June 2016 - Devel - libvirt List Archives

[libvirt] [PATCH 0/4] Move secret object command line building helpers
by John Ferlan 01 Jun '16

01 Jun '16

More "extractable" changes from my work on adding luks support. While working through changes in storage_backend.c I found that the building of the 'qemu-img' command to create a luks volume will need to create a secret object. In order to do that I found if I took the qemu_command code and moved things around a bit, then I would be able to access the API's that I need. Moving the command line building from qemu_command.c to virjson.c seemed logical since it was multipurpose/generic anyway. I'm not "tied" to the API name chosen - if there's suggestions, I'll adjust. Then splitting out the generation of the secret object props into their own API and then eventually into secret_util.c seemed to be the best avenue. I can then include secret_util into the storage driver. The last change just cleans up the secinfo command building processing. It was "complicated" when there was going to be hostdev and disk code trying to generate the same objects... Now that just seems less important. When/if iSCSI/hostdev support for the AES secret is added, I'll made the appropriate adjustments then. John Ferlan (4): qemu: Move and rename qemuBuildObjectCommandlineFromJSON qemu: Introduce qemuBuildSecretObjectProps qemu: Move and rename qemuBuildSecretObjectProps qemu: Rework secinfo command line building src/libvirt_private.syms | 4 +- src/qemu/qemu_command.c | 199 ++++++-------------------------------------- src/qemu/qemu_command.h | 4 - src/secret/secret_util.c | 59 +++++++++++++ src/secret/secret_util.h | 10 +++ src/util/virjson.c | 117 +++++++++++++++++++++++++- src/util/virjson.h | 12 ++- tests/qemucommandutiltest.c | 7 +- 8 files changed, 219 insertions(+), 193 deletions(-) -- 2.5.5

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[libvirt] KVM Forum 2016: Call For Participation
by Paolo Bonzini 01 Jun '16

