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[libvirt] [PATCH] Report an clear error when try to build lvm2 type pool
by Shanzhi Yu 10 Jun '14

10 Jun '14

STORAGE_POOL_DISK_LVM2 can't be created by "parted mklabel", so report an error when build such type pool Signed-off-by: Shanzhi Yu <shyu(a)redhat.com> --- src/storage/storage_backend_disk.c | 10 +++++++++- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/src/storage/storage_backend_disk.c b/src/storage/storage_backend_disk.c index 8e12974..5b5a1fa 100644 --- a/src/storage/storage_backend_disk.c +++ b/src/storage/storage_backend_disk.c @@ -414,13 +414,21 @@ virStorageBackendDiskBuildPool(virConnectPtr conn ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED, goto error; } - if (flags & VIR_STORAGE_POOL_BUILD_OVERWRITE) + if (flags & VIR_STORAGE_POOL_BUILD_OVERWRITE && + pool->def->source.format != VIR_STORAGE_POOL_DISK_LVM2) ok_to_mklabel = true; else { int check; check = virStorageBackendDiskFindLabel( pool->def->source.devices[0].path); + + if (pool->def->source.format == VIR_STORAGE_POOL_DISK_LVM2){ + virReportError(VIR_ERR_OPERATION_INVALID, "%s", + _("Invalid disk label: lvm2")); + goto error; + } + if (check > 0) { ok_to_mklabel = true; } else if (check < 0) { -- 1.9.3

1 0

[libvirt] [PATCH] qemu: Properly label FDs while saving domain for successful restores in case of static labelling.
by Shivaprasad G Bhat 10 Jun '14

10 Jun '14

Static labelling has the relabel set to no by default and restore of a saved image file fails when the selinux context is static. This is because the saved file doesnt have the context set during the saving. The libvirt has to set the conext of save image file to that of the guest during save. The fix applies to both managedsave and save codepath. The managedsave works as is without the fix as well since the files are saved in the directory having viable default context. Signed-off-by: Shivaprasad G Bhat <shivaprasadbhat(a)gmail.com> --- src/qemu/qemu_driver.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c b/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c index 3a7622a..e4390ee 100644 --- a/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c +++ b/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c @@ -2966,6 +2966,9 @@ qemuDomainSaveMemory(virQEMUDriverPtr driver, if (fd < 0) goto cleanup; + if (asyncJob == QEMU_ASYNC_JOB_SAVE) + virSecurityManagerSetImageFDLabel(driver->securityManager, vm->def, fd); + if (!(wrapperFd = virFileWrapperFdNew(&fd, path, wrapperFlags))) goto cleanup;

1 0

[libvirt] [PATCH] SELinux: don't silently fail when no label is present
by Ján Tomko 10 Jun '14

