Hi, I'm starting working on an improvement for libvirt to be able to support per-guest configurable user and group IDs for QEMU processes. Currently, libvirt uses a configurable pair of user and group, which is defined in qemu.conf, for all qemu processes when running in privileged mode. This topic was already commented in qemu mailing list (http://lists.nongnu.org/archive/html/qemu-devel/2011-10/msg00758.html) but, as this requires changes in libvirt API, I'd like to discuss what would be the best solution for it. A solution (as proposed in the link above) would be to extend the security driver model to allow multiple drivers. In this case, an example of the XML definition would be: ... <seclabel type='dynamic' model='selinux'> <label>system_u:system_r:svirt_t:s0:c633,c712</label> <imagelabel>system_u:object_r:svirt_image_t:s0:c633,c712</imagelabel> </seclabel> <seclabel type='dynamic' model='dac'> <label>102:102</label> <imagelabel>102:102</imagelabel> </seclabel> ... I don't know if this is a clean solution because the usual option would be to enclose the block above in a "<seclabels>" tag. But as this would break the actual API, it's not viable.

Another option is to expose the stack security driver that already exists internally in libvirt (maybe extending it to support more than two security drivers): ... <seclabel type='stack'> <seclabel type='dynamic' model='selinux'> <label>system_u:system_r:svirt_t:s0:c633,c712</label> <imagelabel>system_u:object_r:svirt_image_t:s0:c633,c712</imagelabel> </seclabel> <seclabel type='dynamic' model='dac'> <label>102:102</label> <imagelabel>102:102</imagelabel> </seclabel> </seclabel> ... In that case, a nested seclabel only would be allowed when type='stack'.

Independently of how multiple security drivers can be expressed in the XML, another problem would be how functions as virDomainGetSecurityLabel should behave. A third option is to just not support multiple security drivers and include a new tag for DAC: ... <seclabel type='dynamic' model='selinux'> <label>system_u:system_r:svirt_t:s0:c633,c712</label> <imagelabel>system_u:object_r:svirt_image_t:s0:c633,c712</imagelabel> </seclabel> <dac process='102:102' image='102:102'/> ...

On 02/23/2012 05:47 PM, Daniel P. Berrange wrote: >On Thu, Feb 23, 2012 at 05:41:27PM -0200, Marcelo Cerri wrote: >>Hi, >> >>I'm starting working on an improvement for libvirt to be able to >>support per-guest configurable user and group IDs for QEMU >>processes. Currently, libvirt uses a configurable pair of user and >>group, which is defined in qemu.conf, for all qemu processes when >>running in privileged mode. >> >>This topic was already commented in qemu mailing list (http://lists.nongnu.org/archive/html/qemu-devel/2011-10/msg00758.html) >>but, as this requires changes in libvirt API, I'd like to discuss >>what would be the best solution for it. >> >>A solution (as proposed in the link above) would be to extend the >>security driver model to allow multiple drivers. In this case, an >>example of the XML definition would be: >> >> ... >><seclabel type='dynamic' model='selinux'> >><label>system_u:system_r:svirt_t:s0:c633,c712</label> >><imagelabel>system_u:object_r:svirt_image_t:s0:c633,c712</imagelabel> >></seclabel> >><seclabel type='dynamic' model='dac'> >><label>102:102</label> >><imagelabel>102:102</imagelabel> >></seclabel> >> ... >> >>I don't know if this is a clean solution because the usual option >>would be to enclose the block above in a "<seclabels>" tag. But as >>this would break the actual API, it's not viable. > >While it is true that we would ordinarily have an enclosing tag >like<seclabels>, there's no serious problem not having it. Just >having two (or more)<seclabel> elements in a row is just fine, >given our backwards compatibility requirements. > >So I think this option is just fine. I agree that this is a good solution, considering the XML compatibility. But, what about virDomainGetSecurityLabel? It could access the first security label or ignore the DAC driver (and maybe another function could be added to access the whole list of seclabels), but it doesn't seem to be the best solution.

