On 04.10.19 14:36, Daniel P. Berrangé wrote:
On Fri, Oct 04, 2019 at 02:18:49PM +0200, Christian Borntraeger
wrote:
>
>
> On 04.10.19 14:13, Paolo Bonzini wrote:
>> On 04/10/19 14:03, Christian Borntraeger wrote:
>>> Stefano, Paolo,
>>>
>>> I have an interesting fail in QEMU
>>>
>>> 2019-10-04T12:00:32.675188Z qemu-system-s390x: GLib: g_mapped_file_unref:
assertion 'file != NULL' failed
>>> that bisected to
>>> commit 816b9fe450220e19acb91a0ce4a8ade7000648d1 (refs/bisect/bad)
>>> elf-ops.h: Map into memory the ELF to load
>>>
>>> strace tells that I can read the ELF file, but not mmap
>>> strace:
>>> 214365 openat(AT_FDCWD,
"/var/lib/libvirt/images/test_cpu_timer.elf", O_RDONLY) = 36
>>> 214365 read(46, "\177ELF\2\2\1\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0", 16) = 16
>>> 214365 lseek(46, 0, SEEK_SET) = 0
>>> [...]
>>> 214365 fstat(46, {st_mode=S_IFREG|0755, st_size=168176, ...}) = 0
>>> 214365 mmap(NULL, 168176, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE, 46, 0) = -1
EACCES (Permission denied)
>>>
>>> So reading from /var/lib/libvirt/images/test_cpu_timer.elf does work, mmaping
does not.
>>> setenforce 0 makes the problem go away.
>>>
>>> This might be more of an issue in libvirt, setting the svirt context too
>>> restrictive, but I am not too deep into the svirt part of libvirt.
>>> Reverting the qemu commit makes the problem go away.
>>
>> Yes, the policy is too restrictive in my opinion.
>>
>> Can you include the output of "audit2allow" and/or "audit2allow
-R"?
>>
>> Thanks,
>>
>> Paolo
>>
>
> require {
> type unconfined_t;
> type virt_content_t;
> type svirt_t;
> type systemd_tmpfiles_t;
> type user_home_t;
> type NetworkManager_t;
> class file { entrypoint execute ioctl lock map open read write };
> class bpf prog_run;
> }
>
> #============= svirt_t ==============
> allow svirt_t user_home_t:file { entrypoint execute ioctl lock open read write };
>
> #!!!! This avc can be allowed using the boolean 'domain_can_mmap_files'
This is an unrelated boolean and we don't want to use that so ignore
this suggestion !
> allow svirt_t virt_content_t:file map;
This matches your strace. virt_content_t is the label we use on
files that are exposed to QEMU read-only.
The svirt policy only allows mmap on files that re exposed read-write
currently.
I believe we can safely allow this mmap on read-only files too
because the read-only restriction is enforced at time of open,
and any writes to the mapped file will result in a private
copy on write.
Please file a bz entry against the selinux-policy component for
whatever distro you're using, and/or Fedora rawhide, and CC me
on it too.
Done. This was on Fedora 30.
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1758525
Now sure about others like RHEL. RHV.