10 Jun '14

This fixes startup of a domain with: <seclabel type='none' model='dac'/> on a host with selinux and dac drivers and security_default_confined = 0 https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1105939 --- src/security/security_selinux.c | 98 ++++++++++++----------------------------- 1 file changed, 29 insertions(+), 69 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/security/security_selinux.c b/src/security/security_selinux.c index 8380bba..008c58c 100644 --- a/src/security/security_selinux.c +++ b/src/security/security_selinux.c @@ -585,7 +585,7 @@ virSecuritySELinuxGenSecurityLabel(virSecurityManagerPtr mgr, seclabel = virDomainDefGetSecurityLabelDef(def, SECURITY_SELINUX_NAME); if (seclabel == NULL) - return rc; + return 0; data = virSecurityManagerGetPrivateData(mgr); @@ -739,11 +739,7 @@ virSecuritySELinuxReserveSecurityLabel(virSecurityManagerPtr mgr, virSecurityLabelDefPtr seclabel; seclabel = virDomainDefGetSecurityLabelDef(def, SECURITY_SELINUX_NAME); - if (seclabel == NULL) { - return -1; - } - - if (seclabel->type == VIR_DOMAIN_SECLABEL_STATIC) + if (!seclabel || seclabel->type == VIR_DOMAIN_SECLABEL_STATIC) return 0; if (getpidcon_raw(pid, &pctx) == -1) { @@ -1060,7 +1056,7 @@ virSecuritySELinuxSetSecurityTPMFileLabel(virSecurityManagerPtr mgr, seclabel = virDomainDefGetSecurityLabelDef(def, SECURITY_SELINUX_NAME); if (seclabel == NULL) - return -1; + return 0; switch (tpm->type) { case VIR_DOMAIN_TPM_TYPE_PASSTHROUGH: @@ -1102,7 +1098,7 @@ virSecuritySELinuxRestoreSecurityTPMFileLabelInt(virSecurityManagerPtr mgr, seclabel = virDomainDefGetSecurityLabelDef(def, SECURITY_SELINUX_NAME); if (seclabel == NULL) - return -1; + return 0; switch (tpm->type) { case VIR_DOMAIN_TPM_TYPE_PASSTHROUGH: @@ -1136,7 +1132,7 @@ virSecuritySELinuxRestoreSecurityImageLabelInt(virSecurityManagerPtr mgr, seclabel = virDomainDefGetSecurityLabelDef(def, SECURITY_SELINUX_NAME); if (seclabel == NULL) - return -1; + return 0; disk_seclabel = virDomainDiskDefGetSecurityLabelDef(disk, SECURITY_SELINUX_NAME); @@ -1256,10 +1252,7 @@ virSecuritySELinuxSetSecurityImageLabel(virSecurityManagerPtr mgr, cbdata.manager = mgr; cbdata.secdef = virDomainDefGetSecurityLabelDef(def, SECURITY_SELINUX_NAME); - if (cbdata.secdef == NULL) - return -1; - - if (cbdata.secdef->norelabel) + if (!cbdata.secdef || cbdata.secdef->norelabel) return 0; if (virDomainDiskGetType(disk) == VIR_STORAGE_TYPE_NETWORK) @@ -1279,7 +1272,7 @@ virSecuritySELinuxSetSecurityHostdevLabelHelper(const char *file, void *opaque) secdef = virDomainDefGetSecurityLabelDef(def, SECURITY_SELINUX_NAME); if (secdef == NULL) - return -1; + return 0; return virSecuritySELinuxSetFilecon(file, secdef->imagelabel); } @@ -1397,7 +1390,7 @@ virSecuritySELinuxSetSecurityHostdevCapsLabel(virDomainDefPtr def, secdef = virDomainDefGetSecurityLabelDef(def, SECURITY_SELINUX_NAME); if (secdef == NULL) - return -1; + return 0; switch (dev->source.caps.type) { case VIR_DOMAIN_HOSTDEV_CAPS_TYPE_STORAGE: { @@ -1447,10 +1440,7 @@ virSecuritySELinuxSetSecurityHostdevLabel(virSecurityManagerPtr mgr ATTRIBUTE_UN virSecurityLabelDefPtr secdef; secdef = virDomainDefGetSecurityLabelDef(def, SECURITY_SELINUX_NAME); - if (secdef == NULL) - return -1; - - if (secdef->norelabel) + if (!secdef || secdef->norelabel) return 0; switch (dev->mode) { @@ -1635,10 +1625,7 @@ virSecuritySELinuxRestoreSecurityHostdevLabel(virSecurityManagerPtr mgr, virSecurityLabelDefPtr secdef; secdef = virDomainDefGetSecurityLabelDef(def, SECURITY_SELINUX_NAME); - if (secdef == NULL) - return -1; - - if (secdef->norelabel) + if (!secdef || secdef->norelabel) return 0; switch (dev->mode) { @@ -1667,14 +1654,14 @@ virSecuritySELinuxSetSecurityChardevLabel(virDomainDefPtr def, int ret = -1; seclabel = virDomainDefGetSecurityLabelDef(def, SECURITY_SELINUX_NAME); - if (seclabel == NULL) - return -1; + if (!seclabel || seclabel->norelabel) + return 0; if (dev) chr_seclabel = virDomainChrDefGetSecurityLabelDef(dev, SECURITY_SELINUX_NAME); - if (seclabel->norelabel || (chr_seclabel && chr_seclabel->norelabel)) + if (chr_seclabel && chr_seclabel->norelabel) return 0; if (chr_seclabel) @@ -1738,13 +1725,13 @@ virSecuritySELinuxRestoreSecurityChardevLabel(virSecurityManagerPtr mgr, int ret = -1; seclabel = virDomainDefGetSecurityLabelDef(def, SECURITY_SELINUX_NAME); - if (seclabel == NULL) - return -1; + if (!seclabel || seclabel->norelabel) + return 0; if (dev) chr_seclabel = virDomainChrDefGetSecurityLabelDef(dev, SECURITY_SELINUX_NAME); - if (seclabel->norelabel || (chr_seclabel && chr_seclabel->norelabel)) + if (chr_seclabel && chr_seclabel->norelabel) return 0; switch (dev_source->type) { @@ -1864,7 +1851,7 @@ virSecuritySELinuxRestoreSecurityAllLabel(virSecurityManagerPtr mgr, secdef = virDomainDefGetSecurityLabelDef(def, SECURITY_SELINUX_NAME); if (secdef == NULL) - return -1; + return 0; if (secdef->norelabel || data->skipAllLabel) return 0; @@ -1925,7 +1912,7 @@ virSecuritySELinuxReleaseSecurityLabel(virSecurityManagerPtr mgr, secdef = virDomainDefGetSecurityLabelDef(def, SECURITY_SELINUX_NAME); if (secdef == NULL) - return -1; + return 0; if (secdef->type == VIR_DOMAIN_SECLABEL_DYNAMIC) { if (secdef->label != NULL) { @@ -1953,10 +1940,7 @@ virSecuritySELinuxSetSavedStateLabel(virSecurityManagerPtr mgr ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED, virSecurityLabelDefPtr secdef; secdef = virDomainDefGetSecurityLabelDef(def, SECURITY_SELINUX_NAME); - if (secdef == NULL) - return -1; - - if (secdef->norelabel) + if (!secdef || secdef->norelabel) return 0; return virSecuritySELinuxSetFilecon(savefile, secdef->imagelabel); @@ -1971,10 +1955,7 @@ virSecuritySELinuxRestoreSavedStateLabel(virSecurityManagerPtr mgr, virSecurityLabelDefPtr secdef; secdef = virDomainDefGetSecurityLabelDef(def, SECURITY_SELINUX_NAME); - if (secdef == NULL) - return -1; - - if (secdef->norelabel) + if (!secdef || secdef->norelabel) return 0; return virSecuritySELinuxRestoreSecurityFileLabel(mgr, savefile); @@ -1989,7 +1970,7 @@ virSecuritySELinuxSecurityVerify(virSecurityManagerPtr mgr ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED, secdef = virDomainDefGetSecurityLabelDef(def, SECURITY_SELINUX_NAME); if (secdef == NULL) - return -1; + return 0; if (!STREQ(SECURITY_SELINUX_NAME, secdef->model)) { virReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR, @@ -2018,10 +1999,7 @@ virSecuritySELinuxSetSecurityProcessLabel(virSecurityManagerPtr mgr ATTRIBUTE_UN virSecurityLabelDefPtr secdef; secdef = virDomainDefGetSecurityLabelDef(def, SECURITY_SELINUX_NAME); - if (secdef == NULL) - return -1; - - if (secdef->label == NULL) + if (!secdef || !secdef->label) return 0; VIR_DEBUG("label=%s", secdef->label); @@ -2055,10 +2033,7 @@ virSecuritySELinuxSetSecurityChildProcessLabel(virSecurityManagerPtr mgr ATTRIBU virSecurityLabelDefPtr secdef; secdef = virDomainDefGetSecurityLabelDef(def, SECURITY_SELINUX_NAME); - if (secdef == NULL) - return -1; - - if (secdef->label == NULL) + if (!secdef || !secdef->label) return 0; VIR_DEBUG("label=%s", secdef->label); @@ -2088,10 +2063,7 @@ virSecuritySELinuxSetSecurityDaemonSocketLabel(virSecurityManagerPtr mgr ATTRIBU int rc = -1; secdef = virDomainDefGetSecurityLabelDef(def, SECURITY_SELINUX_NAME); - if (secdef == NULL) - return -1; - - if (secdef->label == NULL) + if (!secdef || !secdef->label) return 0; if (!STREQ(SECURITY_SELINUX_NAME, secdef->model)) { @@ -2138,10 +2110,7 @@ virSecuritySELinuxSetSecuritySocketLabel(virSecurityManagerPtr mgr ATTRIBUTE_UNU int rc = -1; secdef = virDomainDefGetSecurityLabelDef(vm, SECURITY_SELINUX_NAME); - if (secdef == NULL) - return -1; - - if (secdef->label == NULL) + if (!secdef || !secdef->label) return 0; if (!STREQ(SECURITY_SELINUX_NAME, secdef->model)) { @@ -2179,10 +2148,7 @@ virSecuritySELinuxClearSecuritySocketLabel(virSecurityManagerPtr mgr ATTRIBUTE_U virSecurityLabelDefPtr secdef; secdef = virDomainDefGetSecurityLabelDef(def, SECURITY_SELINUX_NAME); - if (secdef == NULL) - return -1; - - if (secdef->label == NULL) + if (!secdef || !secdef->label) return 0; if (!STREQ(SECURITY_SELINUX_NAME, secdef->model)) { @@ -2264,7 +2230,7 @@ virSecuritySELinuxSetSecurityAllLabel(virSecurityManagerPtr mgr, secdef = virDomainDefGetSecurityLabelDef(def, SECURITY_SELINUX_NAME); if (secdef == NULL) - return -1; + return 0; if (secdef->norelabel || data->skipAllLabel) return 0; @@ -2337,10 +2303,7 @@ virSecuritySELinuxSetImageFDLabel(virSecurityManagerPtr mgr ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED, virSecurityLabelDefPtr secdef; secdef = virDomainDefGetSecurityLabelDef(def, SECURITY_SELINUX_NAME); - if (secdef == NULL) - return -1; - - if (secdef->imagelabel == NULL) + if (!secdef || !secdef->imagelabel) return 0; return virSecuritySELinuxFSetFilecon(fd, secdef->imagelabel); @@ -2358,10 +2321,7 @@ virSecuritySELinuxSetTapFDLabel(virSecurityManagerPtr mgr, int rc = -1; secdef = virDomainDefGetSecurityLabelDef(def, SECURITY_SELINUX_NAME); - if (secdef == NULL) - return rc; - - if (secdef->label == NULL) + if (!secdef || !secdef->label) return 0; if (fstat(fd, &buf) < 0) { -- 1.8.3.2

