On Wed, May 23, 2018 at 04:18:26PM -0500, Brijesh Singh wrote: Since virSEVCapability will be added to virDomainCaps too, you need to move ^this into domain_capabilities.c so it will become virSEVCapabilityFree, I've got a further comment regarding this in patch 2 as well. NOTE: notice the SEV in the function name, we should stay consistent in naming and since SEV is the name of the feature... virSEVCapabilityFree(qemuCaps->sevCapabilities) 1 more blank line here... Need 1 more blank line here... We declared ^these as uint in virSEVCapability, so that fact should be reflected here too... GetNumberUInt()... GetNumberUInt()... we should mention the query command that failed, i.e. "query-sev-capabilities reply was missing 'xyz' field" same here same here... Erik

On Wed, May 23, 2018 at 04:18:27PM -0500, Brijesh Singh wrote: ...and this one should be IMHO named conf: Expose SEV in domain capabilities needs 1 more level of indent... As I said, I have to agree with Dan here that reporting the 8k string in capabilities is a good idea, so we can store it, we just wouldn't format it ^here... domCaps is a one-time-use object needed when you format the qemuCaps into domCaps which is returned to the user and is therefore cleaned up on the API exit, so ^this shouldn't be considered safe and you should create virQEMUCapsFillDomainFeatureSEVCaps where you allocate a fresh domCaps->sev structure and then you'll need to put virSEVCapabilityFree I mentioned in patch 1 to virDomainCapsDispose so as not to leak any memory related to copying the SEV data. Erik

The launch-security element can be used to define the security model to use when launching a domain. Currently we support 'sev'. When 'sev' is used, the VM will be launched with AMD SEV feature enabled. SEV feature supports running encrypted VM under the control of KVM. Encrypted VMs have their pages (code and data) secured such that only the guest itself has access to the unencrypted version. Each encrypted VM is associated with a unique encryption key; if its data is accessed to a different entity using a different key the encrypted guests data will be incorrectly decrypted, leading to unintelligible data. Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh(a)amd.com&gt; --- docs/formatdomain.html.in | 115 ++++++++++++++++++ docs/schemas/domaincommon.rng | 39 ++++++ src/conf/domain_conf.c | 133 +++++++++++++++++++++ src/conf/domain_conf.h | 27 +++++ tests/genericxml2xmlindata/launch-security-sev.xml | 24 ++++ tests/genericxml2xmltest.c | 2 + 6 files changed, 340 insertions(+) create mode 100644 tests/genericxml2xmlindata/launch-security-sev.xml diff --git a/docs/formatdomain.html.in b/docs/formatdomain.html.in index 665d0f25293e..cab08ea52003 100644 --- a/docs/formatdomain.html.in +++ b/docs/formatdomain.html.in @@ -8310,6 +8310,121 @@ qemu-kvm -net nic,model=? /dev/null <p>Note: DEA/TDEA is synonymous with DES/TDES.</p> + <h3><a id="sev">Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV)</a></h3> + + <p> + The contents of the <code>&lt;launch-security type='sev'&gt;</code> element + is used to provide the guest owners input used for creating an encrypted + VM using the AMD SEV feature. + + SEV is an extension to the AMD-V architecture which supports running + encrypted virtual machine (VMs) under the control of KVM. Encrypted + VMs have their pages (code and data) secured such that only the guest + itself has access to the unencrypted version. Each encrypted VM is + associated with a unique encryption key; if its data is accessed to a + different entity using a different key the encrypted guests data will + be incorrectly decrypted, leading to unintelligible data. + + For more information see various input parameters and its format see the SEV API spec + <a href="https://support.amd.com/TechDocs/55766_SEV-KM%20API_Specificat... https://support.amd.com/TechDocs/55766_SEV-KM%20API_Specification.pdf </a> + <span class="since">Since 4.4.0</span> + </p> + <pre> +&lt;domain&gt; + ... + &lt;launch-security type='sev'&gt; + &lt;policy&gt; 0x0001 &lt;/policy&gt; + &lt;cbitpos&gt; 47 &lt;/cbitpos&gt; + &lt;reduced-phys-bits&gt; 1 &lt;/reduced-phys-bits&gt; + &lt;session&gt; AAACCCDD=FFFCCCDSDS &lt;/session&gt; + &lt;dh-cert&gt; RBBBSDDD=FDDCCCDDDG &lt;/dh&gt; + &lt;/sev&gt; + ... +&lt;/domain&gt; +</pre> + + <dl> + <dt><code>cbitpos</code></dt> + <dd>The required <code>cbitpos</code> element provides the C-bit (aka encryption bit) + location in guest page table entry. The value of <code>cbitpos</code> is + hypervisor