On Wed, Jun 06, 2018 at 12:50:07PM -0500, Brijesh Singh wrote: With the following squashed in: Reviewed-by: Erik Skultety <eskultet(a)redhat.com&gt; diff --git a/src/conf/domain_capabilities.h b/src/conf/domain_capabilities.h index 30b32725c0..56c1903cf4 100644 --- a/src/conf/domain_capabilities.h +++ b/src/conf/domain_capabilities.h @@ -137,9 +137,6 @@ struct _virDomainCapsCPU { virDomainCapsCPUModelsPtr custom; }; -/* - * SEV capabilities - */ typedef struct _virSEVCapability virSEVCapability; typedef virSEVCapability *virSEVCapabilityPtr; struct _virSEVCapability { @@ -149,10 +146,6 @@ struct _virSEVCapability { unsigned int reduced_phys_bits; }; -void -virSEVCapabilitiesFree(virSEVCapability *capabilities); - - struct _virDomainCaps { virObjectLockable parent; @@ -218,4 +211,7 @@ int virDomainCapsEnumSet(virDomainCapsEnumPtr capsEnum, void virDomainCapsEnumClear(virDomainCapsEnumPtr capsEnum); char * virDomainCapsFormat(virDomainCapsPtr const caps); + +void +virSEVCapabilitiesFree(virSEVCapability *capabilities); #endif /* __DOMAIN_CAPABILITIES_H__ */ diff --git a/src/libvirt_private.syms b/src/libvirt_private.syms index ba435db07f..af66c7995f 100644 --- a/src/libvirt_private.syms +++ b/src/libvirt_private.syms @@ -187,6 +187,7 @@ virDomainCapsFormat; virDomainCapsNew; virSEVCapabilitiesFree; + # conf/domain_conf.h virBlkioDeviceArrayClear; virDiskNameParse;

On Wed, Jun 06, 2018 at 12:50:08PM -0500, Brijesh Singh wrote: With the diff below squashed in: Reviewed-by: Erik Skultety <eskultet(a)redhat.com&gt; diff --git a/src/conf/domain_capabilities.c b/src/conf/domain_capabilities.c index 54b0878b78..ec469bfb9a 100644 --- a/src/conf/domain_capabilities.c +++ b/src/conf/domain_capabilities.c @@ -614,6 +614,7 @@ virDomainCapsFormat(virDomainCapsPtr const caps) virDomainCapsFeatureGICFormat(&buf, &caps->gic); virBufferAsprintf(&buf, "<vmcoreinfo supported='%s'/>\n", caps->vmcoreinfo ? "yes" : "no"); + virBufferAsprintf(&buf, "<genid supported='%s'/>\n", caps->genid ? "yes" : "no"); virDomainCapsFeatureSEVFormat(&buf, caps->sev); diff --git a/src/qemu/qemu_capabilities.c b/src/qemu/qemu_capabilities.c index 503ed975eb..44ce12c7b9 100644 --- a/src/qemu/qemu_capabilities.c +++ b/src/qemu/qemu_capabilities.c @@ -5165,7 +5165,7 @@ virQEMUCapsFillDomainFeatureGICCaps(virQEMUCapsPtr qemuCaps, * using the 'query-sev-capabilities' QMP command and stored in @qemuCaps * and convert it to a form suitable for @domCaps. * - * Returns: 0 on success, <0 on failure + * Returns: 0 on success, -1 on failure */ static int virQEMUCapsFillDomainFeatureSEVCaps(virQEMUCapsPtr qemuCaps, @@ -5173,6 +5173,7 @@ virQEMUCapsFillDomainFeatureSEVCaps(virQEMUCapsPtr qemuCaps, { virSEVCapability *sev; virSEVCapability *cap = qemuCaps->sevCapabilities; + int ret = -1; if (!cap) return 0; @@ -5181,22 +5182,19 @@ virQEMUCapsFillDomainFeatureSEVCaps(virQEMUCapsPtr qemuCaps, return -1; if (VIR_STRDUP(sev->pdh, cap->pdh) < 0) - goto out; + goto cleanup; if (VIR_STRDUP(sev->cert_chain, cap->cert_chain) < 0) - goto out; + goto cleanup; sev->cbitpos = cap->cbitpos; sev->reduced_phys_bits = cap->reduced_phys_bits; - domCaps->sev = sev; + VIR_STEAL_PTR(domCaps->sev, sev); - return 0; - - out: - VIR_FREE(sev->cert_chain); - VIR_FREE(sev->pdh); - VIR_FREE(sev); - return -1; + ret = 0; + cleanup: + virSEVCapabilitiesFree(sev); + return ret; }

A better commit subject would have been: libvirt: Introduce virNodeGetSEVInfo public API On Wed, Jun 06, 2018 at 12:50:09PM -0500, Brijesh Singh wrote: There were a few typos in the macro description, please squash in the diff below. Reviewed-by: Erik Skultety <eskultet(a)redhat.com&gt; diff --git a/include/libvirt/libvirt-host.h b/include/libvirt/libvirt-host.h index e46f88b5ce..a04d669901 100644 --- a/include/libvirt/libvirt-host.h +++ b/include/libvirt/libvirt-host.h @@ -441,33 +441,33 @@ typedef virNodeMemoryStats *virNodeMemoryStatsPtr; /** * VIR_NODE_SEV_PDH: * - * Marco represents the Platform Diffie-Hellman key, as VIR_TYPED_PARAMS_STRING. + * Macro represents the Platform Diffie-Hellman key, as VIR_TYPED_PARAMS_STRING. */ -# define VIR_NODE_SEV_PDH "pdh" +# define VIR_NODE_SEV_PDH "pdh" /** * VIR_NODE_SEV_CERT_CHAIN: * - * Marco represents the Platform certificate chain that includes the + * Macro represents the platform certificate chain that includes the platform * endorsement key (PEK), owner certificate authority (OCD) and chip * endorsement key (CEK), as VIR_TYPED_PARAMS_STRING. */ -# define VIR_NODE_SEV_CERT_CHAIN "cert-chain" +# define VIR_NODE_SEV_CERT_CHAIN "cert-chain" /** * VIR_NODE_SEV_CBITPOS: * - * Marco represents the CBit Position used by hypervisor when SEV is enabled. + * Macro represents the CBit Position used by hypervisor when SEV is enabled. */ -# define VIR_NODE_SEV_CBITPOS "cbitpos" +# define VIR_NODE_SEV_CBITPOS "cbitpos" /** * VIR_NODE_SEV_REDUCED_PHYS_BITS: * - * Marco represents the number of bits we lose in physical address space + * Macro represents the number of bits we lose in physical address space * when SEV is enabled in the guest. */ -# define VIR_NODE_SEV_REDUCED_PHYS_BITS "reduced-phys-bits" +# define VIR_NODE_SEV_REDUCED_PHYS_BITS "reduced-phys-bits" int virNodeGetSEVInfo (virConnectPtr conn, virTypedParameterPtr *params, diff --git a/src/libvirt-host.c b/src/libvirt-host.c index 2a633f01d5..e20d6ee250 100644 --- a/src/libvirt-host.c +++ b/src/libvirt-host.c @@ -1640,15 +1640,17 @@ virNodeAllocPages(virConnectPtr conn, return -1; } + /* * virNodeGetSEVInfo: * @conn: pointer to the hypervisor connection - * @params: where to store SEV information; output - * @nparams: pointer to number of SEV parameters; output + * @params: where to store SEV information + * @nparams: pointer to number of SEV parameters returned in @params * @flags: extra flags; not used yet, so callers should always pass 0 * - * If hypervisor supports SEV then @params will contains PDH and - * certificate chain. + * If hypervisor supports AMD's SEV feature, then @params will contain various + * platform specific information like PDH and certificate chain. Caller is + * responsible for freeing @params. * * Returns 0 in case of success, and -1 in case of failure. */

On Wed, Jun 06, 2018 at 12:50:10PM -0500, Brijesh Singh wrote: virNodeGetSEVInfo() With the following diff squashed in: Reviewed-by: Erik Skultety <eskultet(a)redhat.com&gt; diff --git a/src/remote_protocol-structs b/src/remote_protocol-structs index afeefd32ad..dfc3624d1e 100644 --- a/src/remote_protocol-structs +++ b/src/remote_protocol-structs @@ -2907,18 +2907,17 @@ struct remote_connect_baseline_hypervisor_cpu_args { struct remote_connect_baseline_hypervisor_cpu_ret { remote_nonnull_string cpu; }; -struct remote_node_get_sev_capability_args { - int nparams; - u_int flags; +struct remote_node_get_sev_info_args { + int nparams; + u_int flags; }; -struct remote_node_get_sev_capability_ret { +struct remote_node_get_sev_info_ret { struct { u_int params_len; remote_typed_param * params_val; } params; int nparams; }; - enum remote_procedure { REMOTE_PROC_CONNECT_OPEN = 1, REMOTE_PROC_CONNECT_CLOSE = 2, @@ -3314,5 +3313,5 @@ enum remote_procedure { REMOTE_PROC_DOMAIN_DETACH_DEVICE_ALIAS = 392, REMOTE_PROC_CONNECT_COMPARE_HYPERVISOR_CPU = 393, REMOTE_PROC_CONNECT_BASELINE_HYPERVISOR_CPU = 394, - REMOTE_PROC_NODE_SEV_INFO = 395, + REMOTE_PROC_NODE_GET_SEV_INFO = 395, };

The launch-security element can be used to define the security model to use when launching a domain. Currently we support 'sev'. When 'sev' is used, the VM will be launched with AMD SEV feature enabled. SEV feature supports running encrypted VM under the control of KVM. Encrypted VMs have their pages (code and data) secured such that only the guest itself has access to the unencrypted version. Each encrypted VM is associated with a unique encryption key; if its data is accessed to a different entity using a different key the encrypted guests data will be incorrectly decrypted, leading to unintelligible data. Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh(a)amd.com&gt; --- docs/formatdomain.html.in | 115 ++++++++++++++++++ docs/schemas/domaincommon.rng | 37 ++++++ src/conf/domain_conf.c | 133 +++++++++++++++++++++ src/conf/domain_conf.h | 27 +++++ tests/genericxml2xmlindata/launch-security-sev.xml | 24 ++++ tests/genericxml2xmltest.c | 2 + 6 files changed, 338 insertions(+) create mode 100644 tests/genericxml2xmlindata/launch-security-sev.xml diff --git a/docs/formatdomain.html.in b/docs/formatdomain.html.in index 7f4de65..decd854 100644 --- a/docs/formatdomain.html.in +++ b/docs/formatdomain.html.in @@ -8367,6 +8367,121 @@ qemu-kvm -net nic,model=? /dev/null <p>Note: DEA/TDEA is synonymous with DES/TDES.</p> + <h3><a id="sev">Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV)</a></h3> + + <p> + The contents of the <code>&lt;launch-security type='sev'&gt;</code> element + is used to provide the guest owners input used for creating an encrypted + VM using the AMD SEV feature. + + SEV is an extension to the AMD-V architecture which supports running + encrypted virtual machine (VMs) under the control of KVM. Encrypted + VMs have their pages (code and data) secured such that only the guest + itself has access to the unencrypted version. Each encrypted VM is + associated with a unique encryption key; if its data is accessed to a + different entity using a different key the encrypted guests data will + be incorrectly decrypted, leading to unintelligible data. + + For more information see various input parameters and its format see the SEV API spec + <a href="https://support.amd.com/TechDocs/55766_SEV-KM%20API_Specificat... https://support.amd.com/TechDocs/55766_SEV-KM%20API_Specification.pdf </a> + <span class="since">Since 4.4.0</span> + </p> + <pre> +&lt;domain&gt; + ... + &lt;launch-security type='sev'&gt; + &lt;policy&gt; 0x0001 &lt;/policy&gt; + &lt;cbitpos&gt; 47 &lt;/cbitpos&gt; + &lt;reduced-phys-bits&gt; 1 &lt;/reduced-phys-bits&gt; + &lt;session&gt; AAACCCDD=FFFCCCDSDS &lt;/session&gt; + &lt;dh-cert&gt; RBBBSDDD=FDDCCCDDDG &lt;/dh&gt; + &lt;/sev&gt; + ... +&lt;/domain&gt; +</pre> + + <dl> + <dt><code>cbitpos</code></dt> + <dd>The required <code>cbitpos</code> element provides the C-bit (aka encryption bit) + location in guest page table entry. The value of <code>cbitpos</code> is + hypervisor dependent