2 2

[libvirt] [RFC][PATCH]QEMU: Parse -device vfio-pci commandline
by Olivia Yin 09 Jun '14

09 Jun '14

Signed-off-by: Olivia Yin <Hong-Hua.Yin(a)freescale.com> --- src/qemu/qemu_command.c | 67 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ tests/qemuargv2xmltest.c | 2 +- 2 files changed, 68 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/src/qemu/qemu_command.c b/src/qemu/qemu_command.c index e6acced..4db4a1d 100644 --- a/src/qemu/qemu_command.c +++ b/src/qemu/qemu_command.c @@ -10239,6 +10239,59 @@ qemuParseCommandLinePCI(const char *val) return NULL; } +/* + * Tries to parse a QEMU vfio-pci device + */ +static virDomainHostdevDefPtr +qemuParseCommandLineVFIOPCI(const char *val) +{ + int bus = 0, slot = 0, func = 0; + const char *start; + char *end; + virDomainHostdevDefPtr def = virDomainHostdevDefAlloc(); + + if (!def) + goto error; + + if (!STRPREFIX(val, "host=")) { + virReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR, + _("unknown PCI device syntax '%s'"), val); + goto error; + } + + start = val + strlen("host="); + if (virStrToLong_i(start, &end, 16, &bus) < 0 || *end != ':') { + virReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR, + _("cannot extract PCI device bus '%s'"), val); + goto error; + } + start = end + 1; + if (virStrToLong_i(start, &end, 16, &slot) < 0 || *end != '.') { + virReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR, + _("cannot extract PCI device slot '%s'"), val); + goto error; + } + start = end + 1; + if (virStrToLong_i(start, &end, 16, &func) < 0 || *end != ',') { + virReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR, + _("cannot extract PCI device function '%s'"), val); + goto error; + } + + def->mode = VIR_DOMAIN_HOSTDEV_MODE_SUBSYS; + def->managed = true; + def->source.subsys.type = VIR_DOMAIN_HOSTDEV_SUBSYS_TYPE_PCI; + def->source.subsys.u.pci.backend = VIR_DOMAIN_HOSTDEV_PCI_BACKEND_VFIO; + def->source.subsys.u.pci.addr.bus = bus; + def->source.subsys.u.pci.addr.slot = slot; + def->source.subsys.u.pci.addr.function = func; + return def; + + error: + virDomainHostdevDefFree(def); + return NULL; +} + /* * Tries to parse a QEMU USB device @@ -11351,6 +11404,20 @@ qemuParseCommandLine(virCapsPtr qemuCaps, virDomainHostdevDefFree(hostdev); goto error; } + } else if (STREQ(arg, "-device")) { + WANT_VALUE(); + if (STRPREFIX(val, "vfio-pci,")) { + const char *start; + start = val; + virDomainHostdevDefPtr hostdev; + start += strlen("vfio-pci,"); + if (!(hostdev = qemuParseCommandLineVFIOPCI(start))) + goto error; + if (VIR_APPEND_ELEMENT(def->hostdevs, def->nhostdevs, hostdev) < 0) { + virDomainHostdevDefFree(hostdev); + goto error; + } + } } else if (STREQ(arg, "-soundhw")) { const char *start; WANT_VALUE(); diff --git a/tests/qemuargv2xmltest.c b/tests/qemuargv2xmltest.c index 0fc9fcb..b4ba97a 100644 --- a/tests/qemuargv2xmltest.c +++ b/tests/qemuargv2xmltest.c @@ -251,8 +251,8 @@ mymain(void) DO_TEST("watchdog"); DO_TEST("hostdev-usb-address"); - DO_TEST("hostdev-pci-address"); + DO_TEST("hostdev-vfio"); DO_TEST("smp"); -- 1.8.5