dependent and can be obtained through the <code>sev</code> element + from the domain capabilities. + </dd> + <dt><code>reduced-phys-bits</code></dt> + <dd>The required <code>reduced-phys-bits</code> element provides the physical + address bit reducation. Similar to <code>cbitpos</code> the value of <code> + reduced-phys-bit</code> is hypervisor dependent and can be obtained + through the <code>sev</code> element from the domain capabilities. + </dd> + <dt><code>policy</code></dt> + <dd>The required <code>policy</code> element provides the guest policy + which must be maintained by the SEV firmware. This policy is enforced by + the firmware and restricts what configuration and operational commands + can be performed on this guest by the hypervisor. The guest policy + provided during guest launch is bound to the guest and cannot be changed + throughout the lifetime of the guest. The policy is also transmitted + during snapshot and migration flows and enforced on the destination platform. + + The guest policy is a 4 unsigned byte with the fields shown in Table: + + <table class="top_table"> + <tr> + <th> Bit(s) </th> + <th> Description </th> + </tr> + <tr> + <td> 0 </td> + <td> Debugging of the guest is disallowed when set </td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td> 1 </td> + <td> Sharing keys with other guests is disallowed when set </td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td> 2 </td> + <td> SEV-ES is required when set</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td> 3 </td> + <td> Sending the guest to another platform is disallowed when set</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td> 4 </td> + <td> The guest must not be transmitted to another platform that is + not in the domain when set. </td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td> 5 </td> + <td> The guest must not be transmitted to another platform that is + not SEV capable when set. </td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td> 15:6 </td> + <td> reserved </td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td> 16:32 </td> + <td> The guest must not be transmitted to another platform with a + lower firmware version. </td> + </tr> + </table> + + </dd> + <dt><code>dh-cert</code></dt> + <dd>The optional <code>dh-cert</code> element provides the guest owners + base64 encoded Diffie-Hellman (DH) key. The key is used to negotiate a + master secret key between the SEV firmware and guest owner. This master + secret key is then used to establish a trusted channel between SEV + firmware and guest owner. + </dd> + <dt><code>session</code></dt> + <dd>The optional <code>session</code> element provides the guest owners + base64 encoded session blob defined in the SEV API spec. + + See SEV spec LAUNCH_START section for the session blob format. + </dd> + </dl> + <h2><a id="examples">Example configs</a></h2> <p> diff --git a/docs/schemas/domaincommon.rng b/docs/schemas/domaincommon.rng index f16e157397d4..69b6c84b9540 100644 --- a/docs/schemas/domaincommon.rng +++ b/docs/schemas/domaincommon.rng @@ -77,6 +77,9 @@ <optional> <ref name='keywrap'/> </optional> + <optional> + <ref name='launch-security'/> + </optional> </interleave> </element> </define> @@ -436,6 +439,42 @@ </element> </define> + <define name="launch-security"> + <element name="launch-security"> + <attribute name="type"> + <value>sev</value> + </attribute> + <interleave> + <element name="cbitpos"> + <data type='unsignedInt'/> + </element> + <element name="reduced-phys-bits"> + <data type='unsignedInt'/> + </element> + <optional> + <element name="policy"> + <ref name='hexuint'/> + </element> + </optional> + <optional> + <element name="handle"> + <ref name='unsignedInt'/> + </element> + </optional> + <optional> + <element name="dh-cert"> + <data type="string"/> + </element> + </optional> + <optional> + <element name="session"> + <data type="string"/> + </element> + </optional> + </interleave> + </element> + </define> + <!