + .args_filter = (xdrproc_t) xdr_remote_domain_get_security_label_args, + .ret_filter = (xdrproc_t) xdr_remote_domain_get_security_label_ret, +}, +{ /* NodeGetSecurityModel => 119 */ + .fn = (dispatch_fn) remoteDispatchNodeGetSecurityModel, + .args_filter = (xdrproc_t) xdr_void, + .ret_filter = (xdrproc_t) xdr_remote_node_get_security_model_ret, +}, diff -up libvirt-0.6.0/qemud/remote_protocol.c.svirt libvirt-0.6.0/qemud/remote_protocol.c --- libvirt-0.6.0/qemud/remote_protocol.c.svirt 2009-01-31 04:04:17.000000000 -0500 +++ libvirt-0.6.0/qemud/remote_protocol.c 2009-02-17 10:07:06.268676000 -0500 @@ -1166,6 +1166,43 @@ xdr_remote_domain_get_max_vcpus_ret (XDR } bool_t +xdr_remote_domain_get_security_label_args (XDR *xdrs, remote_domain_get_security_label_args *objp) +{ + + if (!xdr_remote_nonnull_domain (xdrs, &objp->dom)) + return FALSE; + return TRUE; +} + +bool_t +xdr_remote_domain_get_security_label_ret (XDR *xdrs, remote_domain_get_security_label_ret *objp) +{ + char **objp_cpp0 = (char **) (void *) &objp->label.label_val; + + if (!xdr_array (xdrs, objp_cpp0, (u_int *) &objp->label.label_len, REMOTE_SECURITY_LABEL_MAX, + sizeof (char), (xdrproc_t) xdr_char)) + return FALSE; + if (!xdr_int (xdrs, &objp->enforcing)) + return FALSE; + return TRUE; +} + +bool_t +xdr_remote_node_get_security_model_ret (XDR *xdrs, remote_node_get_security_model_ret *objp) +{ + char **objp_cpp1 = (char **) (void *) &objp->doi.doi_val; + char **objp_cpp0 = (char **) (void *) &objp->model.model_val; + + if (!xdr_array (xdrs, objp_cpp0, (u_int *) &objp->model.model_len, REMOTE_SECURITY_MODEL_MAX, + sizeof (char), (xdrproc_t) xdr_char)) + return FALSE; + if (!xdr_array (xdrs, objp_cpp1, (u_int *) &objp->doi.doi_len, REMOTE_SECURITY_DOI_MAX, + sizeof (char), (xdrproc_t) xdr_char)) + return FALSE; + return TRUE; +} + +bool_t xdr_remote_domain_attach_device_args (XDR *xdrs, remote_domain_attach_device_args *objp) { diff -up libvirt-0.6.0/qemud/remote_protocol.h.svirt libvirt-0.6.0/qemud/remote_protocol.h --- libvirt-0.6.0/qemud/remote_protocol.h.svirt 2009-01-31 04:04:17.000000000 -0500 +++ libvirt-0.6.0/qemud/remote_protocol.h 2009-02-17 10:07:06.274679000 -0500 @@ -38,6 +38,9 @@ typedef remote_nonnull_string *remote_st #define REMOTE_AUTH_TYPE_LIST_MAX 20 #define REMOTE_DOMAIN_BLOCK_PEEK_BUFFER_MAX 65536 #define REMOTE_DOMAIN_MEMORY_PEEK_BUFFER_MAX 65536 +#define REMOTE_SECURITY_MODEL_MAX VIR_SECURITY_MODEL_BUFLEN +#define REMOTE_SECURITY_LABEL_MAX VIR_SECURITY_LABEL_BUFLEN +#define REMOTE_SECURITY_DOI_MAX VIR_SECURITY_DOI_BUFLEN typedef char remote_uuid[VIR_UUID_BUFLEN]; @@ -637,6 +640,32 @@ struct remote_domain_get_max_vcpus_ret { }; typedef struct remote_domain_get_max_vcpus_ret remote_domain_get_max_vcpus_ret; +struct remote_domain_get_security_label_args { + remote_nonnull_domain dom; +}; +typedef struct remote_domain_get_security_label_args remote_domain_get_security_label_args; + +struct remote_domain_get_security_label_ret { + struct { + u_int label_len; + char *label_val; + } label; + int enforcing; +}; +typedef struct remote_domain_get_security_label_ret remote_domain_get_security_label_ret; + +struct remote_node_get_security_model_ret { + struct { + u_int model_len; + char *model_val; + } model; + struct { + u_int doi_len; + char *doi_val; + } doi; +}; +typedef struct remote_node_get_security_model_ret remote_node_get_security_model_ret; + struct remote_domain_attach_device_args { remote_nonnull_domain dom; remote_nonnull_string xml; @@ -1348,6 +1377,8 @@ enum remote_procedure { REMOTE_PROC_NODE_DEVICE_GET_PARENT = 115, REMOTE_PROC_NODE_DEVICE_NUM_OF_CAPS = 116, REMOTE_PROC_NODE_DEVICE_LIST_CAPS = 117, + REMOTE_PROC_DOMAIN_GET_SECURITY_LABEL = 118, + REMOTE_PROC_NODE_GET_SECURITY_MODEL = 119, }; typedef enum remote_procedure remote_procedure; @@ -1474,6 +1505,9 @@ extern bool_t xdr_remote_domain_get_vcp extern bool_t xdr_remote_domain_get_vcpus_ret (XDR *, remote_domain_get_vcpus_ret*); extern bool_t xdr_remote_domain_get_max_vcpus_args (XDR *, remote_domain_get_max_vcpus_args*); extern bool_t xdr_remote_domain_get_max_vcpus_ret (XDR *, remote_domain_get_max_vcpus_ret*); +extern bool_t xdr_remote_domain_get_security_label_args (XDR *, remote_domain_get_security_label_args*); +extern bool_t xdr_remote_domain_get_security_label_ret (XDR *, remote_domain_get_security_label_ret*); +extern bool_t xdr_remote_node_get_security_model_ret (XDR *, remote_node_get_security_model_ret*); extern bool_t xdr_remote_domain_attach_device_args (XDR *, remote_domain_attach_device_args*); extern bool_t xdr_remote_domain_detach_device_args (XDR *, remote_domain_detach_device_args*); extern bool_t xdr_remote_domain_get_autostart_args (XDR *, remote_domain_get_autostart_args*); @@ -1679,6 +1713,9 @@ extern bool_t xdr_remote_domain_get_vcpu extern bool_t xdr_remote_domain_get_vcpus_ret (); extern bool_t xdr_remote_domain_get_max_vcpus_args (); extern bool_t xdr_remote_domain_get_max_vcpus_ret (); +extern bool_t xdr_remote_domain_get_security_label_args (); +extern bool_t xdr_remote_domain_get_security_label_ret (); +extern bool_t xdr_remote_node_get_security_model_ret (); extern bool_t xdr_remote_domain_attach_device_args (); extern bool_t xdr_remote_domain_detach_device_args (); extern bool_t xdr_remote_domain_get_autostart_args (); diff -up libvirt-0.6.0/qemud/remote_protocol.x.svirt libvirt-0.6.0/qemud/remote_protocol.x --- libvirt-0.6.0/qemud/remote_protocol.x.svirt 2008-12-19 07:51:11.000000000 -0500 +++ libvirt-0.6.0/qemud/remote_protocol.x 2009-02-17 10:07:06.279676000 -0500 @@ -115,6 +115,21 @@ const REMOTE_DOMAIN_BLOCK_PEEK_BUFFER_MA */ const REMOTE_DOMAIN_MEMORY_PEEK_BUFFER_MAX = 65536; +/* + * Maximum length of a security model field. + */ +const REMOTE_SECURITY_MODEL_MAX = VIR_SECURITY_MODEL_BUFLEN; + +/* + * Maximum length of a security label field. + */ +const REMOTE_SECURITY_LABEL_MAX = VIR_SECURITY_LABEL_BUFLEN; + +/* + * Maximum length of a security DOI field. + */ +const REMOTE_SECURITY_DOI_MAX = VIR_SECURITY_DOI_BUFLEN; + /* UUID. VIR_UUID_BUFLEN definition comes from libvirt.h */ typedef opaque remote_uuid[VIR_UUID_BUFLEN]; @@ -617,6 +632,20 @@ struct remote_domain_get_max_vcpus_ret { int num; }; +struct remote_domain_get_security_label_args { + remote_nonnull_domain dom; +}; + +struct remote_domain_get_security_label_ret { + char label<REMOTE_SECURITY_LABEL_MAX>; + int enforcing; +}; + +struct remote_node_get_security_model_ret { + char model<REMOTE_SECURITY_MODEL_MAX>; + char doi<REMOTE_SECURITY_DOI_MAX>; +}; + struct remote_domain_attach_device_args { remote_nonnull_domain dom; remote_nonnull_string xml; @@ -1223,7 +1252,10 @@ enum remote_procedure { REMOTE_PROC_NODE_DEVICE_DUMP_XML = 114, REMOTE_PROC_NODE_DEVICE_GET_PARENT = 115, REMOTE_PROC_NODE_DEVICE_NUM_OF_CAPS = 116, - REMOTE_PROC_NODE_DEVICE_LIST_CAPS = 117 + REMOTE_PROC_NODE_DEVICE_LIST_CAPS = 117, + + REMOTE_PROC_DOMAIN_GET_SECURITY_LABEL = 118, + REMOTE_PROC_NODE_GET_SECURITY_MODEL = 119 }; /* Custom RPC structure. */ diff -up libvirt-0.6.0/src/capabilities.c.svirt libvirt-0.6.0/src/capabilities.c --- libvirt-0.6.0/src/capabilities.c.svirt 2009-01-31 04:04:17.000000000 -0500 +++ libvirt-0.6.0/src/capabilities.c 2009-02-17 10:07:06.285678000 -0500 @@ -150,6 +150,8 @@ virCapabilitiesFree(virCapsPtr caps) { VIR_FREE(caps->host.migrateTrans); VIR_FREE(caps->host.arch); + VIR_FREE(caps->host.secModel.model); + VIR_FREE(caps->host.secModel.doi); VIR_FREE(caps); } @@ -599,6 +601,14 @@ virCapabilitiesFormatXML(virCapsPtr caps virBufferAddLit(&xml, " </cells>\n"); virBufferAddLit(&xml, " </topology>\n"); } + + if (caps->host.secModel.model) { + virBufferAddLit(&xml, " <secmodel>\n"); + virBufferVSprintf(&xml, " <model>%s</model>\n", caps->host.secModel.model); + virBufferVSprintf(&xml, " <doi>%s</doi>\n", caps->host.secModel.doi); + virBufferAddLit(&xml, " </secmodel>\n"); + } + virBufferAddLit(&xml, " </host>\n\n"); diff -up libvirt-0.6.0/src/capabilities.h.svirt libvirt-0.6.0/src/capabilities.h --- libvirt-0.6.0/src/capabilities.h.svirt 2009-01-31 04:04:17.000000000 -0500 +++ libvirt-0.6.0/src/capabilities.h 2009-02-17 10:07:06.292677000 -0500 @@ -78,6 +78,12 @@ struct _virCapsHostNUMACell { int *cpus; }; +typedef struct _virCapsHostSecModel virCapsHostSecModel; +struct _virCapsHostSecModel { + char *model; + char *doi; +}; + typedef struct _virCapsHost virCapsHost; typedef virCapsHost *virCapsHostPtr; struct _virCapsHost { @@ -90,6 +96,7 @@ struct _virCapsHost { char **migrateTrans; int nnumaCell; virCapsHostNUMACellPtr *numaCell; + virCapsHostSecModel secModel; }; typedef struct _virCaps virCaps; diff -up libvirt-0.6.0/src/domain_conf.c.svirt libvirt-0.6.0/src/domain_conf.c --- libvirt-0.6.0/src/domain_conf.c.svirt 2009-02-17 10:07:06.195708000 -0500 +++ libvirt-0.6.0/src/domain_conf.c 2009-02-17 10:07:06.300677000 -0500 @@ -379,6 +379,16 @@ void virDomainDeviceDefFree(virDomainDev VIR_FREE(def); } +void virSecurityLabelDefFree(virDomainDefPtr def); + +void virSecurityLabelDefFree(virDomainDefPtr def) +{ + if (def->seclabel.model) + VIR_FREE(def->seclabel.model); + if (def->seclabel.label) + VIR_FREE(def->seclabel.label); +} + void virDomainDefFree(virDomainDefPtr def) { unsigned int i; @@ -437,6 +447,8 @@ void virDomainDefFree(virDomainDefPtr de VIR_FREE(def->cpumask); VIR_FREE(def->emulator); + virSecurityLabelDefFree(def); + VIR_FREE(def); } @@ -1818,6 +1830,34 @@ static int virDomainLifecycleParseXML(vi return 0; } +static int +virSecurityLabelDefParseXML(virConnectPtr conn, + const virDomainDefPtr def, + xmlXPathContextPtr ctxt) +{ + char *p; + + if (virXPathNode(conn, "./seclabel", ctxt) == NULL) + return 0; + + p = virXPathStringLimit(conn, "string(./seclabel/label[1])", + VIR_SECURITY_LABEL_BUFLEN-1, ctxt); + if (p == NULL) + goto error; + def->seclabel.label = p; + + p = virXPathStringLimit(conn, "string(./seclabel/@model)", + VIR_SECURITY_MODEL_BUFLEN-1, ctxt); + if (p == NULL) + goto error; + def->seclabel.model = p; + + return 0; + +error: + virSecurityLabelDefFree(def); + return -1; +} virDomainDeviceDefPtr virDomainDeviceDefParse(virConnectPtr conn, virCapsPtr caps, @@ -2403,6 +2443,10 @@ static virDomainDefPtr virDomainDefParse } VIR_FREE(nodes); + /* analysis of security label */ + if (virSecurityLabelDefParseXML(conn, def, ctxt) == -1) + goto error; + return def; no_memory: @@ -3420,6 +3464,13 @@ char *virDomainDefFormat(virConnectPtr c goto cleanup; virBufferAddLit(&buf, " </devices>\n"); + + if (def->seclabel.model) { + virBufferEscapeString(&buf, " <seclabel model='%s'>\n", def->seclabel.model); + virBufferEscapeString(&buf, " <label>%s</label>\n", def->seclabel.label); + virBufferAddLit(&buf, " </seclabel>\n"); + } + virBufferAddLit(&buf, "</domain>\n"); if (virBufferError(&buf)) diff -up libvirt-0.6.0/src/domain_conf.h.svirt