On 05/01/2012 06:15 PM, Eric Blake wrote:
On 05/01/2012 03:53 PM, Anthony Liguori wrote:
>> I think (correct me if I'm wrong) libvirt should be aware of any file
>> that qemu
>> asks it to open. So from a security point of view, libvirt can prevent
>> opening a
>> file if it isn't affiliated with the guest.
>
> Right, libvirt can maintain a whitelist of files QEMU is allowed to open
> (which is already has because it needs to label these files).
Indeed.
> The only
> complexity is that it's not a straight strcmp(). The path needs to be
> (carefully) broken into components with '.' and '..' handled
> appropriately. But this shouldn't be that difficult to do.
Libvirt would probably canonicalize path names, both when sticking them
in the whitelist, and in validating the requests from qemu - agreed that
it's not difficult.
More importantly, libvirt needs to start tracking the backing chain of
any qcow2 or qed file as part of the domain XML; and operations like
'block-stream' would update not only the chain, but also the whitelist.
In the drive-reopen case, this means that libvirt would have to be
careful when to change labeling - provide access to the new files before
drive-reopen, then revoke access to files after drive-reopen completes.
In other words, having the -open-hook-fd client pass a command to
libvirt at the time it is closing an fd would help libvirt know when
qemu has quit using a file, which might make it easier to revoke SELinux
labels at that time.
If we were to go with this approach, I think the following updates would
be required for libvirt. Could you let me know if I'm missing anything?
libvirt tasks:
- Introduce a data structure to store file whitelist per guest
- Add -open-hook-fd option to QEMU command line and pass Unix
domain socket fd to QEMU
- Create open() handler that handles requests from QEMU to open
files and passes back fd
- Potentially also handle close requests from QEMU? Would allow
libvirt to update XML and whitelist (as well as SELinux labels).
- Canonicalize path names when putting them in whitelist and
when validating requests from QEMU
- XML updates to track backing chain of qcow2 and qed files
- Update whitelist and XML chain when QEMU monitor commands are
used to open new files: block-stream, drive-reopen, drive_add,
savevm, snapshot_blkdev, change
Updates would also be required for SELinux and AppArmor policy to allow
libvirt open of NFS files, and allow QEMU read/write (no open allowed)
of NFS Files.
--
Regards,
Corey