-- Enable or disable perf events for the domain. For each of the events the following rules apply: diff --git a/src/conf/domain_conf.c b/src/conf/domain_conf.c index 225309809029..8fde7f8d0359 100644 --- a/src/conf/domain_conf.c +++ b/src/conf/domain_conf.c @@ -933,6 +933,10 @@ VIR_ENUM_IMPL(virDomainShmemModel, VIR_DOMAIN_SHMEM_MODEL_LAST, "ivshmem-plain", "ivshmem-doorbell") +VIR_ENUM_IMPL(virDomainLaunchSecurity, VIR_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_LAST, + "", + "sev") + static virClassPtr virDomainObjClass; static virClassPtr virDomainXMLOptionClass; static void virDomainObjDispose(void *obj); @@ -2904,6 +2908,19 @@ virDomainCachetuneDefFree(virDomainCachetuneDefPtr cachetune) } +static void +virDomainSevDefFree(virDomainSevDefPtr def) +{ + if (!def) + return; + + VIR_FREE(def->dh_cert); + VIR_FREE(def->session); + + VIR_FREE(def); +} + + void virDomainDefFree(virDomainDefPtr def) { size_t i; @@ -3085,6 +3102,8 @@ void virDomainDefFree(virDomainDefPtr def) if (def->namespaceData && def->ns.free) (def->ns.free)(def->namespaceData); + virDomainSevDefFree(def->sev); + xmlFreeNode(def->metadata); VIR_FREE(def); @@ -15688,6 +15707,85 @@ virDomainMemoryTargetDefParseXML(xmlNodePtr node, } +static virDomainSevDefPtr +virDomainSevDefParseXML(xmlNodePtr sevNode, + xmlXPathContextPtr ctxt) +{ + char *tmp = NULL; + char *type = NULL; + xmlNodePtr save = ctxt->node; + virDomainSevDefPtr def; + unsigned long policy; + + ctxt->node = sevNode; + + if (VIR_ALLOC(def) < 0) + return NULL; + + if (!(type = virXMLPropString(sevNode, "type"))) { + virReportError(VIR_ERR_XML_ERROR, "%s", + _("missing launch-security type")); + goto error; + } + + def->sectype = virDomainLaunchSecurityTypeFromString(type); + switch ((virDomainLaunchSecurity) def->sectype) { + case VIR_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_SEV: + break; + case VIR_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_NONE: + case VIR_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_LAST: + default: + virReportError(VIR_ERR_XML_ERROR, + _("unsupported launch-security type '%s'"), + type); + goto error; + } + + if (virXPathUInt("string(./cbitpos)", ctxt, &def->cbitpos) < 0) { + virReportError(VIR_ERR_XML_ERROR, "%s", + _("failed to get launch-security cbitpos")); + goto error; + } + + if (virXPathUInt("string(./reduced-phys-bits)", ctxt, + &def->reduced_phys_bits) < 0) { + virReportError(VIR_ERR_XML_ERROR, "%s", + _("failed to get launch-security reduced-phys-bits")); + goto error; + } + + if (virXPathULongHex("string(./policy)", ctxt, &policy) < 0) { + virReportError(VIR_ERR_XML_ERROR, "%s", + _("failed to get launch-security policy")); + goto error; + } + + def->policy = policy; + + if ((tmp = virXPathString("string(./dh-cert)", ctxt))) { + if (VIR_STRDUP(def->dh_cert, tmp) < 0) + goto error; + + VIR_FREE(tmp); + } + + if ((tmp = virXPathString("string(./session)", ctxt))) { + if (VIR_STRDUP(def->session, tmp) < 0) + goto error; + + VIR_FREE(tmp); + } + + ctxt->node = save; + return def; + + error: + VIR_FREE(tmp); + virDomainSevDefFree(def); + ctxt->node = save; + return NULL; +} + static virDomainMemoryDefPtr virDomainMemoryDefParseXML(virDomainXMLOptionPtr xmlopt, xmlNodePtr memdevNode, @@ -20370,6 +20468,13 @@ virDomainDefParseXML(xmlDocPtr xml, ctxt->node = node; VIR_FREE(nodes); + /* Check for SEV feature */ + if ((node = virXPathNode("./launch-security", ctxt)) != NULL) { + def->sev = virDomainSevDefParseXML(node, ctxt); + if (!def->sev) + goto error; + } + /* analysis of memory devices */ if ((n = virXPathNodeSet("./devices/memory", ctxt, &nodes)) < 0) goto error; @@ -26263,6 +26368,32 @@ virDomainKeyWrapDefFormat(virBufferPtr buf, virDomainKeyWrapDefPtr keywrap) virBufferAddLit(buf, "</keywrap>\n"); } + +static void +virDomainSevDefFormat(virBufferPtr buf, virDomainSevDefPtr sev) +{ + if (!sev) + return; + + virBufferAsprintf(buf, "<launch-security type='%s'>\n", + virDomainLaunchSecurityTypeToString(sev->sectype)); + virBufferAdjustIndent(buf, 2); + + virBufferAsprintf(buf, "<cbitpos>%d</cbitpos>\n", sev->cbitpos); + virBufferAsprintf(buf, "<reduced-phys-bits>%d</reduced-phys-bits>\n", + sev->reduced_phys_bits); + virBufferAsprintf(buf, "<policy>0x%04x</policy>\n", sev->policy); + if (sev->dh_cert) + virBufferEscapeString(buf, "<dh-cert>%s</dh-cert>\n", sev->dh_cert); + + if (sev->session) + virBufferEscapeString(buf, "<session>%s</session>\n", sev->session); + + virBufferAdjustIndent(buf, -2); + virBufferAddLit(buf, "</launch-security>\n"); +} + + static void virDomainPerfDefFormat(virBufferPtr buf, virDomainPerfDefPtr perf) { @@ -27451,6 +27582,8 @@ virDomainDefFormatInternal(virDomainDefPtr def, if (def->keywrap) virDomainKeyWrapDefFormat(buf, def->keywrap); + virDomainSevDefFormat(buf, def->sev); + virBufferAdjustIndent(buf, -2); virBufferAddLit(buf, "</domain>\n"); diff --git a/src/conf/domain_conf.h b/src/conf/domain_conf.h index 37356df42d71..d1c101cc4673 100644 --- a/src/conf/domain_conf.h +++ b/src/conf/domain_conf.h @@ -142,6 +142,9 @@ typedef virDomainPanicDef *virDomainPanicDefPtr; typedef struct _virDomainMemoryDef