On 03/24/2010 02:23 PM, Anthony Liguori wrote:
On 03/24/2010 05:42 AM, Avi Kivity wrote:
>
>> The filtering access part of this daemon is also not mapping well onto
>> libvirt's access model, because we don't soley filter based on UID in
>> libvirtd. We have it configurable based on UID, policykit, SASL,
>> TLS/x509
>> already, and intend adding role based access control to further filter
>> things, integrating with the existing apparmour/selinux security
>> models.
>> A qemud that filters based on UID only, gives users a side-channel
>> to get
>> around libvirt's access control.
>
> That's true. Any time you write a multiplexer these issues crop up.
> Much better to stay in single process land where everything is
> already taken care of.
What does a multiplexer give you that making individual qemu instances
discoverable doesn't give you? The later doesn't suffer from these
problems.
You don't get a directory filled with a zillion socket files pointing at
dead guests. Agree that's a poor return on investment.
Maybe we want a O_UNLINK_ON_CLOSE for unix domain sockets - but no,
that's not implementable.
--
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