01 Jun '16

================================================================= KVM Forum 2016: Call For Participation August 24-26, 2016 - Westin Harbor Castle - Toronto, Canada (All submissions must be received before midnight May 1, 2016) ================================================================= KVM Forum is an annual event that presents a rare opportunity for developers and users to meet, discuss the state of Linux virtualization technology, and plan for the challenges ahead. We invite you to lead part of the discussion by submitting a speaking proposal for KVM Forum 2016. At this highly technical conference, developers driving innovation in the KVM virtualization stack (Linux, KVM, QEMU, libvirt) can meet users who depend on KVM as part of their offerings, or to power their data centers and clouds. KVM Forum will include sessions on the state of the KVM virtualization stack, planning for the future, and many opportunities for attendees to collaborate. As we celebrate ten years of KVM development in the Linux kernel, KVM continues to be a critical part of the FOSS cloud infrastructure. This year, KVM Forum is joining LinuxCon and ContainerCon in Toronto, Canada. Selected talks from KVM Forum will be presented on Wednesday August 24 to the full audience of LinuxCon and ContainerCon. Also, attendees of KVM Forum will have access to all of the LinuxCon and ContainerCon talks on Wednesday. http://events.linuxfoundation.org/cfp Suggested topics: KVM and Linux * Scaling and optimizations * Nested virtualization * Linux kernel performance improvements * Resource management (CPU, I/O, memory) * Hardening and security * VFIO: SR-IOV, GPU, platform device assignment * Architecture ports QEMU * Management interfaces: QOM and QMP * New devices, new boards, new architectures * Scaling and optimizations * Desktop virtualization and SPICE * Virtual GPU * virtio and vhost, including non-Linux or non-virtualized uses * Hardening and security * New storage features * Live migration and fault tolerance * High availability and continuous backup * Real-time guest support * Emulation and TCG * Firmware: ACPI, UEFI, coreboot, u-Boot, etc. * Testing Management and infrastructure * Managing KVM: Libvirt, OpenStack, oVirt, etc. * Storage: glusterfs, Ceph, etc. * Software defined networking: Open vSwitch, OpenDaylight, etc. * Network Function Virtualization * Security * Provisioning * Performance tuning =============== SUBMITTING YOUR PROPOSAL =============== Abstracts due: May 1, 2016 Please submit a short abstract (~150 words) describing your presentation proposal. Slots vary in length up to 45 minutes. Also include the proposal type -- one of: - technical talk - end-user talk Submit your proposal here: http://events.linuxfoundation.org/cfp Please only use the categories "presentation" and "panel discussion" You will receive a notification whether or not your presentation proposal was accepted by May 27, 2016. Speakers will receive a complimentary pass for the event. In the instance that your submission has multiple presenters, only the primary speaker for a proposal will receive a complementary event pass. For panel discussions, all panelists will receive a complimentary event pass. TECHNICAL TALKS A good technical talk should not just report on what has happened over the last year; it should present a concrete problem and how it impacts the user and/or developer community. Whenever applicable, focus on work that needs to be done, difficulties that haven't yet been solved, and on decisions that other developers should be aware of. Summarizing recent developments is okay but it should not be more than a small portion of the overall talk. END-USER TALKS One of the big challenges as developers is to know what, where and how people actually use our software. We will reserve a few slots for end users talking about their deployment challenges and achievements. If you are using KVM in production you are encouraged submit a speaking proposal. Simply mark it as an end-user talk. As an end user, this is a unique opportunity to get your input to developers. HANDS-ON / BOF SESSIONS We will reserve some time for people to get together and discuss strategic decisions as well as other topics that are best solved within smaller groups. These sessions will be announced during the event. If you are interested in organizing such a session, please add it to the list at http://www.linux-kvm.org/page/KVM_Forum_2016_BOF Let people you think might be interested know about it, and encourage them to add their names to the wiki page as well. Please try to add your ideas to the list before KVM Forum starts. PANEL DISCUSSIONS If you are proposing a panel discussion, please make sure that you list all of your potential panelists in your abstract. We will request full biographies if a panel is accepted. =============== HOTEL / TRAVEL =============== This year's event will take place at the Westin Harbour Castle Toronto. For information on discounted room rates for conference attendees and on other hotels close to the conference, please visit http://events.linuxfoundation.org/events/kvm-forum/attend/hotel-travel. As of March 15, 2016, non-US citizens need either a visa or an Electronic Travel Authorization (eTA) in order to enter Canada. Detailed information on the travel documentation required for your country of origin can be found at http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/visit/visas.asp and http://events.linuxfoundation.org/events/kvm-forum/attend/hotel-travel. ** We urge you to start this process as quickly as possible to ensure ** receipt of appropriate travel documentation in time for your conference ** travel to Canada. For processing times for visa applications, please visit ** http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/information/times/. =============== IMPORTANT DATES =============== Notification: May 27, 2015 Schedule announced: June 3, 2015 Event dates: August 24-26, 2016 Thank you for your interest in KVM. We're looking forward to your submissions and seeing you at the KVM Forum 2016 in August! -your KVM Forum 2016 Program Committee Please contact us with any questions or comments at kvm-forum-2016-pc(a)redhat.com

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[libvirt] [PATCH v2 0/6] Move secret object command line building helpers
by John Ferlan 01 Jun '16

01 Jun '16

v1: http://www.redhat.com/archives/libvir-list/2016-May/msg02017.html Changes in v2: Patch 1 - Move function to a new src/util/virqemu.c with adjustments to other affected areas Patches 2-4 - Similarly adjust the flow/name of the patches with an adjustment so that patch 2 is just the new code in virqemu.c and patch 3 shows how the master secret code would use the same function to build it's command line. Patch 4 just follows suit... Patch 5 was reviewed/ACK'd - this patch just shows the changes to remove the "virSecretPtr secret = NULL;" and "virObjectUnref(secret);" Patch 6 is unchanged John Ferlan (6): qemu: Move and rename qemuBuildObjectCommandlineFromJSON util: Introduce virQEMUBuildSecretObjectProps qemu: Use virQEMUBuildSecretObjectProps to build secret objects qemu: Rework secinfo command line building storage: Use virSecretGetSecretString secret: Move virStorageSecretType to secret_util and rename cfg.mk | 2 +- po/POTFILES.in | 1 + src/Makefile.am | 2 + src/libvirt_private.syms | 5 + src/libxl/libxl_conf.c | 2 +- src/qemu/qemu_command.c | 219 +++++---------------- src/qemu/qemu_command.h | 4 - src/qemu/qemu_domain.c | 4 +- src/secret/secret_util.c | 18 +- src/secret/secret_util.h | 22 ++- src/storage/storage_backend_iscsi.c | 55 +----- src/storage/storage_backend_rbd.c | 49 +---- src/util/virqemu.c | 211 ++++++++++++++++++++ src/util/virqemu.h | 42 ++++ src/util/virstoragefile.c | 33 ++-- src/util/virstoragefile.h | 17 +- tests/qemuargv2xmltest.c | 4 +- tests/qemucommandutiltest.c | 9 +- ...muxml2argv-disk-drive-network-rbd-auth-AES.args | 3 +- .../qemuxml2argvdata/qemuxml2argv-master-key.args | 3 +- .../qemuxml2argvdata/qemuxml2argv-name-escape.args | 3 +- 21 files changed, 380 insertions(+), 328 deletions(-) create mode 100644 src/util/virqemu.c create mode 100644 src/util/virqemu.h -- 2.5.5