virDomainMemoryDef; typedef virDomainMemoryDef *virDomainMemoryDefPtr; +typedef struct _virDomainSevDef virDomainSevDef; +typedef virDomainSevDef *virDomainSevDefPtr; + /* forward declarations virDomainChrSourceDef, required by * virDomainNetDef */ @@ -2297,6 +2300,26 @@ struct _virDomainKeyWrapDef { int dea; /* enum virTristateSwitch */ }; +typedef enum { + VIR_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_NONE, + VIR_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_SEV, + + VIR_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_LAST, +} virDomainLaunchSecurity; + +typedef struct _virDomainSevDef virDomainSevDef; +typedef virDomainSevDef *virDomainSevDefPtr; + +struct _virDomainSevDef { + int sectype; /* enum virDomainLaunchSecurity */ + char *dh_cert; + char *session; + unsigned int policy; + unsigned int cbitpos; + unsigned int reduced_phys_bits; +}; + + typedef enum { VIR_DOMAIN_IOMMU_MODEL_INTEL, @@ -2462,6 +2485,9 @@ struct _virDomainDef { virDomainKeyWrapDefPtr keywrap; + /* SEV-specific domain */ + virDomainSevDefPtr sev; + /* Application-specific custom metadata */ xmlNodePtr metadata; @@ -3358,6 +3384,7 @@ VIR_ENUM_DECL(virDomainMemorySource) VIR_ENUM_DECL(virDomainMemoryAllocation) VIR_ENUM_DECL(virDomainIOMMUModel) VIR_ENUM_DECL(virDomainShmemModel) +VIR_ENUM_DECL(virDomainLaunchSecurity) /* from libvirt.h */ VIR_ENUM_DECL(virDomainState) VIR_ENUM_DECL(virDomainNostateReason) diff --git a/tests/genericxml2xmlindata/launch-security-sev.xml b/tests/genericxml2xmlindata/launch-security-sev.xml new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..fb64e1e4bec3 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/genericxml2xmlindata/launch-security-sev.xml @@ -0,0 +1,24 @@ +<domain type='kvm'> + <name>QEMUGuest1</name> + <uuid>c7a5fdbd-edaf-9455-926a-d65c16db1809</uuid> + <memory unit='KiB'>219100</memory> + <currentMemory unit='KiB'>219100</currentMemory> + <vcpu placement='static'>1</vcpu> + <os> + <type arch='x86_64' machine='pc-1.0'>hvm</type> + <boot dev='hd'/> + </os> + <clock offset='utc'/> + <on_poweroff>destroy</on_poweroff> + <on_reboot>restart</on_reboot> + <on_crash>destroy</on_crash> + <devices> + </devices> + <launch-security type='sev'> + <cbitpos>47</cbitpos> + <reduced-phys-bits>1</reduced-phys-bits> + <policy>0x0001</policy> + <dh-cert>AQAAAAAOAAAAQAAAAAOAAAAQAAAAAOAAAAQAAAAAOAAAAQAAAAAOAAA</dh-cert> + <session>IHAVENOIDEABUTJUSTPROVIDINGASTRING</session> + </launch-security> +</domain> diff --git a/tests/genericxml2xmltest.c b/tests/genericxml2xmltest.c index d8270a6cae82..366ac6f9c3ab 100644 --- a/tests/genericxml2xmltest.c +++ b/tests/genericxml2xmltest.c @@ -141,6 +141,8 @@ mymain(void) DO_TEST_FULL("cachetune-colliding-types", false, true, TEST_COMPARE_DOM_XML2XML_RESULT_FAIL_PARSE); + DO_TEST("launch-security-sev"); + virObjectUnref(caps); virObjectUnref(xmlopt); -- 2.14.3

On 05/28/2018 05:57 AM, Erik Skultety wrote: As I said in cover letter patch response, the value need to be user config to make the SEV launch migration safe. Consider the below example 1) user launches a guest on platform A. On this platform hypervisor reports cbitpos=47 and reduced-phys-bit=1. While creating the guest QEMU requires caller to specify the cbitpos and reduced-phys-bit parameters. These params gets validate before creating the guest. If the user specified values are acceptable then QEMU will create the guest otherwise it will fail to create guest. Typically cbitpos and reduced-phys-bit is platform and hypervisor dependent. If user does not know the value then it can query it with "virsh domcapabilities" before creating the domain XML file. 2) user tries to migrate the above guest to platform B. a) If the platform B hypervisor supports the cbitpos and reduced-phys-bits value used in #1 then we have no issues. b) if platform B hypervisor does not support those value then we should fail the migration. If we don't make the <cbitpos> and <reduced-phys-bits> user configurable then we will end up pick the different value compare to what was used during the launch flow. Good catch, thanks. I should be 6:15 Noted. OK. I will go ahead and Use SEV instead of 'Sev' in all other places in function name to be consistent. As explained above, <cbitpos> and <reduced-phys-bits> must be configurable. We had good discussion about this topic here: https://marc.info/?l=qemu-devel&m=151740619818655&w=2

