March 2009 - Devel - libvirt List Archives

[libvirt] selinux
by Michael Kress 04 Mar '09

04 Mar '09

Hi! What do I have to do to get qemu-kvm to run with selinux running with enforcing policy? I get these messages when I enable this policy: Mar 3 20:56:23 matrix kernel: [ 8972.482746] device vnet0 entered promiscuous mode Mar 3 20:56:23 matrix kernel: [ 8972.898943] br0: port 2(vnet0) entering learning state Mar 3 20:56:23 matrix kernel: [ 8972.901957] type=1400 audit(1236110183.820:20): avc: denied { execmem } for pid=6376 comm="kvm" scontext=system_u:system_r:initrc_t:s0 tcontext=system_u:system_r:initrc_t:s0 tclass=process Mar 3 20:56:23 matrix kernel: [ 8973.161318] type=1400 audit(1236110183.832:21): avc: denied { append } for pid=6379 comm="ifup" name="ifstate" dev=sda1 ino=1376380 scontext=system_u:system_r:udev_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 tcontext=system_u:object_r:etc_runtime_t:s0 tclass=file Mar 3 20:56:23 matrix kernel: [ 8973.188371] br0: port 2(vnet0) entering disabled state Mar 3 20:56:23 matrix kernel: [ 8973.203666] device vnet0 left promiscuous mode Mar 3 20:56:23 matrix kernel: [ 8973.203675] br0: port 2(vnet0) entering disabled state Mar 3 20:56:23 matrix libvirtd: Received signal 17, dispatching to drivers Mar 3 20:56:23 matrix libvirtd: Received signal 17, dispatching to drivers Mar 3 20:56:23 matrix kernel: [ 8973.216362] type=1400 audit(1236110183.880:22): avc: denied { append } for pid=6387 comm="ifdown" name="ifstate" dev=sda1 ino=1376380 scontext=system_u:system_r:udev_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 tcontext=system_u:object_r:etc_runtime_t:s0 tclass=file I've tried to set the type: chcon -t virt_image_t a01.img but all I got was: chcon: failed to change context of `a01.img' to `system_u:object_r:virt_image_t:s0': Invalid argument The host is a debian 5.0 machine. TIA Regards Michael

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[libvirt] PATCH: Fix libvirtd test cases
by Daniel P. Berrange 04 Mar '09

04 Mar '09

The libvirtd tests have a number of bugs causing them to fail & generally do bad things. They all currently fail on RHEL5 hosts. - daemon-conf - the abs_topbuild_dir env var was not being set correctly so it failed to find config.h. It also broken by changes in stderr debug output from libvirtd. This patch fixes the env var, and changes it to it just looks for the desired error message, not doing a diff across entire of stdout/err. - libvirtd-fail - again fails because it is diffing the whole of stdout/err and coming across warning messages its not expecting. Change it to look for daemon error exit status because that reliably indicates whether it quit as expected on bogus configs - libvirtd-pool - running the QEMU driver which does not exist, just to test virsh's XML generation capabilities. This adds a --print-xml arg to virsh and uses the test:///default driver for testing, so we avoid the QEMU driver & daemon during tests - libvirt-net-persist - again trying to rnu the QEMU driver which does not exist, and its writing config files into the user's home directory. There's no easy fix for this, so I'm killing it off. It can be tested in the separate integration test suite where you can be sure to arrange for correct pre-requisites and safe working environment src/virsh.c | 51 ++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------- tests/Makefile.am | 3 -- tests/daemon-conf | 13 +++------- tests/libvirtd-fail | 9 ++---- tests/libvirtd-net-persist | 58 --------------------------------------------- tests/libvirtd-pool | 41 ++++++------------------------- 6 files changed, 48 insertions(+), 127 deletions(-) Daniel Index: src/virsh.c =================================================================== RCS file: /data/cvs/libvirt/src/virsh.c,v retrieving revision 1.195 diff -u -p -u -p -r1.195 virsh.c --- src/virsh.c 3 Mar 2009 09:59:02 -0000 1.195 +++ src/virsh.c 3 Mar 2009 19:23:01 -0000 @@ -2923,6 +2923,7 @@ cmdPoolCreate(vshControl *ctl, const vsh */ static const vshCmdOptDef opts_pool_X_as[] = { {"name", VSH_OT_DATA, VSH_OFLAG_REQ, gettext_noop("name of the pool")}, + {"print-xml", VSH_OT_BOOL, 0, gettext_noop("print XML document, but don't define/create")}, {"type", VSH_OT_DATA, VSH_OFLAG_REQ, gettext_noop("type of the pool")}, {"source-host", VSH_OT_DATA, 0, gettext_noop("source-host for underlying storage")}, {"source-path", VSH_OT_DATA, 0, gettext_noop("source path for underlying storage")}, @@ -3002,6 +3003,7 @@ cmdPoolCreateAs(vshControl *ctl, const v { virStoragePoolPtr pool; char *xml, *name; + int printXML = vshCommandOptBool(cmd, "print-xml"); if (!vshConnectionUsability(ctl, ctl->conn, TRUE)) return FALSE; @@ -3009,18 +3011,22 @@ cmdPoolCreateAs(vshControl *ctl, const v if (!buildPoolXML(cmd, &name, &xml)) return FALSE; - pool = virStoragePoolCreateXML(ctl->conn, xml, 0); - free (xml); - - if (pool != NULL) { - vshPrint(ctl, _("Pool %s created\n"), name); - virStoragePoolFree(pool); - return TRUE; + if (printXML) { + printf("%s", xml); + free (xml); } else { - vshError(ctl, FALSE, _("Failed to create pool %s"), name); - } + pool = virStoragePoolCreateXML(ctl->conn, xml, 0); + free (xml); - return FALSE; + if (pool != NULL) { + vshPrint(ctl, _("Pool %s created\n"), name); + virStoragePoolFree(pool); + } else { + vshError(ctl, FALSE, _("Failed to create pool %s"), name); + return FALSE; + } + } + return TRUE; } @@ -3085,6 +3091,7 @@ cmdPoolDefineAs(vshControl *ctl, const v { virStoragePoolPtr pool; char *xml, *name; + int printXML = vshCommandOptBool(cmd, "print-xml"); if (!vshConnectionUsability(ctl, ctl->conn, TRUE)) return FALSE; @@ -3092,18 +3099,22 @@ cmdPoolDefineAs(vshControl *ctl, const v if (!buildPoolXML(cmd, &name, &xml)) return FALSE; - pool = virStoragePoolDefineXML(ctl->conn, xml, 0); - free (xml); - - if (pool != NULL) { - vshPrint(ctl, _("Pool %s defined\n"), name); - virStoragePoolFree(pool); - return TRUE; + if (printXML) { + printf("%s", xml); + free (xml); } else { - vshError(ctl, FALSE, _("Failed to define pool %s"), name); - } + pool = virStoragePoolDefineXML(ctl->conn, xml, 0); + free (xml); - return FALSE; + if (pool != NULL) { + vshPrint(ctl, _("Pool %s defined\n"), name); + virStoragePoolFree(pool); + } else { + vshError(ctl, FALSE, _("Failed to define pool %s"), name); + return FALSE; + } + } + return TRUE; } Index: tests/Makefile.am =================================================================== RCS file: /data/cvs/libvirt/tests/Makefile.am,v retrieving revision 1.76 diff -u -p -u -p -r1.76 Makefile.am --- tests/Makefile.am 3 Mar 2009 17:00:18 -0000 1.76 +++ tests/Makefile.am 3 Mar 2009 19:23:01 -0000 @@ -82,7 +82,6 @@ test_scripts += \ define-dev-segfault \ int-overflow \ libvirtd-fail \ - libvirtd-net-persist \ libvirtd-pool \ read-bufsiz \ read-non-seekable \ @@ -127,7 +126,7 @@ TESTS_ENVIRONMENT = \ abs_top_srcdir=`cd '$(top_srcdir)'; pwd` \ abs_builddir=`cd '$(builddir)'; pwd` \ abs_srcdir=`cd '$(srcdir)'; pwd` \ - CONFIG_HEADER='$(abs_top_builddir)/config.h' \ + CONFIG_HEADER="`cd '$(top_builddir)'; pwd`/config.h" \ PATH="$(path_add)$(PATH_SEPARATOR)$$PATH" \ SHELL="$(SHELL)" \ LIBVIRT_DRIVER_DIR="$(abs_top_builddir)/src/.libs" \ Index: tests/daemon-conf =================================================================== RCS file: /data/cvs/libvirt/tests/daemon-conf,v retrieving revision 1.6 diff -u -p -u -p -r1.6 daemon-conf --- tests/daemon-conf 2 Mar 2009 20:01:26 -0000 1.6 +++ tests/daemon-conf 3 Mar 2009 19:23:01 -0000 @@ -52,15 +52,10 @@ while :; do test $i = $n && break - # Filter out some ignorable diagnostics and drop timestamps - sed \ - -e 's/.*: error : //' \ - -e '/^Cannot set group when not running as root$/d' \ - -e '/^libnuma: Warning: .sys not mounted or no numa system/d' \ - err > k && mv k err - - printf '%s\n\n' "remoteReadConfigFile: $f: $param_name: $msg" > expected-err - diff -u expected-err err || fail=1 + # Check that the diagnostic we want appears + grep "$msg" err 1>/dev/null 2>&1 + RET=$? + test "$RET" = "0" || fail=1 i=$(expr $i + 1) done Index: tests/libvirtd-fail =================================================================== RCS file: /data/cvs/libvirt/tests/libvirtd-fail,v retrieving revision 1.1 diff -u -p -u -p -r1.1 libvirtd-fail --- tests/libvirtd-fail 2 Mar 2009 20:01:05 -0000 1.1 +++ tests/libvirtd-fail 3 Mar 2009 19:23:01 -0000 @@ -12,10 +12,7 @@ test -z "$abs_top_srcdir" && abs_top_src fail=0 -libvirtd --config=no-such-file > log 2>&1 && fail=1 -cat <<\EOF > exp -Failed to open file 'no-such-file': No such file or directory -EOF +libvirtd --config=no-such-conf --timeout=5 2> log +RET=$? -compare exp log || fail=1 -exit $fail +test "$RET" != "0" && exit 0 || exit 1 Index: tests/libvirtd-net-persist =================================================================== RCS file: tests/libvirtd-net-persist diff -N tests/libvirtd-net-persist --- tests/libvirtd-net-persist 2 Mar 2009 18:41:00 -0000 1.1 +++ /dev/null 1 Jan 1970 00:00:00 -0000 @@ -1,58 +0,0 @@ -#!/bin/sh -# ensure that net-destroy doesn't make network disappear (persistence-related) - -if test "$VERBOSE" = yes; then - set -x - libvirtd --version - virsh --version -fi - -test -z "$srcdir" && srcdir=$(pwd) -test -z "$abs_top_srcdir" && abs_top_srcdir=$(pwd)/.. -. "$srcdir/test-lib.sh" - -fail=0 - -pwd=$(pwd) || fail=1 -sock_dir="$pwd" -cat > conf <<EOF || fail=1 -unix_sock_dir = "$sock_dir" -log_outputs = "3:file:$pwd/log" -EOF - -cat > net.xml <<EOF || fail=1 -<network> - <name>N</name> - <ip address="192.168.199.1" netmask="255.255.255.0"></ip> -</network> -EOF - -cat > exp <<EOF || fail=1 -Network N defined from net.xml - -Network N destroyed - -Name State Autostart ------------------------------------------ -N inactive no - -EOF - -libvirtd --config=conf > libvirtd-log 2>&1 & pid=$! -sleep 1 - -url="qemu:///session?socket=@$sock_dir/libvirt-sock" -virsh -c "$url" \ - 'net-define net.xml; net-destroy N; net-list --all' > out 2>&1 \ - || fail=1 - -# if libvird's log is empty, sleep for a second before killing it -test -s libvirtd-log || sleep 1 -kill $pid - -compare exp out || fail=1 - -printf "Shutting down network 'N'\n" > log-exp -compare log-exp libvirtd-log || fail=1 - -exit $fail Index: tests/libvirtd-pool =================================================================== RCS file: /data/cvs/libvirt/tests/libvirtd-pool,v retrieving revision 1.1 diff -u -p -u -p -r1.1 libvirtd-pool --- tests/libvirtd-pool 2 Mar 2009 20:01:05 -0000 1.1 +++ tests/libvirtd-pool 3 Mar 2009 19:23:01 -0000 @@ -1,9 +1,8 @@ #!/bin/sh -# Get coverage of libvirtd's config-parsing code. +# Get coverage of virsh pool-define-as XML formatting if test "$VERBOSE" = yes; then set -x - libvirtd --version virsh --version fi @@ -14,50 +13,28 @@ test -z "$abs_top_srcdir" && abs_top_src fail=0 pwd=$(pwd) || fail=1 -sock_dir="$pwd" -cat > conf <<EOF || fail=1 -unix_sock_dir = "$sock_dir" -log_outputs = "3:file:$pwd/log" -EOF - -libvirtd --config=conf > libvirtd-log 2>&1 & pid=$! -sleep 1 - -url="qemu:///session?socket=@$sock_dir/libvirt-sock" -virsh --connect "$url" \ - pool-define-as P dir src-host /src/path /src/dev S /target-path > out 2>&1 \ - || fail=1 -virsh --connect "$url" pool-dumpxml P >> out 2>&1 || fail=1 -# remove random uuid -sed 's/<uuid>.*/-/' out > k && mv k out || fail=1 - -kill $pid +virsh --connect test:///default \ + pool-define-as --print-xml \ + P dir src-host /src/path /src/dev S /target-path \ + 1>out 2>&1 cat <<EOF > pool-list-exp -Pool P defined - <pool type='dir'> <name>P</name> - - - <capacity>0</capacity> - <allocation>0</allocation> - <available>0</available> <source> + <host name='src-host'/> + <dir path='/src/path'/> + <device path='/src/dev'/> + <name>S</name> </source> <target> <path>/target-path</path> - <permissions> - <mode>0700</mode> - <owner>500</owner> - <group>500</group> - </permissions> </target> </pool> EOF compare pool-list-exp out || fail=1 -compare /dev/null libvirtd-log || fail=1 exit $fail -- |: Red Hat, Engineering, London -o- http://people.redhat.com/berrange/ :| |: http://libvirt.org -o- http://virt-manager.org -o- http://ovirt.org :| |: http://autobuild.org -o- http://search.cpan.org/~danberr/ :| |: GnuPG: 7D3B9505 -o- F3C9 553F A1DA 4AC2 5648 23C1 B3DF F742 7D3B 9505 :|