and can be obtained through the <code>sev</code> element + from the domain capabilities. + </dd> + <dt><code>reduced-phys-bits</code></dt> + <dd>The required <code>reduced-phys-bits</code> element provides the physical + address bit reducation. Similar to <code>cbitpos</code> the value of <code> + reduced-phys-bit</code> is hypervisor dependent and can be obtained + through the <code>sev</code> element from the domain capabilities. + </dd> + <dt><code>policy</code></dt> + <dd>The required <code>policy</code> element provides the guest policy + which must be maintained by the SEV firmware. This policy is enforced by + the firmware and restricts what configuration and operational commands + can be performed on this guest by the hypervisor. The guest policy + provided during guest launch is bound to the guest and cannot be changed + throughout the lifetime of the guest. The policy is also transmitted + during snapshot and migration flows and enforced on the destination platform. + + The guest policy is a 4 unsigned byte with the fields shown in Table: + + <table class="top_table"> + <tr> + <th> Bit(s) </th> + <th> Description </th> + </tr> + <tr> + <td> 0 </td> + <td> Debugging of the guest is disallowed when set </td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td> 1 </td> + <td> Sharing keys with other guests is disallowed when set </td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td> 2 </td> + <td> SEV-ES is required when set</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td> 3 </td> + <td> Sending the guest to another platform is disallowed when set</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td> 4 </td> + <td> The guest must not be transmitted to another platform that is + not in the domain when set. </td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td> 5 </td> + <td> The guest must not be transmitted to another platform that is + not SEV capable when set. </td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td> 6:15 </td> + <td> reserved </td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td> 16:32 </td> + <td> The guest must not be transmitted to another platform with a + lower firmware version. </td> + </tr> + </table> + + </dd> + <dt><code>dh-cert</code></dt> + <dd>The optional <code>dh-cert</code> element provides the guest owners + base64 encoded Diffie-Hellman (DH) key. The key is used to negotiate a + master secret key between the SEV firmware and guest owner. This master + secret key is then used to establish a trusted channel between SEV + firmware and guest owner. + </dd> + <dt><code>session</code></dt> + <dd>The optional <code>session</code> element provides the guest owners + base64 encoded session blob defined in the SEV API spec. + + See SEV spec LAUNCH_START section for the session blob format. + </dd> + </dl> + <h2><a id="examples">Example configs</a></h2> <p> diff --git a/docs/schemas/domaincommon.rng b/docs/schemas/domaincommon.rng index 6379ab1..c6f3c7d 100644 --- a/docs/schemas/domaincommon.rng +++ b/docs/schemas/domaincommon.rng @@ -77,6 +77,9 @@ <optional> <ref name='keywrap'/> </optional> + <optional> + <ref name='launch-security'/> + </optional> </interleave> </element> </define> @@ -436,6 +439,40 @@ </element> </define> + <define name="launch-security"> + <element name="launch-security"> + <attribute name="type"> + <value>sev</value> + </attribute> + <interleave> + <element name="cbitpos"> + <data type='unsignedInt'/> + </element> + <element name="reduced-phys-bits"> + <data type='unsignedInt'/> + </element> + <element name="policy"> + <ref name='hexuint'/> + </element> + <optional> + <element name="handle"> + <ref name='unsignedInt'/> + </element> + </optional> + <optional> + <element name="dh-cert"> + <data type="string"/> + </element> + </optional> + <optional> + <element name="session"> + <data type="string"/> + </element> + </optional> + </interleave> + </element> + </define> + <!-- Enable or disable perf events for the domain. For each of the events the following rules apply: diff --git a/src/conf/domain_conf.c b/src/conf/domain_conf.c index 4aaad2a..e03ac7f 100644 --- a/src/conf/domain_conf.c +++ b/src/conf/domain_conf.c @@ -938,6 +938,10 @@ VIR_ENUM_IMPL(virDomainShmemModel, VIR_DOMAIN_SHMEM_MODEL_LAST, "ivshmem-plain", "ivshmem-doorbell") +VIR_ENUM_IMPL(virDomainLaunchSecurity, VIR_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_LAST, + "", + "sev") + static virClassPtr virDomainObjClass; static virClassPtr virDomainXMLOptionClass; static void virDomainObjDispose(void *obj); @@ -2946,6 +2950,19 @@ virDomainCachetuneDefFree(virDomainCachetuneDefPtr cachetune) } +static void +virDomainSEVDefFree(virDomainSevDefPtr def) +{ + if (!def) + return; + + VIR_FREE(def->dh_cert); + VIR_FREE(def->session); + + VIR_FREE(def); +} + + void virDomainDefFree(virDomainDefPtr def) { size_t i; @@ -3128,6 +3145,8 @@ void virDomainDefFree(virDomainDefPtr def) if (def->namespaceData && def->ns.free) (def->ns.free)(def->namespaceData); + virDomainSEVDefFree(def->sev); + xmlFreeNode(def->metadata); VIR_FREE(def); @@ -15794,6 +15813,85 @@ virDomainMemoryTargetDefParseXML(xmlNodePtr node, } +static virDomainSevDefPtr +virDomainSEVDefParseXML(xmlNodePtr sevNode, + xmlXPathContextPtr ctxt) +{ + char *tmp = NULL; + char *type = NULL; + xmlNodePtr save = ctxt->node; + virDomainSevDefPtr def; + unsigned long policy; + + ctxt->node = sevNode; + + if (VIR_ALLOC(def) < 0) + return NULL; + + if (!