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[libvirt] RFC: turn cpu 'host-model' into 'custom' for active config on domain start
by Nikolay Shirokovskiy 01 Jun '16

01 Jun '16

Hi, everyone. Cpu mode 'host-model' is not convinient for migration in current form. Consider migration from less capable host to more capable one - it is possible. But then migration backwards is impossible despite the fact that qemu process on destination is running with the same model and features as on source because migration does not update 'host-model' cpu upon migration on destination. The problem is that on migrating back instead of taking current cpu config 'host-model' is expanded again and gain extra features of destination and migration failed by source (new destination) side. What if we change cpu for active config from 'host-model' into 'custom' in the starting process? Then this issue will be fixed. It is quite reasonable from my POV - 'host-model' is effectively about taking active domain cpu from host on start, after that active domain cpu is on its own. Persistent config stays 'host-model' so migrating of active domain and restarting it gains extra features of new host as before. Nikolay

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[libvirt] NFS over AF_VSOCK in <filesystem>
by Stefan Hajnoczi 01 Jun '16

01 Jun '16

virtio-vsock support has been added to the nfs-ganesha NFS server. I'm currently working on upstreaming virtio-vsock into Linux and QEMU. I also have patches for the Linux NFS client and server. Users wishing to share a file system with the guest will need to configure the NFS server. Perhaps libvirt could handle that given that it already has <filesystem> syntax. The basic task is setting up either the kernel nfsd or nfs-ganesha for the VM to access the NFS export(s). When the VM is destroy the NFS server can be shut down. Does this sound like a responsibility that libvirt should handle? Stefan

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[libvirt] [PATCH 0/3] bhyve: virConnectDomainXMLFromNative
by Fabian Freyer 01 Jun '16

01 Jun '16

The following series of patches implement virConnectDomainXMLFromNative. This is mostly some boiler plate code generating argv-lists from the native command string, and two getopt-based argument parsers for the /usr/sbin/bhyve and /usr/sbin/bhyveload commands. Since there is quite some string handling involved especially in the first patch that I am not 100% sure about, I'd appreciate a thorough review. Fabian Freyer (3): bhyve: implement virConnectDomainXMLFromNative bhyve: implement bhyve argument parser bhyve: implement argument parser for loader po/POTFILES.in | 1 + src/Makefile.am | 2 + src/bhyve/bhyve_driver.c | 42 ++ src/bhyve/bhyve_parse_command.c | 869 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ src/bhyve/bhyve_parse_command.h | 30 ++ 5 files changed, 944 insertions(+) create mode 100644 src/bhyve/bhyve_parse_command.c create mode 100644 src/bhyve/bhyve_parse_command.h -- 2.7.0

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Re: [libvirt] [ovs-dev] [PATCH v2 2/2] netdev-dpdk: Support user-defined socket attribs
by Ansis Atteka 01 Jun '16