Great. I think it is a good approach. The lack of an enclosing tag still bothers me. But, as you said, there's no serious problem not having it and I can live with that :) I believe the primary driver should be defined in qemu.conf, so I would like to replace the "security_driver" config with two new configs: primary_security_driver and additional_security_drivers. The last one would contain a list of security divers separated by commas, for example: primary_security_driver = "apparmor" additional_security_divers = "dac,another_driver" For device seclabel's, I intend to add a "model" attribute to specify which security driver is being overriding (if it's not given, the primary driver is considered). <domain ...> ... <devices> <disk type='file' device='disk'> <source file='/path/to/image1'> <seclabel relabel='no' model='dac'/> </source> ... </disk> <disk type='file' device='disk'> <source file='/path/to/image2'> <seclabel relabel='yes' model="selinux"> <label> system_u:object_r:shared_content_t:s0 </label> </seclabel> </source> ... </disk> ... </devices> <seclabel type='dynamic' model='selinux'> <baselabel>text</baselabel> </seclabel> <seclabel type='static' model='dac'> <label>501:501</label> <imagelabel>501:501</imagelabel> </seclabel> </domain> What do you think? Regards, Marcelo On 02/23/2012 07:34 PM, Daniel P. Berrange wrote: > On Thu, Feb 23, 2012 at 06:38:45PM -0200, Marcelo Cerri wrote: >> On 02/23/2012 05:47 PM, Daniel P. Berrange wrote: >>> On Thu, Feb 23, 2012 at 05:41:27PM -0200, Marcelo Cerri wrote: >>>> Hi, >>>> >>>> I'm starting working on an improvement for libvirt to be able to >>>> support per-guest configurable user and group IDs for QEMU >>>> processes. Currently, libvirt uses a configurable pair of user >>>> and group, which is defined in qemu.conf, for all qemu processes >>>> when running in privileged mode. >>>> >>>> This topic was already commented in qemu mailing list >>>> (http://lists.nongnu.org/archive/html/qemu-devel/2011-10/msg00758.html) >>>> but, as this requires changes in libvirt API, I'd like to >>>> discuss what would be the best solution for it. >>>> >>>> A solution (as proposed in the link above) would be to extend the >>>> security driver model to allow multiple drivers. In this case, an >>>> example of the XML definition would be: >>>> >>>> ... >>>> <seclabel type='dynamic' model='selinux'> >>>> <label>system_u:system_r:svirt_t:s0:c633,c712</label> >>>> <imagelabel>system_u:object_r:svirt_image_t:s0:c633,c712</imagelabel> >>>> </seclabel> >>>> <seclabel type='dynamic' model='dac'> >>>> <label>102:102</label> >>>> <imagelabel>102:102</imagelabel> >>>> </seclabel> >>>> ... >>>> >>>> I don't know if this is a clean solution because the usual option >>>> would be to enclose the block above in a "<seclabels>" tag. But >>>> as this would break the actual API, it's not viable. >>> >>> While it is true that we would ordinarily have an enclosing tag >>> like<seclabels>, there's no serious problem not having it. Just >>> having two (or more)<seclabel> elements in a row is just fine, >>> given our backwards compatibility requirements. >>> >>> So I think this option is just fine. >> >> I agree that this is a good solution, considering the XML >> compatibility. But, what about virDomainGetSecurityLabel? It could >> access the first security label or ignore the DAC driver (and maybe >> another function could be added to access the whole list of >> seclabels), but it doesn't seem to be the best solution. > > We can just keep virDomainGetSecurityLabel()/virNodeGetSecurityModel > as only ever handling the primary security driver. > > Then add some new APIs which are more general > > int virNodeGetSecurityModelCount(virConnectPtr conn); > int virNodeGetSecurityModelList(virConnectPtr conn, > virSecurityModelPtr models, > int nmodels); > int virDomainGetSecurityLabelList(virDomainptr dom, > virSecuriyLabelptr labels, > int nlabels); > > > Regards, > Daniel -- libvir-list mailing list libvir-list(a)redhat.com https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/libvir-list