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[libvirt] [ANNOUNCE] New release virtinst 0.400.2
by Cole Robinson 03 Mar '09

03 Mar '09

I'm happy to announce a new virtinst release, version 0.400.2. The release can be downloaded from: http://virt-manager.org/download.html The direct download link is: http://virt-manager.org/download/sources/virtinst/virtinst-0.400.2.tar.gz This release includes: - New virt-clone option --original-xml, allows cloning a guest from an xml file, rather than require an existing, defined guest. - New virt-install option --import, allows creating a guest from an existing disk image, bypassing any OS install phase. - New virt-install option --host-device, for connecting a physical host device to the guest. - Allow specifying 'cache' value via virt-install's --disk options (Ben Kochie) - New virt-install option --nonetworks (John Levon) - Lots of backend cleanups and documentation improvements. Thanks to everyone who has contributed to this release through testing, bug reporting, submitting patches, and otherwise sending in feedback! Thanks, Cole

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[libvirt] [PATCH] * qemud/libvirtd_qemu.aug: Add "security_driver".
by Jim Meyering 03 Mar '09

03 Mar '09

>From 0e79e00614e8c6cd2b7fe7bcad1d52b2de1a3a58 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jim Meyering <meyering(a)redhat.com> Date: Tue, 3 Mar 2009 17:42:53 +0100 Subject: [PATCH] * qemud/libvirtd_qemu.aug: Add "security_driver". --- qemud/libvirtd.conf | 4 ++-- qemud/libvirtd_qemu.aug | 2 +- 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/qemud/libvirtd.conf b/qemud/libvirtd.conf index 1fd5918..0e0b40c 100644 --- a/qemud/libvirtd.conf +++ b/qemud/libvirtd.conf @@ -289,7 +289,7 @@ # separated by spaces. # # e.g: -# log_filters="3:remote 4:event" +#log_filters = "3:remote 4:event" # to only get warning or errors from the remote layer and only errors from # the event layer. @@ -311,5 +311,5 @@ # # Multiple output can be defined , they just need to be separated by spaces. # e.g.: -# log_outputs="3:syslog:libvirtd" +#log_outputs = "3:syslog:libvirtd" # to log all warnings and errors to syslog under the libvirtd ident diff --git a/qemud/libvirtd_qemu.aug b/qemud/libvirtd_qemu.aug index b2e4318..e297a5f 100644 --- a/qemud/libvirtd_qemu.aug +++ b/qemud/libvirtd_qemu.aug @@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ module Libvirtd_qemu = | str_entry "vnc_tls_x509_cert_dir" | bool_entry "vnc_tls_x509_verify" | str_entry "vnc_password" + | str_entry "security_driver" (* Each enty in the config is one of the following three ... *) let entry = vnc_entry @@ -41,4 +42,3 @@ module Libvirtd_qemu = . Util.stdexcl let xfm = transform lns filter - -- 1.6.2.rc1.285.gc5f54

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[libvirt] PATCH: Fix missing thread locking for new remote APIs
by Daniel P. Berrange 03 Mar '09

03 Mar '09

The remote driver additions for the sVirt APIs pre-date the time when we added thread support, and I didn't notice they were mising the lock calls. This patch adds the missing lock calls, so 'virsh dominfo' doesn't hang anymore due to an unlock without initial lock. It also fixes two return values to be -1 rather than -2 Daniel Index: src/libvirt.c =================================================================== RCS file: /data/cvs/libvirt/src/libvirt.c,v retrieving revision 1.198 diff -u -p -r1.198 libvirt.c --- src/libvirt.c 3 Mar 2009 09:14:28 -0000 1.198 +++ src/libvirt.c 3 Mar 2009 18:32:25 -0000 @@ -4206,7 +4206,7 @@ virDomainGetSecurityLabel(virDomainPtr d return conn->driver->domainGetSecurityLabel(domain, seclabel); virLibConnWarning(conn, VIR_ERR_NO_SUPPORT, __FUNCTION__); - return -2; + return -1; } /** @@ -4236,7 +4236,7 @@ virNodeGetSecurityModel(virConnectPtr co return conn->driver->nodeGetSecurityModel(conn, secmodel); virLibConnWarning(conn, VIR_ERR_NO_SUPPORT, __FUNCTION__); - return -2; + return -1; } /** Index: src/remote_internal.c =================================================================== RCS file: /data/cvs/libvirt/src/remote_internal.c,v retrieving revision 1.140 diff -u -p -r1.140 remote_internal.c --- src/remote_internal.c 3 Mar 2009 09:27:03 -0000 1.140 +++ src/remote_internal.c 3 Mar 2009 18:32:25 -0000 @@ -2302,26 +2302,33 @@ remoteDomainGetSecurityLabel (virDomainP remote_domain_get_security_label_args args; remote_domain_get_security_label_ret ret; struct private_data *priv = domain->conn->privateData; + int rv = -1; + + remoteDriverLock(priv); make_nonnull_domain (&args.dom, domain); memset (&ret, 0, sizeof ret); if (call (domain->conn, priv, 0, REMOTE_PROC_DOMAIN_GET_SECURITY_LABEL, (xdrproc_t) xdr_remote_domain_get_security_label_args, (char *)&args, (xdrproc_t) xdr_remote_domain_get_security_label_ret, (char *)&ret) == -1) { - return -1; + goto done; } if (ret.label.label_val != NULL) { if (strlen (ret.label.label_val) >= sizeof seclabel->label) { errorf (domain->conn, VIR_ERR_RPC, _("security label exceeds maximum: %zd"), sizeof seclabel->label - 1); - return -1; + goto done; } strcpy (seclabel->label, ret.label.label_val); seclabel->enforcing = ret.enforcing; } - return 0; + rv = 0; + +done: + remoteDriverUnlock(priv); + return rv; } static int @@ -2329,19 +2336,22 @@ remoteNodeGetSecurityModel (virConnectPt { remote_node_get_security_model_ret ret; struct private_data *priv = conn->privateData; + int rv = -1; + + remoteDriverLock(priv); memset (&ret, 0, sizeof ret); if (call (conn, priv, 0, REMOTE_PROC_NODE_GET_SECURITY_MODEL, (xdrproc_t) xdr_void, NULL, (xdrproc_t) xdr_remote_node_get_security_model_ret, (char *)&ret) == -1) { - return -1; + goto done; } if (ret.model.model_val != NULL) { if (strlen (ret.model.model_val) >= sizeof secmodel->model) { errorf (conn, VIR_ERR_RPC, _("security model exceeds maximum: %zd"), sizeof secmodel->model - 1); - return -1; + goto done; } strcpy (secmodel->model, ret.model.model_val); } @@ -2350,11 +2360,16 @@ remoteNodeGetSecurityModel (virConnectPt if (strlen (ret.doi.doi_val) >= sizeof secmodel->doi) { errorf (conn, VIR_ERR_RPC, _("security doi exceeds maximum: %zd"), sizeof secmodel->doi - 1); - return -1; + goto done; } strcpy (secmodel->doi, ret.doi.doi_val); } - return 0; + + rv = 0; + +done: + remoteDriverUnlock(priv); + return rv; } static char * -- |: Red Hat, Engineering, London -o- http://people.redhat.com/berrange/ :| |: http://libvirt.org -o- http://virt-manager.org -o- http://ovirt.org :| |: http://autobuild.org -o- http://search.cpan.org/~danberr/ :| |: GnuPG: 7D3B9505 -o- F3C9 553F A1DA 4AC2 5648 23C1 B3DF F742 7D3B 9505 :|

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[libvirt] some questions about libvirt features and limitations
by Florian Vichot 03 Mar '09

03 Mar '09

Hello everyone, I'm working on a open source project (http://www.hynesim.org) in which we needed libvirt-like functionalities. As at the time, libvirt did not support OpenVZ, and it did not support VirtualBox, we went and implemented our own wrappers around Kvm/Qemu, VirtualBox and OpenVz (Honeyd too, but our wrapper is such an ugly hack that it doesn't really deserve mention). Now that time has passed, we'd would like to stop duplicating efforts, and use libvirt instead, and concentrate on more innovating functionalities for Hynesim. Also our wrappers are terrible hacks, and do a lot less error checking than libvirt :) But before I can replace our wrappers with libvirt, we're missing some functionalities (that I will propose a patch for if required), and there are a few questions concerning libvirt I've not managed to find an answer for, so I'd be very grateful if I could get some advice on them. Here goes: ------- Is it possible to add a device for any type of domain that would correspond to a TAP device on the host, and would be seen as a regular ethernet interface with a specific MAC address in the virtualized domain ? The "raw" commands to achieve that in OpenVZ and Qemu, for example, are: # kvm ... -net nic,macaddr=00:11:22:33:44:55 -net tap,ifname=tap0,script=no # vzctl set 100 --netif_add eth0,00:11:22:33:44:55,tap0 Is that doable in every driver supported by libvirt ? ------- Is the libvirtd daemon necessary for drivers other than Qemu ? I've been using the openvz driver alone for some tests (by connecting to "openvz:///system"), and yet I get warning messages: # sudo ./hellolibvirt openvz:///system Attempting to connect to hypervisor libvir: Remote error : unable to connect to '/var/run/libvirt/libvirt-sock': No such file or directory libvir: warning : Failed to find the network: Is the daemon running ? libvir: Remote error : unable to connect to '/var/run/libvirt/libvirt-sock': No such file or directory libvir: Remote error : unable to connect to '/var/run/libvirt/libvirt-sock': No such file or directory libvir: warning : Failed to find a node driver: Is the libvirtd daemon running ? Connected to hypervisor at "openvz:///system" Hypervisor: "OpenVZ" version: 3.0.22 There are 0 active and 1 inactive domains Inactive domains: 897 Disconnected from hypervisor The libvirtd daemon is indeed not running, as I don't see why it should be: I thought it was only useful for qemu guests. Am I right ? What is the role of the daemon exactly ? ------- Apparently the only way to start an OpenVZ domain is by specifying a template. Only problem is, when the VE is stopped, and undefined, all modifications are lost in the "private" file system of the VE (as it is deleted). The way we circumvented this in Hynesim is by specifying the --private option to "vzctl create" instead of the --ostemplate one. That way one can specify a dir that will be used directly as the filesystem for the VE. I was thinking maybe adding something along the lines of: <filesystem type='directory'> <source name='/path/to/ve/filesystem' /> <target dir='/'/> </filesystem> would do the trick. It looks simple enough to implement, so should I ? ------- Is there support in libvirt of "cloning" (duplicating a VM disk /filesystem) ? ------- Someone mentioned a VirtualBox driver. I'm highly interested in this. How is it going ? I'd be more than happy to beta test if required. Will it work with both PUEL and OSE versions ? When will it be ready for inclusion in libvirt ? How will you handle RDP access, as from what I saw only VNC is supported in libvirt currently ? ------- And last but not least, what are "node devices" ? The two pages about it are blank in the documentation. Are they the host machine, or a device of the host machine ? ------- I think that's all. Thank you for reading all this, Florian

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[libvirt] PATCH: Fix build on Mingw32
by Daniel P. Berrange 03 Mar '09

03 Mar '09

pread() and pwrite() do not exist on mingw, and the nodedevxml2xmltest was adding libvirt_driver_qemu.la for some unknown reason - probably a cut & paste error. This broke the test compile when qemu was turned off as it is on mingw32. Daniel diff --git a/src/pci.c b/src/pci.c --- a/src/pci.c +++ b/src/pci.c @@ -156,7 +156,8 @@ pciRead(pciDevice *dev, unsigned pos, ui if (pciOpenConfig(dev) < 0) return -1; - if (pread(dev->fd, buf, buflen, pos) < 0) { + if (lseek(dev->fd, pos, SEEK_SET) != pos || + read(dev->fd, buf, buflen) < 0) { char ebuf[1024]; VIR_WARN(_("Failed to read from '%s' : %s"), dev->path, virStrerror(errno, ebuf, sizeof(ebuf))); @@ -195,7 +196,8 @@ pciWrite(pciDevice *dev, unsigned pos, u if (pciOpenConfig(dev) < 0) return -1; - if (pwrite(dev->fd, buf, buflen, pos) < 0) { + if (lseek(dev->fd, pos, SEEK_SET) != pos || + write(dev->fd, buf, buflen) < 0) { char ebuf[1024]; VIR_WARN(_("Failed to write to '%s' : %s"), dev->path, virStrerror(errno, ebuf, sizeof(ebuf))); diff --git a/tests/Makefile.am b/tests/Makefile.am --- a/tests/Makefile.am +++ b/tests/Makefile.am @@ -185,7 +185,7 @@ endif nodedevxml2xmltest_SOURCES = \ nodedevxml2xmltest.c \ testutils.c testutils.h -nodedevxml2xmltest_LDADD = ../src/libvirt_driver_qemu.la $(LDADDS) +nodedevxml2xmltest_LDADD = $(LDADDS) virshtest_SOURCES = \ virshtest.c \ -- |: Red Hat, Engineering, London -o- http://people.redhat.com/berrange/ :| |: http://libvirt.org -o- http://virt-manager.org -o- http://ovirt.org :| |: http://autobuild.org -o- http://search.cpan.org/~danberr/ :| |: GnuPG: 7D3B9505 -o- F3C9 553F A1DA 4AC2 5648 23C1 B3DF F742 7D3B 9505 :|