libvirt-0.6.0/src/domain_conf.h --- libvirt-0.6.0/src/domain_conf.h.svirt 2009-01-31 04:04:17.000000000 -0500 +++ libvirt-0.6.0/src/domain_conf.h 2009-02-17 10:07:06.307676000 -0500 @@ -407,6 +407,14 @@ struct _virDomainOSDef { char *bootloaderArgs; }; +/* Security configuration for domain */ +typedef struct _virSecurityLabelDef virSecurityLabelDef; +typedef virSecurityLabelDef *virSecurityLabelDefPtr; +struct _virSecurityLabelDef { + char *model; /* name of security model */ + char *label; /* security label string */ +}; + #define VIR_DOMAIN_CPUMASK_LEN 1024 /* Guest VM main configuration */ @@ -464,6 +472,7 @@ struct _virDomainDef { /* Only 1 */ virDomainChrDefPtr console; + virSecurityLabelDef seclabel; }; /* Guest VM runtime state */ diff -up libvirt-0.6.0/src/driver.h.svirt libvirt-0.6.0/src/driver.h --- libvirt-0.6.0/src/driver.h.svirt 2008-12-19 07:51:11.000000000 -0500 +++ libvirt-0.6.0/src/driver.h 2009-02-17 10:07:06.313676000 -0500 @@ -181,6 +181,12 @@ typedef int typedef int (*virDrvDomainGetMaxVcpus) (virDomainPtr domain); typedef int + (*virDrvDomainGetSecurityLabel) (virDomainPtr domain, + virSecurityLabelPtr seclabel); +typedef int + (*virDrvNodeGetSecurityModel) (virConnectPtr conn, + virSecurityModelPtr secmodel); +typedef int (*virDrvDomainAttachDevice) (virDomainPtr domain, const char *xml); typedef int @@ -361,6 +367,8 @@ struct _virDriver { virDrvDomainPinVcpu domainPinVcpu; virDrvDomainGetVcpus domainGetVcpus; virDrvDomainGetMaxVcpus domainGetMaxVcpus; + virDrvDomainGetSecurityLabel domainGetSecurityLabel; + virDrvNodeGetSecurityModel nodeGetSecurityModel; virDrvDomainDumpXML domainDumpXML; virDrvListDefinedDomains listDefinedDomains; virDrvNumOfDefinedDomains numOfDefinedDomains; diff -up libvirt-0.6.0/src/libvirt.c.svirt libvirt-0.6.0/src/libvirt.c --- libvirt-0.6.0/src/libvirt.c.svirt 2009-01-31 04:04:17.000000000 -0500 +++ libvirt-0.6.0/src/libvirt.c 2009-02-17 10:07:06.332683000 -0500 @@ -4156,6 +4156,70 @@ error: return -1; } +/** + * virDomainGetSecurityLabel: + * @domain: a domain object + * @seclabel: pointer to a virSecurityLabel structure + * + * Extract security label of an active domain. + * + * Returns 0 in case of success, -1 in case of failure, and -2 + * if the operation is not supported (caller decides if that's + * an error). + */ +int +virDomainGetSecurityLabel(virDomainPtr domain, virSecurityLabelPtr seclabel) +{ + virConnectPtr conn; + + if (!VIR_IS_CONNECTED_DOMAIN(domain)) { + virLibDomainError(NULL, VIR_ERR_INVALID_DOMAIN, __FUNCTION__); + return -1; + } + + if (seclabel == NULL) { + virLibDomainError(domain, VIR_ERR_INVALID_ARG, __FUNCTION__); + return -1; + } + + conn = domain->conn; + + if (conn->driver->domainGetSecurityLabel) + return conn->driver->domainGetSecurityLabel(domain, seclabel); + + virLibConnWarning(conn, VIR_ERR_NO_SUPPORT, __FUNCTION__); + return -2; +} + +/** + * virNodeGetSecurityModel: + * @conn: a connection object + * @secmodel: pointer to a virSecurityModel structure + * + * Extract the security model of a hypervisor. + * + * Returns 0 in case of success, -1 in case of failure, and -2 if the + * operation is not supported (caller decides if that's an error). + */ +int +virNodeGetSecurityModel(virConnectPtr conn, virSecurityModelPtr secmodel) +{ + if (!VIR_IS_CONNECT(conn)) { + virLibConnError(conn, VIR_ERR_INVALID_CONN, __FUNCTION__); + return -1; + } + + if (secmodel == NULL) { + virLibConnError(conn, VIR_ERR_INVALID_ARG, __FUNCTION__); + return -1; + } + + if (conn->driver->nodeGetSecurityModel) + return conn->driver->nodeGetSecurityModel(conn, secmodel); + + virLibConnWarning(conn, VIR_ERR_NO_SUPPORT, __FUNCTION__); + return -2; +} /** * virDomainAttachDevice: diff -up libvirt-0.6.0/src/libvirt_private.syms.svirt libvirt-0.6.0/src/libvirt_private.syms --- libvirt-0.6.0/src/libvirt_private.syms.svirt 2009-01-31 04:04:17.000000000 -0500 +++ libvirt-0.6.0/src/libvirt_private.syms 2009-02-17 10:36:52.867582000 -0500 @@ -334,3 +334,4 @@ virXPathNode; virXPathNodeSet; virXPathString; virXMLPropString; +virXPathStringLimit; diff -up libvirt-0.6.0/src/libvirt_public.syms.svirt libvirt-0.6.0/src/libvirt_public.syms --- libvirt-0.6.0/src/libvirt_public.syms.svirt 2009-01-20 08:48:28.000000000 -0500 +++ libvirt-0.6.0/src/libvirt_public.syms 2009-02-17 10:37:09.630287000 -0500 @@ -244,7 +244,8 @@ LIBVIRT_0.6.0 { virStoragePoolRef; virStorageVolRef; virNodeDeviceRef; - + virDomainGetSecurityLabel; + virNodeGetSecurityModel; } LIBVIRT_0.5.0; # .... define new API here using predicted next version number .... diff -up libvirt-0.6.0/src/lxc_driver.c.svirt libvirt-0.6.0/src/lxc_driver.c --- libvirt-0.6.0/src/lxc_driver.c.svirt 2009-01-31 04:04:17.000000000 -0500 +++ libvirt-0.6.0/src/lxc_driver.c 2009-02-17 10:07:06.339677000 -0500 @@ -1430,6 +1430,8 @@ static virDriver lxcDriver = { NULL, /* domainPinVcpu */ NULL, /* domainGetVcpus */ NULL, /* domainGetMaxVcpus */ + NULL, /* domainGetSecurityLabel */ + NULL, /* nodeGetSecurityModel */ lxcDomainDumpXML, /* domainDumpXML */ lxcListDefinedDomains, /* listDefinedDomains */ lxcNumDefinedDomains, /* numOfDefinedDomains */ diff -up libvirt-0.6.0/src/Makefile.am.svirt libvirt-0.6.0/src/Makefile.am --- libvirt-0.6.0/src/Makefile.am.svirt 2009-01-31 04:04:17.000000000 -0500 +++ libvirt-0.6.0/src/Makefile.am 2009-02-17 10:07:06.346676000 -0500 @@ -139,7 +139,7 @@ UML_DRIVER_SOURCES = \ NETWORK_DRIVER_SOURCES = \ network_driver.h network_driver.c -# And finally storage backend specific impls +# Storage backend specific impls STORAGE_DRIVER_SOURCES = \ storage_driver.h storage_driver.c \ storage_backend.h storage_backend.c @@ -164,6 +164,12 @@ STORAGE_DRIVER_DISK_SOURCES = \ STORAGE_HELPER_DISK_SOURCES = \ parthelper.c +# Security framework and drivers for various models +SECURITY_DRIVER_SOURCES = \ + security.h security.c + +SECURITY_DRIVER_SELINUX_SOURCES = \ + security_selinux.h security_selinux.c NODE_DEVICE_DRIVER_SOURCES = \ node_device.c node_device.h @@ -377,6 +383,19 @@ libvirt_driver_nodedev_la_LDFLAGS += -mo endif endif +libvirt_driver_security_la_SOURCES = $(SECURITY_DRIVER_SOURCES) +if WITH_DRIVER_MODULES +mod_LTLIBRARIES += libvirt_driver_security.la +else +noinst_LTLIBRARIES += libvirt_driver_security.la +endif +if WITH_DRIVER_MODULES +libvirt_driver_security_la_LDFLAGS = -module -avoid-version +endif + +if HAVE_SELINUX +libvirt_driver_security_la_SOURCES += $(SECURITY_DRIVER_SELINUX_SOURCES) +endif # Add all conditional sources just in case... EXTRA_DIST += \ @@ -395,7 +414,9 @@ EXTRA_DIST += \ $(STORAGE_DRIVER_DISK_SOURCES) \ $(NODE_DEVICE_DRIVER_SOURCES) \ $(NODE_DEVICE_DRIVER_HAL_SOURCES) \ - $(NODE_DEVICE_DRIVER_DEVKIT_SOURCES) + $(NODE_DEVICE_DRIVER_DEVKIT_SOURCES) \ + $(SECURITY_DRIVER_SOURCES) \ + $(SECURITY_DRIVER_SELINUX_SOURCES) # # Build our version script. This is composed of three parts: diff -up libvirt-0.6.0/src/openvz_driver.c.svirt libvirt-0.6.0/src/openvz_driver.c --- libvirt-0.6.0/src/openvz_driver.c.svirt 2009-01-31 04:04:18.000000000 -0500 +++ libvirt-0.6.0/src/openvz_driver.c 2009-02-17 10:07:06.362676000 -0500 @@ -1299,6 +1299,8 @@ static virDriver openvzDriver = { NULL, /* domainPinVcpu */ NULL, /* domainGetVcpus */ openvzDomainGetMaxVcpus, /* domainGetMaxVcpus */ + NULL, /* domainGetSecurityLabel */ + NULL, /* nodeGetSecurityModel */ openvzDomainDumpXML, /* domainDumpXML */ openvzListDefinedDomains, /* listDomains */ openvzNumDefinedDomains, /* numOfDomains */ diff -up libvirt-0.6.0/src/qemu_conf.h.svirt libvirt-0.6.0/src/qemu_conf.h --- libvirt-0.6.0/src/qemu_conf.h.svirt 2009-01-31 04:04:18.000000000 -0500 +++ libvirt-0.6.0/src/qemu_conf.h 2009-02-17 10:07:06.368680000 -0500 @@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ #include "domain_conf.h" #include "domain_event.h" #include "threads.h" +#include "security.h" #define qemudDebug(fmt, ...) do {} while(0) @@ -83,6 +84,8 @@ struct qemud_driver { virDomainEventQueuePtr domainEventQueue; int domainEventTimer; int domainEventDispatching; + + virSecurityDriverPtr securityDriver; }; /* Status needed to reconenct to running VMs */ diff -up libvirt-0.6.0/src/qemu_driver.c.svirt libvirt-0.6.0/src/qemu_driver.c --- libvirt-0.6.0/src/qemu_driver.c.svirt 2009-01-31 04:04:18.000000000 -0500 +++ libvirt-0.6.0/src/qemu_driver.c 2009-02-17 10:07:06.378682000 -0500 @@ -68,6 +68,7 @@ #include "memory.h" #include "uuid.h" #include "domain_conf.h" +#include "security.h" #define VIR_FROM_THIS VIR_FROM_QEMU @@ -383,6 +384,50 @@ next: return 0; } +static int +qemudSecurityInit(struct qemud_driver *qemud_drv) +{ + int ret; + const char *doi, *model; + virCapsPtr caps; + virSecurityDriverPtr security_drv; + + ret = virSecurityDriverStartup(&security_drv); + if (ret == -1) { + qemudLog(QEMUD_ERR, _("Failed to start security driver")); + return -1; + } + /* No security driver wanted to be enabled: just return */ + if (ret == -2) + return 0; + + qemud_drv->securityDriver = security_drv; + doi = virSecurityDriverGetDOI(security_drv); + model = virSecurityDriverGetModel(security_drv); + + qemudLog(QEMUD_DEBUG, "Initialized security driver \"%s\" with " + "DOI \"%s\".\n", model, doi); + + /* + * Add security policy host caps now that the security driver is + * initialized. + */ + caps = qemud_drv->caps; + + caps->host.secModel.model = strdup(model); + if (!caps->host.secModel.model) { + qemudLog(QEMUD_ERR, _("Failed to copy secModel model: %s"), strerror(errno)); + return -1; + } + + caps->host.secModel.doi = strdup(doi); + if (!caps->host.secModel.doi) { + qemudLog(QEMUD_ERR, _("Failed to copy secModel DOI: %s"), strerror(errno)); + return -1; + } + + return 0; +} /** * qemudStartup: @@ -474,6 +519,11 @@ qemudStartup(void) { if ((qemu_driver->caps = qemudCapsInit()) == NULL) goto out_of_memory; + if (qemudSecurityInit(qemu_driver) < 0) { + qemudShutdown(); + return -1; + } + if (qemudLoadDriverConfig(qemu_driver, driverConf) < 0) { goto error; } @@ -1111,6 +1161,15 @@ static int qemudNextFreeVNCPort(struct q return -1; } +static int qemudDomainSetSecurityLabel(virConnectPtr conn, struct qemud_driver *driver, virDomainObjPtr vm) +{ + if (vm->def->seclabel.label != NULL) + if (driver->securityDriver && driver->securityDriver->domainSetSecurityLabel) + return driver->securityDriver->domainSetSecurityLabel(conn, driver->securityDriver, + &vm->def->seclabel); + return 0; +} + static virDomainPtr qemudDomainLookupByName(virConnectPtr conn, const char *name); @@ -1178,6 +1237,16 @@ static int qemudStartVMDaemon(virConnect return -1; } + /* + * Set up the security label for the domain here, before doing + * too much else. + */ + if (qemudDomainSetSecurityLabel(conn, driver, vm) < 0) { + qemudReportError(conn, NULL, NULL, VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR, + _("Failed to set security label")); + return -1; + } + if (qemudExtractVersionInfo(emulator, NULL, &qemuCmdFlags) < 0) { @@ -2721,7 +2790,94 @@ cleanup: return ret; } +static int qemudDomainGetSecurityLabel(virDomainPtr dom, virSecurityLabelPtr seclabel) +{ + struct qemud_driver *driver = (struct qemud_driver *)dom->conn->privateData; + virDomainObjPtr vm; + const char *type; + int ret = -1; + + qemuDriverLock(driver); + vm = virDomainFindByUUID(&driver->domains, dom->uuid); + qemuDriverUnlock(driver); + + if (!vm) { + char uuidstr[VIR_UUID_STRING_BUFLEN]; + + virUUIDFormat(dom->uuid, uuidstr); + qemudReportError(dom->conn, dom, NULL, VIR_ERR_INVALID_DOMAIN, + _("no domain with matching uuid '%s'"), uuidstr); + goto cleanup; + } + + if (!