(type = virXMLPropString(sevNode, "type"))) { + virReportError(VIR_ERR_XML_ERROR, "%s", + _("missing launch-security type")); + goto error; + } + + def->sectype = virDomainLaunchSecurityTypeFromString(type); + switch ((virDomainLaunchSecurity) def->sectype) { + case VIR_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_SEV: + break; + case VIR_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_NONE: + case VIR_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_LAST: + default: + virReportError(VIR_ERR_XML_ERROR, + _("unsupported launch-security type '%s'"), + type); + goto error; + } + + if (virXPathUInt("string(./cbitpos)", ctxt, &def->cbitpos) < 0) { + virReportError(VIR_ERR_XML_ERROR, "%s", + _("failed to get launch-security cbitpos")); + goto error; + } + + if (virXPathUInt("string(./reduced-phys-bits)", ctxt, + &def->reduced_phys_bits) < 0) { + virReportError(VIR_ERR_XML_ERROR, "%s", + _("failed to get launch-security reduced-phys-bits")); + goto error; + } + + if (virXPathULongHex("string(./policy)", ctxt, &policy) < 0) { + virReportError(VIR_ERR_XML_ERROR, "%s", + _("failed to get launch-security policy")); + goto error; + } + + def->policy = policy; + + if ((tmp = virXPathString("string(./dh-cert)", ctxt))) { + if (VIR_STRDUP(def->dh_cert, tmp) < 0) + goto error; + + VIR_FREE(tmp); + } + + if ((tmp = virXPathString("string(./session)", ctxt))) { + if (VIR_STRDUP(def->session, tmp) < 0) + goto error; + + VIR_FREE(tmp); + } + + ctxt->node = save; + return def; + + error: + VIR_FREE(tmp); + virDomainSEVDefFree(def); + ctxt->node = save; + return NULL; +} + static virDomainMemoryDefPtr virDomainMemoryDefParseXML(virDomainXMLOptionPtr xmlopt, xmlNodePtr memdevNode, @@ -20586,6 +20684,13 @@ virDomainDefParseXML(xmlDocPtr xml, ctxt->node = node; VIR_FREE(nodes); + /* Check for SEV feature */ + if ((node = virXPathNode("./launch-security", ctxt)) != NULL) { + def->sev = virDomainSEVDefParseXML(node, ctxt); + if (!def->sev) + goto error; + } + /* analysis of memory devices */ if ((n = virXPathNodeSet("./devices/memory", ctxt, &nodes)) < 0) goto error; @@ -26560,6 +26665,32 @@ virDomainKeyWrapDefFormat(virBufferPtr buf, virDomainKeyWrapDefPtr keywrap) virBufferAddLit(buf, "</keywrap>\n"); } + +static void +virDomainSEVDefFormat(virBufferPtr buf, virDomainSevDefPtr sev) +{ + if (!sev) + return; + + virBufferAsprintf(buf, "<launch-security type='%s'>\n", + virDomainLaunchSecurityTypeToString(sev->sectype)); + virBufferAdjustIndent(buf, 2); + + virBufferAsprintf(buf, "<cbitpos>%d</cbitpos>\n", sev->cbitpos); + virBufferAsprintf(buf, "<reduced-phys-bits>%d</reduced-phys-bits>\n", + sev->reduced_phys_bits); + virBufferAsprintf(buf, "<policy>0x%04x</policy>\n", sev->policy); + if (sev->dh_cert) + virBufferEscapeString(buf, "<dh-cert>%s</dh-cert>\n", sev->dh_cert); + + if (sev->session) + virBufferEscapeString(buf, "<session>%s</session>\n", sev->session); + + virBufferAdjustIndent(buf, -2); + virBufferAddLit(buf, "</launch-security>\n"); +} + + static void virDomainPerfDefFormat(virBufferPtr buf, virDomainPerfDefPtr perf) { @@ -27799,6 +27930,8 @@ virDomainDefFormatInternal(virDomainDefPtr def, if (def->keywrap) virDomainKeyWrapDefFormat(buf, def->keywrap); + virDomainSEVDefFormat(buf, def->sev); + virBufferAdjustIndent(buf, -2); virBufferAddLit(buf, "</domain>\n"); diff --git a/src/conf/domain_conf.h b/src/conf/domain_conf.h index b6c4090..7babbaa 100644 --- a/src/conf/domain_conf.h +++ b/src/conf/domain_conf.h @@ -142,6 +142,9 @@ typedef virDomainPanicDef *virDomainPanicDefPtr; typedef struct _virDomainMemoryDef virDomainMemoryDef; typedef virDomainMemoryDef *virDomainMemoryDefPtr; +typedef struct _virDomainSevDef virDomainSevDef; +typedef virDomainSevDef *virDomainSevDefPtr; + /* forward declarations virDomainChrSourceDef, required by * virDomainNetDef */ @@ -2303,6 +2306,26 @@ struct _virDomainKeyWrapDef { }; typedef enum { + VIR_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_NONE, + VIR_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_SEV, + + VIR_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_LAST, +} virDomainLaunchSecurity; + +typedef struct _virDomainSevDef virDomainSevDef; +typedef virDomainSevDef *virDomainSevDefPtr; + +struct _virDomainSevDef { + int sectype; /* enum virDomainLaunchSecurity */ + char *dh_cert; + char *session; + unsigned int policy; + unsigned int cbitpos; + unsigned int reduced_phys_bits; +}; + + +typedef enum { VIR_DOMAIN_IOMMU_MODEL_INTEL, VIR_DOMAIN_IOMMU_MODEL_LAST @@ -2490,6 +2513,9 @@ struct _virDomainDef { virDomainKeyWrapDefPtr keywrap; + /* SEV-specific domain */ + virDomainSevDefPtr sev; + /* Application-specific custom metadata */ xmlNodePtr metadata; @@ -3399,6 +3425,7 @@ VIR_ENUM_DECL(virDomainMemoryAllocation) VIR_ENUM_DECL(virDomainIOMMUModel) VIR_ENUM_DECL(virDomainVsockModel) VIR_ENUM_DECL(virDomainShmemModel) +VIR_ENUM_DECL(virDomainLaunchSecurity) /* from