4 14

[libvirt] [PATCHv2] QEMU: Modify qemuParseCommandLinePCI() to parsee '-device vfio-pci'
by Olivia Yin 09 Jun '14

09 Jun '14

Signed-off-by: Olivia Yin <Hong-Hua.Yin(a)freescale.com> Modify qemuParseCommandLinePCI() to support parsing '-device vfio-pci,host=bus:slot.func'. Add test case 'hostdev-vfio' into qemuargv2xmltest to validate this function. The case related to QEMU_CAPS_HOST_PCI_MULTIDOMAIN which uses '-device vfio-pci,host=domain:bus:slot.func' is not supported yet. --- src/qemu/qemu_command.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------ tests/qemuargv2xmltest.c | 2 +- 2 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/qemu/qemu_command.c b/src/qemu/qemu_command.c index 3cf279e..ae7f94e 100644 --- a/src/qemu/qemu_command.c +++ b/src/qemu/qemu_command.c @@ -10193,7 +10193,7 @@ qemuParseCommandLineNet(virDomainXMLOptionPtr xmlopt, * Tries to parse a QEMU PCI device */ static virDomainHostdevDefPtr -qemuParseCommandLinePCI(const char *val) +qemuParseCommandLinePCI(const char *val, bool vfio) { int bus = 0, slot = 0, func = 0; const char *start; @@ -10222,10 +10222,20 @@ qemuParseCommandLinePCI(const char *val) goto error; } start = end + 1; - if (virStrToLong_i(start, NULL, 16, &func) < 0) { - virReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR, - _("cannot extract PCI device function '%s'"), val); - goto error; + + if (!vfio) { + if (virStrToLong_i(start, NULL, 16, &func) < 0) { + virReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR, + _("cannot extract PCI device function '%s'"), val); + goto error; + } + } else { + if (virStrToLong_i(start, &end, 16, &func) < 0 || *end != ',') { + virReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR, + _("cannot extract PCI device function '%s'"), val); + goto error; + } else + def->source.subsys.u.pci.backend = VIR_DOMAIN_HOSTDEV_PCI_BACKEND_VFIO; } def->mode = VIR_DOMAIN_HOSTDEV_MODE_SUBSYS; @@ -11347,12 +11357,26 @@ qemuParseCommandLine(virCapsPtr qemuCaps, } else if (STREQ(arg, "-pcidevice")) { virDomainHostdevDefPtr hostdev; WANT_VALUE(); - if (!(hostdev = qemuParseCommandLinePCI(val))) + if (!(hostdev = qemuParseCommandLinePCI(val,0))) goto error; if (VIR_APPEND_ELEMENT(def->hostdevs, def->nhostdevs, hostdev) < 0) { virDomainHostdevDefFree(hostdev); goto error; } + } else if (STREQ(arg, "-device")) { + WANT_VALUE(); + if (STRPREFIX(val, "vfio-pci,")) { + const char *start; + start = val; + virDomainHostdevDefPtr hostdev; + start += strlen("vfio-pci,"); + if (!(hostdev = qemuParseCommandLinePCI(start,1))) + goto error; + if (VIR_APPEND_ELEMENT(def->hostdevs, def->nhostdevs, hostdev) < 0) { + virDomainHostdevDefFree(hostdev); + goto error; + } + } } else if (STREQ(arg, "-soundhw")) { const char *start; WANT_VALUE(); diff --git a/tests/qemuargv2xmltest.c b/tests/qemuargv2xmltest.c index 0fc9fcb..b4ba97a 100644 --- a/tests/qemuargv2xmltest.c +++ b/tests/qemuargv2xmltest.c @@ -251,8 +251,8 @@ mymain(void) DO_TEST("watchdog"); DO_TEST("hostdev-usb-address"); - DO_TEST("hostdev-pci-address"); + DO_TEST("hostdev-vfio"); DO_TEST("smp"); -- 1.8.5

