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[PATCH] NEWS: Document features/improvements/bug fixes I've participated in
by Michal Privoznik 28 Jun '24

28 Jun '24

There are some features/improvements/bug fixes I've either contributed or reviewed/merged. Document them for upcoming release. Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn(a)redhat.com> --- NEWS.rst | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 30 insertions(+) diff --git a/NEWS.rst b/NEWS.rst index bc8acc62d4..d675c869a4 100644 --- a/NEWS.rst +++ b/NEWS.rst @@ -16,6 +16,10 @@ v10.5.0 (unreleased) * **Removed features** * **New features** + * Introduce SEV-SNP support + + SEV-SNP is introduced as another type of ``<launchSecurity/>``. Its support + is reported in both domain capabilities and ``virt-host-validate``. * **Improvements** @@ -26,8 +30,34 @@ v10.5.0 (unreleased) the dependency on ``certtool`` and providing more comprehensive checks of the certificate properties. + * qemu: implement iommu coldplug/unplug + + The ``<iommu/>`` device can be now cold plugged and/or cold unplugged. + + * Pass shutoff reason to release hook + + Sometimes in release hook it is useful to know if the VM shutdown was + graceful or not. This is especially useful to do cleanup based on the VM + shutdown failure reason in release hook. String with this release the last + argument 'extra' is used to pass VM shutoff reason in the call to release + hook. + + * nodedev: improve DASD detection + + In newer DASD driver versions the ID_TYPE tag is supported. This tag is + missing after a system reboot but when the ccw device is set offline and + online the tag is included. To fix this version independently we need to + check if devices detected as type disk is actually a DASD to maintain + the node object consistency and not end up with multiple node objects + for DASDs. + * **Bug fixes** + * remote_daemon_dispatch: Unref sasl session when closing client connection + + A memory leak was identified when a client started SASL but then suddenly + closed connection. This is now fixed. + v10.4.0 (2024-06-03) ==================== -- 2.44.2

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[PATCH] NEWS: Mention migration fix with disabled vmx-* CPU features
by Jiri Denemark 28 Jun '24

28 Jun '24

Signed-off-by: Jiri Denemark <jdenemar(a)redhat.com> --- NEWS.rst | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) diff --git a/NEWS.rst b/NEWS.rst index b0b893b484..1ea98599db 100644 --- a/NEWS.rst +++ b/NEWS.rst @@ -59,6 +59,12 @@ v10.5.0 (unreleased) A memory leak was identified when a client started SASL but then suddenly closed connection. This is now fixed. + * qemu: Fix migration with disabled vmx-* CPU features + + Migrating a domain with some vmx-* CPU features marked as disabled could + have failed as the destination would incorrectly expect those features to + be enabled after starting QEMU. + v10.4.0 (2024-06-03) ==================== -- 2.45.1

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[PATCH] qemu: fix switchover-ack regression for old qemu
by Jon Kohler 28 Jun '24