(type = virDomainVirtTypeToString(vm->def->virtType))) { + qemudReportError(dom->conn, dom, NULL, VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR, + _("unknown virt type in domain definition '%d'"), + vm->def->virtType); + goto cleanup; + } + + /* + * Theoretically, the pid can be replaced during this operation and + * return the label of a different process. If atomicity is needed, + * further validation will be required. + * + * Comment from Dan Berrange: + * + * Well the PID as stored in the virDomainObjPtr can't be changed + * because you've got a locked object. The OS level PID could have + * exited, though and in extreme circumstances have cycled through all + * PIDs back to ours. We could sanity check that our PID still exists + * after reading the label, by checking that our FD connecting to the + * QEMU monitor hasn't seen SIGHUP/ERR on poll(). + */ + if (virDomainIsActive(vm)) { + if (driver->securityDriver && driver->securityDriver->domainGetSecurityLabel) { + if (driver->securityDriver->domainGetSecurityLabel(dom->conn, vm, seclabel) == -1) { + qemudReportError(dom->conn, dom, NULL, VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR, + _("Failed to get security label")); + goto cleanup; + } + } + } + + ret = 0; + +cleanup: + if (vm) + virDomainObjUnlock(vm); + return ret; +} + +static int qemudNodeGetSecurityModel(virConnectPtr conn, virSecurityModelPtr secmodel) +{ + struct qemud_driver *driver = (struct qemud_driver *)conn->privateData; + char *p; + + if (!driver->securityDriver) + return -2; + + p = driver->caps->host.secModel.model; + if (strlen(p) >= VIR_SECURITY_MODEL_BUFLEN-1) { + qemudReportError(conn, NULL, NULL, VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR, + _("security model string exceeds max %d bytes"), + VIR_SECURITY_MODEL_BUFLEN-1); + return -1; + } + strcpy(secmodel->model, p); + + p = driver->caps->host.secModel.doi; + if (strlen(p) >= VIR_SECURITY_DOI_BUFLEN-1) { + qemudReportError(conn, NULL, NULL, VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR, + _("security DOI string exceeds max %d bytes"), + VIR_SECURITY_DOI_BUFLEN-1); + return -1; + } + strcpy(secmodel->doi, p); + return 0; +} +/* TODO: check seclabel restore */ static int qemudDomainRestore(virConnectPtr conn, const char *path) { struct qemud_driver *driver = conn->privateData; @@ -4475,6 +4631,8 @@ static virDriver qemuDriver = { NULL, /* domainGetVcpus */ #endif qemudDomainGetMaxVcpus, /* domainGetMaxVcpus */ + qemudDomainGetSecurityLabel, /* domainGetSecurityLabel */ + qemudNodeGetSecurityModel, /* nodeGetSecurityModel */ qemudDomainDumpXML, /* domainDumpXML */ qemudListDefinedDomains, /* listDomains */ qemudNumDefinedDomains, /* numOfDomains */ diff -up libvirt-0.6.0/src/remote_internal.c.svirt libvirt-0.6.0/src/remote_internal.c --- libvirt-0.6.0/src/remote_internal.c.svirt 2009-02-17 10:07:06.207699000 -0500 +++ libvirt-0.6.0/src/remote_internal.c 2009-02-17 10:14:28.509959000 -0500 @@ -2299,6 +2299,67 @@ done: return rv; } +static int +remoteDomainGetSecurityLabel (virDomainPtr domain, virSecurityLabelPtr seclabel) +{ + remote_domain_get_security_label_args args; + remote_domain_get_security_label_ret ret; + struct private_data *priv = domain->conn->privateData; + + make_nonnull_domain (&args.dom, domain); + memset (&ret, 0, sizeof ret); + if (call (domain->conn, priv, 0, REMOTE_PROC_DOMAIN_GET_SECURITY_LABEL, + (xdrproc_t) xdr_remote_domain_get_security_label_args, (char *)&args, + (xdrproc_t) xdr_remote_domain_get_security_label_ret, (char *)&ret) == -1) { + return -1; + } + + if (ret.label.label_val != NULL) { + if (strlen (ret.label.label_val) >= sizeof seclabel->label) { + errorf (domain->conn, VIR_ERR_RPC, _("security label exceeds maximum: %zd"), + sizeof seclabel->label - 1); + return -1; + } + strcpy (seclabel->label, ret.label.label_val); + seclabel->enforcing = ret.enforcing; + } + + return 0; +} + +static int +remoteNodeGetSecurityModel (virConnectPtr conn, virSecurityModelPtr secmodel) +{ + remote_node_get_security_model_ret ret; + struct private_data *priv = conn->privateData; + + memset (&ret, 0, sizeof ret); + if (call (conn, priv, 0, REMOTE_PROC_NODE_GET_SECURITY_MODEL, + (xdrproc_t) xdr_void, NULL, + (xdrproc_t) xdr_remote_node_get_security_model_ret, (char *)&ret) == -1) { + return -1; + } + + if (ret.model.model_val != NULL) { + if (strlen (ret.model.model_val) >= sizeof secmodel->model) { + errorf (conn, VIR_ERR_RPC, _("security model exceeds maximum: %zd"), + sizeof secmodel->model - 1); + return -1; + } + strcpy (secmodel->model, ret.model.model_val); + } + + if (ret.doi.doi_val != NULL) { + if (strlen (ret.doi.doi_val) >= sizeof secmodel->doi) { + errorf (conn, VIR_ERR_RPC, _("security doi exceeds maximum: %zd"), + sizeof secmodel->doi - 1); + return -1; + } + strcpy (secmodel->doi, ret.doi.doi_val); + } + return 0; +} + static char * remoteDomainDumpXML (virDomainPtr domain, int flags) { @@ -6721,6 +6782,8 @@ static virDriver driver = { .domainPinVcpu = remoteDomainPinVcpu, .domainGetVcpus = remoteDomainGetVcpus, .domainGetMaxVcpus = remoteDomainGetMaxVcpus, + .domainGetSecurityLabel = remoteDomainGetSecurityLabel, + .nodeGetSecurityModel = remoteNodeGetSecurityModel, .domainDumpXML = remoteDomainDumpXML, .listDefinedDomains = remoteListDefinedDomains, .numOfDefinedDomains = remoteNumOfDefinedDomains, diff -up /dev/null libvirt-0.6.0/src/security.c --- /dev/null 2009-02-11 16:31:53.992012235 -0500 +++ libvirt-0.6.0/src/security.c 2009-02-17 10:07:06.396676000 -0500 @@ -0,0 +1,133 @@ +/* + * Copyright (C) 2008 Red Hat, Inc. + * + * This library is free software; you can redistribute it and/or + * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public + * License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either + * version 2.1 of the License, or (at your option) any later version. + * + * Authors: + * James Morris <jmorris(a)namei.org> + * + */ +#include <config.h> +#include <string.h> + +#include "virterror_internal.h" + +#include "security.h" + +#if HAVE_SELINUX +#include "security_selinux.h" +#endif + +static virSecurityDriverStatus testSecurityDriverProbe(void) +{ + return SECURITY_DRIVER_DISABLE; +} + +virSecurityDriver virTestSecurityDriver = { + .name = "test", + .probe = testSecurityDriverProbe, +}; + +static virSecurityDriverPtr security_drivers[] = { + &virTestSecurityDriver, +#ifdef HAVE_SELINUX + &virSELinuxSecurityDriver, +#endif +}; + +/* + * Probe each security driver: each should perform a test to see if it + * should be loaded, e.g. if the currently active host security mechanism + * matches. If the probe succeeds, initialize the driver and return it. + * + * Returns 0 on success, and -1 on error. If no security driver wanted to + * be enabled, then return -2 and let the caller determine what this really + * means. + */ +int +virSecurityDriverStartup(virSecurityDriverPtr * drv) +{ + unsigned int i; + + for (i = 0; i < (sizeof(security_drivers) / sizeof(security_drivers[0])); i++) { + virSecurityDriverPtr tmp = security_drivers[i]; + virSecurityDriverStatus ret = tmp->probe(); + + switch (ret) { + case SECURITY_DRIVER_ENABLE: + virSecurityDriverInit(tmp); + if (tmp->open(NULL, tmp) == -1) { + return -1; + } else { + *drv = tmp; + return 0; + } + break; + + case SECURITY_DRIVER_DISABLE: + break; + + default: + return -1; + } + } + return -2; +} + +void +virSecurityReportError(virConnectPtr conn, int code, const char *fmt, ...) +{ + va_list args; + char errorMessage[1024]; + + if (fmt) { + va_start(args, fmt); + vsnprintf(errorMessage, sizeof(errorMessage) - 1, fmt, args); + va_end(args); + } else + errorMessage[0] = '\0'; + + virRaiseError(conn, NULL, NULL, VIR_FROM_SECURITY, code, + VIR_ERR_ERROR, NULL, NULL, NULL, -1, -1, "%s", + errorMessage); +} + +/* + * Helpers + */ +void +virSecurityDriverInit(virSecurityDriverPtr drv) +{ + memset(&drv->_private, 0, sizeof drv->_private); +} + +int +virSecurityDriverSetDOI(virConnectPtr conn, + virSecurityDriverPtr drv, + const char *doi) +{ + if (strlen(doi) >= VIR_SECURITY_DOI_BUFLEN) { + virSecurityReportError(conn, VIR_ERR_ERROR, + _("%s: DOI \'%s\' is " + "longer than the maximum allowed length of %d"), + __func__, doi, VIR_SECURITY_DOI_BUFLEN - 1); + return -1; + } + strcpy(drv->_private.doi, doi); + return 0; +} + +const char * +virSecurityDriverGetDOI(virSecurityDriverPtr drv) +{ + return drv->_private.doi; +} + +const char * +virSecurityDriverGetModel(virSecurityDriverPtr drv) +{ + return drv->name; +} diff -up /dev/null libvirt-0.6.0/src/security.h --- /dev/null 2009-02-11 16:31:53.992012235 -0500 +++ libvirt-0.6.0/src/security.h 2009-02-17 10:07:06.402676000 -0500 @@ -0,0 +1,72 @@ +/* + * Copyright (C) 2008 Red Hat, Inc. + * + * This library is free software; you can redistribute it and/or + * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public + * License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either + * version 2.1 of the License, or (at your option) any later version. + * + * Authors: + * James Morris <jmorris(a)namei.org> + * + */ +#ifndef __VIR_SECURITY_H__ +#define __VIR_SECURITY_H__ + +#include "internal.h" +#include "domain_conf.h" + +/* + * Return values for security driver probing: the driver will determine + * whether it should be enabled or disabled. + */ +typedef enum { + SECURITY_DRIVER_ENABLE = 0, + SECURITY_DRIVER_ERROR = -1, + SECURITY_DRIVER_DISABLE = -2, +} virSecurityDriverStatus; + +typedef struct _virSecurityDriver virSecurityDriver; +typedef virSecurityDriver *virSecurityDriverPtr; +typedef virSecurityDriverStatus (*virSecurityDriverProbe) (void); +typedef int (*virSecurityDriverOpen) (virConnectPtr conn, + virSecurityDriverPtr drv); +typedef int (*virSecurityDomainGetLabel) (virConnectPtr conn, + virDomainObjPtr vm, + virSecurityLabelPtr sec); +typedef int (*virSecurityDomainSetLabel) (virConnectPtr conn, + virSecurityDriverPtr drv, + virSecurityLabelDefPtr secdef); + +struct _virSecurityDriver { + const char *name; + virSecurityDriverProbe probe; + virSecurityDriverOpen open; + virSecurityDomainGetLabel