On Tue, Feb 21, 2023 at 10:49:46PM +0100, Stefano Brivio wrote:
On Tue, 21 Feb 2023 19:43:33 +0000
Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange(a)redhat.com> wrote:
> On Tue, Feb 21, 2023 at 08:19:05PM +0100, Stefano Brivio wrote:
> > qemuSecurityCommandRun() causes an explicit domain transition of the
> > new process, but passt ships with its own SELinux policy, with
> > external interfaces for libvirtd, so we simply need to transition
> > from virtd_t to passt_t as passt is executed. The qemu type
> > enforcement rules have little to do with it.
>
> Can you clarify the difference here ?
Between...?
I mean, virCommandRun() will just keep things running under virtd_t, so
that passt later can transition to passt_t.
With qemuSecurityCommandRun(), there would be a transition from virtd_t
to svirt_t (it's the function that's called to start qemu, but
shouldn't be called here), and not to passt_t.
But I'm not really sure that's what you were asking for.
Yes, it is.
> Runing passt under 'svirt_t' is not desirable as that allows
> many actions that are only relevant to QEMU.
Right, that's what this patch avoids. There are also actions, such as
starting passt or killing it, that we don't want to allow QEMU to do.
> Running passt under the MCS label that is associated with the
> VM is highly desirable though. Two passt instances belonging
> to separate VMs are isolated from each other if they each use
> the VM specific MCS label, than if they use the global default
> MCS label.
>
> To use the VM specific MCS label would require libvirt to
> explicitly set the desired selinux label on exec, it can't
> happen automatically via an SELinux transition rule.
>
> We do stil want to use the passt_t type though.
>
> IOW, if we have a VM running
>
> svirt_t:s0:c710,c716
>
> IMHO we would its corresponding passt instance to be
> running
>
> passt_t:s0:c710,c716
>
>
> not
>
> passt_t:s0:c0.c1023
Practically speaking, it doesn't make a huge difference for passt
because it unshares any relevant namespace right after it starts --
that's *in theory* a strictly stronger isolation compared to what
SELinux provides (at least once we reach the main loop).
Even docker/podman will apply SELinux isolation per container,
rather than only relying on namespaces.
But it makes sense, and I guess we should relabel to a specific MCS
with still 'virtd_t' as a type, then later the domain would transition
to passt_t. This could probably be done as an extension of
qemuSecurityCommandRun(), I haven't looked into it yet. I will.
Anyway, right now, I think this provides better security than
'setenforce 0', which is the only way to run passt from libvirt at the
moment on some distributions.
If running with SELinux permissive, this patch has no effect, as it
is unconfined regardless. That's not a situation we care about. If
people want to run without protection they get to keep the pieces
when it all goes wrong.
I'm not sure how you handle these cases on libvirt, but
generally
speaking, this patch is a vast improvement on the current situation,
and I can follow up with an extension or a different version of
qemuSecurityCommandRun() later.
No, I don't think it is a vast improvement.
The goal of sVirt is to guarantee isolation between VMs.
Running passt under svirt_t:MCS is not ideal because the svirt_t
policy allows things that passt should not get. It does still
guarantee isolation between VMs, because the MCS label is present.
Switching to running passt_t:c0.c1023 will be more correct in terms
of what permissions passt should be allowed, but it has disabled
isolation of passt between VMs. This is a clear degradation of
capabilities from the POV of sVirt's goals.
With regards,
Daniel
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