Re: [libvirt] [PATCHv5 17/28] security: DAC: Implement per-image seclabel restore
On 07/04/2014 05:29 AM, Peter Krempa wrote:
Refactor the existing code to allow re-using it for the per-image
label
restore too.
---
src/security/security_dac.c | 59 ++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------------
1 file changed, 31 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-)
- secdef = virDomainDefGetSecurityLabelDef(def, SECURITY_DAC_NAME);
+ /* Don't restore labels on readoly/shared disks, because other VMs may
+ * still be accessing these Alternatively we could iterate over all running
Pre-existing typo, but s/these/these./
+ * domains and try to figure out if it is in use, but this would
not work
+ * for clustered filesystems, since we can't see running VMs using the file
+ * on other nodes Safest bet is thus to skip the restore step.
s/nodes/nodes./
- /* If we have a shared FS & doing migrated, we must not
- * change ownership, because that kills access on the
- * destination host which is sub-optimal for the guest
- * VM's I/O attempts :-)
+ /* If we have a shared FS & doing migrated, we must not change ownership,
s/doing migrated/are doing migration/
+ * because that kills access on the destination host which is
sub-optimal
+ * for the guest VM's I/O attempts :-)
Technically, changing SELinux labels kills guests (that takes effect
immediately); but per POSIX, calling chmod() should not (as chmod only
affects future open() calls, but not already-open fds). But then you
throw in non-POSIX NFS, and there we have a case where chmod() can kill
access to open fds (naughty NFS). So this comment is true, but only
because of botched file systems :)
ACK with comment cleanups.
--
Eric Blake eblake redhat com +1-919-301-3266
Libvirt virtualization library http://libvirt.org
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