On Wed, May 23, 2018 at 04:18:31PM -0500, Brijesh Singh wrote: fails make syntax-check because of indentation, should be "# define ..." ... Will most probably become 4.5.0 :( Technically, I don't have any notes related to the functional changes, therefore I'd give you my RB, however, I still find the naming confusing and I can't think of something better. What if one day we'll actually be able to/need to modify the configuration for some reason, we should reserve a name like this for future modifications of launch-security data of the guest. Next, you're preparing for adding support for some kind of setter in the virsh command, any idea of what the setter data might be? Because I can imagine that you'd still want to perform a measurement, but want to send additional arguments, to the remote side's firmware to change the behaviour of the measurement and you can't do this with a simple flag, you also need typed params for that which means wou'd end up with something like: int virDomainLaunchSecurityMeasure(virDomainPtr domain, virTypedParamsPtr send_params, unsigned int nsend_params, virTypedParamsPtr *recv_params, unsigned int nrecv_params); And you can both send additional arguments as well as receive arguments according to the remote implementation, it's IMHO safer, but it's extremely ugly at the same time and we're hitting the 'one function does all' kind of scenario which we also shouldn't do. At the same time though, we could say that any arguments that you might need to alter the result of the measurement should be available prior to launching the guest in its XML config file, that way, you'll never need anything apart from the recv_params,recv_nparams and the name you're suggesting can stay, since only by using flags you can tell libvirt daemon whether you want to work with the info in the config or take a measurement or something else. This was just me thinking out loud and would like to get some input from you and/or other reviewer because even though I'm okay with the code, I don't want to make a decision we can't take back just yet. Erik

On 05/28/2018 09:36 AM, Erik Skultety wrote: Actually we had similar API in previous patches but I followed the review feedback from earlier versions where it was hinted to use launch-security so that in future if any other architecture or platform provides the similar feature but with different naming then we don't have to introduce yet another APIs. After guest owner validates the measurement, it will provide some additional information to VM. Typically this may include the some type of secret information and we may need to pass the following inputs via the API. - secret blob - length of the blob - the memory address where the blob need to be copied

Add remote support for launch security info. Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh(a)amd.com&gt; --- src/remote/remote_daemon_dispatch.c | 47 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ src/remote/remote_driver.c | 42 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- src/remote/remote_protocol.x | 20 +++++++++++++++- src/remote_protocol-structs | 11 +++++++++ 4 files changed, 118 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/remote/remote_daemon_dispatch.c b/src/remote/remote_daemon_dispatch.c index a8a5932d7134..30b22fbce092 100644 --- a/src/remote/remote_daemon_dispatch.c +++ b/src/remote/remote_daemon_dispatch.c @@ -3109,6 +3109,53 @@ remoteDispatchNodeGetMemoryStats(virNetServerPtr server ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED, return rv; } +static int +remoteDispatchDomainGetLaunchSecurityInfo(virNetServerPtr server ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED, + virNetServerClientPtr client ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED, + virNetMessagePtr msg ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED, + virNetMessageErrorPtr rerr, + remote_domain_get_launch_security_info_args *args, + remote_domain_get_launch_security_info_ret *ret) +{ + virDomainPtr dom = NULL; + virTypedParameterPtr params = NULL; + int nparams = 0; + int rv = -1; + struct daemonClientPrivate *priv = + virNetServerClientGetPrivateData(client); + + if (!priv->conn) { + virReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR, "%s", _("connection not open")); + goto cleanup; + } + + if (!