domainGetSecurityLabel; + virSecurityDomainSetLabel domainSetSecurityLabel; + + /* + * This is internally managed driver state and should only be accessed + * via helpers below. + */ + struct { + char doi[VIR_SECURITY_DOI_BUFLEN]; + } _private; +}; + +/* Global methods */ +int virSecurityDriverStartup(virSecurityDriverPtr * drv); + +void +virSecurityReportError(virConnectPtr conn, int code, const char *fmt, ...) + ATTRIBUTE_FORMAT(printf, 3, 4); + +/* Helpers */ +void virSecurityDriverInit(virSecurityDriverPtr drv); +int virSecurityDriverSetDOI(virConnectPtr conn, + virSecurityDriverPtr drv, + const char *doi); +const char *virSecurityDriverGetDOI(virSecurityDriverPtr drv); +const char *virSecurityDriverGetModel(virSecurityDriverPtr drv); + +#endif /* __VIR_SECURITY_H__ */ diff -up /dev/null libvirt-0.6.0/src/security_selinux.c --- /dev/null 2009-02-11 16:31:53.992012235 -0500 +++ libvirt-0.6.0/src/security_selinux.c 2009-02-17 10:07:06.407678000 -0500 @@ -0,0 +1,108 @@ +/* + * Copyright (C) 2008 Red Hat, Inc. + * + * This library is free software; you can redistribute it and/or + * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public + * License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either + * version 2.1 of the License, or (at your option) any later version. + * + * Authors: + * James Morris <jmorris(a)namei.org> + * + * SELinux security driver. + */ +#include <config.h> +#include <selinux/selinux.h> + +#include "security.h" +#include "security_selinux.h" + +#define SECURITY_SELINUX_VOID_DOI "0" + +static int +SELinuxSecurityDriverProbe(void) +{ + return is_selinux_enabled() ? SECURITY_DRIVER_ENABLE : SECURITY_DRIVER_DISABLE; +} + +static int +SELinuxSecurityDriverOpen(virConnectPtr conn, virSecurityDriverPtr drv) +{ + /* + * Where will the DOI come from? SELinux configuration, or qemu + * configuration? For the moment, we'll just set it to "0". + */ + virSecurityDriverSetDOI(conn, drv, SECURITY_SELINUX_VOID_DOI); + + return 0; +} + +static int +SELinuxSecurityDomainGetSecurityLabel(virConnectPtr conn, + virDomainObjPtr vm, + virSecurityLabelPtr sec) +{ + security_context_t ctx; + + if (getpidcon(vm->pid, &ctx) == -1) { + virSecurityReportError(conn, VIR_ERR_ERROR, _("%s: error calling " + "getpidcon(): %s"), __func__, + strerror(errno)); + return -1; + } + + if (strlen((char *) ctx) >= VIR_SECURITY_LABEL_BUFLEN) { + virSecurityReportError(conn, VIR_ERR_ERROR, + _("%s: security label exceeds " + "maximum length: %d"), __func__, + VIR_SECURITY_LABEL_BUFLEN - 1); + return -1; + } + + strcpy(sec->label, (char *) ctx); + free(ctx); + + sec->enforcing = security_getenforce(); + if (sec->enforcing == -1) { + virSecurityReportError(conn, VIR_ERR_ERROR, _("%s: error calling " + "security_getenforce(): %s"), __func__, + strerror(errno)); + return -1; + } + + return 0; +} + +static int +SELinuxSecurityDomainSetSecurityLabel(virConnectPtr conn, + virSecurityDriverPtr drv, + const virSecurityLabelDefPtr secdef) +{ + /* TODO: verify DOI */ + + if (!STREQ(drv->name, secdef->model)) { + virSecurityReportError(conn, VIR_ERR_ERROR, + _("%s: security label driver mismatch: " + "\'%s\' model configured for domain, but " + "hypervisor driver is \'%s\'."), + __func__, secdef->model, drv->name); + return -1; + } + + if (setexeccon(secdef->label) == -1) { + virSecurityReportError(conn, VIR_ERR_ERROR, + _("%s: unable to set security context " + "'\%s\': %s."), __func__, secdef->label, + strerror(errno)); + return -1; + } + return 0; +} + +virSecurityDriver virSELinuxSecurityDriver = { + .name = "selinux", + .probe = SELinuxSecurityDriverProbe, + .open = SELinuxSecurityDriverOpen, + .domainGetSecurityLabel = SELinuxSecurityDomainGetSecurityLabel, + .domainSetSecurityLabel = SELinuxSecurityDomainSetSecurityLabel, +}; diff -up /dev/null libvirt-0.6.0/src/security_selinux.h --- /dev/null 2009-02-11 16:31:53.992012235 -0500 +++ libvirt-0.6.0/src/security_selinux.h 2009-02-17 10:07:06.413677000 -0500 @@ -0,0 +1,18 @@ +/* + * Copyright (C) 2008 Red Hat, Inc. + * + * This library is free software; you can redistribute it and/or + * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public + * License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either + * version 2.1 of the License, or (at your option) any later version. + * + * Authors: + * James Morris <jmorris(a)namei.org> + * + */ +#ifndef __VIR_SECURITY_SELINUX_H__ +#define __VIR_SECURITY_SELINUX_H__ + +extern virSecurityDriver virSELinuxSecurityDriver; + +#endif /* __VIR_SECURITY_SELINUX_H__ */ diff -up libvirt-0.6.0/src/storage_backend.c.svirt libvirt-0.6.0/src/storage_backend.c --- libvirt-0.6.0/src/storage_backend.c.svirt 2009-01-31 04:04:18.000000000 -0500 +++ libvirt-0.6.0/src/storage_backend.c 2009-02-17 10:07:06.419677000 -0500 @@ -276,6 +276,7 @@ virStorageBackendUpdateVolTargetInfoFD(v VIR_FREE(target->perms.label); #if HAVE_SELINUX + /* XXX: make this a security driver call */ if (fgetfilecon(fd, &filecon) == -1) { if (errno != ENODATA && errno != ENOTSUP) { virReportSystemError(conn, errno, diff -up libvirt-0.6.0/src/test.c.svirt libvirt-0.6.0/src/test.c --- libvirt-0.6.0/src/test.c.svirt 2009-01-20 15:39:28.000000000 -0500 +++ libvirt-0.6.0/src/test.c 2009-02-17 10:07:06.428677000 -0500 @@ -3510,6 +3510,8 @@ static virDriver testDriver = { NULL, /* domainPinVcpu */ NULL, /* domainGetVcpus */ NULL, /* domainGetMaxVcpus */ + NULL, /* domainGetSecurityLabel */ + NULL, /* nodeGetSecurityModel */ testDomainDumpXML, /* domainDumpXML */ testListDefinedDomains, /* listDefinedDomains */ testNumOfDefinedDomains, /* numOfDefinedDomains */ diff -up libvirt-0.6.0/src/uml_driver.c.svirt libvirt-0.6.0/src/uml_driver.c --- libvirt-0.6.0/src/uml_driver.c.svirt 2009-01-31 04:04:18.000000000 -0500 +++ libvirt-0.6.0/src/uml_driver.c 2009-02-17 10:07:06.436676000 -0500 @@ -1852,6 +1852,8 @@ static virDriver umlDriver = { NULL, /* domainPinVcpu */ NULL, /* domainGetVcpus */ NULL, /* domainGetMaxVcpus */ + NULL, /* domainGetSecurityLabel */ + NULL, /* nodeGetSecurityModel */ umlDomainDumpXML, /* domainDumpXML */ umlListDefinedDomains, /* listDomains */ umlNumDefinedDomains, /* numOfDomains */ diff -up libvirt-0.6.0/src/virsh.c.svirt libvirt-0.6.0/src/virsh.c --- libvirt-0.6.0/src/virsh.c.svirt 2009-01-31 04:04:18.000000000 -0500 +++ libvirt-0.6.0/src/virsh.c 2009-02-17 10:07:06.447677000 -0500 @@ -954,6 +954,7 @@ static const vshCmdOptDef opts_undefine[ {NULL, 0, 0, NULL} }; +/* XXX MAC policy for defining & undefining domains ?? */ static int cmdUndefine(vshControl *ctl, const vshCmd *cmd) { @@ -1515,6 +1516,8 @@ cmdDominfo(vshControl *ctl, const vshCmd { virDomainInfo info; virDomainPtr dom; + virSecurityModel secmodel; + virSecurityLabel seclabel; int ret = TRUE, autostart; unsigned int id; char *str, uuid[VIR_UUID_STRING_BUFLEN]; @@ -1573,6 +1576,29 @@ cmdDominfo(vshControl *ctl, const vshCmd autostart ? _("enable") : _("disable") ); } + /* Security model and label information */ + memset(&secmodel, 0, sizeof secmodel); + if (virNodeGetSecurityModel(ctl->conn, &secmodel) == -1) { + virDomainFree(dom); + return FALSE; + } else { + /* Only print something if a security model is active */ + if (secmodel.model[0] != '\0') { + vshPrint(ctl, "%-15s %s\n", _("Security model:"), secmodel.model); + vshPrint(ctl, "%-15s %s\n", _("Security DOI:"), secmodel.doi); + + /* Security labels are only valid for active domains */ + memset(&seclabel, 0, sizeof seclabel); + if (virDomainGetSecurityLabel(dom, &seclabel) == -1) { + virDomainFree(dom); + return FALSE; + } else { + if (seclabel.label[0] != '\0') + vshPrint(ctl, "%-15s %s (%s)\n", _("Security label:"), + seclabel.label, seclabel.enforcing ? "enforcing" : "permissive"); + } + } + } virDomainFree(dom); return ret; } diff -up libvirt-0.6.0/src/virterror.c.svirt libvirt-0.6.0/src/virterror.c --- libvirt-0.6.0/src/virterror.c.svirt 2009-01-31 04:04:18.000000000 -0500 +++ libvirt-0.6.0/src/virterror.c 2009-02-17 10:07:06.454684000 -0500 @@ -151,6 +151,9 @@ static const char *virErrorDomainName(vi case VIR_FROM_UML: dom = "UML "; break; + case VIR_FROM_SECURITY: + dom = "Security Labeling "; + break; } return(dom); } @@ -962,6 +965,12 @@ virErrorMsg(virErrorNumber error, const else errmsg = _("Node device not found: %s"); break; + case VIR_ERR_NO_SECURITY_MODEL: + if (info == NULL) + errmsg = _("Security model not found"); + else + errmsg = _("Security model not found: %s"); + break; } return (errmsg); } diff -up libvirt-0.6.0/src/xml.c.svirt libvirt-0.6.0/src/xml.c --- libvirt-0.6.0/src/xml.c.svirt 2009-01-31 04:04:18.000000000 -0500 +++ libvirt-0.6.0/src/xml.c 2009-02-17 10:07:06.461676000 -0500 @@ -77,6 +77,39 @@ virXPathString(virConnectPtr conn, } /** + * virXPathStringLimit: + * @xpath: the XPath string to evaluate + * @maxlen: maximum length permittred string + * @ctxt: an XPath context + * + * Wrapper for virXPathString, which validates the length of the returned + * string. + * + * Returns a new string which must be deallocated by the caller or NULL if + * the evaluation failed. + */ +char * +virXPathStringLimit(virConnectPtr conn, + const char *xpath, + size_t maxlen, + xmlXPathContextPtr ctxt) +{ + char *tmp = virXPathString(conn, xpath, ctxt); + + if (tmp != NULL) { + if (strlen(tmp) >= maxlen) { + virXMLError(conn, VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR, + _("\'%s\' value longer than %Zd bytes in virXPathStringLimit()"), + xpath, maxlen); + return NULL; + } + } else + virXMLError(conn, VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR, + _("\'%s\' missing in virXPathStringLimit()"), xpath); + return tmp; +} + +/** * virXPathNumber: * @xpath: the XPath string to evaluate * @ctxt: an XPath context diff -up libvirt-0.6.0/src/xml.h.svirt libvirt-0.6.0/src/xml.h --- libvirt-0.6.0/src/xml.h.svirt 2008-08-12 03:13:00.000000000 -0400 +++ libvirt-0.6.0/src/xml.h 2009-02-17 10:07:06.467677000 -0500 @@ -17,6 +17,10 @@ int virXPathBoolean (virConnectPtr conn char * virXPathString (virConnectPtr conn, const char *xpath, xmlXPathContextPtr ctxt); +char * virXPathStringLimit(virConnectPtr conn, + const char *xpath, + size_t maxlen, + xmlXPathContextPtr ctxt); int virXPathNumber (virConnectPtr conn, const char *xpath, xmlXPathContextPtr ctxt, diff -up libvirt-0.6.0/tests/daemon-conf.svirt libvirt-0.6.0/tests/daemon-conf --- libvirt-0.6.0/tests/daemon-conf.svirt 2008-12-22 08:21:49.000000000 -0500 +++ libvirt-0.6.0/tests/daemon-conf 2009-02-17 10:07:06.470678000 -0500 @@ -63,6 +63,9 @@ while :; do -e '/^libnuma: Warning: .sys not mounted or no numa system/d' \ err > k && mv k err + # Filter out this diagnostic, too. + sed '/^Initialized security driver/d' err > k && mv k err + printf '%s\n\n' "remoteReadConfigFile: $f: $param_name: $msg" > expected-err diff -u expected-err err || fail=1