libvirt.h */ VIR_ENUM_DECL(virDomainState) VIR_ENUM_DECL(virDomainNostateReason) diff --git a/tests/genericxml2xmlindata/launch-security-sev.xml b/tests/genericxml2xmlindata/launch-security-sev.xml new file mode 100644 index 0000000..fb64e1e --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/genericxml2xmlindata/launch-security-sev.xml @@ -0,0 +1,24 @@ +<domain type='kvm'> + <name>QEMUGuest1</name> + <uuid>c7a5fdbd-edaf-9455-926a-d65c16db1809</uuid> + <memory unit='KiB'>219100</memory> + <currentMemory unit='KiB'>219100</currentMemory> + <vcpu placement='static'>1</vcpu> + <os> + <type arch='x86_64' machine='pc-1.0'>hvm</type> + <boot dev='hd'/> + </os> + <clock offset='utc'/> + <on_poweroff>destroy</on_poweroff> + <on_reboot>restart</on_reboot> + <on_crash>destroy</on_crash> + <devices> + </devices> + <launch-security type='sev'> + <cbitpos>47</cbitpos> + <reduced-phys-bits>1</reduced-phys-bits> + <policy>0x0001</policy> + <dh-cert>AQAAAAAOAAAAQAAAAAOAAAAQAAAAAOAAAAQAAAAAOAAAAQAAAAAOAAA</dh-cert> + <session>IHAVENOIDEABUTJUSTPROVIDINGASTRING</session> + </launch-security> +</domain> diff --git a/tests/genericxml2xmltest.c b/tests/genericxml2xmltest.c index d8270a6..366ac6f 100644 --- a/tests/genericxml2xmltest.c +++ b/tests/genericxml2xmltest.c @@ -141,6 +141,8 @@ mymain(void) DO_TEST_FULL("cachetune-colliding-types", false, true, TEST_COMPARE_DOM_XML2XML_RESULT_FAIL_PARSE); + DO_TEST("launch-security-sev"); + virObjectUnref(caps); virObjectUnref(xmlopt); -- 2.7.4

QEMU uses /dev/sev device while creating the SEV guest, lets add /dev/sev in the list of devices allowed to be accessed by the QEMU. Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <&lt;brijesh.singh(a)amd.com&gt;&gt; Reviewed-by: Erik Skultety <eskultet(a)redhat.com&gt; --- docs/drvqemu.html.in | 1 + src/qemu/qemu.conf | 2 +- src/qemu/qemu_cgroup.c | 2 +- src/qemu/test_libvirtd_qemu.aug.in | 1 + 4 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/docs/drvqemu.html.in b/docs/drvqemu.html.in index cbd159d..7c33a18 100644 --- a/docs/drvqemu.html.in +++ b/docs/drvqemu.html.in @@ -397,6 +397,7 @@ chmod o+x /path/to/directory /dev/random, /dev/urandom, /dev/ptmx, /dev/kvm, /dev/kqemu, /dev/rtc, /dev/hpet, /dev/net/tun +/dev/sev </pre> <p> diff --git a/src/qemu/qemu.conf b/src/qemu/qemu.conf index c8e1a62..3a733b3 100644 --- a/src/qemu/qemu.conf +++ b/src/qemu/qemu.conf @@ -485,7 +485,7 @@ # "/dev/null", "/dev/full", "/dev/zero", # "/dev/random", "/dev/urandom", # "/dev/ptmx", "/dev/kvm", "/dev/kqemu", -# "/dev/rtc","/dev/hpet" +# "/dev/rtc","/dev/hpet", "/dev/sev" #] # # RDMA migration requires the following extra files to be added to the list: diff --git a/src/qemu/qemu_cgroup.c b/src/qemu/qemu_cgroup.c index 546a4c8..21dcb3c 100644 --- a/src/qemu/qemu_cgroup.c +++ b/src/qemu/qemu_cgroup.c @@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ const char *const defaultDeviceACL[] = { "/dev/null", "/dev/full", "/dev/zero", "/dev/random", "/dev/urandom", "/dev/ptmx", "/dev/kvm", "/dev/kqemu", - "/dev/rtc", "/dev/hpet", + "/dev/rtc", "/dev/hpet", "/dev/sev", NULL, }; #define DEVICE_PTY_MAJOR 136 diff --git a/src/qemu/test_libvirtd_qemu.aug.in b/src/qemu/test_libvirtd_qemu.aug.in index 912161c..f127726 100644 --- a/src/qemu/test_libvirtd_qemu.aug.in +++ b/src/qemu/test_libvirtd_qemu.aug.in @@ -62,6 +62,7 @@ module Test_libvirtd_qemu = { "8" = "/dev/kqemu" } { "9" = "/dev/rtc" } { "10" = "/dev/hpet" } + { "11" = "/dev/sev" } } { "save_image_format" = "raw" } { "dump_image_format" = "raw" } -- 2.7.4

QEMU >= 2.12 provides 'sev-guest' object which is used to launch encrypted VMs on AMD platform using SEV feature. The various inputs required to launch SEV guest is provided through the <launch-security> tag. A typical SEV guest launch command line looks like this: # $QEMU ...\ -object sev-guest,id=sev0,cbitpos=47,reduced-phys-bits=5 ...\ -machine memory-encryption=sev0 \ Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh(a)amd.com&gt; Reviewed-by: Erik Skultety <eskultet(a)redhat.com&gt; --- src/qemu/qemu_command.c | 41 ++++++++++++++++ src/qemu/qemu_process.c | 62 +++++++++++++++++++++++++ tests/qemuxml2argvdata/launch-security-sev.args | 29 ++++++++++++ tests/qemuxml2argvdata/launch-security-sev.xml | 37 +++++++++++++++ tests/qemuxml2argvtest.c | 4 ++ 5 files changed, 173 insertions(+) create mode 100644 tests/qemuxml2argvdata/launch-security-sev.args create mode 100644 tests/qemuxml2argvdata/launch-security-sev.xml diff --git a/src/qemu/qemu_command.c b/src/qemu/qemu_command.c index 1324c67..6ffdf63 100644 --- a/src/qemu/qemu_command.c +++ b/src/qemu/qemu_command.c @@ -7295,6 +7295,9 @@ qemuBuildMachineCommandLine(virCommandPtr cmd, virQEMUCapsGet(qemuCaps, QEMU_CAPS_LOADPARM)) qemuAppendLoadparmMachineParm(&buf, def); + if (virQEMUCapsGet(qemuCaps, QEMU_CAPS_SEV_GUEST) && def->sev) + virBufferAddLit(&buf, ",memory-encryption=sev0"); + virCommandAddArgBuffer(cmd, &buf); ret = 0; @@ -9651,6 +9654,41 @@ qemuBuildTPMCommandLine(virCommandPtr cmd, return 0; } +static int +qemuBuildSevCommandLine(virDomainObjPtr vm, virCommandPtr cmd, + virDomainSevDefPtr sev) +{ + virBuffer obj = VIR_BUFFER_INITIALIZER; + qemuDomainObjPrivatePtr priv = vm->privateData; + char *path = NULL; + + if (!sev) + return 0; + + VIR_DEBUG("policy=0x%x cbitpos=%d reduced_phys_bits=%d", + sev->policy, sev->cbitpos, sev->reduced_phys_bits); + + virBufferAsprintf(&obj, "sev-guest,id=sev0,cbitpos=%d", sev->cbitpos); + virBufferAsprintf(&obj, ",reduced-phys-bits=%d", sev->reduced_phys_bits); + virBufferAsprintf(&obj, ",policy=0x%x", sev->policy); + + if (sev->dh_cert) { + if (virAsprintf(&path, "%s/dh_cert.base64", priv->libDir) < 0) + return -1; + virBufferAsprintf(&obj, ",dh-cert-file=%s", path); + VIR_FREE(path); + } + + if (sev->session) { + if (virAsprintf(&path, "%s/session.base64", priv->libDir) < 0) + return -1; + virBufferAsprintf(&obj, ",session-file=%s", path); + VIR_FREE(path); + } + + virCommandAddArgList(cmd, "-object", virBufferContentAndReset(&obj), NULL); + return 0; +} static int qemuBuildVMCoreInfoCommandLine(virCommandPtr cmd, @@ -10245,6 +10283,9 @@ qemuBuildCommandLine(virQEMUDriverPtr driver, if (qemuBuildVMCoreInfoCommandLine(cmd, def, qemuCaps) < 0) goto error; + if (qemuBuildSevCommandLine(vm, cmd, def->sev) < 0) + goto error; + if (snapshot) virCommandAddArgList(cmd, "-loadvm", snapshot->def->name, NULL); diff --git a/src/qemu/qemu_process.c b/src/qemu/qemu_process.c index 9eb3ea0..5783627 100644 --- a/src/qemu/qemu_process.c +++ b/src/qemu/qemu_process.c @@ -5825,6 +5825,65 @@ qemuProcessPrepareDomain(virQEMUDriverPtr driver, static int +qemuBuildSevCreateFile(const char *configDir, + const char *name, + const char *data) +{ + char *configFile; + + if (!(configFile = virFileBuildPath(configDir, name, ".base64"))) + return -1; + + if (virFileRewriteStr(configFile, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR, data) < 0) { + virReportSystemError(errno, _("failed to write data to config '%s'"), + configFile); + goto error; + } + + VIR_FREE(configFile); + return 0; + + error: + VIR_FREE(configFile); + return -1; +} + + +static int +qemuProcessPrepareSevGuestInput(virDomainObjPtr vm) +{ + qemuDomainObjPrivatePtr priv = vm->privateData; + virDomainDefPtr def = vm->def; + virQEMUCapsPtr qemuCaps = priv->qemuCaps; + virDomainSevDefPtr sev = def->sev; + + if (!sev) + return 0; + + VIR_DEBUG("Prepare SEV guest"); + + if (!virQEMUCapsGet(qemuCaps, QEMU_CAPS_SEV_GUEST)) { + virReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR, + _("Domain %s asked for 'sev' launch but this " + "QEMU does not support SEV feature"), vm->def->name); + return -1; + } + + if (sev->dh_cert) { + if (qemuBuildSevCreateFile(priv->libDir, "dh_cert", sev->dh_cert) < 0) + return -1; + } + + if (sev->session) { + if (qemuBuildSevCreateFile(priv->libDir, "session", sev->session) < 0) + return -1; + } + + return 0; +} + + +static int qemuProcessPrepareHostStorage(virQEMUDriverPtr driver, virDomainObjPtr vm, unsigned int flags) @@ -5982,6 +6041,9 @@ qemuProcessPrepareHost(virQEMUDriverPtr driver, if (qemuProcessPrepareHostStorage(driver, vm, flags) < 0) goto cleanup; + if (qemuProcessPrepareSevGuestInput(vm) < 0) + goto cleanup; + ret = 0; cleanup: virObjectUnref(cfg); diff --git a/tests/qemuxml2argvdata/launch-security-sev.args b/tests/qemuxml2argvdata/launch-security-sev.args new file mode 100644 index 0000000..db0be1a --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/qemuxml2argvdata/launch-security-sev.args @@ -0,0 +1,29 @@ +LC_ALL=C \ +PATH=/bin \ +HOME=/home/test \ +USER=test \ +LOGNAME=test \ +QEMU_AUDIO_DRV=none \ +/usr/bin/qemu-system-x86_64 \ +-name QEMUGuest1 \ +-S \ +-machine pc-1.0,accel=kvm,usb=off,dump-guest-core=off,memory-encryption=sev0 \ +-m 214 \ +-smp 1,sockets=1,cores=1,threads=1 \ +-uuid c7a5fdbd-edaf-9455-926a-d65c16db1809 \ +-display none \ +-no-user-config \ +-nodefaults \ +-chardev socket,id=charmonitor,path=/tmp/lib/domain--1-QEMUGuest1/monitor.sock,\ +server,nowait \ +-mon chardev=charmonitor,id=monitor,mode=control \ +-rtc base=utc \ +-no-shutdown \ +-no-acpi \ +-boot c \ +-usb \ +-drive file=/dev/HostVG/QEMUGuest1,format=raw,if=none,id=drive-ide0-0-0 \ +-device ide-drive,bus=ide.0,unit=0,drive=drive-ide0-0-0,id=ide0-0-0 \ +-object sev-guest,id=sev0,cbitpos=47,reduced-phys-bits=1,policy=0x1,\ +dh-cert-file=/tmp/lib/domain--1-QEMUGuest1/dh_cert.base64,\ +session-file=/tmp/lib/domain--1-QEMUGuest1/session.base64 diff --git a/tests/qemuxml2argvdata/launch-security-sev.xml b/tests/qemuxml2argvdata/launch-security-sev.xml new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5ae83f6 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/qemuxml2argvdata/launch-security-sev.xml @@ -0,0 +1,37 @@ +<domain type='kvm'> + <name>QEMUGuest1</name> + <uuid>c7a5fdbd-edaf-9455-926a-d65c16db1809</uuid> + <memory unit='KiB'>219100</memory> + <currentMemory unit='KiB'>219100</currentMemory> + <vcpu placement='static'>1</vcpu> + <os> + <type arch='x86_64' machine='pc-1.0'>hvm</type> + <boot dev='hd'/> + </os> + <clock offset='utc'/> + <on_poweroff>destroy</on_poweroff> + <on_reboot>restart</on_reboot> + <on_crash>destroy</on_crash> + <devices> + <emulator>/usr/bin/qemu-system-x86_64</emulator> + <disk type='block' device='disk'> + <driver name='qemu' type='raw'/> + <source