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[libvirt] PATCH: Mark <seclabel> as dynamic generated, or statically pre-defined
by Daniel P. Berrange 03 Mar '09

03 Mar '09

This patch implements the behaviour I was refering to earlier, whereby the domain XML explicitly says whether the security label is a statically pre-defined one, or dynamically generated on VM boot by libvirtd So when creating a new guest, apps like virt-install have 2 options: - Leave out the <seclabel> tag completely -> If no security driver is active, just works as normal unconfined VM -> If a security driver is active, a dynamic seclabel is generated <seclabel type='dynamic' model='selinux'> <label>system_u:system_r:qemu_t:s0:c424,c719</label> <imagelabel>system_u:object_r:virt_image_t:s0:c424,c719</imagelabel> </seclabel> - Add an explicit <seclabel> tag with type='static' attribute -> Security driver uses the defined label & imagelabel <seclabel type='static' model='selinux'> <label>system_u:system_r:qemu_t:s0:c25,c100</label> <imagelabel>system_u:system_r:virt_image_t:s0:c25,c100</imagelabel> </seclabel> A static seclabel is visible in the XML, at all times, whether the VM is active or inactive. A dynamic seclabel is only visible when the VM is running, since it is auto-generated at VM boot. If you migrate the VM, or save/restore it, the dynamic seclabel will change on each boot. The seclabel isn't visible when not running, or if asking for the inactive XML dump This patch implements parsing of the 'type' attribute, and makes the seclabel generation key off this attribute. It also adds the 'imagelabel' XML element, since that was being used internally, but was not including in the XML output, or parsing routines, making it impossible to specify a pre-defined image label or see the dyanmic one domain_conf.c | 65 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------- domain_conf.h | 9 +++++++ qemu_driver.c | 13 ++++++++-- security_selinux.c | 1 4 files changed, 73 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-) Daniel Index: src/domain_conf.c =================================================================== RCS file: /data/cvs/libvirt/src/domain_conf.c,v retrieving revision 1.70 diff -u -p -r1.70 domain_conf.c --- src/domain_conf.c 3 Mar 2009 09:44:42 -0000 1.70 +++ src/domain_conf.c 3 Mar 2009 15:36:02 -0000 @@ -168,6 +168,10 @@ VIR_ENUM_IMPL(virDomainState, VIR_DOMAIN "shutoff", "crashed") +VIR_ENUM_IMPL(virDomainSeclabel, VIR_DOMAIN_SECLABEL_LAST, + "dynamic", + "static") + #define virDomainReportError(conn, code, fmt...) \ virReportErrorHelper(conn, VIR_FROM_DOMAIN, code, __FILE__, \ __FUNCTION__, __LINE__, fmt) @@ -1847,24 +1851,46 @@ static int virDomainLifecycleParseXML(vi static int virSecurityLabelDefParseXML(virConnectPtr conn, const virDomainDefPtr def, - xmlXPathContextPtr ctxt) + xmlXPathContextPtr ctxt, + int flags) { char *p; if (virXPathNode(conn, "./seclabel", ctxt) == NULL) return 0; - p = virXPathStringLimit(conn, "string(./seclabel/label[1])", + p = virXPathStringLimit(conn, "string(./seclabel/@type)", VIR_SECURITY_LABEL_BUFLEN-1, ctxt); if (p == NULL) goto error; - def->seclabel.label = p; - - p = virXPathStringLimit(conn, "string(./seclabel/@model)", - VIR_SECURITY_MODEL_BUFLEN-1, ctxt); - if (p == NULL) + if ((def->seclabel.type = virDomainSeclabelTypeFromString(p)) < 0) goto error; - def->seclabel.model = p; + VIR_FREE(p); + + /* Only parse details, if using static labels, or + * if the 'live' VM XML is requested + */ + if (def->seclabel.type == VIR_DOMAIN_SECLABEL_STATIC || + !(flags & VIR_DOMAIN_XML_INACTIVE)) { + p = virXPathStringLimit(conn, "string(./seclabel/@model)", + VIR_SECURITY_MODEL_BUFLEN-1, ctxt); + if (p == NULL) + goto error; + def->seclabel.model = p; + + p = virXPathStringLimit(conn, "string(./seclabel/label[1])", + VIR_SECURITY_LABEL_BUFLEN-1, ctxt); + if (p == NULL) + goto error; + def->seclabel.label = p; + + p = virXPathStringLimit(conn, "string(./seclabel/imagelabel[1])", + VIR_SECURITY_LABEL_BUFLEN-1, ctxt); + if (p == NULL) + goto error; + def->seclabel.imagelabel = p; + + } return 0; @@ -2458,7 +2484,7 @@ static virDomainDefPtr virDomainDefParse VIR_FREE(nodes); /* analysis of security label */ - if (virSecurityLabelDefParseXML(conn, def, ctxt) == -1) + if (virSecurityLabelDefParseXML(conn, def, ctxt, flags) == -1) goto error; return def; @@ -3480,9 +3506,24 @@ char *virDomainDefFormat(virConnectPtr c virBufferAddLit(&buf, " </devices>\n"); if (def->seclabel.model) { - virBufferEscapeString(&buf, " <seclabel model='%s'>\n", def->seclabel.model); - virBufferEscapeString(&buf, " <label>%s</label>\n", def->seclabel.label); - virBufferAddLit(&buf, " </seclabel>\n"); + const char *sectype = virDomainSeclabelTypeToString(def->seclabel.type); + if (!sectype) + goto cleanup; + if (!def->seclabel.label || + (def->seclabel.type == VIR_DOMAIN_SECLABEL_DYNAMIC && + (flags & VIR_DOMAIN_XML_INACTIVE))) { + virBufferVSprintf(&buf, " <seclabel type='%s' model='%s'/>\n", + sectype, def->seclabel.model); + } else { + virBufferVSprintf(&buf, " <seclabel type='%s' model='%s'>\n", + sectype, def->seclabel.model); + virBufferEscapeString(&buf, " <label>%s</label>\n", + def->seclabel.label); + if (def->seclabel.imagelabel) + virBufferEscapeString(&buf, " <imagelabel>%s</imagelabel>\n", + def->seclabel.imagelabel); + virBufferAddLit(&buf, " </seclabel>\n"); + } } virBufferAddLit(&buf, "</domain>\n"); Index: src/domain_conf.h =================================================================== RCS file: /data/cvs/libvirt/src/domain_conf.h,v retrieving revision 1.39 diff -u -p -r1.39 domain_conf.h --- src/domain_conf.h 3 Mar 2009 09:44:42 -0000 1.39 +++ src/domain_conf.h 3 Mar 2009 15:36:02 -0000 @@ -410,6 +410,13 @@ struct _virDomainOSDef { char *bootloaderArgs; }; +enum virDomainSeclabelType { + VIR_DOMAIN_SECLABEL_DYNAMIC, + VIR_DOMAIN_SECLABEL_STATIC, + + VIR_DOMAIN_SECLABEL_LAST, +}; + /* Security configuration for domain */ typedef struct _virSecurityLabelDef virSecurityLabelDef; typedef virSecurityLabelDef *virSecurityLabelDefPtr; @@ -417,6 +424,7 @@ struct _virSecurityLabelDef { char *model; /* name of security model */ char *label; /* security label string */ char *imagelabel; /* security image label string */ + int type; }; #define VIR_DOMAIN_CPUMASK_LEN 1024 @@ -650,5 +658,6 @@ VIR_ENUM_DECL(virDomainInputBus) VIR_ENUM_DECL(virDomainGraphics) /* from libvirt.h */ VIR_ENUM_DECL(virDomainState) +VIR_ENUM_DECL(virDomainSeclabel) #endif /* __DOMAIN_CONF_H */ Index: src/qemu_driver.c =================================================================== RCS file: /data/cvs/libvirt/src/qemu_driver.c,v retrieving revision 1.213 diff -u -p -r1.213 qemu_driver.c --- src/qemu_driver.c 3 Mar 2009 15:18:24 -0000 1.213 +++ src/qemu_driver.c 3 Mar 2009 15:36:02 -0000 @@ -1314,9 +1314,9 @@ static int qemudStartVMDaemon(virConnect hookData.vm = vm; hookData.driver = driver; - /* If you are using a SecurityDriver and there was no security label in - database, then generate a security label for isolation */ - if (vm->def->seclabel.label == NULL && + /* If you are using a SecurityDriver with dynamic labelling, + then generate a security label for isolation */ + if (vm->def->seclabel.type == VIR_DOMAIN_SECLABEL_DYNAMIC && driver->securityDriver && driver->securityDriver->domainGenSecurityLabel && driver->securityDriver->domainGenSecurityLabel(conn, vm) < 0) @@ -1525,6 +1525,13 @@ static void qemudShutdownVMDaemon(virCon if (driver->securityDriver) driver->securityDriver->domainRestoreSecurityLabel(conn, vm); + /* Clear out dynamically assigned labels */ + if (vm->def->seclabel.type == VIR_DOMAIN_SECLABEL_DYNAMIC) { + VIR_FREE(vm->def->seclabel.model); + VIR_FREE(vm->def->seclabel.label); + VIR_FREE(vm->def->seclabel.imagelabel); + } + if (qemudRemoveDomainStatus(conn, driver, vm) < 0) { VIR_WARN(_("Failed to remove domain status for %s"), vm->def->name); Index: src/security_selinux.c =================================================================== RCS file: /data/cvs/libvirt/src/security_selinux.c,v retrieving revision 1.2 diff -u -p -r1.2 security_selinux.c --- src/security_selinux.c 3 Mar 2009 15:18:24 -0000 1.2 +++ src/security_selinux.c 3 Mar 2009 15:36:02 -0000 @@ -161,6 +161,7 @@ SELinuxGenSecurityLabel(virConnectPtr co char *scontext = NULL; int c1 = 0; int c2 = 0; + if ( ( vm->def->seclabel.label ) || ( vm->def->seclabel.model ) || ( vm->def->seclabel.imagelabel )) { -- |: Red Hat, Engineering, London -o- http://people.redhat.com/berrange/ :| |: http://libvirt.org -o- http://virt-manager.org -o- http://ovirt.org :| |: http://autobuild.org -o- http://search.cpan.org/~danberr/ :| |: GnuPG: 7D3B9505 -o- F3C9 553F A1DA 4AC2 5648 23C1 B3DF F742 7D3B 9505 :|

3 3

[libvirt] [PATCH] config: fix a typo
by Jim Meyering 03 Mar '09

03 Mar '09

>From 5cdfbefc15f81b3be7e2d60b3d173fdb2352a83c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jim Meyering <meyering(a)redhat.com> Date: Tue, 3 Mar 2009 15:58:49 +0100 Subject: [PATCH] config: fix a typo * src/qemu_conf.c (CHECK_TYPE): Fix typo: s/security_river/security_driver/ --- src/qemu_conf.c | 2 +- 1 files changed, 1 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/qemu_conf.c b/src/qemu_conf.c index 71fed5a..03f710f 100644 --- a/src/qemu_conf.c +++ b/src/qemu_conf.c @@ -152,7 +152,7 @@ int qemudLoadDriverConfig(struct qemud_driver *driver, } p = virConfGetValue (conf, "security_driver"); - CHECK_TYPE ("security_river", VIR_CONF_STRING); + CHECK_TYPE ("security_driver", VIR_CONF_STRING); if (p && p->str) { if (!(driver->securityDriverName = strdup(p->str))) { virReportOOMError(NULL); -- 1.6.2.rc1.285.gc5f54

2 1

[libvirt] Updated James Morris patch to apply to libvirt-0.6.0 version
by Daniel J Walsh 03 Mar '09