(dom = get_nonnull_domain(priv->conn, args->dom))) + goto cleanup; + + if (virDomainGetLaunchSecurityInfo(dom, &params, &nparams, args->flags) < 0) + goto cleanup; + + if (nparams > REMOTE_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_INFO_PARAMS_MAX) { + virReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR, "%s", _("nparams too large")); + goto cleanup; + } + + if (virTypedParamsSerialize(params, nparams, + (virTypedParameterRemotePtr *) &ret->params.params_val, + &ret->params.params_len, + args->flags) < 0) + goto cleanup; + + rv = 0; + + cleanup: + if (rv < 0) + virNetMessageSaveError(rerr); + virTypedParamsFree(params, nparams); + virObjectUnref(dom); + return rv; +} + static int remoteDispatchDomainGetPerfEvents(virNetServerPtr server ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED, virNetServerClientPtr client ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED, diff --git a/src/remote/remote_driver.c b/src/remote/remote_driver.c index 95437b43657e..fc649276799e 100644 --- a/src/remote/remote_driver.c +++ b/src/remote/remote_driver.c @@ -1965,6 +1965,45 @@ remoteDomainGetNumaParameters(virDomainPtr domain, return rv; } +static int +remoteDomainGetLaunchSecurityInfo(virDomainPtr domain, + virTypedParameterPtr *params, + int *nparams, + unsigned int flags) +{ + int rv = -1; + remote_domain_get_launch_security_info_args args; + remote_domain_get_launch_security_info_ret ret; + struct private_data *priv = domain->conn->privateData; + + remoteDriverLock(priv); + + make_nonnull_domain(&args.dom, domain); + args.flags = flags; + + memset(&ret, 0, sizeof(ret)); + if (call(domain->conn, priv, 0, REMOTE_PROC_DOMAIN_GET_LAUNCH_SECURITY_INFO, + (xdrproc_t) xdr_remote_domain_get_launch_security_info_args, (char *) &args, + (xdrproc_t) xdr_remote_domain_get_launch_security_info_ret, (char *) &ret) == -1) + goto done; + + if (virTypedParamsDeserialize((virTypedParameterRemotePtr) ret.params.params_val, + ret.params.params_len, + REMOTE_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_INFO_PARAMS_MAX, + params, + nparams) < 0) + goto cleanup; + + rv = 0; + + cleanup: + xdr_free((xdrproc_t) xdr_remote_domain_get_launch_security_info_ret, + (char *) &ret); + done: + remoteDriverUnlock(priv); + return rv; +} + static int remoteDomainGetPerfEvents(virDomainPtr domain, virTypedParameterPtr *params, @@ -8448,7 +8487,8 @@ static virHypervisorDriver hypervisor_driver = { .domainSetGuestVcpus = remoteDomainSetGuestVcpus, /* 2.0.0 */ .domainSetVcpu = remoteDomainSetVcpu, /* 3.1.0 */ .domainSetBlockThreshold = remoteDomainSetBlockThreshold, /* 3.2.0 */ - .domainSetLifecycleAction = remoteDomainSetLifecycleAction /* 3.9.0 */ + .domainSetLifecycleAction = remoteDomainSetLifecycleAction, /* 3.9.0 */ + .domainGetLaunchSecurityInfo = remoteDomainGetLaunchSecurityInfo /* 4.4.0 */ }; static virNetworkDriver network_driver = { diff --git a/src/remote/remote_protocol.x b/src/remote/remote_protocol.x index 296a0871813a..9e979eb85fd9 100644 --- a/src/remote/remote_protocol.x +++ b/src/remote/remote_protocol.x @@ -253,6 +253,9 @@ const REMOTE_DOMAIN_IP_ADDR_MAX = 2048; /* Upper limit on number of guest vcpu information entries */ const REMOTE_DOMAIN_GUEST_VCPU_PARAMS_MAX = 64; +/* Upper limit on number of launch security information entries */ +const REMOTE_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_INFO_PARAMS_MAX = 64; + /* UUID. VIR_UUID_BUFLEN definition comes from libvirt.h */ typedef opaque remote_uuid[VIR_UUID_BUFLEN]; @@ -3448,6 +3451,15 @@ struct remote_domain_set_lifecycle_action_args { unsigned int flags; }; +struct remote_domain_get_launch_security_info_args { + remote_nonnull_domain dom; + unsigned int flags; +}; + +struct remote_domain_get_launch_security_info_ret { + remote_typed_param params<REMOTE_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_INFO_PARAMS_MAX>; +}; + /*----- Protocol. -----*/ /* Define the program number, protocol version and procedure numbers here. */ @@ -6135,5 +6147,11 @@ enum remote_procedure { * @priority: high * @acl: storage_pool:getattr */ - REMOTE_PROC_STORAGE_POOL_LOOKUP_BY_TARGET_PATH = 391 + REMOTE_PROC_STORAGE_POOL_LOOKUP_BY_TARGET_PATH = 391, + + /** + * @generate: none + * @acl: domain:read + */ + REMOTE_PROC_DOMAIN_GET_LAUNCH_SECURITY_INFO = 392 }; diff --git a/src/remote_protocol-structs b/src/remote_protocol-structs index fe163db73f88..e73152d72371 100644 --- a/src/remote_protocol-structs +++ b/src/remote_protocol-structs @@ -2877,6 +2877,16 @@ struct remote_domain_set_lifecycle_action_args { u_int action; u_int flags; }; +struct remote_domain_get_launch_security_info_args { + remote_nonnull_domain dom; + u_int flags; +}; +struct remote_domain_get_launch_security_info_ret { + struct { + u_int params_len; + remote_typed_param * params_val; + } params; +}; enum remote_procedure { REMOTE_PROC_CONNECT_OPEN = 1, REMOTE_PROC_CONNECT_CLOSE = 2, @@ -3269,4 +3279,5 @@ enum remote_procedure { REMOTE_PROC_DOMAIN_MANAGED_SAVE_DEFINE_XML = 389, REMOTE_PROC_DOMAIN_SET_LIFECYCLE_ACTION = 390, REMOTE_PROC_STORAGE_POOL_LOOKUP_BY_TARGET_PATH = 391, + REMOTE_PROC_DOMAIN_GET_LAUNCH_SECURITY_INFO = 392, }; -- 2.14.3