dev='/dev/HostVG/QEMUGuest1'/> + <target dev='hda' bus='ide'/> + <address type='drive' controller='0' bus='0' target='0' unit='0'/> + </disk> + <controller type='usb' index='0'/> + <controller type='ide' index='0'/> + <controller type='pci' index='0' model='pci-root'/> + <input type='mouse' bus='ps2'/> + <input type='keyboard' bus='ps2'/> + <memballoon model='none'/> + </devices> + <launch-security type='sev'> + <cbitpos>47</cbitpos> + <reduced-phys-bits>1</reduced-phys-bits> + <policy>0x0001</policy> + <dh-cert>AQAAAAAOAAAAQAAAAAOAAAAQAAAAAOAAAAQAAAAAOAAAAQAAAAAOAAA</dh-cert> + <session>IHAVENOIDEABUTJUSTPROVIDINGASTRING</session> + </launch-security> +</domain> diff --git a/tests/qemuxml2argvtest.c b/tests/qemuxml2argvtest.c index 2092b8e..9586200 100644 --- a/tests/qemuxml2argvtest.c +++ b/tests/qemuxml2argvtest.c @@ -2862,6 +2862,10 @@ mymain(void) DO_TEST_CAPS_LATEST("vhost-vsock"); DO_TEST_CAPS_LATEST("vhost-vsock-auto"); + DO_TEST("launch-security-sev", + QEMU_CAPS_KVM, + QEMU_CAPS_SEV_GUEST); + if (getenv("LIBVIRT_SKIP_CLEANUP") == NULL) virFileDeleteTree(fakerootdir); -- 2.7.4

The API can be used outside the libvirt to get the launch security information. When SEV is enabled, the API can be used to get the measurement of the launch process. Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh(a)amd.com&gt; --- include/libvirt/libvirt-domain.h | 17 ++++++++++++++ src/driver-hypervisor.h | 8 +++++++ src/libvirt-domain.c | 48 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ src/libvirt_public.syms | 1 + 4 files changed, 74 insertions(+) diff --git a/include/libvirt/libvirt-domain.h b/include/libvirt/libvirt-domain.h index da773b7..6a3d73f 100644 --- a/include/libvirt/libvirt-domain.h +++ b/include/libvirt/libvirt-domain.h @@ -4767,4 +4767,21 @@ int virDomainSetLifecycleAction(virDomainPtr domain, unsigned int action, unsigned int flags); +/** + * Launch Security API + */ + +/** + * VIR_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_SEV_MEASUREMENT: + * + * Macro represents the launch measurement of the SEV guest, + * as VIR_TYPED_PARAM_STRING. + */ +#define VIR_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_SEV_MEASUREMENT "sev-measurement" + +int virDomainGetLaunchSecurityInfo(virDomainPtr domain, + virTypedParameterPtr *params, + int *nparams, + unsigned int flags); + #endif /* __VIR_LIBVIRT_DOMAIN_H__ */ diff --git a/src/driver-hypervisor.h b/src/driver-hypervisor.h index c50d2a0..eef31eb 100644 --- a/src/driver-hypervisor.h +++ b/src/driver-hypervisor.h @@ -1315,6 +1315,13 @@ typedef int int *nparams, unsigned int flags); +typedef int +(*virDrvDomainGetLaunchSecurityInfo)(virDomainPtr domain, + virTypedParameterPtr *params, + int *nparams, + unsigned int flags); + + typedef struct _virHypervisorDriver virHypervisorDriver; typedef virHypervisorDriver *virHypervisorDriverPtr; @@ -1564,6 +1571,7 @@ struct _virHypervisorDriver { virDrvConnectCompareHypervisorCPU connectCompareHypervisorCPU; virDrvConnectBaselineHypervisorCPU connectBaselineHypervisorCPU; virDrvNodeGetSEVInfo nodeGetSEVInfo; + virDrvDomainGetLaunchSecurityInfo domainGetLaunchSecurityInfo; }; diff --git a/src/libvirt-domain.c b/src/libvirt-domain.c index d44b553..dcfc7d4 100644 --- a/src/libvirt-domain.c +++ b/src/libvirt-domain.c @@ -12154,3 +12154,51 @@ int virDomainSetLifecycleAction(virDomainPtr domain, virDispatchError(domain->conn); return -1; } + +/** + * virDomainGetLaunchSecurityInfo: + * @domain: a domain object + * @params: where to store security info + * @nparams: number of items in @params + * @flags: currently used, set to 0. + * + * Get the launch security info. In case of the SEV guest, this will + * return the launch measurement. + * + * Returns -1 in case of failure, 0 in case of success. + */ +int virDomainGetLaunchSecurityInfo(virDomainPtr domain, + virTypedParameterPtr *params, + int *nparams, + unsigned int flags) +{ + virConnectPtr conn = domain->conn; + + VIR_DOMAIN_DEBUG(domain, "params=%p, nparams=%p flags=0x%x", + params, nparams, flags); + + virResetLastError(); + + virCheckDomainReturn(domain, -1); + virCheckNonNullArgGoto(params, error); + virCheckNonNullArgGoto(nparams, error); + virCheckReadOnlyGoto(conn->flags, error); + + if (VIR_DRV_SUPPORTS_FEATURE(domain->conn->driver, domain->conn, + VIR_DRV_FEATURE_TYPED_PARAM_STRING)) + flags |= VIR_TYPED_PARAM_STRING_OKAY; + + if (conn->driver->domainGetLaunchSecurityInfo) { + int ret; + ret = conn->driver->domainGetLaunchSecurityInfo(domain, params, + nparams, flags); + if (ret < 0) + goto error; + return ret; + } + virReportUnsupportedError(); + + error: + virDispatchError(domain->conn); + return -1; +} diff --git a/src/libvirt_public.syms b/src/libvirt_public.syms index 524d5fd..3bf3c3f 100644 --- a/src/libvirt_public.syms +++ b/src/libvirt_public.syms @@ -797,6 +797,7 @@ LIBVIRT_4.5.0 { virGetLastErrorCode; virGetLastErrorDomain; virNodeGetSEVInfo; + virDomainGetLaunchSecurityInfo; } LIBVIRT_4.4.0; # .... define new API here using predicted next version number .... -- 2.7.4

On 06/07/2018 11:46 AM, Erik Skultety wrote: I did ran through syntax-check but don't remember getting complain. I will fix in next rev.