28 Jun '24

When enabling switchover-ack on qemu from libvirt, the .party value was set to both source and target; however, qemuMigrationParamsCheck() only takes that into account to validate that the remote side of the migration supports the flag if it is marked optional or auto/always on. In the case of switchover-ack, when enabled on only the dst and not the src, the migration will fail if the src qemu does not support switchover-ack, as the dst qemu will issue a switchover-ack msg: qemu/migration/savevm.c -> loadvm_process_command -> migrate_send_rp_switchover_ack(mis) -> migrate_send_rp_message(mis, MIG_RP_MSG_SWITCHOVER_ACK, 0, NULL) Since the src qemu doesn't understand messages with header_type == MIG_RP_MSG_SWITCHOVER_ACK, qemu will kill the migration with error: qemu-kvm: RP: Received invalid message 0x0007 length 0x0000 qemu-kvm: Unable to write to socket: Bad file descriptor Looking at the original commit [1] for optional migration capabilities, it seems that the spirit of optional handling was to enhance a given existing capability where possible. Given that switchover-ack exclusively depends on return-path, adding it as optional to that cap feels right. [1] 61e34b08568 ("qemu: Add support for optional migration capabilities") Fixes: 1cc7737f69e ("qemu: add support for qemu switchover-ack") Signed-off-by: Jon Kohler <jon(a)nutanix.com> Cc: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson(a)redhat.com> Cc: Avihai Horon <avihaih(a)nvidia.com> Cc: Jiri Denemark <jdenemar(a)redhat.com> Cc: Markus Armbruster <armbru(a)redhat.com> Cc: Peter Xu <peterx(a)redhat.com> Cc: YangHang Liu <yanghliu(a)redhat.com> --- src/qemu/qemu_migration_params.c | 6 +----- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/qemu/qemu_migration_params.c b/src/qemu/qemu_migration_params.c index 9593b6ba65..98822012cc 100644 --- a/src/qemu/qemu_migration_params.c +++ b/src/qemu/qemu_migration_params.c @@ -210,17 +210,13 @@ static const qemuMigrationParamsFlagMapItem qemuMigrationParamsFlagMap[] = { {.match = QEMU_MIGRATION_FLAG_FORBIDDEN, .flag = VIR_MIGRATE_TUNNELLED, .cap = QEMU_MIGRATION_CAP_RETURN_PATH, + .optional = QEMU_MIGRATION_CAP_SWITCHOVER_ACK, .party = QEMU_MIGRATION_SOURCE | QEMU_MIGRATION_DESTINATION}, {.match = QEMU_MIGRATION_FLAG_REQUIRED, .flag = VIR_MIGRATE_ZEROCOPY, .cap = QEMU_MIGRATION_CAP_ZERO_COPY_SEND, .party = QEMU_MIGRATION_SOURCE}, - - {.match = QEMU_MIGRATION_FLAG_FORBIDDEN, - .flag = VIR_MIGRATE_TUNNELLED, - .cap = QEMU_MIGRATION_CAP_SWITCHOVER_ACK, - .party = QEMU_MIGRATION_SOURCE | QEMU_MIGRATION_DESTINATION}, }; /* Translation from VIR_MIGRATE_PARAM_* typed parameters to -- 2.43.0

2 1

[libvirt PATCH] vircgroup: fix g_variant_new_parsed format string causing abort
by Pavel Hrdina 28 Jun '24

28 Jun '24

The original code was incorrect and never tested because at the time of implementing it the cgroup file `io.weight` was not available. Resolves: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-45185 Introduced-by: 9c1693eff427661616ce1bd2795688f87288a412 Signed-off-by: Pavel Hrdina <phrdina(a)redhat.com> --- src/util/vircgroupv1.c | 2 +- src/util/vircgroupv2.c | 2 +- 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/util/vircgroupv1.c b/src/util/vircgroupv1.c index 77c7e209ce..c1f0562249 100644 --- a/src/util/vircgroupv1.c +++ b/src/util/vircgroupv1.c @@ -1225,7 +1225,7 @@ virCgroupV1SetBlkioDeviceWeight(virCgroup *group, if (group->unitName) { GVariant *value = NULL; - value = g_variant_new_parsed("[(%s, uint64 %u)]", path, weight); + value = g_variant_new_parsed("[(%s, %t)]", path, weight); return virCgroupSetValueDBus(group->unitName, "BlockIODeviceWeight", value); } else { diff --git a/src/util/vircgroupv2.c b/src/util/vircgroupv2.c index db115e25f7..eaf5ae98f6 100644 --- a/src/util/vircgroupv2.c +++ b/src/util/vircgroupv2.c @@ -867,7 +867,7 @@ virCgroupV2SetBlkioDeviceWeight(virCgroup *group, if (group->unitName) { GVariant *value = NULL; - value = g_variant_new_parsed("[(%s, uint64 %u)]", path, weight); + value = g_variant_new_parsed("[(%s, %t)]", path, weight); return virCgroupSetValueDBus(group->unitName, "IODeviceWeight", value); } else { -- 2.45.2

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Entering freeze for libvirt-10.5.0
by Jiri Denemark 28 Jun '24