03 Mar '09

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Is this acceptable to upstream? Dan -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.9 (GNU/Linux) Comment: Using GnuPG with Fedora - http://enigmail.mozdev.org iEYEARECAAYFAkma48EACgkQrlYvE4MpobMSBwCfXJnrlgoM0CuwdxF8BzcoQVvr 5pIAoNcKSrh+YsxNMjk8RgM4E7feUc4R =iLJG -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- diff -up libvirt-0.6.0/include/libvirt/libvirt.h.in.svirt libvirt-0.6.0/include/libvirt/libvirt.h.in --- libvirt-0.6.0/include/libvirt/libvirt.h.in.svirt 2009-01-20 08:48:27.000000000 -0500 +++ libvirt-0.6.0/include/libvirt/libvirt.h.in 2009-02-17 10:07:06.215686000 -0500 @@ -111,6 +111,68 @@ typedef enum { } virDomainCreateFlags; /** + * VIR_SECURITY_LABEL_BUFLEN: + * + * Macro providing the maximum length of the virSecurityLabel label string. + * Note that this value is based on that used by Labeled NFS. + */ +#define VIR_SECURITY_LABEL_BUFLEN (4096 + 1) + +/** + * virSecurityLabel: + * + * a virSecurityLabel is a structure filled by virDomainGetSecurityLabel(), + * providing the security label and associated attributes for the specified + * domain. + * + */ +typedef struct _virSecurityLabel { + char label[VIR_SECURITY_LABEL_BUFLEN]; /* security label string */ + int enforcing; /* 1 if security policy is being enforced for domain */ +} virSecurityLabel; + +/** + * virSecurityLabelPtr: + * + * a virSecurityLabelPtr is a pointer to a virSecurityLabel. + */ +typedef virSecurityLabel *virSecurityLabelPtr; + +/** + * VIR_SECURITY_MODEL_BUFLEN: + * + * Macro providing the maximum length of the virSecurityModel model string. + */ +#define VIR_SECURITY_MODEL_BUFLEN (256 + 1) + +/** + * VIR_SECURITY_DOI_BUFLEN: + * + * Macro providing the maximum length of the virSecurityModel doi string. + */ +#define VIR_SECURITY_DOI_BUFLEN (256 + 1) + +/** + * virSecurityModel: + * + * a virSecurityModel is a structure filled by virNodeGetSecurityModel(), + * providing the per-hypervisor security model and DOI attributes for the + * specified domain. + * + */ +typedef struct _virSecurityModel { + char model[VIR_SECURITY_MODEL_BUFLEN]; /* security model string */ + char doi[VIR_SECURITY_DOI_BUFLEN]; /* domain of interpetation */ +} virSecurityModel; + +/** + * virSecurityModelPtr: + * + * a virSecurityModelPtr is a pointer to a virSecurityModel. + */ +typedef virSecurityModel *virSecurityModelPtr; + +/** * virNodeInfoPtr: * * a virNodeInfo is a structure filled by virNodeGetInfo() and providing @@ -417,6 +479,9 @@ char * virConnectGetCap unsigned long long virNodeGetFreeMemory (virConnectPtr conn); +int virNodeGetSecurityModel (virConnectPtr conn, + virSecurityModelPtr secmodel); + /* * Gather list of running domains */ @@ -506,6 +571,8 @@ int virDomainSetMaxM int virDomainSetMemory (virDomainPtr domain, unsigned long memory); int virDomainGetMaxVcpus (virDomainPtr domain); +int virDomainGetSecurityLabel (virDomainPtr domain, + virSecurityLabelPtr seclabel); /* * XML domain description diff -up libvirt-0.6.0/include/libvirt/libvirt.h.svirt libvirt-0.6.0/include/libvirt/libvirt.h --- libvirt-0.6.0/include/libvirt/libvirt.h.svirt 2009-01-31 04:20:10.000000000 -0500 +++ libvirt-0.6.0/include/libvirt/libvirt.h 2009-02-17 10:07:32.421570000 -0500 @@ -111,6 +111,68 @@ typedef enum { } virDomainCreateFlags; /** + * VIR_SECURITY_LABEL_BUFLEN: + * + * Macro providing the maximum length of the virSecurityLabel label string. + * Note that this value is based on that used by Labeled NFS. + */ +#define VIR_SECURITY_LABEL_BUFLEN (4096 + 1) + +/** + * virSecurityLabel: + * + * a virSecurityLabel is a structure filled by virDomainGetSecurityLabel(), + * providing the security label and associated attributes for the specified + * domain. + * + */ +typedef struct _virSecurityLabel { + char label[VIR_SECURITY_LABEL_BUFLEN]; /* security label string */ + int enforcing; /* 1 if security policy is being enforced for domain */ +} virSecurityLabel; + +/** + * virSecurityLabelPtr: + * + * a virSecurityLabelPtr is a pointer to a virSecurityLabel. + */ +typedef virSecurityLabel *virSecurityLabelPtr; + +/** + * VIR_SECURITY_MODEL_BUFLEN: + * + * Macro providing the maximum length of the virSecurityModel model string. + */ +#define VIR_SECURITY_MODEL_BUFLEN (256 + 1) + +/** + * VIR_SECURITY_DOI_BUFLEN: + * + * Macro providing the maximum length of the virSecurityModel doi string. + */ +#define VIR_SECURITY_DOI_BUFLEN (256 + 1) + +/** + * virSecurityModel: + * + * a virSecurityModel is a structure filled by virNodeGetSecurityModel(), + * providing the per-hypervisor security model and DOI attributes for the + * specified domain. + * + */ +typedef struct _virSecurityModel { + char model[VIR_SECURITY_MODEL_BUFLEN]; /* security model string */ + char doi[VIR_SECURITY_DOI_BUFLEN]; /* domain of interpetation */ +} virSecurityModel; + +/** + * virSecurityModelPtr: + * + * a virSecurityModelPtr is a pointer to a virSecurityModel. + */ +typedef virSecurityModel *virSecurityModelPtr; + +/** * virNodeInfoPtr: * * a virNodeInfo is a structure filled by virNodeGetInfo() and providing @@ -417,6 +479,9 @@ char * virConnectGetCap unsigned long long virNodeGetFreeMemory (virConnectPtr conn); +int virNodeGetSecurityModel (virConnectPtr conn, + virSecurityModelPtr secmodel); + /* * Gather list of running domains */ @@ -506,6 +571,8 @@ int virDomainSetMaxM int virDomainSetMemory (virDomainPtr domain, unsigned long memory); int virDomainGetMaxVcpus (virDomainPtr domain); +int virDomainGetSecurityLabel (virDomainPtr domain, + virSecurityLabelPtr seclabel); /* * XML domain description diff -up libvirt-0.6.0/include/libvirt/virterror.h.svirt libvirt-0.6.0/include/libvirt/virterror.h --- libvirt-0.6.0/include/libvirt/virterror.h.svirt 2008-11-25 08:42:33.000000000 -0500 +++ libvirt-0.6.0/include/libvirt/virterror.h 2009-02-17 10:07:06.223677000 -0500 @@ -61,6 +61,7 @@ typedef enum { VIR_FROM_UML, /* Error at the UML driver */ VIR_FROM_NODEDEV, /* Error from node device monitor */ VIR_FROM_XEN_INOTIFY, /* Error from xen inotify layer */ + VIR_FROM_SECURITY, /* Error from security framework */ } virErrorDomain; @@ -154,6 +155,7 @@ typedef enum { VIR_WAR_NO_NODE, /* failed to start node driver */ VIR_ERR_INVALID_NODE_DEVICE,/* invalid node device object */ VIR_ERR_NO_NODE_DEVICE,/* node device not found */ + VIR_ERR_NO_SECURITY_MODEL, /* security model not found */ } virErrorNumber; /** diff -up libvirt-0.6.0/po/POTFILES.in.svirt libvirt-0.6.0/po/POTFILES.in --- libvirt-0.6.0/po/POTFILES.in.svirt 2009-01-31 04:04:17.000000000 -0500 +++ libvirt-0.6.0/po/POTFILES.in 2009-02-17 10:07:06.226679000 -0500 @@ -22,6 +22,8 @@ src/proxy_internal.c src/qemu_conf.c src/qemu_driver.c src/remote_internal.c +src/security.c +src/security_selinux.c src/storage_backend.c src/storage_backend_disk.c src/storage_backend_fs.c diff -up libvirt-0.6.0/python/generator.py.svirt libvirt-0.6.0/python/generator.py --- libvirt-0.6.0/python/generator.py.svirt 2008-11-21 07:47:32.000000000 -0500 +++ libvirt-0.6.0/python/generator.py 2009-02-17 10:07:06.230676000 -0500 @@ -342,6 +342,8 @@ skip_function = ( 'virCopyLastError', # Python API is called virGetLastError instead 'virConnectOpenAuth', # Python C code is manually written 'virDefaultErrorFunc', # Python virErrorFuncHandler impl calls this from C + 'virDomainGetSecurityLabel', # Needs investigation... + 'virNodeGetSecurityModel', # Needs investigation... 'virConnectDomainEventRegister', # overridden in virConnect.py 'virConnectDomainEventDeregister', # overridden in virConnect.py ) diff -up libvirt-0.6.0/qemud/Makefile.am.svirt libvirt-0.6.0/qemud/Makefile.am --- libvirt-0.6.0/qemud/Makefile.am.svirt 2009-01-31 04:04:17.000000000 -0500 +++ libvirt-0.6.0/qemud/Makefile.am 2009-02-17 10:07:06.237678000 -0500 @@ -130,6 +130,7 @@ libvirtd_LDADD += ../src/libvirt_driver_ endif endif +libvirtd_LDADD += ../src/libvirt_driver_security.la libvirtd_LDADD += ../src/libvirt.la if HAVE_POLKIT diff -up libvirt-0.6.0/qemud/remote.c.svirt libvirt-0.6.0/qemud/remote.c --- libvirt-0.6.0/qemud/remote.c.svirt 2009-01-31 04:04:17.000000000 -0500 +++ libvirt-0.6.0/qemud/remote.c 2009-02-17 10:07:06.246680000 -0500 @@ -1340,6 +1340,76 @@ remoteDispatchDomainGetMaxVcpus (struct } static int +remoteDispatchDomainGetSecurityLabel(struct qemud_server *server ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED, + struct qemud_client *client ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED, + virConnectPtr conn, + remote_error *rerr, + remote_domain_get_security_label_args *args, + remote_domain_get_security_label_ret *ret) +{ + virDomainPtr dom; + virSecurityLabel seclabel; + + dom = get_nonnull_domain(conn, args->dom); + if (dom == NULL) { + remoteDispatchConnError(rerr, conn); + return -1; + } + + memset(&seclabel, 0, sizeof seclabel); + if (virDomainGetSecurityLabel(dom, &seclabel) == -1) { + virDomainFree(dom); + remoteDispatchFormatError(rerr, "%s", _("unable to get security label")); + return -1; + } + + ret->label.label_len = strlen(seclabel.label) + 1; + if (VIR_ALLOC_N(ret->label.label_val, ret->label.label_len) < 0) { + virDomainFree(dom); + remoteDispatchOOMError(rerr); + return -1; + } + strcpy(ret->label.label_val, seclabel.label); + ret->enforcing = seclabel.enforcing; + virDomainFree(dom); + + return 0; +} + +static int +remoteDispatchNodeGetSecurityModel(struct qemud_server *server ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED, + struct qemud_client *client ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED, + virConnectPtr conn, + remote_error *rerr, + void *args ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED, + remote_node_get_security_model_ret *ret) +{ + virSecurityModel secmodel; + + memset(&secmodel, 0, sizeof secmodel); + if (virNodeGetSecurityModel(conn, &secmodel) == -1) { + remoteDispatchFormatError(rerr, "%s", _("unable to get security model")); + return -1; + } + + ret->model.model_len = strlen(secmodel.model) + 1; + if (VIR_ALLOC_N(ret->model.model_val, ret->model.model_len) < 0) { + remoteDispatchOOMError(rerr); + return -1; + } + strcpy(ret->model.model_val, secmodel.model); + + ret->doi.doi_len = strlen(secmodel.doi) + 1; + if (VIR_ALLOC_N(ret->doi.doi_val, ret->doi.doi_len) < 0) { + remoteDispatchOOMError(rerr); + return -1; + } + strcpy(ret->doi.doi_val, secmodel.doi); + + return 0; +} + +static int remoteDispatchDomainGetOsType (struct qemud_server *server ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED, struct qemud_client *client ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED, virConnectPtr conn, diff -up libvirt-0.6.0/qemud/remote_dispatch_args.h.svirt libvirt-0.6.0/qemud/remote_dispatch_args.h --- libvirt-0.6.0/qemud/remote_dispatch_args.h.svirt 2008-12-19 09:00:02.000000000 -0500 +++ libvirt-0.6.0/qemud/remote_dispatch_args.h 2009-02-17 10:07:06.250678000 -0500 @@ -99,3 +99,4 @@ remote_node_device_get_parent_args val_remote_node_device_get_parent_args; remote_node_device_num_of_caps_args val_remote_node_device_num_of_caps_args; remote_node_device_list_caps_args val_remote_node_device_list_caps_args; + remote_domain_get_security_label_args val_remote_domain_get_security_label_args; diff -up libvirt-0.6.0/qemud/remote_dispatch_prototypes.h.svirt libvirt-0.6.0/qemud/remote_dispatch_prototypes.h --- libvirt-0.6.0/qemud/remote_dispatch_prototypes.h.svirt 2008-12-19 