Add remote support for launch security info. Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh(a)amd.com&gt; Reviewed-by: Erik Skultety <eskultet(a)redhat.com&gt; --- src/remote/remote_daemon_dispatch.c | 47 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ src/remote/remote_driver.c | 40 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ src/remote/remote_protocol.x | 19 ++++++++++++++- src/remote_protocol-structs | 11 +++++++++ 4 files changed, 116 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/src/remote/remote_daemon_dispatch.c b/src/remote/remote_daemon_dispatch.c index 959367f..f1a5ba2 100644 --- a/src/remote/remote_daemon_dispatch.c +++ b/src/remote/remote_daemon_dispatch.c @@ -3110,6 +3110,53 @@ remoteDispatchNodeGetMemoryStats(virNetServerPtr server ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED, } static int +remoteDispatchDomainGetLaunchSecurityInfo(virNetServerPtr server ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED, + virNetServerClientPtr client ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED, + virNetMessagePtr msg ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED, + virNetMessageErrorPtr rerr, + remote_domain_get_launch_security_info_args *args, + remote_domain_get_launch_security_info_ret *ret) +{ + virDomainPtr dom = NULL; + virTypedParameterPtr params = NULL; + int nparams = 0; + int rv = -1; + struct daemonClientPrivate *priv = + virNetServerClientGetPrivateData(client); + + if (!priv->conn) { + virReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR, "%s", _("connection not open")); + goto cleanup; + } + + if (!(dom = get_nonnull_domain(priv->conn, args->dom))) + goto cleanup; + + if (virDomainGetLaunchSecurityInfo(dom, &params, &nparams, args->flags) < 0) + goto cleanup; + + if (nparams > REMOTE_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_INFO_PARAMS_MAX) { + virReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR, "%s", _("nparams too large")); + goto cleanup; + } + + if (virTypedParamsSerialize(params, nparams, + (virTypedParameterRemotePtr *) &ret->params.params_val, + &ret->params.params_len, + args->flags) < 0) + goto cleanup; + + rv = 0; + + cleanup: + if (rv < 0) + virNetMessageSaveError(rerr); + virTypedParamsFree(params, nparams); + virObjectUnref(dom); + return rv; +} + +static int remoteDispatchDomainGetPerfEvents(virNetServerPtr server ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED, virNetServerClientPtr client ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED, virNetMessagePtr msg ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED, diff --git a/src/remote/remote_driver.c b/src/remote/remote_driver.c index 8ac7264..995d440 100644 --- a/src/remote/remote_driver.c +++ b/src/remote/remote_driver.c @@ -1966,6 +1966,45 @@ remoteDomainGetNumaParameters(virDomainPtr domain, } static int +remoteDomainGetLaunchSecurityInfo(virDomainPtr domain, + virTypedParameterPtr *params, + int *nparams, + unsigned int flags) +{ + int rv = -1; + remote_domain_get_launch_security_info_args args; + remote_domain_get_launch_security_info_ret ret; + struct private_data *priv = domain->conn->privateData; + + remoteDriverLock(priv); + + make_nonnull_domain(&args.dom, domain); + args.flags = flags; + + memset(&ret, 0, sizeof(ret)); + if (call(domain->conn, priv, 0, REMOTE_PROC_DOMAIN_GET_LAUNCH_SECURITY_INFO, + (xdrproc_t) xdr_remote_domain_get_launch_security_info_args, (char *) &args, + (xdrproc_t) xdr_remote_domain_get_launch_security_info_ret, (char *) &ret) == -1) + goto done; + + if (virTypedParamsDeserialize((virTypedParameterRemotePtr) ret.params.params_val, + ret.params.params_len, + REMOTE_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_INFO_PARAMS_MAX, + params, + nparams) < 0) + goto cleanup; + + rv = 0; + + cleanup: + xdr_free((xdrproc_t) xdr_remote_domain_get_launch_security_info_ret, + (char *) &ret); + done: + remoteDriverUnlock(priv); + return rv; +} + +static int remoteDomainGetPerfEvents(virDomainPtr domain, virTypedParameterPtr *params, int *nparams, @@ -8491,6 +8530,7 @@ static virHypervisorDriver hypervisor_driver = { .connectCompareHypervisorCPU = remoteConnectCompareHypervisorCPU, /* 4.4.0 */ .connectBaselineHypervisorCPU = remoteConnectBaselineHypervisorCPU, /* 4.4.0 */ .nodeGetSEVInfo = remoteNodeGetSEVInfo, /* 4.5.0 */ + .domainGetLaunchSecurityInfo = remoteDomainGetLaunchSecurityInfo /* 4.5.0 */ }; static virNetworkDriver network_driver = { diff --git a/src/remote/remote_protocol.x b/src/remote/remote_protocol.x index ec72afa..162cf5e 100644 --- a/src/remote/remote_protocol.x +++ b/src/remote/remote_protocol.x @@ -256,6 +256,9 @@ const REMOTE_DOMAIN_GUEST_VCPU_PARAMS_MAX = 64; /* Upper limit on number of SEV parameters */ const REMOTE_NODE_SEV_INFO_MAX = 64; +/* Upper limit on number of launch security information entries */ +const REMOTE_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_INFO_PARAMS_MAX = 64; + /* UUID. VIR_UUID_BUFLEN definition comes from libvirt.h */ typedef opaque remote_uuid[VIR_UUID_BUFLEN]; @@ -3493,6 +3496,14 @@ struct remote_node_get_sev_info_ret { int nparams; }; +struct remote_domain_get_launch_security_info_args { + remote_nonnull_domain dom; + unsigned int flags; +}; + +struct remote_domain_get_launch_security_info_ret { + remote_typed_param params<REMOTE_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_INFO_PARAMS_MAX>; +}; /*----- Protocol. -----*/ @@ -6207,5 +6218,11 @@ enum remote_procedure { * @generate: none * @acl: connect:read */ - REMOTE_PROC_NODE_GET_SEV_INFO = 395 + REMOTE_PROC_NODE_GET_SEV_INFO = 395, + + /** + * @generate: none + * @acl: domain:read + */ + REMOTE_PROC_DOMAIN_GET_LAUNCH_SECURITY_INFO = 396 }; diff --git a/src/remote_protocol-structs b/src/remote_protocol-structs index afeefd3..f650723 100644 --- a/src/remote_protocol-structs +++ b/src/remote_protocol-structs @@ -2918,6 +2918,16 @@ struct remote_node_get_sev_capability_ret { } params; int nparams; }; +struct remote_domain_get_launch_security_info_args { + remote_nonnull_domain dom; + u_int flags; +}; +struct remote_domain_get_launch_security_info_ret { + struct { + u_int params_len; + remote_typed_param * params_val; + } params; +}; enum remote_procedure { REMOTE_PROC_CONNECT_OPEN = 1, @@ -3315,4 +3325,5 @@ enum remote_procedure { REMOTE_PROC_CONNECT_COMPARE_HYPERVISOR_CPU = 393, REMOTE_PROC_CONNECT_BASELINE_HYPERVISOR_CPU = 394, REMOTE_PROC_NODE_SEV_INFO = 395, + REMOTE_PROC_DOMAIN_GET_LAUNCH_SECURITY_INFO = 396, }; -- 2.7.4