5 24

[libvirt] KVM netowrk setting
by aliahsan naqvi 03 Mar '09

03 Mar '09

HI All I have KVM virtual machine running under bridging.I don't want to use bridging/Nating.I want to use routing via IPTABLES to route traffic toward the virtual machine is that possible.These thing benifit me in flitering .And i have live ip on virtual machine.Please let me how i can achive this. _________________________________________________________________ Windows Live™ Groups: Create an online spot for your favorite groups to meet. http://windowslive.com/online/groups?ocid=TXT_TAGLM_WL_groups_032009

1 0

[libvirt] [PATCH] virsh: adjust remaining format strings to avoid emitting trailing space
by Jim Meyering 03 Mar '09

03 Mar '09

This may help avoid testing churn and makes the format strings more uniform. This is identical to yesterday's change, http://git.et.redhat.com/?p=libvirt.git;a=commitdiff;h=b285e110625 but applies the same idea to all of the format strings. >From 2a837515b419cadd1943b3078e5d7b3b116e42ef Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jim Meyering <meyering(a)redhat.com> Date: Tue, 3 Mar 2009 13:28:39 +0100 Subject: [PATCH] virsh: adjust remaining format strings to avoid emitting trailing space * src/virsh.c (cmdNetworkList, cmdPoolList, cmdVolList): Change format strings like "%-20s\n" to "%s\n". --- src/virsh.c | 13 +++++++------ 1 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/virsh.c b/src/virsh.c index 6a257ca..9f143a0 100644 --- a/src/virsh.c +++ b/src/virsh.c @@ -2640,7 +2640,7 @@ cmdNetworkList(vshControl *ctl, const vshCmd *cmd ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED) else autostartStr = autostart ? "yes" : "no"; - vshPrint(ctl, "%-20s %-10s %-10s\n", + vshPrint(ctl, "%-20s %-10s %s\n", virNetworkGetName(network), _("active"), autostartStr); @@ -3370,7 +3370,8 @@ cmdPoolList(vshControl *ctl, const vshCmd *cmd ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED) qsort(&inactiveNames[0], maxinactive, sizeof(char*), namesorter); } } - vshPrintExtra(ctl, "%-20s %-10s %-10s\n", _("Name"), _("State"), _("Autostart")); + vshPrintExtra(ctl, "%-20s %-10s %s\n", + _("Name"), _("State"), _("Autostart")); vshPrintExtra(ctl, "-----------------------------------------\n"); for (i = 0; i < maxactive; i++) { @@ -3389,7 +3390,7 @@ cmdPoolList(vshControl *ctl, const vshCmd *cmd ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED) else autostartStr = autostart ? "yes" : "no"; - vshPrint(ctl, "%-20s %-10s %-10s\n", + vshPrint(ctl, "%-20s %-10s %s\n", virStoragePoolGetName(pool), _("active"), autostartStr); @@ -3412,7 +3413,7 @@ cmdPoolList(vshControl *ctl, const vshCmd *cmd ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED) else autostartStr = autostart ? "yes" : "no"; - vshPrint(ctl, "%-20s %-10s %-10s\n", + vshPrint(ctl, "%-20s %-10s %s\n", inactiveNames[i], _("inactive"), autostartStr); @@ -4155,7 +4156,7 @@ cmdVolList(vshControl *ctl, const vshCmd *cmd ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED) qsort(&activeNames[0], maxactive, sizeof(char *), namesorter); } - vshPrintExtra(ctl, "%-20s %-40s\n", _("Name"), _("Path")); + vshPrintExtra(ctl, "%-20s %s\n", _("Name"), _("Path")); vshPrintExtra(ctl, "-----------------------------------------\n"); for (i = 0; i < maxactive; i++) { @@ -4174,7 +4175,7 @@ cmdVolList(vshControl *ctl, const vshCmd *cmd ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED) } - vshPrint(ctl, "%-20s %-40s\n", + vshPrint(ctl, "%-20s %s\n", virStorageVolGetName(vol), path); free(path); -- 1.6.2.rc1.285.gc5f54

2 1

[libvirt] [PATCH] don't leak a file descriptor on failed pciGetDevice call
by Jim Meyering 03 Mar '09

03 Mar '09

This loop would mistakenly return early (skipping the closedir) upon pciGetDevice failure. >From 2d4d1d25edf8f1c3f4770707215bba67d73fd59f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jim Meyering <meyering(a)redhat.com> Date: Tue, 3 Mar 2009 11:11:07 +0100 Subject: [PATCH] don't leak a file descriptor on failed pciGetDevice call * src/pci.c (pciIterDevices): Always close dir handle. --- src/pci.c | 14 +++++++++----- 1 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/pci.c b/src/pci.c index 2343be3..501c6aa 100644 --- a/src/pci.c +++ b/src/pci.c @@ -233,6 +233,7 @@ pciIterDevices(virConnectPtr conn, { DIR *dir; struct dirent *entry; + int ret = 0; *matched = NULL; @@ -252,14 +253,17 @@ pciIterDevices(virConnectPtr conn, if (entry->d_name[0] == '.') continue; - if (sscanf(entry->d_name, "%x:%x:%x.%x", &domain, &bus, &slot, &function) < 4) { + if (sscanf(entry->d_name, "%x:%x:%x.%x", + &domain, &bus, &slot, &function) < 4) { VIR_WARN("Unusual entry in " PCI_SYSFS "devices: %s", entry->d_name); continue; } try = pciGetDevice(conn, domain, bus, slot, function); - if (!try) - return -1; + if (!try) { + ret = -1; + break; + } if (predicate(try, dev)) { VIR_DEBUG("%s %s: iter matched on %s", dev->id, dev->name, try->name); @@ -269,7 +273,7 @@ pciIterDevices(virConnectPtr conn, pciFreeDevice(conn, try); } closedir(dir); - return 0; + return ret; } static uint8_t @@ -823,7 +827,7 @@ void pciFreeDevice(virConnectPtr conn ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED, pciDevice *dev) { VIR_DEBUG("%s %s: freeing", dev->id, dev->name); - if (dev->fd) + if (dev->fd >= 0) close(dev->fd); VIR_FREE(dev); } -- 1.6.2.rc1.285.gc5f54

2 4

[libvirt] PATCH: Remove qemudLog() macro, use logging.h instead
by Daniel P. Berrange 03 Mar '09