28 Jun '24

I have just tagged v10.5.0-rc1 in the repository and pushed signed tarballs to https://download.libvirt.org/ Please give the release candidate some testing and in case you find a serious issue which should have a fix in the upcoming release, feel free to reply to this thread to make sure the issue is more visible. If you have not done so yet, please update NEWS.rst to document any significant change you made since the last release. Thanks, Jirka

1 1

[RFC PATCH v3 0/6] Added virtio-net RSS with eBPF support.
by Andrew Melnychenko 27 Jun '24

27 Jun '24

This series of rfc patches adds support for loading the RSS eBPF program and passing it to the QEMU. Comments and suggestions would be useful. QEMU with vhost may work with RSS through eBPF. To load eBPF, the capabilities required that Libvirt may provide. eBPF program and maps may be unique for particular QEMU and Libvirt retrieves eBPF through qapi. For now, there is only "RSS" eBPF object in QEMU, in the future, there may be another one(g.e. network filters). That's why in Libvirt added logic to load and store any eBPF object that QEMU provides using qapi schema. One of the reasons why this series of patches is in RFC are tests. To this series of patches, the tests were added. For now, the tests are synthetic, the proper "reply" file should be generated with a new "caps" file. Currently, there are changes in caps-9.0.0* files. There was added support for ebpf_rss_fds feature, and request-ebpf command. Also, there was added new config for qemuConfig - allowEBPF. This config allows to enable/disable eBPF blob loading explicitly. This is required for qemuxmlconf tests - where some test expects that RSS would not support eBPF. So, overall, the tests are required for review, comment, and discussion how we want them to be implemented in the future. For virtio-net RSS, the document has not changed. ``` <interface type="network"> <model type="virtio"/> <driver queues="4" rss="on" rss_hash_report="off"/> <interface type="network"> ``` Simplified routine for RSS: * Libvirt retrieves eBPF "RSS" and load it. * Libvirt passes file descriptors to virtio-net with property "ebpf_rss_fds" ("rss" property should be "on" too). * if fds was provided - QEMU using eBPF RSS implementation. * if fds was not provided - QEMU tries to load eBPF RSS in own context and use it. * if eBPF RSS was not loaded - QEMU uses "in-qemu" RSS(vhost not supported). Changes since RFC v2: * refactored and rebased. * applied changes according to the Qemu. * added basic test. Changes since RFC v1: * changed eBPF format saved in the XML cache. * refactored and checked with syntax test. * refactored patch hunks. Andrew Melnychenko (6): qemu_monitor: Added QEMU's "request-ebpf" support. qemu_capabilities: Added logic for retrieving eBPF objects from QEMU. qemu_interface: Added routine for loading the eBPF objects. qemu_command: Added "ebpf_rss_fds" support for virtio-net. qemu_conf: Added configuration to optionally disable eBPF loading. tests: Added tests for eBPF blob loading. meson.build | 7 + meson_options.txt | 1 + src/qemu/meson.build | 1 + src/qemu/qemu_capabilities.c | 126 +++++++++++ src/qemu/qemu_capabilities.h | 6 + src/qemu/qemu_command.c | 63 ++++++ src/qemu/qemu_conf.c | 2 + src/qemu/qemu_conf.h | 2 + src/qemu/qemu_domain.c | 4 + src/qemu/qemu_domain.h | 3 + src/qemu/qemu_interface.c | 83 ++++++++ src/qemu/qemu_interface.h | 4 + src/qemu/qemu_monitor.c | 13 ++ src/qemu/qemu_monitor.h | 3 + src/qemu/qemu_monitor_json.c | 26 +++ src/qemu/qemu_monitor_json.h | 3 + .../caps_9.0.0_x86_64.replies | 199 ++++++++++-------- .../caps_9.0.0_x86_64.xml | 4 + tests/qemuxml2argvmock.c | 21 ++ .../net-virtio-rss-bpf.x86_64-latest.args | 37 ++++ .../net-virtio-rss-bpf.x86_64-latest.xml | 46 ++++ tests/qemuxmlconfdata/net-virtio-rss-bpf.xml | 46 ++++ tests/qemuxmlconftest.c | 4 + 23 files changed, 612 insertions(+), 92 deletions(-) create mode 100644 tests/qemuxmlconfdata/net-virtio-rss-bpf.x86_64-latest.args create mode 100644 tests/qemuxmlconfdata/net-virtio-rss-bpf.x86_64-latest.xml create mode 100644 tests/qemuxmlconfdata/net-virtio-rss-bpf.xml -- 2.44.0