2 1

[libvirt] [PATCH] parallels: Avoid possible leak of "cpu" from parallelsBuildCapabilities
by Peter Krempa 09 Jun '14

09 Jun '14

4d06af97d38c3648937eb8f732704379b3cd9e59 introduced a possible memory leak of the memory allocated into the "cpu" pointer in parallelsBuildCapabilities in the case "nodeGetInfo()" would fail right after the allocation. Rearrange the code to avoid the possibility of the leak. Found by Coverity. --- src/parallels/parallels_driver.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/parallels/parallels_driver.c b/src/parallels/parallels_driver.c index 153961b..411527c 100644 --- a/src/parallels/parallels_driver.c +++ b/src/parallels/parallels_driver.c @@ -151,10 +151,10 @@ parallelsBuildCapabilities(void) "parallels", NULL, NULL, 0, NULL) == NULL) goto error; - if (VIR_ALLOC(cpu) < 0) + if (nodeGetInfo(&nodeinfo)) goto error; - if (nodeGetInfo(&nodeinfo)) + if (VIR_ALLOC(cpu) < 0) goto error; cpu->arch = caps->host.arch; -- 1.9.3

2 2

Re: [libvirt] [Qemu-devel] Question about how to distinguish a usb device in usb pass-through feature
by Gonglei (Arei) 09 Jun '14

09 Jun '14

Hi, Qemu has supported 3rd method for USB passthrough except two ways that you have pointed: hostbus+hostport -- match for a specific physical port in the host, any device which is plugged in there gets passed to the guest. The method can resolve your all problems. AFAICT, libvirt do not support this way at present. Any Plan? CC'ing libvirt developer mailist. Best regards, -Gonglei From: qemu-devel-bounces+arei.gonglei=huawei.com(a)nongnu.org [mailto:qemu-devel-bounces+arei.gonglei=huawei.com@nongnu.org] On Behalf Of Yuanjing (D) Sent: Monday, June 09, 2014 11:37 AM To: qemu-devel(a)nongnu.org Cc: Liuji (Jeremy) Subject: [Qemu-devel] Question about how to distinguish a usb device in usb pass-through feature Hi, I want to provide feature that pass-through host's usb device to guest os in Openstack. I have question about how to distinguish a usb device. I have read some introductions and made some tests. I think qemu supports two ways to identify a host usb device: (1)host:bus.addr (2)host:vendor_id:product_id I think they both have restriction on some use cases: (1) 'host:bus.addr' is not appropriate if more than one usb devices with the same 'host:bus.addr' in a host. (2) The addr(device number) may change every time unplug/plug usb device of a host. One this happen the guest may reboot failed with wrong host:bus.addr. I noticed that Vmware supports technology 'autoconnection', they pass-through usb device by using usb path of the device on the host(physical topology and port location). Once unplug usb device and plug usb device again with the same usb path, the new device appears and is connected to the guest. I am not a qemu/system programmer and I apologize if I am missing something very obvious. Hope somebody can help me to find the best way to distinguish a usb device? Thanks in advance

1 0

[libvirt] [PATCH] m4: bhyve: Fix check for the required bhyve programs
by Peter Krempa 09 Jun '14