03 Mar '09

The qemudLog() macro just spews its messages to stderr. This patch changes it to use the proper logging.h APIs, so the output channel is configurable in the expected way. Daniel diff --git a/src/iptables.c b/src/iptables.c --- a/src/iptables.c +++ b/src/iptables.c @@ -45,8 +45,7 @@ #include "util.h" #include "memory.h" #include "virterror_internal.h" - -#define qemudLog(level, msg...) fprintf(stderr, msg) +#include "logging.h" enum { ADD = 0, @@ -101,7 +100,7 @@ notifyRulesUpdated(const char *table, char ebuf[1024]; if (virRun(NULL, argv, NULL) < 0) - qemudLog(QEMUD_WARN, _("Failed to run '%s %s': %s"), + VIR_WARN(_("Failed to run '%s %s': %s"), LOKKIT_PATH, arg, virStrerror(errno, ebuf, sizeof ebuf)); } @@ -149,8 +148,8 @@ notifyRulesRemoved(const char *table, len = virFileReadAll(SYSCONF_DIR "/sysconfig/system-config-firewall", MAX_FILE_LEN, &content); if (len < 0) { - qemudLog(QEMUD_WARN, "%s", _("Failed to read " SYSCONF_DIR - "/sysconfig/system-config-firewall")); + VIR_WARN("%s", _("Failed to read " SYSCONF_DIR + "/sysconfig/system-config-firewall")); return; } @@ -178,8 +177,8 @@ notifyRulesRemoved(const char *table, write_error:; char ebuf[1024]; - qemudLog(QEMUD_WARN, _("Failed to write to " SYSCONF_DIR - "/sysconfig/system-config-firewall : %s"), + VIR_WARN(_("Failed to write to " SYSCONF_DIR + "/sysconfig/system-config-firewall : %s"), virStrerror(errno, ebuf, sizeof ebuf)); if (f) fclose(f); @@ -244,13 +243,13 @@ iptRulesSave(iptRules *rules) char ebuf[1024]; if ((err = virFileMakePath(rules->dir))) { - qemudLog(QEMUD_WARN, _("Failed to create directory %s : %s"), + VIR_WARN(_("Failed to create directory %s : %s"), rules->dir, virStrerror(err, ebuf, sizeof ebuf)); return; } if ((err = writeRules(rules->path, rules->rules, rules->nrules))) { - qemudLog(QEMUD_WARN, _("Failed to saves iptables rules to %s : %s"), + VIR_WARN(_("Failed to saves iptables rules to %s : %s"), rules->path, virStrerror(err, ebuf, sizeof ebuf)); return; } @@ -551,8 +550,7 @@ iptRulesReload(iptRules *rules) rule->argv[rule->command_idx] = (char *) "--delete"; if (virRun(NULL, rule->argv, NULL) < 0) - qemudLog(QEMUD_WARN, - _("Failed to remove iptables rule '%s'" + VIR_WARN(_("Failed to remove iptables rule '%s'" " from chain '%s' in table '%s': %s"), rule->rule, rules->chain, rules->table, virStrerror(errno, ebuf, sizeof ebuf)); @@ -562,8 +560,8 @@ iptRulesReload(iptRules *rules) for (i = 0; i < rules->nrules; i++) if (virRun(NULL, rules->rules[i].argv, NULL) < 0) - qemudLog(QEMUD_WARN, _("Failed to add iptables rule '%s'" - " to chain '%s' in table '%s': %s"), + VIR_WARN(_("Failed to add iptables rule '%s'" + " to chain '%s' in table '%s': %s"), rules->rules[i].rule, rules->chain, rules->table, virStrerror(errno, ebuf, sizeof ebuf)); } diff --git a/src/qemu_conf.c b/src/qemu_conf.c --- a/src/qemu_conf.c +++ b/src/qemu_conf.c @@ -47,6 +47,7 @@ #include "datatypes.h" #include "xml.h" #include "nodeinfo.h" +#include "logging.h" #define VIR_FROM_THIS VIR_FROM_QEMU @@ -77,8 +78,6 @@ VIR_ENUM_IMPL(qemuDiskCacheV2, VIR_DOMAI "writeback"); -#define qemudLog(level, msg...) fprintf(stderr, msg) - int qemudLoadDriverConfig(struct qemud_driver *driver, const char *filename) { virConfPtr conf; @@ -469,18 +468,16 @@ rewait: if (errno == EINTR) goto rewait; - qemudLog(QEMUD_ERR, - _("Unexpected exit status from qemu %d pid %lu"), - WEXITSTATUS(status), (unsigned long)child); + VIR_ERROR(_("Unexpected exit status from qemu %d pid %lu"), + WEXITSTATUS(status), (unsigned long)child); ret = -1; } /* Check & log unexpected exit status, but don't fail, * as there's really no need to throw an error if we did * actually read a valid version number above */ if (WEXITSTATUS(status) != 0) { - qemudLog(QEMUD_WARN, - _("Unexpected exit status '%d', qemu probably failed"), - WEXITSTATUS(status)); + VIR_ERROR(_("Unexpected exit status '%d', qemu probably failed"), + WEXITSTATUS(status)); } return ret; diff --git a/src/qemu_driver.c b/src/qemu_driver.c --- a/src/qemu_driver.c +++ b/src/qemu_driver.c @@ -82,8 +82,6 @@ static int qemudShutdown(void); -#define qemudLog(level, msg...) fprintf(stderr, msg) - static void qemuDriverLock(struct qemud_driver *driver) { virMutexLock(&driver->lock); @@ -220,9 +218,9 @@ qemudAutostartConfigs(struct qemud_drive int ret = qemudStartVMDaemon(conn, driver, vm, NULL, -1); if (ret < 0) { virErrorPtr err = virGetLastError(); - qemudLog(QEMUD_ERROR, _("Failed to autostart VM '%s': %s\n"), - vm->def->name, - err ? err->message : NULL); + VIR_ERROR(_("Failed to autostart VM '%s': %s\n"), + vm->def->name, + err ? err->message : NULL); } else { virDomainEventPtr event = virDomainEventNewFromObj(vm, @@ -306,8 +304,8 @@ qemudReconnectVMs(struct qemud_driver *d if ((config = virDomainConfigFile(NULL, driver->stateDir, vm->def->name)) == NULL) { - qemudLog(QEMUD_ERROR, _("Failed to read domain status for %s\n"), - vm->def->name); + VIR_ERROR(_("Failed to read domain status for %s\n"), + vm->def->name); goto next_error; } @@ -316,14 +314,14 @@ qemudReconnectVMs(struct qemud_driver *d vm->newDef = vm->def; vm->def = status->def; } else { - qemudLog(QEMUD_ERROR, _("Failed to parse domain status for %s\n"), - vm->def->name); + VIR_ERROR(_("Failed to parse domain status for %s\n"), + vm->def->name); goto next_error; } if ((rc = qemudOpenMonitor(NULL, driver, vm, status->monitorpath, 1)) != 0) { - qemudLog(QEMUD_ERROR, _("Failed to reconnect monitor for %s: %d\n"), - vm->def->name, rc); + VIR_ERROR(_("Failed to reconnect monitor for %s: %d\n"), + vm->def->name, rc); goto next_error; } @@ -369,7 +367,7 @@ qemudStartup(void) { return -1; if (virMutexInit(&qemu_driver->lock) < 0) { - qemudLog(QEMUD_ERROR, "%s", _("cannot initialize mutex")); + VIR_ERROR("%s", _("cannot initialize mutex")); VIR_FREE(qemu_driver); return -1; } @@ -422,8 +420,8 @@ qemudStartup(void) { if (virFileMakePath(qemu_driver->stateDir) < 0) { char ebuf[1024]; - qemudLog(QEMUD_ERROR, _("Failed to create state dir '%s': %s\n"), - qemu_driver->stateDir, virStrerror(errno, ebuf, sizeof ebuf)); + VIR_ERROR(_("Failed to create state dir '%s': %s\n"), + qemu_driver->stateDir, virStrerror(errno, ebuf, sizeof ebuf)); goto error; } @@ -901,7 +899,7 @@ static int qemudWaitForMonitor(virConnec "console", 3); if (close(logfd) < 0) { char ebuf[1024]; - qemudLog(QEMUD_WARN, _("Unable to close logfile: %s\n"), + VIR_WARN(_("Unable to close logfile: %s\n"), virStrerror(errno, ebuf, sizeof ebuf)); } @@ -1299,29 +1297,29 @@ static int qemudStartVMDaemon(virConnect tmp = progenv; while (*tmp) { if (safewrite(vm->logfile, *tmp, strlen(*tmp)) < 0) - qemudLog(QEMUD_WARN, _("Unable to write envv to logfile: %s\n"), + VIR_WARN(_("Unable to write envv to logfile: %s\n"), virStrerror(errno, ebuf, sizeof ebuf)); if (safewrite(vm->logfile, " ", 1) < 0) - qemudLog(QEMUD_WARN, _("Unable to write envv to logfile: %s\n"), + VIR_WARN(_("Unable to write envv to logfile: %s\n"), virStrerror(errno, ebuf, sizeof ebuf)); tmp++; } tmp = argv; while (*tmp) { if (safewrite(vm->logfile, *tmp, strlen(*tmp)) < 0) - qemudLog(QEMUD_WARN, _("Unable to write argv to logfile: %s\n"), + VIR_WARN(_("Unable to write argv to logfile: %s\n"), virStrerror(errno, ebuf, sizeof ebuf)); if (safewrite(vm->logfile, " ", 1) < 0) - qemudLog(QEMUD_WARN, _("Unable to write argv to logfile: %s\n"), + VIR_WARN(_("Unable to write argv to logfile: %s\n"), virStrerror(errno, ebuf, sizeof ebuf)); tmp++; } if (safewrite(vm->logfile, "\n", 1) < 0) - qemudLog(QEMUD_WARN, _("Unable to write argv to logfile: %s\n"), + VIR_WARN(_("Unable to write argv to logfile: %s\n"), virStrerror(errno, ebuf, sizeof ebuf)); if ((pos = lseek(vm->logfile, 0, SEEK_END)) < 0) - qemudLog(QEMUD_WARN, _("Unable to seek to end of logfile: %s\n"), + VIR_WARN(_("Unable to seek to end of logfile: %s\n"), virStrerror(errno, ebuf, sizeof ebuf)); for (i = 0 ; i < ntapfds ; i++) @@ -1399,7 +1397,7 @@ static void qemudShutdownVMDaemon(virCon if (!virDomainIsActive(vm)) return; - qemudLog(QEMUD_DEBUG, _("Shutting down VM '%s'\n"), vm->def->name); + VIR_DEBUG(_("Shutting down VM '%s'\n"), vm->def->name); if (virKillProcess(vm->pid, 0) == 0 && virKillProcess(vm->pid, SIGTERM) < 0) @@ -1414,7 +1412,7 @@ static void qemudShutdownVMDaemon(virCon if (close(vm->logfile) < 0) { char ebuf[1024]; - qemudLog(QEMUD_WARN, _("Unable to close logfile: %s\n"), + VIR_WARN(_("Unable to close logfile: %s\n"), virStrerror(errno, ebuf, sizeof ebuf)); } if (vm->monitor != -1) @@ -1426,7 +1424,7 @@ static void qemudShutdownVMDaemon(virCon virKillProcess(vm->pid, SIGKILL); if (qemudRemoveDomainStatus(conn, driver, vm) < 0) { - qemudLog(QEMUD_WARN, _("Failed to remove domain status for %s"), + VIR_WARN(_("Failed to remove domain status for %s"), vm->def->name); } vm->pid = -1; @@ -1473,8 +1471,8 @@ qemudDispatchVMEvent(int watch, int fd, if (events & (VIR_EVENT_HANDLE_HANGUP | VIR_EVENT_HANDLE_ERROR)) quit = 1; else { - qemudLog(QEMUD_ERROR, _("unhandled fd event %d for %s"), - events, vm->def->name); + VIR_ERROR(_("unhandled fd event %d for %s"), + events, vm->def->name); failed = 1; } } @@ -1587,7 +1585,7 @@ qemudMonitorCommandExtra(const virDomain /* Log, but ignore failures to write logfile for VM */ if (safewrite(vm->logfile, buf, strlen(buf)) < 0) { char ebuf[1024]; - qemudLog(QEMUD_WARN, _("Unable to log VM console data: %s\n"), + VIR_WARN(_("Unable to log VM console data: %s\n"), virStrerror(errno, ebuf, sizeof ebuf)); } @@ -1599,7 +1597,7 @@ qemudMonitorCommandExtra(const virDomain /* Log, but ignore failures to write logfile for VM */ if (safewrite(vm->logfile, buf, strlen(buf)) < 0) { char ebuf[1024]; - qemudLog(QEMUD_WARN, _("Unable to log VM console data: %s\n"), + VIR_WARN(_("Unable to log VM console data: %s\n"), virStrerror(errno, ebuf, sizeof ebuf)); } VIR_FREE(buf); @@ -3380,7 +3378,7 @@ static int qemudDomainAttachPciDiskDevic s += strlen(PCI_ATTACH_OK_MSG); if (virStrToLong_i ((const char*)s, &dummy, 10, &dev->data.disk->slotnum) == -1) - qemudLog(QEMUD_WARN, "%s", _("Unable to parse slot number\n")); + VIR_WARN("%s", _("Unable to parse slot number\n")); } else { qemudReportError (conn, dom, NULL, VIR_ERR_OPERATION_FAILED, _("adding %s disk failed"), type); @@ -4512,8 +4510,8 @@ cleanup: * overwrite the previous error, though, so we just throw something * to the logs and hope for the best */ - qemudLog(QEMUD_ERROR, _("Failed to resume guest %s after failure\n"), - vm->def->name); + VIR_ERROR(_("Failed to resume guest %s after failure\n"), + vm->def->name); } else { DEBUG ("cont reply: %s", info); diff --git a/src/uuid.c b/src/uuid.c --- a/src/uuid.c +++ b/src/uuid.c @@ -37,8 +37,7 @@ #include "internal.h" #include "util.h" #include "virterror_internal.h" - -#define qemudLog(level, msg...) fprintf(stderr, msg) +#include "logging.h" #ifndef ENODATA #define ENODATA EIO @@ -102,8 +101,7 @@ virUUIDGenerate(unsigned char *uuid) if ((err = virUUIDGenerateRandomBytes(uuid, VIR_UUID_BUFLEN))) { char ebuf[1024]; - qemudLog(QEMUD_WARN, - _("Falling back to pseudorandom UUID," + VIR_WARN(_("Falling back to pseudorandom UUID," " failed to generate random bytes: %s"), virStrerror(err, ebuf, sizeof ebuf)); } -- |: Red Hat, Engineering, London -o- http://people.redhat.com/berrange/ :| |: http://libvirt.org -o- http://virt-manager.org -o- http://ovirt.org :| |: http://autobuild.org -o- http://search.cpan.org/~danberr/ :| |: GnuPG: 7D3B9505 -o- F3C9 553F A1DA 4AC2 5648 23C1 B3DF F742 7D3B 9505 :|

