Re: [libvirt] [CFT][PATCH 00/10] Making new mounts of proc and sysfs as safe as bind mounts (take 2)

[CC'ing libvirt-lxc folks] Am 28.05.2015 um 23:32 schrieb Eric W. Biederman: > Richard Weinberger <richard(a)nod.at&gt; writes: > >> Am 28.05.2015 um 21:57 schrieb Eric W. Biederman: >>>> FWIW, it breaks also libvirt-lxc: >>>> Error: internal error: guest failed to start: Failed to re-mount /proc/sys on /proc/sys flags=1021: Operation not permitted >>> >>> Interesting. I had not anticipated a failure there? And it is failing >>> in remount? Oh that is interesting. >>> >>> That implies that there is some flag of the original mount of /proc that >>> the remount of /proc/sys is clearing, and that previously >>> >>> The flags specified are current rdonly,remount,bind so I expect there >>> are some other flags on proc that libvirt-lxc is clearing by accident >>> and we did not fail before because the kernel was not enforcing things. >> >> Please see: >> http://libvirt.org/git/?p=libvirt.git;a=blob;f=src/lxc/lxc_container.c;h=... >> lxcContainerMountBasicFS() >> >> and: >> http://libvirt.org/git/?p=libvirt.git;a=blob;f=src/lxc/lxc_container.c;h=... >> lxcBasicMounts >> >>> What are the mount flags in a working libvirt-lxc? >> >> See: >> test1:~ # cat /proc/self/mountinfo >> 149 147 0:56 / /proc rw,nosuid,nodev,noexec,relatime - proc proc rw >> 150 149 0:56 /sys /proc/sys ro,nodev,relatime - proc proc rw > >> If you need more info, please let me know. :-) > > Oh interesting I had not realized libvirt-lxc had grown an unprivileged > mode using user namespaces. > > This does appear to be a classic remount bug, where you are not > preserving the permissions. It appears the fact that the code > failed to enforce locked permissions on the fresh mount of proc > was hiding this bug until now. > > I expect what you actually want is the code below: > > diff --git a/src/lxc/lxc_container.c b/src/lxc/lxc_container.c > index 9a9ae5c2aaf0..f008a7484bfe 100644 > --- a/src/lxc/lxc_container.c > +++ b/src/lxc/lxc_container.c > @@ -850,7 +850,7 @@ typedef struct { > > static const virLXCBasicMountInfo lxcBasicMounts[] = { > { "proc", "/proc", "proc", MS_NOSUID|MS_NOEXEC|MS_NODEV, false, false, false }, > - { "/proc/sys", "/proc/sys", NULL, MS_BIND|MS_RDONLY, false, false, false }, > + { "/proc/sys", "/proc/sys", NULL, MS_BIND|MS_NOSUID|MS_NOEXEC|MS_NODEV|MS_RDONLY, false, false, false }, > { "/.oldroot/proc/sys/net/ipv4", "/proc/sys/net/ipv4", NULL, MS_BIND, false, false, true }, > { "/.oldroot/proc/sys/net/ipv6", "/proc/sys/net/ipv6", NULL, MS_BIND, false, false, true }, > { "sysfs", "/sys", "sysfs", MS_NOSUID|MS_NOEXEC|MS_NODEV|MS_RDONLY, false, false, false }, > > Or possibly just: > > diff --git a/src/lxc/lxc_container.c b/src/lxc/lxc_container.c > index 9a9ae5c2aaf0..a60ccbd12bfc 100644 > --- a/src/lxc/lxc_container.c > +++ b/src/lxc/lxc_container.c > @@ -850,7 +850,7 @@ typedef struct { > > static const virLXCBasicMountInfo lxcBasicMounts[] = { > { "proc", "/proc", "proc", MS_NOSUID|MS_NOEXEC|MS_NODEV, false, false, false }, > - { "/proc/sys", "/proc/sys", NULL, MS_BIND|MS_RDONLY, false, false, false }, > + { "/proc/sys", "/proc/sys", NULL, MS_BIND|MS_RDONLY, true, false, false }, > { "/.oldroot/proc/sys/net/ipv4", "/proc/sys/net/ipv4", NULL, MS_BIND, false, false, true }, > { "/.oldroot/proc/sys/net/ipv6", "/proc/sys/net/ipv6", NULL, MS_BIND, false, false, true }, > { "sysfs", "/sys", "sysfs", MS_NOSUID|MS_NOEXEC|MS_NODEV|MS_RDONLY, false, false, false }, > > As the there is little point in making /proc/sys read-only in a > user-namespace, as the permission checks are uid based and no-one should > have the global uid 0 in your container. Making mounting /proc/sys > read-only rather pointless. Eric, using the patch below I was able to spawn a user-namespace enabled container using libvirt-lxc. :-) I had to: 1. Disable the read-only mount of /proc/sys which is anyway useless in the user-namespace case. 2. Disable the /proc/sys/net/ipv{4,6} bind mounts, this ugly hack is only needed for the non user-namespace case. 3. Remove MS_RDONLY from the sysfs mount (For the non user-namespace case we'd have to keep this, though). Daniel, I'd take this as a chance to disable all the MS_RDONLY games if user-namespace are configured. With Eric's fixes they hurt us. And as I wrote many times before if root within the user-namespace is able to do nasty things in /sys and /proc that's a plain kernel bug which needs fixing. There is no point in mounting these read-only. Except for the case then no user-namespace is used.