This patch implements the internal driver API for launch event into qemu driver. When SEV is enabled, execute 'query-sev-launch-measurement' to get the measurement of memory encrypted through launch sequence. Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh(a)amd.com&gt; --- src/qemu/qemu_driver.c | 68 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ src/qemu/qemu_monitor.c | 8 ++++++ src/qemu/qemu_monitor.h | 3 ++ src/qemu/qemu_monitor_json.c | 42 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++ src/qemu/qemu_monitor_json.h | 2 ++ 5 files changed, 123 insertions(+) diff --git a/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c b/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c index 3a328e5d4679..6569dea32fce 100644 --- a/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c +++ b/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c @@ -21194,6 +21194,73 @@ qemuDomainSetLifecycleAction(virDomainPtr dom, } +static int +qemuDomainGetSevMeasurement(virQEMUDriverPtr driver, + virDomainObjPtr vm, + virTypedParameterPtr *params, + int *nparams, + unsigned int flags) +{ + int ret = -1; + char *tmp; + int maxpar = 0; + + virCheckFlags(VIR_TYPED_PARAM_STRING_OKAY, -1); + + if (qemuDomainObjBeginJob(driver, vm, QEMU_JOB_QUERY) < 0) + return -1; + + if (qemuDomainObjEnterMonitorAsync(driver, vm, QEMU_ASYNC_JOB_NONE) < 0) + goto endjob; + + tmp = qemuMonitorGetSevMeasurement(QEMU_DOMAIN_PRIVATE(vm)->mon); + if (tmp == NULL) + goto endjob; + + if (qemuDomainObjExitMonitor(driver, vm) < 0) + goto endjob; + + if (virTypedParamsAddString(params, nparams, &maxpar, + VIR_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_SEV_MEASUREMENT, + tmp) < 0) + goto endjob; + + ret = 0; + + endjob: + qemuDomainObjEndJob(driver, vm); + return ret; +} + + +static int +qemuDomainGetLaunchSecurityInfo(virDomainPtr domain, + virTypedParameterPtr *params, + int *nparams, + unsigned int flags) +{ + virQEMUDriverPtr driver = domain->conn->privateData; + virDomainObjPtr vm; + int ret = -1; + + if (!(vm = qemuDomObjFromDomain(domain))) + goto cleanup; + + if (virDomainGetLaunchSecurityInfoEnsureACL(domain->conn, vm->def) < 0) + goto cleanup; + + if (vm->def->sev) { + if (qemuDomainGetSevMeasurement(driver, vm, params, nparams, flags) < 0) + goto cleanup; + } + + ret = 0; + + cleanup: + virDomainObjEndAPI(&vm); + return ret; +} + static virHypervisorDriver qemuHypervisorDriver = { .name = QEMU_DRIVER_NAME, .connectURIProbe = qemuConnectURIProbe, @@ -21414,6 +21481,7 @@ static virHypervisorDriver qemuHypervisorDriver = { .domainSetVcpu = qemuDomainSetVcpu, /* 3.1.0 */ .domainSetBlockThreshold = qemuDomainSetBlockThreshold, /* 3.2.0 */ .domainSetLifecycleAction = qemuDomainSetLifecycleAction, /* 3.9.0 */ + .domainGetLaunchSecurityInfo = qemuDomainGetLaunchSecurityInfo, /* 4.2.0 */ }; diff --git a/src/qemu/qemu_monitor.c b/src/qemu/qemu_monitor.c index 3b034930408c..977cbe5a41f8 100644 --- a/src/qemu/qemu_monitor.c +++ b/src/qemu/qemu_monitor.c @@ -4226,3 +4226,11 @@ qemuMonitorBlockdevDel(qemuMonitorPtr mon, return qemuMonitorJSONBlockdevDel(mon, nodename); } + +char * +qemuMonitorGetSevMeasurement(qemuMonitorPtr mon) +{ + QEMU_CHECK_MONITOR_NULL(mon); + + return qemuMonitorJSONGetSevMeasurement(mon); +} diff --git a/src/qemu/qemu_monitor.h b/src/qemu/qemu_monitor.h index b1b7ef09c929..8a64ae5f3d96 100644 --- a/src/qemu/qemu_monitor.h +++ b/src/qemu/qemu_monitor.h @@ -1137,4 +1137,7 @@ int qemuMonitorBlockdevAdd(qemuMonitorPtr mon, int qemuMonitorBlockdevDel(qemuMonitorPtr mon, const char *nodename); +char * +qemuMonitorGetSevMeasurement(qemuMonitorPtr mon); + #endif /* QEMU_MONITOR_H */ diff --git a/src/qemu/qemu_monitor_json.c b/src/qemu/qemu_monitor_json.c index 24d3a2ff412f..041f595ca1e4 100644 --- a/src/qemu/qemu_monitor_json.c +++ b/src/qemu/qemu_monitor_json.c @@ -8024,3 +8024,45 @@ qemuMonitorJSONBlockdevDel(qemuMonitorPtr mon, virJSONValueFree(reply); return ret; } + +/** + * The function is used to retrieve the measurement of SEV guest. + * The measurement is signature of the memory contents that was encrypted + * through the SEV launch flow. + * + * A example jason output: + * + * { "execute" : "query-sev-launch-measure" } + * { "return" : { "data" : "4l8LXeNlSPUDlXPJG5966/8%YZ" } } + */ +char * +qemuMonitorJSONGetSevMeasurement(qemuMonitorPtr mon) +{ + const char *tmp; + char *measurement = NULL; + virJSONValuePtr cmd; + virJSONValuePtr reply = NULL; + virJSONValuePtr data; + + if (!