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[PATCH v2] security_manager: Ensure top lock is acquired before nested locks
by hongmianquan 27 Jun '24

27 Jun '24

Fix libvirtd hang since fork() was called while another thread had security manager locked. We have the stack security driver, which internally manages other security drivers, just call them "top" and "nested". We call virSecurityStackPreFork() to lock the top one, and it also locks and then unlocks the nested drivers prior to fork. Then in qemuSecurityPostFork(), it unlocks the top one, but not the nested ones. Thus, if one of the nested drivers ("dac" or "selinux") is still locked, it will cause a deadlock. We discovered this case: the nested list obtained through the qemuSecurityGetNested() will be locked for subsequent use, such as in virQEMUDriverCreateCapabilities(), where the nested list is locked using qemuSecurityGetDOI, but the top one is not locked beforehand. The problem stack is as follows: libvirtd thread1 libvirtd thread2 child libvirtd | | | | | | virsh capabilities qemuProcessLanuch | | | | | lock top | | | | lock nested | | | | | | fork------------------->|(nested lock held by thread1) | | | | | | unlock nested unlock top unlock top | | qemuSecuritySetSocketLabel | | lock nested (deadlock) In this commit, we ensure that the top lock is acquired before the nested lock, so during fork, it's not possible for another task to acquire the nested lock. Resolves: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1303031 Signed-off-by: hongmianquan <hongmianquan(a)bytedance.com> --- src/libvirt_private.syms | 3 ++- src/qemu/qemu_conf.c | 9 ++++++++- src/qemu/qemu_driver.c | 16 +++++++++------- src/qemu/qemu_security.h | 2 ++ src/security/security_manager.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++ src/security/security_manager.h | 2 ++ 6 files changed, 45 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/libvirt_private.syms b/src/libvirt_private.syms index bac4a8a366..39cdb90772 100644 --- a/src/libvirt_private.syms +++ b/src/libvirt_private.syms @@ -1806,7 +1806,8 @@ virSecurityManagerTransactionAbort; virSecurityManagerTransactionCommit; virSecurityManagerTransactionStart; virSecurityManagerVerify; - +virSecurityManagerStackLock; +virSecurityManagerStackUnlock; # security/security_util.h virSecurityXATTRNamespaceDefined; diff --git a/src/qemu/qemu_conf.c b/src/qemu/qemu_conf.c index 4050a82341..21f0739fd5 100644 --- a/src/qemu/qemu_conf.c +++ b/src/qemu/qemu_conf.c @@ -1380,6 +1380,9 @@ virCaps *virQEMUDriverCreateCapabilities(virQEMUDriver *driver) return NULL; } + /* Ensure top lock is acquired before nested locks */ + qemuSecurityStackLock(driver->securityManager); + /* access sec drivers and create a sec model for each one */ if (!(sec_managers = qemuSecurityGetNested(driver->securityManager))) return NULL; @@ -1402,8 +1405,10 @@ virCaps *virQEMUDriverCreateCapabilities(virQEMUDriver *driver) lbl = qemuSecurityGetBaseLabel(sec_managers[i], virtTypes[j]); type = virDomainVirtTypeToString(virtTypes[j]); if (lbl && - virCapabilitiesHostSecModelAddBaseLabel(sm, type, lbl) < 0) + virCapabilitiesHostSecModelAddBaseLabel(sm, type, lbl) < 0) { + qemuSecurityStackUnlock(driver->securityManager); return NULL; + } } VIR_DEBUG("Initialized caps for security driver \"%s\" with " @@ -1412,6 +1417,8 @@ virCaps *virQEMUDriverCreateCapabilities(virQEMUDriver *driver) caps->host.numa = virCapabilitiesHostNUMANewHost(); caps->host.cpu = virQEMUDriverGetHostCPU(driver); + + qemuSecurityStackUnlock(driver->securityManager); return g_steal_pointer(&caps); } diff --git a/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c