09:00:02.000000000 -0500 +++ libvirt-0.6.0/qemud/remote_dispatch_prototypes.h 2009-02-17 10:07:06.255676000 -0500 @@ -184,6 +184,13 @@ static int remoteDispatchDomainGetSchedu remote_error *err, remote_domain_get_scheduler_type_args *args, remote_domain_get_scheduler_type_ret *ret); +static int remoteDispatchDomainGetSecurityLabel( + struct qemud_server *server, + struct qemud_client *client, + virConnectPtr conn, + remote_error *err, + remote_domain_get_security_label_args *args, + remote_domain_get_security_label_ret *ret); static int remoteDispatchDomainGetVcpus( struct qemud_server *server, struct qemud_client *client, @@ -576,6 +583,13 @@ static int remoteDispatchNodeGetInfo( remote_error *err, void *args, remote_node_get_info_ret *ret); +static int remoteDispatchNodeGetSecurityModel( + struct qemud_server *server, + struct qemud_client *client, + virConnectPtr conn, + remote_error *err, + void *args, + remote_node_get_security_model_ret *ret); static int remoteDispatchNodeListDevices( struct qemud_server *server, struct qemud_client *client, diff -up libvirt-0.6.0/qemud/remote_dispatch_ret.h.svirt libvirt-0.6.0/qemud/remote_dispatch_ret.h --- libvirt-0.6.0/qemud/remote_dispatch_ret.h.svirt 2008-12-19 09:00:02.000000000 -0500 +++ libvirt-0.6.0/qemud/remote_dispatch_ret.h 2009-02-17 10:07:06.259676000 -0500 @@ -86,3 +86,5 @@ remote_node_device_get_parent_ret val_remote_node_device_get_parent_ret; remote_node_device_num_of_caps_ret val_remote_node_device_num_of_caps_ret; remote_node_device_list_caps_ret val_remote_node_device_list_caps_ret; + remote_domain_get_security_label_ret val_remote_domain_get_security_label_ret; + remote_node_get_security_model_ret val_remote_node_get_security_model_ret; diff -up libvirt-0.6.0/qemud/remote_dispatch_table.h.svirt libvirt-0.6.0/qemud/remote_dispatch_table.h --- libvirt-0.6.0/qemud/remote_dispatch_table.h.svirt 2008-12-19 09:00:02.000000000 -0500 +++ libvirt-0.6.0/qemud/remote_dispatch_table.h 2009-02-17 10:07:06.263676000 -0500 @@ -592,3 +592,13 @@ .args_filter = (xdrproc_t) xdr_remote_node_device_list_caps_args, .ret_filter = (xdrproc_t) xdr_remote_node_device_list_caps_ret, }, +{ /* DomainGetSecurityLabel => 118 */ + .fn = (dispatch_fn) remoteDispatchDomainGetSecurityLabel, + .args_filter = (xdrproc_t) xdr_remote_domain_get_security_label_args, + .ret_filter = (xdrproc_t) xdr_remote_domain_get_security_label_ret, +}, +{ /* NodeGetSecurityModel => 119 */ + .fn = (dispatch_fn) remoteDispatchNodeGetSecurityModel, + .args_filter = (xdrproc_t) xdr_void, + .ret_filter = (xdrproc_t) xdr_remote_node_get_security_model_ret, +}, diff -up libvirt-0.6.0/qemud/remote_protocol.c.svirt libvirt-0.6.0/qemud/remote_protocol.c --- libvirt-0.6.0/qemud/remote_protocol.c.svirt 2009-01-31 04:04:17.000000000 -0500 +++ libvirt-0.6.0/qemud/remote_protocol.c 2009-02-17 10:07:06.268676000 -0500 @@ -1166,6 +1166,43 @@ xdr_remote_domain_get_max_vcpus_ret (XDR } bool_t +xdr_remote_domain_get_security_label_args (XDR *xdrs, remote_domain_get_security_label_args *objp) +{ + + if (!xdr_remote_nonnull_domain (xdrs, &objp->dom)) + return FALSE; + return TRUE; +} + +bool_t +xdr_remote_domain_get_security_label_ret (XDR *xdrs, remote_domain_get_security_label_ret *objp) +{ + char **objp_cpp0 = (char **) (void *) &objp->label.label_val; + + if (!xdr_array (xdrs, objp_cpp0, (u_int *) &objp->label.label_len, REMOTE_SECURITY_LABEL_MAX, + sizeof (char), (xdrproc_t) xdr_char)) + return FALSE; + if (!xdr_int (xdrs, &objp->enforcing)) + return FALSE; + return TRUE; +} + +bool_t +xdr_remote_node_get_security_model_ret (XDR *xdrs, remote_node_get_security_model_ret *objp) +{ + char **objp_cpp1 = (char **) (void *) &objp->doi.doi_val; + char **objp_cpp0 = (char **) (void *) &objp->model.model_val; + + if (!xdr_array (xdrs, objp_cpp0, (u_int *) &objp->model.model_len, REMOTE_SECURITY_MODEL_MAX, + sizeof (char), (xdrproc_t) xdr_char)) + return FALSE; + if (!xdr_array (xdrs, objp_cpp1, (u_int *) &objp->doi.doi_len, REMOTE_SECURITY_DOI_MAX, + sizeof (char), (xdrproc_t) xdr_char)) + return FALSE; + return TRUE; +} + +bool_t xdr_remote_domain_attach_device_args (XDR *xdrs, remote_domain_attach_device_args *objp) { diff -up libvirt-0.6.0/qemud/remote_protocol.h.svirt libvirt-0.6.0/qemud/remote_protocol.h --- libvirt-0.6.0/qemud/remote_protocol.h.svirt 2009-01-31 04:04:17.000000000 -0500 +++ libvirt-0.6.0/qemud/remote_protocol.h 2009-02-17 10:07:06.274679000 -0500 @@ -38,6 +38,9 @@ typedef remote_nonnull_string *remote_st #define REMOTE_AUTH_TYPE_LIST_MAX 20 #define REMOTE_DOMAIN_BLOCK_PEEK_BUFFER_MAX 65536 #define REMOTE_DOMAIN_MEMORY_PEEK_BUFFER_MAX 65536 +#define REMOTE_SECURITY_MODEL_MAX VIR_SECURITY_MODEL_BUFLEN +#define REMOTE_SECURITY_LABEL_MAX VIR_SECURITY_LABEL_BUFLEN +#define REMOTE_SECURITY_DOI_MAX VIR_SECURITY_DOI_BUFLEN typedef char remote_uuid[VIR_UUID_BUFLEN]; @@ -637,6 +640,32 @@ struct remote_domain_get_max_vcpus_ret { }; typedef struct remote_domain_get_max_vcpus_ret remote_domain_get_max_vcpus_ret; +struct remote_domain_get_security_label_args { + remote_nonnull_domain dom; +}; +typedef struct remote_domain_get_security_label_args remote_domain_get_security_label_args; + +struct remote_domain_get_security_label_ret { + struct { + u_int label_len; + char *label_val; + } label; + int enforcing; +}; +typedef struct remote_domain_get_security_label_ret remote_domain_get_security_label_ret; + +struct remote_node_get_security_model_ret { + struct { + u_int model_len; + char *model_val; + } model; + struct { + u_int doi_len; + char *doi_val; + } doi; +}; +typedef struct remote_node_get_security_model_ret remote_node_get_security_model_ret; + struct remote_domain_attach_device_args { remote_nonnull_domain dom; remote_nonnull_string xml; @@ -1348,6 +1377,8 @@ enum remote_procedure { REMOTE_PROC_NODE_DEVICE_GET_PARENT = 115, REMOTE_PROC_NODE_DEVICE_NUM_OF_CAPS = 116, REMOTE_PROC_NODE_DEVICE_LIST_CAPS = 117, + REMOTE_PROC_DOMAIN_GET_SECURITY_LABEL = 118, + REMOTE_PROC_NODE_GET_SECURITY_MODEL = 119, }; typedef enum remote_procedure remote_procedure; @@ -1474,6 +1505,9 @@ extern bool_t xdr_remote_domain_get_vcp extern bool_t xdr_remote_domain_get_vcpus_ret (XDR *, remote_domain_get_vcpus_ret*); extern bool_t xdr_remote_domain_get_max_vcpus_args (XDR *, remote_domain_get_max_vcpus_args*); extern bool_t xdr_remote_domain_get_max_vcpus_ret (XDR *, remote_domain_get_max_vcpus_ret*); +extern bool_t xdr_remote_domain_get_security_label_args (XDR *, remote_domain_get_security_label_args*); +extern bool_t xdr_remote_domain_get_security_label_ret (XDR *, remote_domain_get_security_label_ret*); +extern bool_t xdr_remote_node_get_security_model_ret (XDR *, remote_node_get_security_model_ret*); extern bool_t xdr_remote_domain_attach_device_args (XDR *, remote_domain_attach_device_args*); extern bool_t xdr_remote_domain_detach_device_args (XDR *, remote_domain_detach_device_args*); extern bool_t xdr_remote_domain_get_autostart_args (XDR *, remote_domain_get_autostart_args*); @@ -1679,6 +1713,9 @@ extern bool_t xdr_remote_domain_get_vcpu extern bool_t xdr_remote_domain_get_vcpus_ret (); extern bool_t xdr_remote_domain_get_max_vcpus_args (); extern bool_t xdr_remote_domain_get_max_vcpus_ret (); +extern bool_t xdr_remote_domain_get_security_label_args (); +extern bool_t xdr_remote_domain_get_security_label_ret (); +extern bool_t xdr_remote_node_get_security_model_ret (); extern bool_t xdr_remote_domain_attach_device_args (); extern bool_t xdr_remote_domain_detach_device_args (); extern bool_t xdr_remote_domain_get_autostart_args (); diff -up libvirt-0.6.0/qemud/remote_protocol.x.svirt libvirt-0.6.0/qemud/remote_protocol.x --- libvirt-0.6.0/qemud/remote_protocol.x.svirt 2008-12-19 07:51:11.000000000 -0500 +++ libvirt-0.6.0/qemud/remote_protocol.x 2009-02-17 10:07:06.279676000 -0500 @@ -115,6 +115,21 @@ const REMOTE_DOMAIN_BLOCK_PEEK_BUFFER_MA */ const REMOTE_DOMAIN_MEMORY_PEEK_BUFFER_MAX = 65536; +/* + * Maximum length of a security model field. + */ +const REMOTE_SECURITY_MODEL_MAX = VIR_SECURITY_MODEL_BUFLEN; + +/* + * Maximum length of a security label field. + */ +const REMOTE_SECURITY_LABEL_MAX = VIR_SECURITY_LABEL_BUFLEN; + +/* + * Maximum length of a security DOI field. + */ +const REMOTE_SECURITY_DOI_MAX = VIR_SECURITY_DOI_BUFLEN; + /* UUID. VIR_UUID_BUFLEN definition comes from libvirt.h */ typedef opaque remote_uuid[VIR_UUID_BUFLEN]; @@ -617,6 +632,20 @@ struct remote_domain_get_max_vcpus_ret { int num; }; +struct remote_domain_get_security_label_args { + remote_nonnull_domain dom; +}; + +struct remote_domain_get_security_label_ret { + char label<REMOTE_SECURITY_LABEL_MAX>; + int enforcing; +}; + +struct remote_node_get_security_model_ret { + char model<REMOTE_SECURITY_MODEL_MAX>; + char doi<REMOTE_SECURITY_DOI_MAX>; +}; + struct remote_domain_attach_device_args { remote_nonnull_domain dom; remote_nonnull_string xml; @@ -1223,7 +1252,10 @@ enum remote_procedure { REMOTE_PROC_NODE_DEVICE_DUMP_XML = 114, REMOTE_PROC_NODE_DEVICE_GET_PARENT = 115, REMOTE_PROC_NODE_DEVICE_NUM_OF_CAPS = 116, - REMOTE_PROC_NODE_DEVICE_LIST_CAPS = 117 + REMOTE_PROC_NODE_DEVICE_LIST_CAPS = 117, + + REMOTE_PROC_DOMAIN_GET_SECURITY_LABEL = 118, + REMOTE_PROC_NODE_GET_SECURITY_MODEL = 119 }; /* Custom RPC structure. */ diff -up libvirt-0.6.0/src/capabilities.c.svirt libvirt-0.6.0/src/capabilities.c --- libvirt-0.6.0/src/capabilities.c.svirt 2009-01-31 04:04:17.000000000 -0500 +++ libvirt-0.6.0/src/capabilities.c 2009-02-17 10:07:06.285678000 -0500 @@ -150,6 +150,8 @@ virCapabilitiesFree(virCapsPtr caps) { VIR_FREE(caps->host.migrateTrans); VIR_FREE(caps->host.arch); + VIR_FREE(caps->host.secModel.model); + VIR_FREE(caps->host.secModel.doi); VIR_FREE(caps); } @@ -599,6 +601,14 @@ virCapabilitiesFormatXML(virCapsPtr caps virBufferAddLit(&xml, " </cells>\n"); virBufferAddLit(&xml, " </topology>\n"); } + + if (caps->host.secModel.model) { + virBufferAddLit(&xml, " <secmodel>\n"); + virBufferVSprintf(&xml, " <model>%s</model>\n", caps->host.secModel.model); + virBufferVSprintf(&xml, " <doi>%s</doi>\n", caps->host.secModel.doi); + virBufferAddLit(&xml, " </secmodel>\n"); + } + virBufferAddLit(&xml, " </host>\n\n"); diff -up libvirt-0.6.0/src/capabilities.h.svirt libvirt-0.6.0/src/capabilities.h --- libvirt-0.6.0/src/capabilities.h.svirt 2009-01-31 04:04:17.000000000 -0500 +++ libvirt-0.6.0/src/capabilities.h 2009-02-17 10:07:06.292677000 -0500 @@ -78,6 +78,12 @@ struct _virCapsHostNUMACell { int *cpus; }; +typedef struct _virCapsHostSecModel virCapsHostSecModel; +struct _virCapsHostSecModel { + char *model; + char *doi; +}; + typedef struct _virCapsHost virCapsHost; typedef virCapsHost *virCapsHostPtr; struct _virCapsHost { @@ -90,6 +96,7 @@ struct _virCapsHost { char **migrateTrans; int nnumaCell; virCapsHostNUMACellPtr *numaCell; + virCapsHostSecModel secModel; }; typedef struct _virCaps virCaps; diff -up libvirt-0.6.0/src/domain_conf.c.svirt libvirt-0.6.0/src/domain_conf.c --- libvirt-0.6.0/src/domain_conf.c.svirt 2009-02-17 10:07:06.195708000 -0500 +++ libvirt-0.6.0/src/domain_conf.c 2009-02-17 10:07:06.300677000 -0500 @@ -379,6 +379,16 @@ void virDomainDeviceDefFree(virDomainDev VIR_FREE(def); } +void virSecurityLabelDefFree(virDomainDefPtr def); + +void virSecurityLabelDefFree(virDomainDefPtr def) +{ + if (def->seclabel.model) + VIR_FREE(def->seclabel.model); + if (def->seclabel.label) + VIR_FREE(def->seclabel.label); +} + void virDomainDefFree(virDomainDefPtr def) { unsigned int i; @@ -437,6 +447,8 @@ void virDomainDefFree(virDomainDefPtr de VIR_FREE(def->cpumask); VIR_FREE(def->emulator); + virSecurityLabelDefFree(def); + VIR_FREE(def); } @@ -1818,6 +1830,34 @@ static int virDomainLifecycleParseXML(vi return 0; } +static int +virSecurityLabelDefParseXML(virConnectPtr conn, + const virDomainDefPtr def, + xmlXPathContextPtr ctxt) +{ + char *p; + + if (virXPathNode(conn, "./seclabel", ctxt) == NULL) + return 0; + + p = virXPathStringLimit(conn, "string(./seclabel/label[1])", + VIR_SECURITY_LABEL_BUFLEN-1, ctxt); + if (p == NULL) + goto error; + def->seclabel.label = p; + + p = virXPathStringLimit(conn, "string(./seclabel/@model)", + VIR_SECURITY_MODEL_BUFLEN-1, ctxt); + if (p == NULL) + goto error; + def->seclabel.model = p; + + return 0; + +error: + virSecurityLabelDefFree(def); + return -1; +} virDomainDeviceDefPtr virDomainDeviceDefParse(virConnectPtr conn, virCapsPtr caps, @@ -2403,6 +2443,10 @@ static virDomainDefPtr virDomainDefParse } VIR_FREE(nodes); + /* analysis of security label */ + if (virSecurityLabelDefParseXML(conn, def, ctxt) == -1) + goto error; + return def; no_memory: @@ -3420,6 +3464,13 @@ char *virDomainDefFormat(virConnectPtr c goto cleanup; virBufferAddLit(&buf, " </devices>\n"); + + if (def->seclabel.model) { + virBufferEscapeString(&buf, " <seclabel model='%s'>\n", def->seclabel.model); + virBufferEscapeString(&buf, " <label>%s</label>\n", def->seclabel.label); + virBufferAddLit(&buf, " </seclabel>\n"); + } + virBufferAddLit(&buf, "</domain>\n"); if (virBufferError(&buf)) diff -up libvirt-0.6.0/src/domain_conf.h.svirt libvirt-0.6.0/src/domain_conf.h --- libvirt-0.6.0/src/domain_conf.h.svirt 2009-01-31 04:04:17.000000000 -0500 +++ libvirt-0.6.0/src/domain_conf.h 2009-02-17 10:07:06.307676000 -0500 @@ -407,6 +407,14 @@ struct _virDomainOSDef { char *bootloaderArgs; }; +/* Security configuration for domain */ +typedef struct _virSecurityLabelDef virSecurityLabelDef; +typedef virSecurityLabelDef *virSecurityLabelDefPtr; +struct _virSecurityLabelDef { + char *model; /* name of security model */ + char *label; /* security label string */ +}; + #define VIR_DOMAIN_CPUMASK_LEN 1024 /* Guest VM main configuration */ @@ -464,6 +472,7 @@ struct _virDomainDef { /* Only 1 */ virDomainChrDefPtr console; + virSecurityLabelDef seclabel; }; /* Guest VM runtime state */ diff -up libvirt-0.6.0/src/driver.h.svirt libvirt-0.6.0/src/driver.h --- libvirt-0.6.0/src/driver.h.svirt 2008-12-19 07:51:11.000000000 -0500 +++ libvirt-0.6.0/src/driver.h 2009-02-17 10:07:06.313676000 -0500 @@ -181,6 +181,12 @@ typedef int typedef int (*virDrvDomainGetMaxVcpus) (virDomainPtr domain); typedef int + (*virDrvDomainGetSecurityLabel) (virDomainPtr domain, + virSecurityLabelPtr seclabel); +typedef int + (*virDrvNodeGetSecurityModel) (virConnectPtr conn, + virSecurityModelPtr secmodel); +typedef int (*virDrvDomainAttachDevice) (virDomainPtr domain, const char *xml); typedef int @@ -361,6 +367,8 @@ struct _virDriver { virDrvDomainPinVcpu domainPinVcpu; virDrvDomainGetVcpus domainGetVcpus; virDrvDomainGetMaxVcpus domainGetMaxVcpus; + virDrvDomainGetSecurityLabel domainGetSecurityLabel; + virDrvNodeGetSecurityModel nodeGetSecurityModel; virDrvDomainDumpXML domainDumpXML; virDrvListDefinedDomains listDefinedDomains; virDrvNumOfDefinedDomains numOfDefinedDomains; diff -up libvirt-0.6.0/src/libvirt.c.svirt libvirt-0.6.0/src/libvirt.c --- libvirt-0.6.0/src/libvirt.c.svirt 2009-01-31 04:04:17.000000000 -0500 +++ libvirt-0.6.0/src/libvirt.c 2009-02-17 10:07:06.332683000 -0500 @@ -4156,6 +4156,70 @@ error: return -1; } +/** + * virDomainGetSecurityLabel: + * @domain: a domain object + * @seclabel: pointer to a virSecurityLabel structure + * + * Extract security label of an active domain. + * + * Returns 0 in case of success, -1 in case of failure, and -2 + * if the operation is not supported (caller decides if that's + * an error). + */ +int +virDomainGetSecurityLabel(virDomainPtr domain, virSecurityLabelPtr seclabel) +{ + virConnectPtr conn; + + if (!VIR_IS_CONNECTED_DOMAIN(domain)) { + virLibDomainError(NULL, VIR_ERR_INVALID_DOMAIN, __FUNCTION__); + return -1; + } + + if (seclabel == NULL) { + virLibDomainError(domain, VIR_ERR_INVALID_ARG, __FUNCTION__); + return -1; + } + + conn = domain->conn; + + if (conn->driver->domainGetSecurityLabel) + return conn->driver->domainGetSecurityLabel(domain, seclabel); + + virLibConnWarning(conn, VIR_ERR_NO_SUPPORT, __FUNCTION__); + return -2; +} + +/** + * virNodeGetSecurityModel: + * @conn: a connection object + * @secmodel: pointer to a virSecurityModel structure + * + * Extract the security model of a hypervisor. + * + * Returns 0 in case of success, -1 in case of failure, and -2 if the + * operation is not supported (caller decides if that's an error). + */ +int +virNodeGetSecurityModel(virConnectPtr conn, virSecurityModelPtr secmodel) +{ + if (!VIR_IS_CONNECT(conn)) { + virLibConnError(conn, VIR_ERR_INVALID_CONN, __FUNCTION__); + return -1; + } + + if (secmodel == NULL) { + virLibConnError(conn, VIR_ERR_INVALID_ARG, __FUNCTION__); + return -1; + } + + if (conn->driver->nodeGetSecurityModel) + return conn->driver->nodeGetSecurityModel(conn, secmodel); + + virLibConnWarning(conn, VIR_ERR_NO_SUPPORT, __FUNCTION__); + return -2; +} /** * virDomainAttachDevice: diff -up libvirt-0.6.0/src/libvirt_private.syms.svirt libvirt-0.6.0/src/libvirt_private.syms --- libvirt-0.6.0/src/libvirt_private.syms.svirt 2009-01-31 04:04:17.000000000 -0500 +++ libvirt-0.6.0/src/libvirt_private.syms 2009-02-17 10:36:52.867582000 -0500 @@ -334,3 +334,4 @@ virXPathNode; virXPathNodeSet; virXPathString; virXMLPropString; +virXPathStringLimit; diff -up libvirt-0.6.0/src/libvirt_public.syms.svirt libvirt-0.6.0/src/libvirt_public.syms --- libvirt-0.6.0/src/libvirt_public.syms.svirt 2009-01-20 08:48:28.000000000 -0500 +++ libvirt-0.6.0/src/libvirt_public.syms 2009-02-17 10:37:09.630287000 -0500 @@ -244,7 +244,8 @@ LIBVIRT_0.6.0 { virStoragePoolRef; virStorageVolRef; virNodeDeviceRef; - + virDomainGetSecurityLabel; + virNodeGetSecurityModel; } LIBVIRT_0.5.0; # .... define new API here using predicted next version number .... diff -up libvirt-0.6.0/src/lxc_driver.c.svirt libvirt-0.6.0/src/lxc_driver.c --- libvirt-0.6.0/src/lxc_driver.c.svirt 2009-01-31 04:04:17.000000000 -0500 +++ libvirt-0.6.0/src/lxc_driver.c 2009-02-17 10:07:06.339677000 -0500 @@ -1430,6 +1430,8 @@ static virDriver lxcDriver = { NULL, /* domainPinVcpu */ NULL, /* domainGetVcpus */ NULL, /* domainGetMaxVcpus */ + NULL, /* domainGetSecurityLabel */ + NULL, /* nodeGetSecurityModel */ lxcDomainDumpXML, /* domainDumpXML */ lxcListDefinedDomains, /* listDefinedDomains */ lxcNumDefinedDomains, /* numOfDefinedDomains */ diff -up libvirt-0.6.0/src/Makefile.am.svirt libvirt-0.6.0/src/Makefile.am --- libvirt-0.6.0/src/Makefile.am.svirt 2009-01-31 04:04:17.000000000 -0500 +++ libvirt-0.6.0/src/Makefile.am 2009-02-17 10:07:06.346676000 -0500 @@ -139,7 +139,7 @@ UML_DRIVER_SOURCES = \ NETWORK_DRIVER_SOURCES = \ network_driver.h network_driver.c -# And finally storage backend specific impls +# Storage backend specific impls STORAGE_DRIVER_SOURCES = \ storage_driver.h storage_driver.c \ storage_backend.h storage_backend.c @@ -164,6 +164,12 @@ STORAGE_DRIVER_DISK_SOURCES = \ STORAGE_HELPER_DISK_SOURCES = \ parthelper.c +# Security framework and drivers for various models +SECURITY_DRIVER_SOURCES = \ + security.h security.c + +SECURITY_DRIVER_SELINUX_SOURCES = \ + security_selinux.h security_selinux.c NODE_DEVICE_DRIVER_SOURCES = \ node_device.c node_device.h @@ -377,6 +383,19 @@ libvirt_driver_nodedev_la_LDFLAGS += -mo endif endif +libvirt_driver_security_la_SOURCES = $(SECURITY_DRIVER_SOURCES) +if WITH_DRIVER_MODULES +mod_LTLIBRARIES += libvirt_driver_security.la +else +noinst_LTLIBRARIES += libvirt_driver_security.la +endif +if WITH_DRIVER_MODULES +libvirt_driver_security_la_LDFLAGS = -module -avoid-version +endif + +if HAVE_SELINUX +libvirt_driver_security_la_SOURCES += $(SECURITY_DRIVER_SELINUX_SOURCES) +endif # Add all conditional sources just in case... EXTRA_DIST += \ @@ -395,7 +414,9 @@ EXTRA_DIST += \ $(STORAGE_DRIVER_DISK_SOURCES) \ $(NODE_DEVICE_DRIVER_SOURCES) \ $(NODE_DEVICE_DRIVER_HAL_SOURCES) \ - $(NODE_DEVICE_DRIVER_DEVKIT_SOURCES) + $(NODE_DEVICE_DRIVER_DEVKIT_SOURCES) \ + $(SECURITY_DRIVER_SOURCES) \ + $(SECURITY_DRIVER_SELINUX_SOURCES) # # Build our version script. This is composed of three parts: diff -up libvirt-0.6.0/src/openvz_driver.c.svirt libvirt-0.6.0/src/openvz_driver.c --- libvirt-0.6.0/src/openvz_driver.c.svirt 2009-01-31 04:04:18.000000000 -0500 +++ libvirt-0.6.0/src/openvz_driver.c 2009-02-17 10:07:06.362676000 -0500 @@ -1299,6 +1299,8 @@ static virDriver openvzDriver = { NULL, /* domainPinVcpu */ NULL, /* domainGetVcpus */ openvzDomainGetMaxVcpus, /* domainGetMaxVcpus */ + NULL, /* domainGetSecurityLabel */ + NULL, /* nodeGetSecurityModel */ openvzDomainDumpXML, /* domainDumpXML */ openvzListDefinedDomains, /* listDomains */ openvzNumDefinedDomains, /* numOfDomains */ diff -up libvirt-0.6.0/src/qemu_conf.h.svirt libvirt-0.6.0/src/qemu_conf.h --- libvirt-0.6.0/src/qemu_conf.h.svirt 2009-01-31 04:04:18.000000000 -0500 +++ libvirt-0.6.0/src/qemu_conf.h 2009-02-17 10:07:06.368680000 -0500 @@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ #include "domain_conf.h" #include "domain_event.h" #include "threads.h" +#include "security.h" #define qemudDebug(fmt, ...) do {} while(0) @@ -83,6 +84,8 @@ struct qemud_driver { virDomainEventQueuePtr domainEventQueue; int domainEventTimer; int domainEventDispatching; + + virSecurityDriverPtr securityDriver; }; /* Status needed to reconenct to running VMs */ diff -up libvirt-0.6.0/src/qemu_driver.c.svirt libvirt-0.6.0/src/qemu_driver.c --- libvirt-0.6.0/src/qemu_driver.c.svirt 2009-01-31 04:04:18.000000000 -0500 +++ libvirt-0.6.0/src/qemu_driver.c 2009-02-17 10:07:06.378682000 -0500 @@ -68,6 +68,7 @@ #include "memory.h" #include "uuid.h" #include "domain_conf.h" +#include "security.h" #define VIR_FROM_THIS VIR_FROM_QEMU @@ -383,6 +384,50 @@ next: return 0; } +static int +qemudSecurityInit(struct qemud_driver *qemud_drv) +{ + int ret; + const char *doi, *model; + virCapsPtr caps; + virSecurityDriverPtr security_drv; + + ret = virSecurityDriverStartup(&security_drv); + if (ret == -1) { + qemudLog(QEMUD_ERR, _("Failed to start security driver")); + return -1; + } + /* No security driver wanted to be enabled: just return */ + if (ret == -2) + return 0; + + qemud_drv->securityDriver = security_drv; + doi = virSecurityDriverGetDOI(security_drv); + model = virSecurityDriverGetModel(security_drv); + + qemudLog(QEMUD_DEBUG, "Initialized security driver \"%s\" with " + "DOI \"%s\".