On Tue, Sep 01, 2020 at 12:11:11PM +0200, Christian Ehrhardt wrote:
On Thu, May 28, 2020 at 12:45 PM Simon Arlott
<libvirt(a)octiron.net> wrote:
>
> The VM does not need read permission for its own sockets to create,
> bind(), listen(), accept() connections or to recv(), send(), etc. on
> those connections.
>
> This was fixed in ab9569e5460d1e4737fe8b625c67687dc2204665
> (virt-aa-helper: disallow VNC socket read permissions),
> but then b6465e1aa49397367a9cd0f27110b9c2280a7385
> (graphics: introduce new listen type 'socket')
> and acc83afe333bfadd3f7f79091d38ca3d7da1eeb2
> (acc83afe333bfadd3f7f79091d38ca3d7da1eeb2) reverted it.
>
> Unless the read permission is omitted, VMs can connect to each other's
> VNC/graphics sockets.
snip
And as I said the concern of "VMs can connect to each
other" would
only be true if the admin specifies the same path in each of them
intentionally.
Protecting against administrator mis-configurations is NOT a goal
of the security drivers. We're only aiming to protect against a
compromised QEMU in whatever configuration the admin requested.
Regards,
Daniel
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