On Wed, Feb 26, 2014 at 08:54:02AM -0600, Serge Hallyn wrote:
Quoting Stephan Sachse (ste.sachse(a)gmail.com):
> for me there is no valid reason why a container is not allowed to set
> file capabilities.
(For the sake of the libvir-list, I replied to this on the lxc-devel@
list with a proposal that should work; but this particular patch is
not safe, as nothing would stop an unprivileged user from mapping 0
to his uid in a new namespace, adding CAP_SYS_ADMIN, getting back to
the init namespace, and running it with privilege. Adding a new
capability format which adds the kuid_t of the user_ns root would
solve this. Thanks Stephan for pushing on this.)
Thanks, I thought there would be some good reason for this restriction.
Regards,
Daniel
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