b/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c index fc1704f4fc..c980a0990f 100644 --- a/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c +++ b/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c @@ -560,7 +560,6 @@ qemuStateInitialize(bool privileged, bool autostart = true; size_t i; const char *defsecmodel = NULL; - g_autofree virSecurityManager **sec_managers = NULL; g_autoptr(virIdentity) identity = virIdentityGetCurrent(); qemu_driver = g_new0(virQEMUDriver, 1); @@ -835,11 +834,8 @@ qemuStateInitialize(bool privileged, if (!qemu_driver->qemuCapsCache) goto error; - if (!(sec_managers = qemuSecurityGetNested(qemu_driver->securityManager))) - goto error; - - if (sec_managers[0] != NULL) - defsecmodel = qemuSecurityGetModel(sec_managers[0]); + if (qemu_driver->securityManager != NULL) + defsecmodel = qemuSecurityGetModel(qemu_driver->securityManager); if (!(qemu_driver->xmlopt = virQEMUDriverCreateXMLConf(qemu_driver, defsecmodel))) @@ -5663,7 +5659,12 @@ static int qemuDomainGetSecurityLabelList(virDomainPtr dom, ret = 0; } else { int len = 0; - virSecurityManager ** mgrs = qemuSecurityGetNested(driver->securityManager); + virSecurityManager ** mgrs = NULL; + + /* Ensure top lock is acquired before nested locks */ + qemuSecurityStackLock(driver->securityManager); + + mgrs = qemuSecurityGetNested(driver->securityManager); if (!mgrs) goto cleanup; @@ -5688,6 +5689,7 @@ static int qemuDomainGetSecurityLabelList(virDomainPtr dom, } cleanup: + qemuSecurityStackUnlock(driver->securityManager); virDomainObjEndAPI(&vm); return ret; } diff --git a/src/qemu/qemu_security.h b/src/qemu/qemu_security.h index 41da33debc..19fcb3c939 100644 --- a/src/qemu/qemu_security.h +++ b/src/qemu/qemu_security.h @@ -151,3 +151,5 @@ int qemuSecurityCommandRun(virQEMUDriver *driver, #define qemuSecuritySetTapFDLabel virSecurityManagerSetTapFDLabel #define qemuSecurityStackAddNested virSecurityManagerStackAddNested #define qemuSecurityVerify virSecurityManagerVerify +#define qemuSecurityStackLock virSecurityManagerStackLock +#define qemuSecurityStackUnlock virSecurityManagerStackUnlock \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/src/security/security_manager.c b/src/security/security_manager.c index 24f2f3d3dc..c49c4f708f 100644 --- a/src/security/security_manager.c +++ b/src/security/security_manager.c @@ -989,6 +989,28 @@ virSecurityManagerGetNested(virSecurityManager *mgr) return list; } +/* + * Usually called before virSecurityManagerGetNested(). + * We need to ensure locking the stack security manager before + * locking the nested security manager to maintain the correct + * synchronization state. + * It must be followed by a call virSecurityManagerStackUnlock(). + */ +void +virSecurityManagerStackLock(virSecurityManager *mgr) +{ + if (STREQ("stack", mgr->drv->name)) + virObjectLock(mgr); +} + + +void +virSecurityManagerStackUnlock(virSecurityManager *mgr) +{ + if (STREQ("stack", mgr->drv->name)) + virObjectUnlock(mgr); +} + /** * virSecurityManagerDomainSetPathLabel: diff --git a/src/security/security_manager.h b/src/security/security_manager.h index a416af3215..bb6d22bc31 100644 --- a/src/security/security_manager.h +++ b/src/security/security_manager.h @@ -158,6 +158,8 @@ int virSecurityManagerSetTapFDLabel(virSecurityManager *mgr, char *virSecurityManagerGetMountOptions(virSecurityManager *mgr, virDomainDef *vm); virSecurityManager ** virSecurityManagerGetNested(virSecurityManager *mgr); +void virSecurityManagerStackLock(virSecurityManager *mgr); +void virSecurityManagerStackUnlock(virSecurityManager *mgr); typedef enum { VIR_SECURITY_DOMAIN_IMAGE_LABEL_BACKING_CHAIN = 1 << 0, -- 2.11.0