2 2

[libvirt] tls_allowed_ip_list?
by Chris Lalancette 03 Mar '09

03 Mar '09

All, While doing testing on TLS, I came across the mention of "tls_allowed_ip_list" in the website documentation, here: http://libvirt.org/remote.html#Remote_libvirtd_configuration However, I don't see any implementation of the tls_allowed_ip_list in libvirt itself; a grep through the sources show that we are implementing "tls_allowed_dn_list", but not "tls_allowed_ip_list". Am I missing something in the sources? Should we update the libvirt.org documentation and remove that (seemingly non-existent) parameter? Or should I go in and implement the "tls_allowed_ip_list"? -- Chris Lalancette

3 5

[libvirt] [PATCH]: Fix qemu+tls negotiation
by Chris Lalancette 03 Mar '09

03 Mar '09

All, While doing testing on the migration stuff, I noticed that a connection string using tls (in my case, qemu+tls://host/system) was hanging up trying to connect. I traced this down to a bug in the newer qemud negotiation implementation. What is happening is that we are forgetting to clear client->handshake to 0 after successfully doing a remoteAccessCheck(); this means we were never putting the '\1' byte on the transmit queue to be sent to the client, so the client was essentially waiting forever for the server to respond. Fix this by clearing the handshake once we've successfully done the handshake. Signed-off-by: Chris Lalancette <clalance(a)redhat.com>

3 3

[libvirt] new test failure: QEMU XML-2-ARGV hostdev-pci-address
by Jim Meyering 03 Mar '09

03 Mar '09

FYI, at least on my Fedora 10 system, "make check" gets one failure: 52) QEMU XML-2-ARGV hostdev-pci-address ... Failed to open file '/sys/bus/pci/devices/0000:06:12.5/vendor': No such file or directory Failed to open file '/sys/bus/pci/devices/0000:06:12.5/device': No such file or directory libvir: error : this function is not supported by the hypervisor: Failed to read product/vendor ID for 0000:06:12.5 FAILED It's true, the containing directory doesn't exist: $ ls -1 /sys/bus/pci/devices/0000* /sys/bus/pci/devices/0000:00:00.0@ /sys/bus/pci/devices/0000:00:02.0@ /sys/bus/pci/devices/0000:00:02.1@ /sys/bus/pci/devices/0000:00:03.0@ /sys/bus/pci/devices/0000:00:19.0@ /sys/bus/pci/devices/0000:00:1a.0@ /sys/bus/pci/devices/0000:00:1a.1@ /sys/bus/pci/devices/0000:00:1a.2@ /sys/bus/pci/devices/0000:00:1a.7@ /sys/bus/pci/devices/0000:00:1b.0@ /sys/bus/pci/devices/0000:00:1c.0@ /sys/bus/pci/devices/0000:00:1c.1@ /sys/bus/pci/devices/0000:00:1c.2@ /sys/bus/pci/devices/0000:00:1c.3@ /sys/bus/pci/devices/0000:00:1c.4@ /sys/bus/pci/devices/0000:00:1d.0@ /sys/bus/pci/devices/0000:00:1d.1@ /sys/bus/pci/devices/0000:00:1d.2@ /sys/bus/pci/devices/0000:00:1d.7@ /sys/bus/pci/devices/0000:00:1e.0@ /sys/bus/pci/devices/0000:00:1f.0@ /sys/bus/pci/devices/0000:00:1f.2@ /sys/bus/pci/devices/0000:00:1f.3@ /sys/bus/pci/devices/0000:03:00.0@ /sys/bus/pci/devices/0000:06:00.0@ /sys/bus/pci/devices/0000:06:03.0@ $ readlink /sys/bus/pci/devices/0000:00:1c.4 ../../../devices/pci0000:00/0000:00:1c.4 I'll look into it in about 30 minutes.

1 0

[libvirt] tweak a format string and add a test
by Jim Meyering 02 Mar '09

02 Mar '09

I'm about to commit these (like what I already posted, but now the test kills libvirtd): >From 944052f2287f1a07034be16ea08d620c55eecd6e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jim Meyering <meyering(a)redhat.com> Date: Mon, 2 Mar 2009 14:46:20 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 1/2] virsh: tweak a format string to avoid emitting trailing space * src/virsh.c (cmdNetworkList): Change format not to right-pad with spaces, as that would have required a trailing blank in an expected output file. --- src/virsh.c | 2 +- 1 files changed, 1 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/virsh.c b/src/virsh.c index 8ae79c5..c23fdda 100644 --- a/src/virsh.c +++ b/src/virsh.c @@ -2596,7 +2596,7 @@ cmdNetworkList(vshControl *ctl, const vshCmd *cmd ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED) qsort(&inactiveNames[0], maxinactive, sizeof(char*), namesorter); } } - vshPrintExtra(ctl, "%-20s %-10s %-10s\n", _("Name"), _("State"), _("Autostart")); + vshPrintExtra(ctl, "%-20s %-10s %s\n", _("Name"), _("State"), _("Autostart")); vshPrintExtra(ctl, "-----------------------------------------\n"); for (i = 0; i < maxactive; i++) { -- 1.6.2.rc1.285.gc5f54 >From dfeac0d70dce4a84ee5d70553ec3929bdbeab0c4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jim Meyering <meyering(a)redhat.com> Date: Mon, 2 Mar 2009 14:32:59 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 2/2] tests: test for a recent fix * tests/libvirtd-net-persist: New file. Test for the "Mark defined networks as persistent" fix. * tests/Makefile.am (test_scripts): Add it. --- tests/Makefile.am | 1 + tests/libvirtd-net-persist | 58 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 59 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-) create mode 100755 tests/libvirtd-net-persist diff --git a/tests/Makefile.am b/tests/Makefile.am index bec4f60..7479e03 100644 --- a/tests/Makefile.am +++ b/tests/Makefile.am @@ -81,6 +81,7 @@ test_scripts += \ daemon-conf \ define-dev-segfault \ int-overflow \ + libvirtd-net-persist \ read-bufsiz \ read-non-seekable \ start \ diff --git a/tests/libvirtd-net-persist b/tests/libvirtd-net-persist new file mode 100755 index 0000000..50a1ef4 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/libvirtd-net-persist @@ -0,0 +1,58 @@ +#!/bin/sh +# ensure that net-destroy doesn't make network disappear (persistence-related) + +if test "$VERBOSE" = yes; then + set -x + libvirtd --version + virsh --version +fi + +test -z "$srcdir" && srcdir=$(pwd) +test -z "$abs_top_srcdir" && abs_top_srcdir=$(pwd)/.. +. "$srcdir/test-lib.sh" + +fail=0 + +pwd=$(pwd) || fail=1 +sock_dir="$pwd" +cat > conf <<EOF || fail=1 +unix_sock_dir = "$sock_dir" +log_outputs = "3:file:$pwd/log" +EOF + +cat > net.xml <<EOF || fail=1 +<network> + <name>N</name> + <ip address="192.168.199.1" netmask="255.255.255.0"></ip> +</network> +EOF + +cat > exp <<EOF || fail=1 +Network N defined from net.xml + +Network N destroyed + +Name State Autostart +----------------------------------------- +N inactive no + +EOF + +libvirtd --config=conf > libvirtd-log 2>&1 & pid=$! +sleep 1 + +url="qemu:///session?socket=@$sock_dir/libvirt-sock" +virsh -c "$url" \ + 'net-define net.xml; net-destroy N; net-list --all' > out 2>&1 \ + || fail=1 + +# if libvird's log is empty, sleep for a second before killing it +test -s libvirtd-log || sleep 1 +kill $pid + +compare exp out || fail=1 + +printf "Shutting down network 'N'\n" > log-exp +compare log-exp libvirtd-log || fail=1 + +exit $fail -- 1.6.2.rc1.285.gc5f54

3 3

[libvirt] [PATCH 1..2] make a test more robust, and add two more
by Jim Meyering 02 Mar '09

02 Mar '09

Here's a rebased patch from a month or two ago. It's only fixing and adding tests, so I'll commit it momentarily. Dan Berrange noticed that daemon-conf could interfere with existing domains, so the latter patch below makes it use the new log-setting and unix_sock_dir-setting config options as well as the option to select a per-test PID file. >From efee209a2adf6f2478de26fe25c73bd4c38316ea Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jim Meyering <meyering(a)redhat.com> Date: Thu, 8 Jan 2009 20:18:17 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 1/2] add two tests * tests/libvirtd-pool: New file. Exercise the new unix_sock_dir option * tests/libvirtd-fail: New file. * tests/Makefile.am (test_scripts): Add libvirtd-fail and libvirtd-pool. *** empty log message *** --- tests/Makefile.am | 2 + tests/libvirtd-fail | 21 +++++++++++++++++ tests/libvirtd-pool | 63 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 86 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-) create mode 100755 tests/libvirtd-fail create mode 100755 tests/libvirtd-pool diff --git a/tests/Makefile.am b/tests/Makefile.am index b40785f..11ffe76 100644 --- a/tests/Makefile.am +++ b/tests/Makefile.am @@ -81,7 +81,9 @@ test_scripts += \ daemon-conf \ define-dev-segfault \ int-overflow \ + libvirtd-fail \ libvirtd-net-persist \ + libvirtd-pool \ read-bufsiz \ read-non-seekable \ start \ diff --git a/tests/libvirtd-fail b/tests/libvirtd-fail new file mode 100755 index 0000000..92b82c4 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/libvirtd-fail @@ -0,0 +1,21 @@ +#!/bin/sh +# Ensure that libvirt fails when given nonexistent --config=FILE + +if test "$VERBOSE" = yes; then + set -x + libvirtd --version +fi + +test -z "$srcdir" && srcdir=$(pwd) +test -z "$abs_top_srcdir" && abs_top_srcdir=$(pwd)/.. +. "$srcdir/test-lib.sh" + +fail=0 + +libvirtd --config=no-such-file > log 2>&1 && fail=1 +cat <<\EOF > exp +Failed to open file 'no-such-file': No such file or directory +EOF + +compare exp log || fail=1 +exit $fail diff --git a/tests/libvirtd-pool b/tests/libvirtd-pool new file mode 100755 index 0000000..370f3b1 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/libvirtd-pool @@ -0,0 +1,63 @@ +#!/bin/sh +# Get coverage of libvirtd's config-parsing code. + +if test "$VERBOSE" = yes; then + set -x + libvirtd --version + virsh --version +fi + +test -z "$srcdir" && srcdir=$(pwd) +test -z "$abs_top_srcdir" && abs_top_srcdir=$(pwd)/.. +. "$srcdir/test-lib.sh" + +fail=0 + +pwd=$(pwd) || fail=1 +sock_dir="$pwd" +cat > conf <<EOF || fail=1 +unix_sock_dir = "$sock_dir" +log_outputs = "3:file:$pwd/log" +EOF + +libvirtd --config=conf > libvirtd-log 2>&1 & pid=$! +sleep 1 + +url="qemu:///session?socket=@$sock_dir/libvirt-sock" +virsh --connect "$url" \ + pool-define-as P dir src-host /src/path /src/dev S /target-path > out 2>&1 \ + || fail=1 +virsh --connect "$url" pool-dumpxml P >> out 2>&1 || fail=1 + +# remove random uuid +sed 's/<uuid>.*/-/' out > k && mv k out || fail=1 + +kill $pid + +cat <<EOF > pool-list-exp +Pool P defined + +<pool type='dir'> + <name>P</name> + - + <capacity>0</capacity> + <allocation>0</allocation> + <available>0</available> + <source> + </source> + <target> + <path>/target-path</path> + <permissions> + <mode>0700</mode> + <owner>500</owner> + <group>500</group> + </permissions> + </target> +</pool> + +EOF + +compare pool-list-exp out || fail=1 +compare /dev/null libvirtd-log || fail=1 + +exit $fail -- 1.6.2.rc1.285.gc5f54 >From e94ab9fcb3e5e1c180308d638956cfc05078df1e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jim Meyering <meyering(a)redhat.com> Date: Tue, 13 Jan 2009 10:54:41 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 2/2] tests: further isolate a test that runs libvirtd * tests/daemon-conf: Specify a non-default socket directory. Specify test-specific log directory and pid file, too. --- tests/daemon-conf | 12 +++++++++++- 1 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-) diff --git a/tests/daemon-conf b/tests/daemon-conf index 7a53eff..a5e86ae 100755 --- a/tests/daemon-conf +++ b/tests/daemon-conf @@ -67,8 +67,18 @@ done # Run with the unmodified config file. sleep_secs=2 + +# Be careful to specify a non-default socket directory: +sed 's,^unix_sock_dir.*,unix_sock_dir="'"$(pwd)"'",' tmp.conf > k || fail=1 +mv k tmp.conf || fail=1 + +# Also, specify a test-specific log directory: +sed 's,^log_outputs.*,log_outputs="3:file:'"$(pwd)/log"'",' tmp.conf > k \ + || fail=1 +mv k tmp.conf || fail=1 + printf "running libvirtd with a valid config file ($sleep_secs seconds)\n" 1>&2 -libvirtd --config=tmp.conf > log 2>&1 & pid=$! +libvirtd --pid-file=pid-file --config=tmp.conf > log 2>&1 & pid=$! sleep $sleep_secs kill $pid -- 1.6.2.rc1.285.gc5f54

