Re: [libvirt] RFC [3/3]: Lock manager usage scenarios

----- "Daniel P. Berrange" <berrange(a)redhat.com&gt; wrote: > On Tue, Sep 14, 2010 at 05:03:21PM -0400, Ayal Baron wrote: > > > > ----- "Daniel P. Berrange" <berrange(a)redhat.com&gt; wrote: > > > > > > > > That is probably possible with the current security driver > > > implementations > > > but more generally I think it will still hit some trouble. > > > Specifically > > > one of the items on our todo list is a new security driver that > makes > > > use > > > of Linux container namespace functionality to isolate the VMs, so > they > > > > > > can't even see other resources / processes on the host. This may > well > > > prevent the sync manager wrapper talking to a central sync mnager > > > process > > > The general rule we aim for is that once libvirtd has spawned a > VM > > > they > > > are completely isolated with exception of any disks marked with > > > <shareable/> > > > In other words, any communictions channels must be > > > initiated/established > > > by the mgmt layer to the VM process, with nothing to be > established in > > > the > > > reverse direction. > > Correct me if I'm wrong, but the security limitations (selinux > context) > > would only take effect after the "exec", no? so the process could > still > > communicate with the daemon, open an FD and then exec. After exec, > the > > VM would be locked down but the daemon could still wait on the FD to > see > > whether VM has died. > > It depends on which exec you are talking about here. If the comms to > the daemon are done straight from the libvirtd plugin, then it would > still be unrestricted. If the comms were done from the supervisor > process, it would be restricted. > > Daniel I'm talking about the supervisor. You said you spoke to Dan Walsh and that the supervisor and qemu processes could get different contexts. Now you're saying the supervisor would be restricted nonetheless. What am I missing?