Re: [libvirt] [PATCH 04/10] Qemu arbitrary command-line arguments.
On 04/21/2010 10:01 AM, Chris Lalancette wrote:
+static void qemuDomainDefNamespaceFree(void *nsdata)
+{
+ qemuDomainCmdlineDefPtr cmd = nsdata;
+ int i;
s/int/unsigned int/
+static int qemuDomainDefNamespaceParse(xmlDocPtr xml,
+ xmlNodePtr root,
+ xmlXPathContextPtr ctxt,
+ void **data)
+{
+ qemuDomainCmdlineDefPtr cmd = NULL;
+ xmlNsPtr ns;
+ xmlNodePtr *nodes = NULL;
+ int n, i;
n must be signed, but can i be unsigned?
+
+static int qemuDomainDefNamespaceFormatXML(virBufferPtr buf,
+ void *nsdata)
+{
+ qemuDomainCmdlineDefPtr cmd = nsdata;
+ int i;
unsigned
+
+ if (cmd->num_extra || cmd->num_env)
+ virBufferAddLit(buf, " <qemu:commandline>\n");
+ for (i = 0; i < cmd->num_extra; i++)
+ virBufferVSprintf(buf, " <qemu:arg>%s</qemu:arg>\n",
cmd->extra[i]);
Is there any chance that cmd->extra[i] might contain content that needs
escaping before it is valid as XML?
+ for (i = 0; i < cmd->num_env; i++) {
+ virBufferVSprintf(buf, " <qemu:env name='%s'",
cmd->env_name[i]);
+ if (cmd->env_value[i])
+ virBufferVSprintf(buf, " value='%s'",
cmd->env_value[i]);
Likewise for env_value[i]? (I'm assuming that env_name[i] is immune,
since it was parsed using virXPathString("string(./@name)",), which
should have rejected strings not valid as environment variable names.)
The approach looks correct, but I hesitate to give an ack without
knowing for sure that the formatted XML is safe from arbitrary content
in the extra arguments.
--
Eric Blake eblake(a)redhat.com +1-801-349-2682
Libvirt virtualization library http://libvirt.org
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