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[PATCH] qemuDomainDiskChangeSupported: Fill in missing check
by Adam Julis 26 Jun '24

26 Jun '24

Any modification of iothreads attribute is prohibit, the original setup must be identical with updated version of xml. Resolves: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-23607 Signed-off-by: Adam Julis <ajulis(a)redhat.com> --- src/qemu/qemu_domain.c | 47 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 47 insertions(+) diff --git a/src/qemu/qemu_domain.c b/src/qemu/qemu_domain.c index 1a90311ca5..6d7b939a31 100644 --- a/src/qemu/qemu_domain.c +++ b/src/qemu/qemu_domain.c @@ -8484,6 +8484,53 @@ qemuDomainDiskChangeSupported(virDomainDiskDef *disk, CHECK_EQ(discard, "discard", true); CHECK_EQ(iothread, "iothread", true); + /* check if new or original disk contains iothreads information + * if yes, they must be identical, any changes are prohibit*/ + + if (!!disk->iothreads != !!orig_disk->iothreads) { + virReportError(VIR_ERR_OPERATION_UNSUPPORTED, + _("cannot modify field '%1$s' of the disk"), + "iothreads"); + return false; + } + + if (disk->iothreads && orig_disk->iothreads) { + GSList *n, *m; + + m = disk->iothreads; + + for (n = orig_disk->iothreads; n; n = n->next) { + size_t i; + virDomainDiskIothreadDef *n_data = (virDomainDiskIothreadDef *) n->data; + virDomainDiskIothreadDef *m_data = (virDomainDiskIothreadDef *) m->data; + + if (n_data->id != m_data->id || n_data->nqueues != m_data->nqueues) { + virReportError(VIR_ERR_OPERATION_UNSUPPORTED, + _("cannot modify field '%1$s' of the disk"), + "iothreads"); + return false; + } + + for (i = 0; i < n_data->nqueues; i++) { + if (n_data->queues[i] != m_data->queues[i]) { + virReportError(VIR_ERR_OPERATION_UNSUPPORTED, + _("cannot modify field '%1$s' of the disk"), + "iothreads"); + return false; + } + } + + m = m->next; + + if (!m && n->next) { + virReportError(VIR_ERR_OPERATION_UNSUPPORTED, + _("cannot modify field '%1$s' of the disk"), + "iothreads"); + return false; + } + } + } + CHECK_STREQ_NULLABLE(domain_name, "backenddomain"); -- 2.45.2

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[libvirt RFC PATCH 0/2] qemu: do not use deprecated options for new virtiofsd
by Ján Tomko 25 Jun '24

25 Jun '24

Depends on https://gitlab.com/virtio-fs/virtiofsd/-/merge_requests/231 Ján Tomko (2): qemu: fill capabilities for virtiofsd qemu: do not use deprecated options for new virtiofsd src/conf/domain_conf.h | 1 + src/qemu/qemu_vhost_user.c | 59 +++++++++++++++++++++++++ src/qemu/qemu_vhost_user.h | 12 ++++++ src/qemu/qemu_virtiofs.c | 88 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------ 4 files changed, 132 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-) -- 2.45.2

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[PATCH 0/8] Expose SEV-SNP in domcaps and virt-host-validate
by Michal Privoznik 25 Jun '24