2 1

[libvirt] [PATCH] Don't log qemu monitor output from blockStats
by Cole Robinson 02 Mar '09

02 Mar '09

The attached patch changes the qemu driver blockStats command to not log qemu monitor output. virt-manager offers an option to continually poll VM disk stats, and if the app is left running for a while with many VMs, this can make the logs huge, for little benefit (a user reported 100 MB with virt-manager left running overnight). The output from the command is still printed with a DEBUG call, so the info isn't completely lost. Thanks, Cole

2 3

[libvirt] PATCH: Add two missing symbol exports
by Daniel P. Berrange 02 Mar '09

02 Mar '09

If building with --with-driver-modules, the Xen and OpenVZ drivers fail to dlopen() because of a couple of missing symbol exports. THis patch adds them Daniel Index: src/libvirt_private.syms =================================================================== RCS file: /data/cvs/libvirt/src/libvirt_private.syms,v retrieving revision 1.23 diff -u -p -u -p -r1.23 libvirt_private.syms --- src/libvirt_private.syms 2 Mar 2009 17:39:43 -0000 1.23 +++ src/libvirt_private.syms 2 Mar 2009 18:23:07 -0000 @@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ virCapabilitiesFormatXML; virCapabilitiesFree; virCapabilitiesNew; virCapabilitiesSetMacPrefix; +virCapabilitiesGenerateMac; # conf.h @@ -47,6 +48,7 @@ virGetStoragePool; virGetStorageVol; virGetNodeDevice; virUnrefDomain; +virUnrefConnect; # domain_conf.h -- |: Red Hat, Engineering, London -o- http://people.redhat.com/berrange/ :| |: http://libvirt.org -o- http://virt-manager.org -o- http://ovirt.org :| |: http://autobuild.org -o- http://search.cpan.org/~danberr/ :| |: GnuPG: 7D3B9505 -o- F3C9 553F A1DA 4AC2 5648 23C1 B3DF F742 7D3B 9505 :|

2 1

[libvirt] PATCH: Always reset PCI devices
by Daniel P. Berrange 02 Mar '09

02 Mar '09

Mark's patches added a attribute managed='yes|no' for PCI <hostdev> configuration. This allows the caller app to indicate who is responsible for attaching/detaching the PCI device from the host drivers. When using managed=yes, libvirt does it, while using managed=no, the someone else should do it - typically blacklist the devices in /etc/modprobe.conf Before launching a guest though the devices need to be reset. Mark made the reset operation conditional on managed=yes, which was not what I had intended. libvirtd should always reset the devices so they are in a sane state before booting, regardless of who manages the host driver binding. The forthcoming PCI passthrough suppor in the Xen driver will work in this way - we'll only support managed=no, but XenD will still always do the reset of devices I also add a comment to remind us that we should add validation that the PCI device is not still in use in the non-managed case. Daniel Index: src/qemu_conf.c =================================================================== RCS file: /data/cvs/libvirt/src/qemu_conf.c,v retrieving revision 1.132 diff -u -p -u -p -r1.132 qemu_conf.c --- src/qemu_conf.c 2 Mar 2009 16:40:31 -0000 1.132 +++ src/qemu_conf.c 2 Mar 2009 18:23:07 -0000 @@ -1411,7 +1411,9 @@ int qemudBuildCommandLine(virConnectPtr } pciFreeDevice(conn, dev); - } + } /* else { + XXX validate that non-managed device isn't in use + } */ } } @@ -1421,8 +1423,7 @@ int qemudBuildCommandLine(virConnectPtr virDomainHostdevDefPtr hostdev = vm->def->hostdevs[i]; pciDevice *dev; - if (!hostdev->managed || - hostdev->mode != VIR_DOMAIN_HOSTDEV_MODE_SUBSYS || + if (hostdev->mode != VIR_DOMAIN_HOSTDEV_MODE_SUBSYS || hostdev->source.subsys.type != VIR_DOMAIN_HOSTDEV_SUBSYS_TYPE_PCI) continue; -- |: Red Hat, Engineering, London -o- http://people.redhat.com/berrange/ :| |: http://libvirt.org -o- http://virt-manager.org -o- http://ovirt.org :| |: http://autobuild.org -o- http://search.cpan.org/~danberr/ :| |: GnuPG: 7D3B9505 -o- F3C9 553F A1DA 4AC2 5648 23C1 B3DF F742 7D3B 9505 :|

2 1

[libvirt] [PATCH] tests: fix an error that made us skip the daemon-conf test
by Jim Meyering 02 Mar '09

02 Mar '09

FYI, I'm committing this as obvious. Otherwise, you'd get this: grep: /h/meyering/w/co/libvirt/lib/config.h: No such file or directory ./daemon-conf: skipping test: configured without QEMU support SKIP: daemon-conf >From e92b94d5b84d2f840ea3e0f88c17411167cfeac8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jim Meyering <meyering(a)redhat.com> Date: Mon, 2 Mar 2009 20:01:50 +0100 Subject: [PATCH] tests: fix an error that made us skip the daemon-conf test * tests/Makefile.am (CONFIG_HEADER): Correct definition. --- tests/Makefile.am | 2 +- 1 files changed, 1 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-) diff --git a/tests/Makefile.am b/tests/Makefile.am index 7479e03..b40785f 100644 --- a/tests/Makefile.am +++ b/tests/Makefile.am @@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ TESTS_ENVIRONMENT = \ abs_top_srcdir=`cd '$(top_srcdir)'; pwd` \ abs_builddir=`cd '$(builddir)'; pwd` \ abs_srcdir=`cd '$(srcdir)'; pwd` \ - CONFIG_HEADER='$(abs_top_builddir)/lib/config.h' \ + CONFIG_HEADER='$(abs_top_builddir)/config.h' \ PATH="$(path_add)$(PATH_SEPARATOR)$$PATH" \ SHELL="$(SHELL)" \ LIBVIRT_DRIVER_DIR="$(abs_top_builddir)/src/.libs" \ -- 1.6.2.rc1.285.gc5f54

1 0

[libvirt] many more config variables required? or 1 "prefix" config
by Jim Meyering 02 Mar '09

02 Mar '09

I found network-related config from one test leaking into another and making the latter test fail, despite my use of what I thought was everything required to keep them separate (unix_sock_dir and log_outputs both set in config, and --pid-file specified on command line). Unfortunately, there are still hard-coded references to some files. /* Configuration paths are either ~/.libvirt/qemu/... (session) or * /etc/libvirt/qemu/... (system). That's from network_driver.c, to set these variables: struct network_driver ->networkConfigDir ->networkAutostartDir However, storage_driver is nearly identical in that respect. It also uses ~/.libvirt/ vs SYSCONF_DIR/libvirt. Same for uml_driver.c. So, rather than adding new variables for each of these six new parameters, how about just one new config parameter to allow specification of a directory prefix that would replace "~" and "/etc" in determining how to form config-related names? Being able to run multiple libvirtd processes in parallel without having one affect another is a hard requirement for any serious testing.

2 1

[libvirt] [PATCH] Account for defined networks when generating bridge names
by Cole Robinson 02 Mar '09

02 Mar '09

This is the second part of the fix for rhbz 479622. If we are generating a bridge name for a virtual network, don't collide with any bridge name in a defined network. This patch also generates a bridge name at network define time, if none was passed in the xml. The downside to all this is that it won't fix things for existing victims of the bug: if they have 2 networks with the same bridge device in the xml, we can't intelligently remedy the situation. This patch just helps prevent future users getting into that predicament. Thanks, Cole

3 6

[libvirt] [PATCH] Remove redundant monitorWatch
by Cole Robinson 02 Mar '09

02 Mar '09

For some reason there are two VMDef members being used to keep track of monitor event handles: monitor_watch and monitorWatch. Remove the latter. Thanks, Cole

3 5

[libvirt] [PATCH] Better error reporting in qemu AttachDevice
by Cole Robinson 02 Mar '09

02 Mar '09

The attached patch fixes qemu AttachDevice to show the invalid disk bus or type in it's error messages. This also adds an error message where previously we could fall through, leading virsh to print 'Unknown Error' if attempting to hotplug an IDE disk. Thanks, Cole

3 3

[libvirt] [PATCH] Recognize available media in nodedev hal driver
by Cole Robinson 02 Mar '09

02 Mar '09

The host device hal driver can't tell when a storage device has media available, the culprit being an incorrect return value check. The attached patch fixes this. Unfortunately the driver also doesn't properly detect media eject and media inserted hal events. I've been poking at this but it's a more involved fix. Thanks, Cole

3 3

[libvirt] [PATCH] Mark defined networks as persistent
by Cole Robinson 02 Mar '09

02 Mar '09

We aren't setting the persistent bit when a network is defined, so 'destroy' makes them disappear (though they will reappear later since their persistent config is never removed). Attached patch fixes this. Thanks, Cole

3 5

[libvirt] [PATCH] Don't validate disk type in virsh attach-disk
by Cole Robinson 02 Mar '09

02 Mar '09

virsh attempts to validate the requested disk type, rather than just let the underlying driver do it. This was erroneously denying floppy device attaches. Patch attached. Thanks, Cole

3 8

[libvirt] [PATCH 0/6] Add device assignment related node device methods (v2)
by Mark McLoughlin 02 Mar '09

02 Mar '09

Hey, Okay, here's the patches again with the following changes: - Pass virConnectPtr to all pciDevice methods - Read the vendor/product ID from sysfs rather than supplying it to pciGetDevice() - Re-factor the Dettach/ReAttach() so that it can be more easily used with pciback - Add <hostdev managed='(yes|no)'> - Dettach and reset managed hostdev devices before starting a QEMU guest Cheers, Mark.

3 9

[libvirt] How to stop libvirt from deleting tap device after shutdown
by Matthias Dahl 02 Mar '09

02 Mar '09

Hi. I am currently setting up a new server machine which will host several kvm's managed largely by libvirt. The network setup though is done prior to libvirtd startup and shouldn't be touched by it. So currently everything works just fine with 0.6.0 except that libvirt deletes the tap device after I shut a kvm machine down which is something I naturally don't want. I looked through all the documentation I could find but I could not come up with a solution. Forgot to mention: all kvm machine are connected through a tap device with no bridge or whatsoever but 1:1 NAT. This done for performance reasons. As model I use "virtio". Any help would be greatly appreciated. Best regards, Matthias Dahl = XML File for one of the machines =========================================== <domain type='kvm'> <name>charon</name> <uuid>08a3af0e-f145-54c6-30a2-efdab5478523</uuid> <memory>2097152</memory> <currentMemory>524288</currentMemory> <vcpu>1</vcpu> <os> <type arch='x86_64' machine='pc'>hvm</type> <boot dev='hd'/> </os> <features> <acpi/> </features> <clock offset='utc'/> <on_poweroff>destroy</on_poweroff> <on_reboot>restart</on_reboot> <on_crash>restart</on_crash> <devices> <emulator>/usr/bin/kvm</emulator> <disk type='file' device='disk'> <source file='/dev/diskspace/kvm_charon'/> <target dev='vda' bus='virtio'/> </disk> <interface type='ethernet'> <mac address='52:54:00:25:6f:3f'/> <script path='/bin/true'/> <target dev='charon_pvnet1'/> <model type='virtio'/> </interface> <serial type='pty'> <source path='/dev/pts/1'/> <target port='0'/> </serial> <console type='pty' tty='/dev/pts/1'> <source path='/dev/pts/1'/> <target port='0'/> </console> </devices> </domain>

2 1