On Fri, Aug 25, 2017 at 06:45:18 +0000, Zhangbo (Oscar) wrote:
> Hi all:
> The Host Administrator is capable of running any exec in guests via the
qemu-ga command "guest-exec", eg:
>
> virsh qemu-agent-command test_guest '{"execute":
"guest-exec",
"arguments": {"path": "ifconfig", "arg": [
"eth1", "192.168.0.99" ],"capture-output":
true } }'
> {"return":{"pid":12425}}
> virsh qemu-agent-command test_guest '{"execute":
"guest-exec-status", "arguments": { "pid": 12425 } }'
> {"return":{"exitcode":0,"exited":true}}
>
> The example above just change the guests' ip address, the Administrator
may also change guests' user password, get sensitive information, etc. which
causes Insider Access.
> The Administrator also can use other commands such as "
guest-file-open" that also cause Insider Access.
>
> So, how to avoid this security problem, what's your suggestion?
You can use the "--blacklist" facility of qemu-ga to disable APIs you
don't want to support. Or don't run the guest agent at all.
This works if the qemu-agent inside the guest is installed by us cloud provider. But if
the guest
is installed all by the cloud tenant himself, he may not know to add
"--blacklist" by default, and
doesn't notice that his OS is opposed to host attackers. How to solve this problem? It
seems that
we have to mitigate the treat on the host side?