(cmd = qemuMonitorJSONMakeCommand("query-sev-launch-measure", NULL))) + return NULL; + + if (qemuMonitorJSONCommand(mon, cmd, &reply) < 0) + goto cleanup; + + if (qemuMonitorJSONCheckError(cmd, reply) < 0) + goto cleanup; + + data = virJSONValueObjectGetObject(reply, "return"); + + if (!(tmp = virJSONValueObjectGetString(data, "data"))) + goto cleanup; + + if (VIR_STRDUP(measurement, tmp) < 0) + goto cleanup; + + cleanup: + virJSONValueFree(cmd); + virJSONValueFree(reply); + return measurement; +} diff --git a/src/qemu/qemu_monitor_json.h b/src/qemu/qemu_monitor_json.h index 129aab22bf98..66db6653fce4 100644 --- a/src/qemu/qemu_monitor_json.h +++ b/src/qemu/qemu_monitor_json.h @@ -349,6 +349,8 @@ int qemuMonitorJSONGetBlockIoThrottle(qemuMonitorPtr mon, int qemuMonitorJSONSystemWakeup(qemuMonitorPtr mon); +char *qemuMonitorJSONGetSevMeasurement(qemuMonitorPtr mon); + int qemuMonitorJSONGetVersion(qemuMonitorPtr mon, int *major, int *minor, -- 2.14.3

Add new 'launch-security' command, the command can be used to get or set the launch security information when booting encrypted VMs. Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh(a)amd.com&gt; --- tools/virsh-domain.c | 81 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ tools/virsh.pod | 5 ++++ 2 files changed, 86 insertions(+) diff --git a/tools/virsh-domain.c b/tools/virsh-domain.c index cfbbf5a7bc39..27bb702c8bb7 100644 --- a/tools/virsh-domain.c +++ b/tools/virsh-domain.c @@ -13870,6 +13870,81 @@ cmdDomFSInfo(vshControl *ctl, const vshCmd *cmd) return ret >= 0; } +/* + * "launch-security" command + */ +static const vshCmdInfo info_launch_security[] = { + {.name = "help", + .data = N_("Get or set launch-security information") + }, + {.name = "desc", + .data = N_("Get or set the current launch-security information for " + "a guest domain.\n" + " To get the launch-security information use following" + " command: \n\n" + " virsh # launch-security <domain>") + }, + {.name = NULL} +}; + +static const vshCmdOptDef opts_launch_security[] = { + VIRSH_COMMON_OPT_DOMAIN_FULL(0), + VIRSH_COMMON_OPT_DOMAIN_CONFIG, + VIRSH_COMMON_OPT_DOMAIN_LIVE, + VIRSH_COMMON_OPT_DOMAIN_CURRENT, + {.name = NULL} +}; + +static void +virshPrintLaunchSecurityInfo(vshControl *ctl, virTypedParameterPtr params, + int nparams) +{ + size_t i; + + for (i = 0; i < nparams; i++) { + if (params[i].type == VIR_TYPED_PARAM_STRING) + vshPrintExtra(ctl, "%-15s: %s\n", params[i].field, params[i].value.s); + } +} + +static bool +cmdLaunchSecurity(vshControl *ctl, const vshCmd *cmd) +{ + virDomainPtr dom; + int nparams = 0; + virTypedParameterPtr params = NULL; + bool ret = false; + unsigned int flags = VIR_DOMAIN_AFFECT_CURRENT; + bool current = vshCommandOptBool(cmd, "current"); + bool config = vshCommandOptBool(cmd, "config"); + bool live = vshCommandOptBool(cmd, "live"); + + VSH_EXCLUSIVE_OPTIONS_VAR(current, live); + VSH_EXCLUSIVE_OPTIONS_VAR(current, config); + + if (config) + flags |= VIR_DOMAIN_AFFECT_CONFIG; + if (live) + flags |= VIR_DOMAIN_AFFECT_LIVE; + + if (!(dom = virshCommandOptDomain(ctl, cmd, NULL))) + return false; + + if (virDomainGetLaunchSecurityInfo(dom, &params, &nparams, flags) != 0) { + vshError(ctl, "%s", _("Unable to get launch security info")); + goto cleanup; + } + + virshPrintLaunchSecurityInfo(ctl, params, nparams); + + ret = true; + cleanup: + virTypedParamsFree(params, nparams); + virshDomainFree(dom); + return ret; +} + + const vshCmdDef domManagementCmds[] = { {.name = "attach-device", .handler = cmdAttachDevice, @@ -14485,5 +14560,11 @@ const vshCmdDef domManagementCmds[] = { .info = info_domblkthreshold, .flags = 0 }, + {.name = "launch-security-info", + .handler = cmdLaunchSecurity, + .opts = opts_launch_security, + .info = info_launch_security, + .flags = 0 + }, {.name = NULL} }; diff --git a/tools/virsh.pod b/tools/virsh.pod index 929958a9533c..31bb26bda2ac 100644 --- a/tools/virsh.pod +++ b/tools/virsh.pod @@ -2899,6 +2899,11 @@ See B<vcpupin> for information on I<cpulist>. Output the IP address and port number for the VNC display. If the information is not available the processes will provide an exit code of 1. +=item B<launch-security-info> I<domain> + +Get the measurement of the memory contents encrypted through the launch +sequence when I<launch-security> is provided. + =back =head1 DEVICE COMMANDS -- 2.14.3