25 Jun '24

This is a promised follow up to: https://lists.libvirt.org/archives/list/devel@lists.libvirt.org/message/7QQ… Michal Prívozník (8): libvirt_private.syms: Export virDomainLaunchSecurity enum handlers qemuxmlconftest; Explicitly enable QEMU_CAPS_SEV_SNP_GUEST for "launch-security-sev-snp" qemu_capabilities: Probe SEV capabilities even for QEMU_CAPS_SEV_SNP_GUEST domcaps: Report launchSecurity qemu: Fill launchSecurity in domaincaps qemu_validate: Use domaincaps to validate supported launchSecurity type virt-host-validate: Move AMD SEV into a separate func virt-host-validate: Detect SEV-ES and SEV-SNP docs/formatdomaincaps.rst | 10 +++ src/conf/domain_capabilities.c | 14 ++++ src/conf/domain_capabilities.h | 9 ++ src/conf/schemas/domaincaps.rng | 10 +++ src/libvirt_private.syms | 2 + src/qemu/qemu_capabilities.c | 24 +++++- src/qemu/qemu_capabilities.h | 3 + src/qemu/qemu_validate.c | 29 +++---- .../domaincapsdata/qemu_4.2.0-q35.x86_64.xml | 3 + .../domaincapsdata/qemu_4.2.0-tcg.x86_64.xml | 3 + .../qemu_4.2.0-virt.aarch64.xml | 3 + tests/domaincapsdata/qemu_4.2.0.aarch64.xml | 3 + tests/domaincapsdata/qemu_4.2.0.ppc64.xml | 3 + tests/domaincapsdata/qemu_4.2.0.s390x.xml | 3 + tests/domaincapsdata/qemu_4.2.0.x86_64.xml | 3 + .../domaincapsdata/qemu_5.0.0-q35.x86_64.xml | 3 + .../qemu_5.0.0-tcg-virt.riscv64.xml | 3 + .../domaincapsdata/qemu_5.0.0-tcg.x86_64.xml | 3 + .../qemu_5.0.0-virt.aarch64.xml | 3 + .../qemu_5.0.0-virt.riscv64.xml | 3 + tests/domaincapsdata/qemu_5.0.0.aarch64.xml | 3 + tests/domaincapsdata/qemu_5.0.0.ppc64.xml | 3 + tests/domaincapsdata/qemu_5.0.0.x86_64.xml | 3 + .../domaincapsdata/qemu_5.1.0-q35.x86_64.xml | 3 + .../domaincapsdata/qemu_5.1.0-tcg.x86_64.xml | 3 + tests/domaincapsdata/qemu_5.1.0.sparc.xml | 3 + tests/domaincapsdata/qemu_5.1.0.x86_64.xml | 3 + .../domaincapsdata/qemu_5.2.0-q35.x86_64.xml | 3 + .../qemu_5.2.0-tcg-virt.riscv64.xml | 3 + .../domaincapsdata/qemu_5.2.0-tcg.x86_64.xml | 3 + .../qemu_5.2.0-virt.aarch64.xml | 3 + .../qemu_5.2.0-virt.riscv64.xml | 3 + tests/domaincapsdata/qemu_5.2.0.aarch64.xml | 3 + tests/domaincapsdata/qemu_5.2.0.ppc64.xml | 3 + tests/domaincapsdata/qemu_5.2.0.s390x.xml | 3 + tests/domaincapsdata/qemu_5.2.0.x86_64.xml | 3 + .../domaincapsdata/qemu_6.0.0-q35.x86_64.xml | 5 ++ .../domaincapsdata/qemu_6.0.0-tcg.x86_64.xml | 5 ++ .../qemu_6.0.0-virt.aarch64.xml | 3 + tests/domaincapsdata/qemu_6.0.0.aarch64.xml | 3 + tests/domaincapsdata/qemu_6.0.0.s390x.xml | 5 ++ tests/domaincapsdata/qemu_6.0.0.x86_64.xml | 5 ++ .../domaincapsdata/qemu_6.1.0-q35.x86_64.xml | 3 + .../domaincapsdata/qemu_6.1.0-tcg.x86_64.xml | 3 + tests/domaincapsdata/qemu_6.1.0.x86_64.xml | 3 + .../domaincapsdata/qemu_6.2.0-q35.x86_64.xml | 3 + .../domaincapsdata/qemu_6.2.0-tcg.x86_64.xml | 3 + .../qemu_6.2.0-virt.aarch64.xml | 3 + tests/domaincapsdata/qemu_6.2.0.aarch64.xml | 3 + tests/domaincapsdata/qemu_6.2.0.ppc64.xml | 3 + tests/domaincapsdata/qemu_6.2.0.x86_64.xml | 3 + .../qemu_7.0.0-hvf.aarch64+hvf.xml | 3 + .../domaincapsdata/qemu_7.0.0-q35.x86_64.xml | 3 + .../domaincapsdata/qemu_7.0.0-tcg.x86_64.xml | 3 + .../qemu_7.0.0-virt.aarch64.xml | 3 + tests/domaincapsdata/qemu_7.0.0.aarch64.xml | 3 + tests/domaincapsdata/qemu_7.0.0.ppc64.xml | 3 + tests/domaincapsdata/qemu_7.0.0.x86_64.xml | 3 + .../domaincapsdata/qemu_7.1.0-q35.x86_64.xml | 3 + .../domaincapsdata/qemu_7.1.0-tcg.x86_64.xml | 3 + tests/domaincapsdata/qemu_7.1.0.ppc64.xml | 3 + tests/domaincapsdata/qemu_7.1.0.x86_64.xml | 3 + .../qemu_7.2.0-hvf.x86_64+hvf.xml | 3 + .../domaincapsdata/qemu_7.2.0-q35.x86_64.xml | 3 + .../qemu_7.2.0-tcg.x86_64+hvf.xml | 3 + .../domaincapsdata/qemu_7.2.0-tcg.x86_64.xml | 3 + tests/domaincapsdata/qemu_7.2.0.ppc.xml | 3 + tests/domaincapsdata/qemu_7.2.0.x86_64.xml | 3 + .../domaincapsdata/qemu_8.0.0-q35.x86_64.xml | 3 + .../qemu_8.0.0-tcg-virt.riscv64.xml | 3 + .../domaincapsdata/qemu_8.0.0-tcg.x86_64.xml | 3 + .../qemu_8.0.0-virt.riscv64.xml | 3 + tests/domaincapsdata/qemu_8.0.0.x86_64.xml | 3 + .../domaincapsdata/qemu_8.1.0-q35.x86_64.xml | 3 + .../domaincapsdata/qemu_8.1.0-tcg.x86_64.xml | 3 + tests/domaincapsdata/qemu_8.1.0.s390x.xml | 5 ++ tests/domaincapsdata/qemu_8.1.0.x86_64.xml | 3 + .../domaincapsdata/qemu_8.2.0-q35.x86_64.xml | 3 + .../qemu_8.2.0-tcg-virt.loongarch64.xml | 3 + .../domaincapsdata/qemu_8.2.0-tcg.x86_64.xml | 3 + .../qemu_8.2.0-virt.aarch64.xml | 3 + .../qemu_8.2.0-virt.loongarch64.xml | 3 + tests/domaincapsdata/qemu_8.2.0.aarch64.xml | 3 + tests/domaincapsdata/qemu_8.2.0.armv7l.xml | 3 + tests/domaincapsdata/qemu_8.2.0.s390x.xml | 5 ++ tests/domaincapsdata/qemu_8.2.0.x86_64.xml | 3 + .../domaincapsdata/qemu_9.0.0-q35.x86_64.xml | 3 + .../domaincapsdata/qemu_9.0.0-tcg.x86_64.xml | 3 + tests/domaincapsdata/qemu_9.0.0.x86_64.xml | 3 + .../domaincapsdata/qemu_9.1.0-q35.x86_64.xml | 3 + .../domaincapsdata/qemu_9.1.0-tcg.x86_64.xml | 3 + tests/domaincapsdata/qemu_9.1.0.x86_64.xml | 3 + .../caps_9.1.0_x86_64.xml | 1 - tests/qemuxmlconftest.c | 6 +- tools/virt-host-validate-common.c | 83 ++++++++++++++----- 95 files changed, 413 insertions(+), 42 deletions(-) -- 2.44.2

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