On Mon, Apr 04, 2011 at 08:02:26AM -0500, Anthony Liguori wrote:
On 04/04/2011 05:47 AM, Daniel P. Berrange wrote:
>>I'm hoping libvirt's behavior can be made to just work rather than
>>adding new features to QEMU. But perhaps passing file descriptors is
>>useful for more than just reopening host devices. This would
>>basically be a privilege separation model where the QEMU process isn't
>>able to open files itself but can request libvirt to open them on its
>>behalf.
>It is rather frickin' annoying the way udev resets the ownership
>when the media merely changes. If it isn't possible to stop udev
>doing this, then i think the only practical thing is to use ACLs
>instead of user/group ownership. We wanted to switch to ACLs in
>libvirt for other reasons already, but it isn't quite as simple
>as it sounds[1] so we've not done it just yet.
Isn't the root of the problem that you're not running a guest in the
expected security context?
That doesn't really have any impact. If a desktop user is logged
in, udev may change the ownership to match that user, but if they
aren't, then udev may reset it to root:disk. Either way, QEMU
may loose permissions to the disk.
How much of a leap would it be to spawn a guest with the credentials
of the user that created/defined it? Or better yet, to let the user
be specified in the XML.
That's a completely independent RFE which won't fix this issue in
the general case.
Regards,
Daniel
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