Il 28/03/2013 20:30, Laine Stump ha scritto:
> The <interface type='bridge'> is working mostly
because of a bad design
> decision in Linux. Ideally, QEMU would run with an empty capability
> bounding set and would not be able to do any privileged operation
> (not even by running a helper program). This is not the case because
> dropping capabilities from the bounding set requires a capability of its
> own, CAP_SETPCAP; thus QEMU does *not* run with an empty bounding set if
> invoked via qemu:///session.
Ewww. So what you're saying is that the qemu that's run from
qemu:///system is more locked down (and thus "more secure") than the
qemu that's run from qemu:///session? Basically this qemu can run any
setuid application it likes, and there's nothing that we can do about it.
Yes. However, seccompv2 can still prevent execve to be executed by qemu.
Paolo