Hi all: The Host Administrator is capable of running any exec in guests via the qemu-ga command "guest-exec", eg:
virsh qemu-agent-command test_guest '{"execute": "guest-exec", "arguments": {"path": "ifconfig", "arg": [ "eth1", "192.168.0.99" ],"capture-output":
On Fri, Aug 25, 2017 at 06:45:18AM +0000, Zhangbo (Oscar) wrote: true } }'
{"return":{"pid":12425}} virsh qemu-agent-command test_guest '{"execute": "guest-exec-status", "arguments": { "pid": 12425 } }' {"return":{"exitcode":0,"exited":true}}
The example above just change the guests' ip address, the Administrator may also change guests' user password, get sensitive information, etc. which causes Insider Access. The Administrator also can use other commands such as " guest-file-open" that also cause Insider Access.
So, how to avoid this security problem, what's your suggestion? Thanks!
What's your setup that this, in particular, is your concern? Do you have everything encrypted by keys that are not reachable for the host administrator? How are those saved? For example, how do you guard against the host administrator killing the domain? Or mounting the disk
Killing the domain is acceptable somehow at some degree, but leaking sensitive information, for example, trade secret, is horrible. We most concern is to protect that information by (maybe)disabling "guest-exec" guest commands etc. Another concern, as mentioned in another mail, is that, if the cloud tenant himself installed the guest agent, and doesn't know the "adding --blacklist" issue, that guest is in danger.
of the domain, doing whatever they want to with it and starting it back? Or million other things that come to mind. Not trusting the host administrator is kinda (well, precisely) like not trusting root on *NIX machine.
Martin
P.S.: Maybe more aluminium could help, but I haven't tried yet.
Best Regrads Oscar
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