\n", model, doi); + + /* + * Add security policy host caps now that the security driver is + * initialized. + */ + caps = qemud_drv->caps; + + caps->host.secModel.model = strdup(model); + if (!caps->host.secModel.model) { + qemudLog(QEMUD_ERR, _("Failed to copy secModel model: %s"), strerror(errno)); + return -1; + } + + caps->host.secModel.doi = strdup(doi); + if (!caps->host.secModel.doi) { + qemudLog(QEMUD_ERR, _("Failed to copy secModel DOI: %s"), strerror(errno)); + return -1; + } + + return 0; +} /** * qemudStartup: @@ -474,6 +519,11 @@ qemudStartup(void) { if ((qemu_driver->caps = qemudCapsInit()) == NULL) goto out_of_memory; + if (qemudSecurityInit(qemu_driver) < 0) { + qemudShutdown(); + return -1; + } + if (qemudLoadDriverConfig(qemu_driver, driverConf) < 0) { goto error; } @@ -1111,6 +1161,15 @@ static int qemudNextFreeVNCPort(struct q return -1; } +static int qemudDomainSetSecurityLabel(virConnectPtr conn, struct qemud_driver *driver, virDomainObjPtr vm) +{ + if (vm->def->seclabel.label != NULL) + if (driver->securityDriver && driver->securityDriver->domainSetSecurityLabel) + return driver->securityDriver->domainSetSecurityLabel(conn, driver->securityDriver, + &vm->def->seclabel); + return 0; +} + static virDomainPtr qemudDomainLookupByName(virConnectPtr conn, const char *name); @@ -1178,6 +1237,16 @@ static int qemudStartVMDaemon(virConnect return -1; } + /* + * Set up the security label for the domain here, before doing + * too much else. + */ + if (qemudDomainSetSecurityLabel(conn, driver, vm) < 0) { + qemudReportError(conn, NULL, NULL, VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR, + _("Failed to set security label")); + return -1; + } + if (qemudExtractVersionInfo(emulator, NULL, &qemuCmdFlags) < 0) { @@ -2721,7 +2790,94 @@ cleanup: return ret; } +static int qemudDomainGetSecurityLabel(virDomainPtr dom, virSecurityLabelPtr seclabel) +{ + struct qemud_driver *driver = (struct qemud_driver *)dom->conn->privateData; + virDomainObjPtr vm; + const char *type; + int ret = -1; + + qemuDriverLock(driver); + vm = virDomainFindByUUID(&driver->domains, dom->uuid); + qemuDriverUnlock(driver); + + if (!vm) { + char uuidstr[VIR_UUID_STRING_BUFLEN]; + + virUUIDFormat(dom->uuid, uuidstr); + qemudReportError(dom->conn, dom, NULL, VIR_ERR_INVALID_DOMAIN, + _("no domain with matching uuid '%s'"), uuidstr); + goto cleanup; + } + + if (!(type = virDomainVirtTypeToString(vm->def->virtType))) { + qemudReportError(dom->conn, dom, NULL, VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR, + _("unknown virt type in domain definition '%d'"), + vm->def->virtType); + goto cleanup; + } + + /* + * Theoretically, the pid can be replaced during this operation and + * return the label of a different process. If atomicity is needed, + * further validation will be required. + * + * Comment from Dan Berrange: + * + * Well the PID as stored in the virDomainObjPtr can't be changed + * because you've got a locked object. The OS level PID could have + * exited, though and in extreme circumstances have cycled through all + * PIDs back to ours. We could sanity check that our PID still exists + * after reading the label, by checking that our FD connecting to the + * QEMU monitor hasn't seen SIGHUP/ERR on poll(). + */ + if (virDomainIsActive(vm)) { + if (driver->securityDriver && driver->securityDriver->domainGetSecurityLabel) { + if (driver->securityDriver->domainGetSecurityLabel(dom->conn, vm, seclabel) == -1) { + qemudReportError(dom->conn, dom, NULL, VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR, + _("Failed to get security label")); + goto cleanup; + } + } + } + + ret = 0; + +cleanup: + if (vm) + virDomainObjUnlock(vm); + return ret; +} + +static int qemudNodeGetSecurityModel(virConnectPtr conn, virSecurityModelPtr secmodel) +{ + struct qemud_driver *driver = (struct qemud_driver *)conn->privateData; + char *p; + + if (!driver->securityDriver) + return -2; + + p = driver->caps->host.secModel.model; + if (strlen(p) >= VIR_SECURITY_MODEL_BUFLEN-1) { + qemudReportError(conn, NULL, NULL, VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR, + _("security model string exceeds max %d bytes"), + VIR_SECURITY_MODEL_BUFLEN-1); + return -1; + } + strcpy(secmodel->model, p); + + p = driver->caps->host.secModel.doi; + if (strlen(p) >= VIR_SECURITY_DOI_BUFLEN-1) { + qemudReportError(conn, NULL, NULL, VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR, + _("security DOI string exceeds max %d bytes"), + VIR_SECURITY_DOI_BUFLEN-1); + return -1; + } + strcpy(secmodel->doi, p); + return 0; +} +/* TODO: check seclabel restore */ static int qemudDomainRestore(virConnectPtr conn, const char *path) { struct qemud_driver *driver = conn->privateData; @@ -4475,6 +4631,8 @@ static virDriver qemuDriver = { NULL, /* domainGetVcpus */ #endif qemudDomainGetMaxVcpus, /* domainGetMaxVcpus */ + qemudDomainGetSecurityLabel, /* domainGetSecurityLabel */ + qemudNodeGetSecurityModel, /* nodeGetSecurityModel */ qemudDomainDumpXML, /* domainDumpXML */ qemudListDefinedDomains, /* listDomains */ qemudNumDefinedDomains, /* numOfDomains */ diff -up libvirt-0.6.0/src/remote_internal.c.svirt libvirt-0.6.0/src/remote_internal.c --- libvirt-0.6.0/src/remote_internal.c.svirt 2009-02-17 10:07:06.207699000 -0500 +++ libvirt-0.6.0/src/remote_internal.c 2009-02-17 10:14:28.509959000 -0500 @@ -2299,6 +2299,67 @@ done: return rv; } +static int +remoteDomainGetSecurityLabel (virDomainPtr domain, virSecurityLabelPtr seclabel) +{ + remote_domain_get_security_label_args args; + remote_domain_get_security_label_ret ret; + struct private_data *priv = domain->conn->privateData; + + make_nonnull_domain (&args.dom, domain); + memset (&ret, 0, sizeof ret); + if (call (domain->conn, priv, 0, REMOTE_PROC_DOMAIN_GET_SECURITY_LABEL, + (xdrproc_t) xdr_remote_domain_get_security_label_args, (char *)&args, + (xdrproc_t) xdr_remote_domain_get_security_label_ret, (char *)&ret) == -1) { + return -1; + } + + if (ret.label.label_val != NULL) { + if (strlen (ret.label.label_val) >= sizeof seclabel->label) { + errorf (domain->conn, VIR_ERR_RPC, _("security label exceeds maximum: %zd"), + sizeof seclabel->label - 1); + return -1; + } + strcpy (seclabel->label, ret.label.label_val); + seclabel->enforcing = ret.enforcing; + } + + return 0; +} + +static int +remoteNodeGetSecurityModel (virConnectPtr conn, virSecurityModelPtr secmodel) +{ + remote_node_get_security_model_ret ret; + struct private_data *priv = conn->privateData; + + memset (&ret, 0, sizeof ret); + if (call (conn, priv, 0, REMOTE_PROC_NODE_GET_SECURITY_MODEL, + (xdrproc_t) xdr_void, NULL, + (xdrproc_t) xdr_remote_node_get_security_model_ret, (char *)&ret) == -1) { + return -1; + } + + if (ret.model.model_val != NULL) { + if (strlen (ret.model.model_val) >= sizeof secmodel->model) { + errorf (conn, VIR_ERR_RPC, _("security model exceeds maximum: %zd"), + sizeof secmodel->model - 1); + return -1; + } + strcpy (secmodel->model, ret.model.model_val); + } + + if (ret.doi.doi_val != NULL) { + if (strlen (ret.doi.doi_val) >= sizeof secmodel->doi) { + errorf (conn, VIR_ERR_RPC, _("security doi exceeds maximum: %zd"), + sizeof secmodel->doi - 1); + return -1; + } + strcpy (secmodel->doi, ret.doi.doi_val); + } + return 0; +} + static char * remoteDomainDumpXML (virDomainPtr domain, int flags) { @@ -6721,6 +6782,8 @@ static virDriver driver = { .domainPinVcpu = remoteDomainPinVcpu, .domainGetVcpus = remoteDomainGetVcpus, .domainGetMaxVcpus = remoteDomainGetMaxVcpus, + .domainGetSecurityLabel = remoteDomainGetSecurityLabel, + .nodeGetSecurityModel = remoteNodeGetSecurityModel, .domainDumpXML = remoteDomainDumpXML, .listDefinedDomains = remoteListDefinedDomains, .numOfDefinedDomains = remoteNumOfDefinedDomains, diff -up /dev/null libvirt-0.6.0/src/security.c --- /dev/null 2009-02-11 16:31:53.992012235 -0500 +++ libvirt-0.6.0/src/security.c 2009-02-17 10:07:06.396676000 -0500 @@ -0,0 +1,133 @@ +/* + * Copyright (C) 2008 Red Hat, Inc. + * + * This library is free software; you can redistribute it and/or + * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public + * License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either + * version 2.1 of the License, or (at your option) any later version. + * + * Authors: + * James Morris <jmorris(a)namei.org> + * + */ +#include <config.h> +#include <string.h> + +#include "virterror_internal.h" + +#include "security.h" + +#if HAVE_SELINUX +#include "security_selinux.h" +#endif + +static virSecurityDriverStatus testSecurityDriverProbe(void) +{ + return SECURITY_DRIVER_DISABLE; +} + +virSecurityDriver virTestSecurityDriver = { + .name = "test", + .probe = testSecurityDriverProbe, +}; + +static virSecurityDriverPtr security_drivers[] = { + &virTestSecurityDriver, +#ifdef HAVE_SELINUX + &virSELinuxSecurityDriver, +#endif +}; + +/* + * Probe each security driver: each should perform a test to see if it + * should be loaded, e.g. if the currently active host security mechanism + * matches. If the probe succeeds, initialize the driver and return it. + * + * Returns 0 on success, and -1 on error. If no security driver wanted to + * be enabled, then return -2 and let the caller determine what this really + * means. + */ +int +virSecurityDriverStartup(virSecurityDriverPtr * drv) +{ + unsigned int i; + + for (i = 0; i < (sizeof(security_drivers) / sizeof(security_drivers[0])); i++) { + virSecurityDriverPtr tmp = security_drivers[i]; + virSecurityDriverStatus ret = tmp->probe(); + + switch (ret) { + case SECURITY_DRIVER_ENABLE: + virSecurityDriverInit(tmp); + if (tmp->open(NULL, tmp) == -1) { + return -1; + } else { + *drv = tmp; + return 0; + } + break; + + case SECURITY_DRIVER_DISABLE: + break; + + default: + return -1; + } + } + return -2; +} + +void +virSecurityReportError(virConnectPtr conn, int code, const char *fmt, ...) +{ + va_list args; + char errorMessage[1024]; + + if (fmt) { + va_start(args, fmt); + vsnprintf(errorMessage, sizeof(errorMessage) - 1, fmt, args); + va_end(args); + } else + errorMessage[0] = '\0'; + + virRaiseError(conn, NULL, NULL, VIR_FROM_SECURITY, code, + VIR_ERR_ERROR, NULL, NULL, NULL, -1, -1, "%s", + errorMessage); +} + +/* + * Helpers + */ +void +virSecurityDriverInit(virSecurityDriverPtr drv) +{ + memset(&drv->_private, 0, sizeof drv->_private); +} + +int +virSecurityDriverSetDOI(virConnectPtr conn, + virSecurityDriverPtr drv, + const char *doi) +{ + if (strlen(doi) >= VIR_SECURITY_DOI_BUFLEN) { + virSecurityReportError(conn, VIR_ERR_ERROR, + _("%s: DOI \'%s\' is " + "longer than the maximum allowed length of %d"), + __func__, doi, VIR_SECURITY_DOI_BUFLEN - 1); + return -1; + } + strcpy(drv->_private.doi, doi); + return 0; +} + +const char * +virSecurityDriverGetDOI(virSecurityDriverPtr drv) +{ + return drv->_private.doi; +} + +const char * +virSecurityDriverGetModel(virSecurityDriverPtr drv) +{ + return drv->name; +} diff -up /dev/null libvirt-0.6.0/src/security.h --- /dev/null 2009-02-11 16:31:53.992012235 -0500 +++ libvirt-0.6.0/src/security.h 2009-02-17 10:07:06.402676000 -0500 @@ -0,0 +1,72 @@ +/* + * Copyright (C) 2008 Red Hat, Inc. + * + * This library is free software; you can redistribute it and/or + * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public + * License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either + * version 2.1 of the License, or (at your option) any later version. + * + * Authors: + * James Morris <jmorris(a)namei.org> + * + */ +#ifndef __VIR_SECURITY_H__ +#define __VIR_SECURITY_H__ + +#include "internal.h" +#include "domain_conf.h" + +/* + * Return values for security driver probing: the driver will determine + * whether it should be enabled or disabled. + */ +typedef enum { + SECURITY_DRIVER_ENABLE = 0, + SECURITY_DRIVER_ERROR = -1, + SECURITY_DRIVER_DISABLE = -2, +} virSecurityDriverStatus; + +typedef struct _virSecurityDriver virSecurityDriver; +typedef virSecurityDriver *virSecurityDriverPtr; +typedef