On Fri, May 04, 2012 at 11:28:47AM +0800, Zhi Yong Wu wrote:
On Tue, May 1, 2012 at 11:31 PM, Stefan Hajnoczi
<stefanha(a)linux.vnet.ibm.com> wrote:
> Libvirt can take advantage of SELinux to restrict the QEMU process and prevent
> it from opening files that it should not have access to. This improves
> security because it prevents the attacker from escaping the QEMU process if
> they manage to gain control.
>
> NFS has been a pain point for SELinux because it does not support labels (which
> I believe are stored in extended attributes). In other words, it's not
> possible to use SELinux goodness on QEMU when image files are located on NFS.
> Today we have to allow QEMU access to any file on the NFS export rather than
> restricting specifically to the image files that the guest requires.
>
> File descriptor passing is a solution to this problem and might also come in
> handy elsewhere. Libvirt or another external process chooses files which QEMU
> is allowed to access and provides just those file descriptors - QEMU cannot
> open the files itself.
>
> This series adds the -open-hook-fd command-line option. Whenever QEMU needs to
> open an image file it sends a request over the given UNIX domain socket. The
> response includes the file descriptor or an errno on failure. Please see the
> patches for details on the protocol.
>
> The -open-hook-fd approach allows QEMU to support file descriptor passing
> without changing -drive. It also supports snapshot_blkdev and other commands
By the way, How will it support them?
The problem with snapshot_blkdev is that closing a file and opening a
new file cannot be done by the QEMU process when an SELinux policy is in
place to prevent opening files.
The -open-hook-fd approach works even when the QEMU process is not
allowed to open files since file descriptor passing over a UNIX domain
socket is used to open files on behalf of QEMU.
Stefan