On 02/08/2017 10:31 AM, Daniel P. Berrange wrote:
On Wed, Feb 08, 2017 at 10:26:26AM +0100, Michal Privoznik wrote:
> This demand comes from qemu_egl_rendernode_open() in qemu source
> code. It is needed for virgl to work with qemu:///system
> connection. The session one works just fine.
>
> Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn(a)redhat.com>
> ---
> docs/drvqemu.html.in | 1 +
> src/qemu/qemu.conf | 3 ++-
> src/qemu/qemu_cgroup.c | 1 +
> src/qemu/test_libvirtd_qemu.aug.in | 1 +
> 4 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> diff --git a/src/qemu/qemu_cgroup.c b/src/qemu/qemu_cgroup.c
> index 6c90d46d1..b47f714fc 100644
> --- a/src/qemu/qemu_cgroup.c
> +++ b/src/qemu/qemu_cgroup.c
> @@ -47,6 +47,7 @@ const char *const defaultDeviceACL[] = {
> "/dev/random", "/dev/urandom",
> "/dev/ptmx", "/dev/kvm", "/dev/kqemu",
> "/dev/rtc", "/dev/hpet", "/dev/vfio/vfio",
> + "/dev/dri/renderD128",
Surely this is only needed in very specific scenarios. ie with
the virtio-vga 3d rendering enabled.
Allowing unconditional access to the DRI devices is a big
wide open door from security POV, for something few VMs
will ever need.
The global device whitelist is only for devices that we
expect every QEMU to unconditionally require.
I can argue the same about /dev/vfio/vfio and yet we have it on the list.
Michal