virSecurityDriverStatus (*virSecurityDriverProbe) (void); +typedef int (*virSecurityDriverOpen) (virConnectPtr conn, + virSecurityDriverPtr drv); +typedef int (*virSecurityDomainGetLabel) (virConnectPtr conn, + virDomainObjPtr vm, + virSecurityLabelPtr sec); +typedef int (*virSecurityDomainSetLabel) (virConnectPtr conn, + virSecurityDriverPtr drv, + virSecurityLabelDefPtr secdef); + +struct _virSecurityDriver { + const char *name; + virSecurityDriverProbe probe; + virSecurityDriverOpen open; + virSecurityDomainGetLabel domainGetSecurityLabel; + virSecurityDomainSetLabel domainSetSecurityLabel; + + /* + * This is internally managed driver state and should only be accessed + * via helpers below. + */ + struct { + char doi[VIR_SECURITY_DOI_BUFLEN]; + } _private; +}; + +/* Global methods */ +int virSecurityDriverStartup(virSecurityDriverPtr * drv); + +void +virSecurityReportError(virConnectPtr conn, int code, const char *fmt, ...) + ATTRIBUTE_FORMAT(printf, 3, 4); + +/* Helpers */ +void virSecurityDriverInit(virSecurityDriverPtr drv); +int virSecurityDriverSetDOI(virConnectPtr conn, + virSecurityDriverPtr drv, + const char *doi); +const char *virSecurityDriverGetDOI(virSecurityDriverPtr drv); +const char *virSecurityDriverGetModel(virSecurityDriverPtr drv); + +#endif /* __VIR_SECURITY_H__ */ diff -up /dev/null libvirt-0.6.0/src/security_selinux.c --- /dev/null 2009-02-11 16:31:53.992012235 -0500 +++ libvirt-0.6.0/src/security_selinux.c 2009-02-17 10:07:06.407678000 -0500 @@ -0,0 +1,108 @@ +/* + * Copyright (C) 2008 Red Hat, Inc. + * + * This library is free software; you can redistribute it and/or + * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public + * License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either + * version 2.1 of the License, or (at your option) any later version. + * + * Authors: + * James Morris <jmorris(a)namei.org> + * + * SELinux security driver. + */ +#include <config.h> +#include <selinux/selinux.h> + +#include "security.h" +#include "security_selinux.h" + +#define SECURITY_SELINUX_VOID_DOI "0" + +static int +SELinuxSecurityDriverProbe(void) +{ + return is_selinux_enabled() ? SECURITY_DRIVER_ENABLE : SECURITY_DRIVER_DISABLE; +} + +static int +SELinuxSecurityDriverOpen(virConnectPtr conn, virSecurityDriverPtr drv) +{ + /* + * Where will the DOI come from? SELinux configuration, or qemu + * configuration? For the moment, we'll just set it to "0". + */ + virSecurityDriverSetDOI(conn, drv, SECURITY_SELINUX_VOID_DOI); + + return 0; +} + +static int +SELinuxSecurityDomainGetSecurityLabel(virConnectPtr conn, + virDomainObjPtr vm, + virSecurityLabelPtr sec) +{ + security_context_t ctx; + + if (getpidcon(vm->pid, &ctx) == -1) { + virSecurityReportError(conn, VIR_ERR_ERROR, _("%s: error calling " + "getpidcon(): %s"), __func__, + strerror(errno)); + return -1; + } + + if (strlen((char *) ctx) >= VIR_SECURITY_LABEL_BUFLEN) { + virSecurityReportError(conn, VIR_ERR_ERROR, + _("%s: security label exceeds " + "maximum length: %d"), __func__, + VIR_SECURITY_LABEL_BUFLEN - 1); + return -1; + } + + strcpy(sec->label, (char *) ctx); + free(ctx); + + sec->enforcing = security_getenforce(); + if (sec->enforcing == -1) { + virSecurityReportError(conn, VIR_ERR_ERROR, _("%s: error calling " + "security_getenforce(): %s"), __func__, + strerror(errno)); + return -1; + } + + return 0; +} + +static int +SELinuxSecurityDomainSetSecurityLabel(virConnectPtr conn, + virSecurityDriverPtr drv, + const virSecurityLabelDefPtr secdef) +{ + /* TODO: verify DOI */ + + if (!STREQ(drv->name, secdef->model)) { + virSecurityReportError(conn, VIR_ERR_ERROR, + _("%s: security label driver mismatch: " + "\'%s\' model configured for domain, but " + "hypervisor driver is \'%s\'."), + __func__, secdef->model, drv->name); + return -1; + } + + if (setexeccon(secdef->label) == -1) { + virSecurityReportError(conn, VIR_ERR_ERROR, + _("%s: unable to set security context " + "'\%s\': %s."), __func__, secdef->label, + strerror(errno)); + return -1; + } + return 0; +} + +virSecurityDriver virSELinuxSecurityDriver = { + .name = "selinux", + .probe = SELinuxSecurityDriverProbe, + .open = SELinuxSecurityDriverOpen, + .domainGetSecurityLabel = SELinuxSecurityDomainGetSecurityLabel, + .domainSetSecurityLabel = SELinuxSecurityDomainSetSecurityLabel, +}; diff -up /dev/null libvirt-0.6.0/src/security_selinux.h --- /dev/null 2009-02-11 16:31:53.992012235 -0500 +++ libvirt-0.6.0/src/security_selinux.h 2009-02-17 10:07:06.413677000 -0500 @@ -0,0 +1,18 @@ +/* + * Copyright (C) 2008 Red Hat, Inc. + * + * This library is free software; you can redistribute it and/or + * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public + * License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either + * version 2.1 of the License, or (at your option) any later version. + * + * Authors: + * James Morris <jmorris(a)namei.org> + * + */ +#ifndef __VIR_SECURITY_SELINUX_H__ +#define __VIR_SECURITY_SELINUX_H__ + +extern virSecurityDriver virSELinuxSecurityDriver; + +#endif /* __VIR_SECURITY_SELINUX_H__ */ diff -up libvirt-0.6.0/src/storage_backend.c.svirt libvirt-0.6.0/src/storage_backend.c --- libvirt-0.6.0/src/storage_backend.c.svirt 2009-01-31 04:04:18.000000000 -0500 +++ libvirt-0.6.0/src/storage_backend.c 2009-02-17 10:07:06.419677000 -0500 @@ -276,6 +276,7 @@ virStorageBackendUpdateVolTargetInfoFD(v VIR_FREE(target->perms.label); #if HAVE_SELINUX + /* XXX: make this a security driver call */ if (fgetfilecon(fd, &filecon) == -1) { if (errno != ENODATA && errno != ENOTSUP) { virReportSystemError(conn, errno, diff -up libvirt-0.6.0/src/test.c.svirt libvirt-0.6.0/src/test.c --- libvirt-0.6.0/src/test.c.svirt 2009-01-20 15:39:28.000000000 -0500 +++ libvirt-0.6.0/src/test.c 2009-02-17 10:07:06.428677000 -0500 @@ -3510,6 +3510,8 @@ static virDriver testDriver = { NULL, /* domainPinVcpu */ NULL, /* domainGetVcpus */ NULL, /* domainGetMaxVcpus */ + NULL, /* domainGetSecurityLabel */ + NULL, /* nodeGetSecurityModel */ testDomainDumpXML, /* domainDumpXML */ testListDefinedDomains, /* listDefinedDomains */ testNumOfDefinedDomains, /* numOfDefinedDomains */ diff -up libvirt-0.6.0/src/uml_driver.c.svirt libvirt-0.6.0/src/uml_driver.c --- libvirt-0.6.0/src/uml_driver.c.svirt 2009-01-31 04:04:18.000000000 -0500 +++ libvirt-0.6.0/src/uml_driver.c 2009-02-17 10:07:06.436676000 -0500 @@ -1852,6 +1852,8 @@ static virDriver umlDriver = { NULL, /* domainPinVcpu */ NULL, /* domainGetVcpus */ NULL, /* domainGetMaxVcpus */ + NULL, /* domainGetSecurityLabel */ + NULL, /* nodeGetSecurityModel */ umlDomainDumpXML, /* domainDumpXML */ umlListDefinedDomains, /* listDomains */ umlNumDefinedDomains, /* numOfDomains */ diff -up libvirt-0.6.0/src/virsh.c.svirt libvirt-0.6.0/src/virsh.c --- libvirt-0.6.0/src/virsh.c.svirt 2009-01-31 04:04:18.000000000 -0500 +++ libvirt-0.6.0/src/virsh.c 2009-02-17 10:07:06.447677000 -0500 @@ -954,6 +954,7 @@ static const vshCmdOptDef opts_undefine[ {NULL, 0, 0, NULL} }; +/* XXX MAC policy for defining & undefining domains ?? */ static int cmdUndefine(vshControl *ctl, const vshCmd *cmd) { @@ -1515,6 +1516,8 @@ cmdDominfo(vshControl *ctl, const vshCmd { virDomainInfo info; virDomainPtr dom; + virSecurityModel secmodel; + virSecurityLabel seclabel; int ret = TRUE, autostart; unsigned int id; char *str, uuid[VIR_UUID_STRING_BUFLEN]; @@ -1573,6 +1576,29 @@ cmdDominfo(vshControl *ctl, const vshCmd autostart ? _("enable") : _("disable") ); } + /* Security model and label information */ + memset(&secmodel, 0, sizeof secmodel); + if (virNodeGetSecurityModel(ctl->conn, &secmodel) == -1) { + virDomainFree(dom); + return FALSE; + } else { + /* Only print something if a security model is active */ + if (secmodel.model[0] != '\0') { + vshPrint(ctl, "%-15s %s\n", _("Security model:"), secmodel.model); + vshPrint(ctl, "%-15s %s\n", _("Security DOI:"), secmodel.doi); + + /* Security labels are only valid for active domains */ + memset(&seclabel, 0, sizeof seclabel); + if (virDomainGetSecurityLabel(dom, &seclabel) == -1) { + virDomainFree(dom); + return FALSE; + } else { + if (seclabel.label[0] != '\0') + vshPrint(ctl, "%-15s %s (%s)\n", _("Security label:"), + seclabel.label, seclabel.enforcing ? "enforcing" : "permissive"); + } + } + } virDomainFree(dom); return ret; } diff -up libvirt-0.6.0/src/virterror.c.svirt libvirt-0.6.0/src/virterror.c --- libvirt-0.6.0/src/virterror.c.svirt 2009-01-31 04:04:18.000000000 -0500 +++ libvirt-0.6.0/src/virterror.c 2009-02-17 10:07:06.454684000 -0500 @@ -151,6 +151,9 @@ static const char *virErrorDomainName(vi case VIR_FROM_UML: dom = "UML "; break; + case VIR_FROM_SECURITY: + dom = "Security Labeling "; + break; } return(dom); } @@ -962,6 +965,12 @@ virErrorMsg(virErrorNumber error, const else errmsg = _("Node device not found: %s"); break; + case VIR_ERR_NO_SECURITY_MODEL: + if (info == NULL) + errmsg = _("Security model not found"); + else + errmsg = _("Security model not found: %s"); + break; } return (errmsg); } diff -up libvirt-0.6.0/src/xml.c.svirt libvirt-0.6.0/src/xml.c --- libvirt-0.6.0/src/xml.c.svirt 2009-01-31 04:04:18.000000000 -0500 +++ libvirt-0.6.0/src/xml.c 2009-02-17 10:07:06.461676000 -0500 @@ -77,6 +77,39 @@ virXPathString(virConnectPtr conn, } /** + * virXPathStringLimit: + * @xpath: the XPath string to evaluate + * @maxlen: maximum length permittred string + * @ctxt: an XPath context + * + * Wrapper for virXPathString, which validates the length of the returned + * string. + * + * Returns a new string which must be deallocated by the caller or NULL if + * the evaluation failed. + */ +char * +virXPathStringLimit(virConnectPtr conn, + const char *xpath, + size_t maxlen, + xmlXPathContextPtr ctxt) +{ + char *tmp = virXPathString(conn, xpath, ctxt); + + if (tmp != NULL) { + if (strlen(tmp) >= maxlen) { + virXMLError(conn, VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR, + _("\'%s\' value longer than %Zd bytes in virXPathStringLimit()"), + xpath, maxlen); + return NULL; + } + } else + virXMLError(conn, VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR, + _("\'%s\' missing in virXPathStringLimit()"), xpath); + return tmp; +} + +/** * virXPathNumber: * @xpath: the XPath string to evaluate * @ctxt: an XPath context diff -up libvirt-0.6.0/src/xml.h.svirt libvirt-0.6.0/src/xml.h --- libvirt-0.6.0/src/xml.h.svirt 2008-08-12 03:13:00.000000000 -0400 +++ libvirt-0.6.0/src/xml.h 2009-02-17 10:07:06.467677000 -0500 @@ -17,6 +17,10 @@ int virXPathBoolean (virConnectPtr conn char * virXPathString (virConnectPtr conn, const char *xpath, xmlXPathContextPtr ctxt); +char * virXPathStringLimit(virConnectPtr conn, + const char *xpath, + size_t maxlen, + xmlXPathContextPtr ctxt); int virXPathNumber (virConnectPtr conn, const char *xpath, xmlXPathContextPtr ctxt, diff -up libvirt-0.6.0/tests/daemon-conf.svirt libvirt-0.6.0/tests/daemon-conf --- libvirt-0.6.0/tests/daemon-conf.svirt 2008-12-22 08:21:49.000000000 -0500 +++ libvirt-0.6.0/tests/daemon-conf 2009-02-17 10:07:06.470678000 -0500 @@ -63,6 +63,9 @@ while :; do -e '/^libnuma: Warning: .sys not mounted or no numa system/d' \ err > k && mv k err + # Filter out this diagnostic, too. + sed '/^Initialized security driver/d' err > k && mv k err + printf '%s\n\n' "remoteReadConfigFile: $f: $param_name: $msg" > expected-err diff -u expected-err err || fail=1

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