On 03/24/2010 05:42 AM, Avi Kivity wrote:
> The filtering access part of this daemon is also not mapping well onto
> libvirt's access model, because we don't soley filter based on UID in
> libvirtd. We have it configurable based on UID, policykit, SASL,
> TLS/x509
> already, and intend adding role based access control to further filter
> things, integrating with the existing apparmour/selinux security models.
> A qemud that filters based on UID only, gives users a side-channel to
> get
> around libvirt's access control.
That's true. Any time you write a multiplexer these issues crop up.
Much better to stay in single process land where everything is already
taken care of.
What does a multiplexer give you that making individual qemu instances
discoverable doesn't give you? The later doesn't suffer from these
problems.
Regards,
Anthony Liguori
So, at best qemud is a toy for people who are annoyed by libvirt.