01 Jun '16

On Mon, May 30, 2016 at 12:29 AM, Christian Ehrhardt <christian.ehrhardt(a)canonical.com> wrote: > On Tue, May 24, 2016 at 4:10 PM, Aaron Conole <aconole(a)redhat.com> wrote: > >> Daniele Di Proietto <diproiettod(a)vmware.com> writes: >> >> > Hi Aaron, >> > >> > I'm still a little bit nervous about calling chown on a (partially) >> > user controlled file name. >> >> I agree, that always seems scary. >> >> > Before moving forward I wanted to discuss a couple of other options: >> > >> > * Ansis (in CC) suggested using -runas parameter in qemu. This way >> > qemu can open the socket as root and drop privileges before starting >> > guest execution. >> >> I'm not sure how to do this with libvirt, or via the OpenStack Neutron >> plugin. I also don't know if it would be an acceptable workaround for >> users. Additionally, I recall there being something of a "don't even >> know if this works" around it. Maybe Christian or Ansis (both in CC) >> can expound on it. >> Cross-posting to libvirt mailing list to hear opinion from libvirt developers. In short - the problem is that libvirtd process starts qemu process under non-root user. Since qemu starts under non-root process, then qemu can't connect to DPDK unix domain sockets created by ovs-vswitcd process that runs under "root". There are two solutions to this problem: 1. let ovs-vswitchd process to chown its socket from "root" to "libvirt" group and/or user (this is what Aarons patch proposes) 2. make libvirtd process to start qemu process under "root" but then let qemu to downgrade via "-run-as" flag after qemu has opened the Unix Domain socket. Regarding solution #2. I think the necessary changes roughly would be to: 1. invoke virCommandAddArgPair(cmd, "-runas", "libvirt") before starting qemu process; AND 2. revert virCommandSetUID() that automatically downgrades user from "root" to "libvirt" even before qemu starts. I would like to hear feasibility of such solution from libvirt developers? Or maybe there is even a better solution that I am missing? Regarding solution #1. There have already been precedents that other daemons are chowning their sockets so that non-privileged daemons could connect to them. IMHO this is not elegant from security perspective but will at least get the job done if Linux Distribution maintainers (Aaron and Christian) need to ship something out ASAP . The thing I am concerned about this solutions is that ovs-vswitchd could be used to chown() arbitrary files and sockets on file system if there happens to be a bug. Also, this socket is not created by ovs-vswitchd code base itself but rather from Intel DPDK library where ovs-vswitchd calls into. > Hi, > IIRC we kind of agree that long term a proper MAC will be much better but > most involved people needed something to get it working like "now". > Since they are complementary (other than the fix removing a bit of the > urgency for more MAC) it was kind of the least bad option. > > You have to be aware that I brought up the discussion on dev(a)dpdk.org - see > [1] and [2]: > But this will take time and eventually still be the applications task to > "do something" - no matter if via API or via the chmod's right now. > So Aaron is trying to get something that works now until the long term > things are in place, which I appreciate. > > FYI - I was even more in a hurry as it was clear that OVS-2.5 won't get > this in time I run with [3] for now. > I never intended to suggest that, but with the discussion in place, one > could ask if you (Aaron) want to pick up that instead. > That would keep OVS free for now until DPDK made up the API (see [2]) for > socket ownership control and this then could be implemented in OVS? > > (I hope) In some months/years we will all be happy to drop this bunch of > interim solutions, never the less we need it for now. > > [1]: http://dpdk.org/dev/patchwork/patch/12222/ > [2]: http://dpdk.org/ml/archives/dev/2015-December/030326.html > [3]: > https://git.launchpad.net/~ubuntu-server/dpdk/commit/?h=ubuntu-xenial-to-dp… > > [...] > > >> I think originally we quickly discussed 4 possible solutions (and >> hopefully I captured them correctly): >> >> 1. OVS downgrades to the ovs user, and kvm runs under the ovs >> group. I don't actually like this solution because kvm could then >> pollute the ovs database. >> >> 2. OVS runs as some user and sets the user/group ownership of the socket >> via chown/chmod where permissions come from the database (the >> original context had ovs running as root - but as I described above >> it doesn't need to be root provided ovs+DPDK can start without root). >> >> 3. OVS runs as some user, kvm starts as root, opens the socket and >> downgrades. IIRC, this doesn't actually work, or it may have >> implications on other projects. I don't remember exactly what was >> not as great about this solution, TBH. >> >> 4. OVS and KVM run as whatever users; MAC is used to enforce the >> layering between them. >> >> I think solution 2 and solution 4 don't actually interfere with each >> other, and can be used to a complementary effect (if implemented >> properly) so that the MAC layer enforces access, but even without MAC, >> the DAC layer can provide appropriate whitelisting behavior. >> > > I also remember several complex changes needed for the #1 and #3 that > always would end up with huge effort and a high risk not being accepted. > Probably that is what you refer to with "implications on other projects". > > Also keep in mind the position of dpdk out of the last few discussions > which I'd like to summarize as "dpdk got this path from an app, so this app > OWNS that path". > _______________________________________________ > dev mailing list > dev(a)openvswitch.org > http://openvswitch.org/mailman/listinfo/dev

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