09 Jun '14

bhyveload and bhyvectl wouldn't be checked otherwise as the configure script wouldn't execute one of the tests: checking for bhyve... /usr/local/sbin/bhyve checking for bhyvectl... /usr/local/sbin/bhyvectl checking for bhyveload... /usr/local/sbin/bhyveload ./configure: line 62602: test: too many arguments Fix the shell statement testing the 3 binaries. --- m4/virt-driver-bhyve.m4 | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/m4/virt-driver-bhyve.m4 b/m4/virt-driver-bhyve.m4 index 9c0030b..c65b15d 100644 --- a/m4/virt-driver-bhyve.m4 +++ b/m4/virt-driver-bhyve.m4 @@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ AC_DEFUN([LIBVIRT_DRIVER_CHECK_BHYVE],[ AC_PATH_PROG([BHYVECTL], [bhyvectl], [], [$PATH:/usr/sbin]) AC_PATH_PROG([BHYVELOAD], [bhyveload], [], [$PATH:/usr/sbin/]) - if test -z "$BHYVE" || test -z "$BHYVECTL" \ + if test -z "$BHYVE" || test -z "$BHYVECTL" || \ test -z "$BHYVELOAD" || test "$with_freebsd" = "no"; then if test "$with_bhyve" = "check"; then with_bhyve="no" -- 1.9.3

2 2

[libvirt] [PATCH] vmx: Relax virtualHW.version check
by Matthias Bolte 07 Jun '14

07 Jun '14

The original implementation of the VMX config parser assumed that the virtualHW.version would have more influence on the content of the VMX file than it actually seems to have. It started with accepting only version 4. Additonal versions were added later without any additional changes in the parser itself. This suggests that the influence of the virtualHW.version on the content and format of the VMX file is small or non-existent. The parser worked without any changes across several virtualHW and vSphere versions. So instead of adding new virtualHW.version values to the parser as they come along, or adding an extra flag to allow unknown virtualHW.version values just relax the check to require version 4 or later. --- This patch is meant as a alternative for this patch series: https://www.redhat.com/archives/libvir-list/2014-May/msg00122.html src/vmx/vmx.c | 6 ++---- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/vmx/vmx.c b/src/vmx/vmx.c index 169440c..ce228d4 100644 --- a/src/vmx/vmx.c +++ b/src/vmx/vmx.c @@ -1316,12 +1316,10 @@ virVMXParseConfig(virVMXContext *ctx, goto cleanup; } - if (virtualHW_version != 4 && virtualHW_version != 7 && - virtualHW_version != 8 && virtualHW_version != 9 && - virtualHW_version != 10) { + if (virtualHW_version < 4) { virReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR, _("Expecting VMX entry 'virtualHW.version' to be " - "4, 7, 8, 9 or 10 but found %lld"), + "4 or higher but found %lld"), virtualHW_version); goto cleanup; } -- 1.8.1.2

2 2

[libvirt] QMP fallback race in libvirt
by Ron 07 Jun '14

07 Jun '14

Hi, Eric asked me to move this here from #virt so it doesn't get forgotten. I hit a weird bug in a new install of libvirt on Debian Jessie this week where a vm could not be configured to use any CPU type except passthrough. After much digging and headscratching, the immediate cause for that turns out to be one of the (three) files in the qemu/capabilities cache being generated wrongly the first time that libvirtd was started. Instead of being generated from the QMP queries, it appears to have fallen back to the old method of scraping 'qemu -cpu help', and since the output of that changed with qemu 2.0 it leads to things like: <cpu name='SandyBridge Intel Xeon E312xx (Sandy Bridge) '/> and hilarity then ensues when cpuModelIsAllowed() is called by x86Decode(). Since only one of the cache files there was corrupted like this, it would appear libvirt either didn't wait long enough, or didn't try hard enough, to get a connection to the monitor for the QMP query on what was probably also the very first time qemu had been started on this host machine. After nuking the cache files and restarting libvirtd they were then correctly regenerated, and things began to work as expected. This was all done on a new clean install of the host machine, so there was nothing around from any earlier versions to get tangled up with, and possibly means qemu had some first time init of its own to do which took some time before it was ready to be queried. I am also seeing bursts of several of these warnings in the logs: libvirtd[26475]: This thread seems to be the async job owner; entering monitor without asking for a nested job is dangerous Which I haven't confirmed as being related, but doesn't seem to be obviously unrelated either, and at worst is a separate bug. Cheers, Ron

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