Am 01.05.2012 22:25, schrieb Anthony Liguori:
Thanks for sending this out Stefan.
On 05/01/2012 10:31 AM, Stefan Hajnoczi wrote:
> Libvirt can take advantage of SELinux to restrict the QEMU process and prevent
> it from opening files that it should not have access to. This improves
> security because it prevents the attacker from escaping the QEMU process if
> they manage to gain control.
>
> NFS has been a pain point for SELinux because it does not support labels (which
> I believe are stored in extended attributes). In other words, it's not
> possible to use SELinux goodness on QEMU when image files are located on NFS.
> Today we have to allow QEMU access to any file on the NFS export rather than
> restricting specifically to the image files that the guest requires.
>
> File descriptor passing is a solution to this problem and might also come in
> handy elsewhere. Libvirt or another external process chooses files which QEMU
> is allowed to access and provides just those file descriptors - QEMU cannot
> open the files itself.
>
> This series adds the -open-hook-fd command-line option. Whenever QEMU needs to
> open an image file it sends a request over the given UNIX domain socket. The
> response includes the file descriptor or an errno on failure. Please see the
> patches for details on the protocol.
>
> The -open-hook-fd approach allows QEMU to support file descriptor passing
> without changing -drive. It also supports snapshot_blkdev and other commands
> that re-open image files.
>
> Anthony Liguori<aliguori(a)us.ibm.com> wrote most of these patches. I added a
> demo -open-hook-fd server and added some small fixes. Since Anthony is
> traveling right now I'm sending the RFC for discussion.
What I like about this approach is that it's useful outside the block layer and
is conceptionally simple from a QEMU PoV. We simply delegate open() to libvirt
and let libvirt enforce whatever rules it wants.
This is not meant to be an alternative to blockdev, but even with blockdev, I
think we still want to use a mechanism like this even with blockdev.
What does it provide on top?
This doesn't look like something that I'd like a lot. qemu should be
able to continue to run no matter what the management tool does, whether
it responds to RPCs properly or whether it has crashed. You need a
really good use case for the RPC that cannot be covered otherwise in
order to justify this.
Kevin