On 09/14/2012 04:40 AM, Daniel P. Berrange wrote:
>On Tue, Sep 11, 2012 at 02:13:38PM -0400, Corey Bryant wrote:
>>Are there any other requirements that need to be taken care of to
>>enable execution of QEMU guests under separate unprivileged user IDs
>>(ie. DAC isolation)?
>>
>>At this point, this patch series (Per-guest configurable user/group
>>for QEMU processes) is upstream, allowing libvirt to execute guests
>>under separate unprivileged user IDs. Additionally, the QEMU bridge
>>helper series is upstream, allowing QEMU to allocate a tap device
>>and attach it to a bridge when run under an unprivileged user ID
(
http://www.redhat.com/archives/libvir-list/2012-August/msg00277.html).
>>
>>Is there any other feature in QEMU that requires QEMU to be run as root?
>
>Well those features you mention are for two separate issues. When
>running libvirt privileged (qemu:///system), QEMU was already run
>as non-root (qemu:qemu). The per-guest user/group was just making
>sure that QEMU VMs were isolated from each other using user IDs.
>Since libvirtd is running privileged, it can either set permissions
>or open things on QEMU's behalf. All this side of things really
>works already.
Ok good. This is really what I was getting at and you answered my
question. So we now have DAC isolation of QEMU guests when running
with the qemu:///system URI and there shouldn't be any issues
running unprivileged guests from a privileged libvirt.
>
>The TAP device bridge helper is something that's needed when running
>libvirtd itself unprivileged (eg the per user qemu:///session libvirtd).
>In this case libvirtd can't access privileged resources at all, hence
>the setuid TAP helper was required.
>
Ah, that's right, the bridge helper is really only benefiting
libvirt when running with the qemu:///session URI.
Is there a desire to get to a point where libvirt can do everything
under a session URI that it can do today under a system URI? Then
libvirt and guests could all run unprivileged. I'm sure it's a lot
of work.. I'm just asking. :)
Well if you want to give a VM a raw block device someone/thing needs to
be running privileged to set an ACL on the device to le the unprivileged
VM use it. Similarly for PCI device passthrough. Traditionally in the
qemu:///system case, libvirt can deal with this. In a qemu:///session
case the sysadmin would have had to setup ACLs/permissions on the
devices / files ahead of time.
Daniel
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