Re: [libvirt] Updated James Morris patch to apply to libvirt-0.6.0 version

On Mon, Mar 02, 2009 at 09:18:05AM +1100, James Morris wrote: > On Fri, 27 Feb 2009, Daniel J Walsh wrote: > >> I think we need a mechanism in libvirtd.conf to turn this off. And >> allow perhaps three modes. >> >> svirt=Disabled. No Security Driver. >> svirt=MLS (Requires context in xml, no relabel of disks) >> svirt=Standard, (If no XML label, then random generate one and reset >> file context). > I wouldn't call these MLS and Standard. The simple isolation scheme with > automatic labeling is just one way to do things. Down the track, we'll > want to be able to specify arbitrary types for guests, not just for MLS. I think perhaps we should make this a QEMU driver config option (ie be in /etc/libvirt/qemu.conf) and have 2 flags security_driver="selinux|none" security_autolabel="yes|no" If security_autolabel is set to 'no', then the app must pass an explicit security context in the domain XML, otherwise the domain is unconfined. If security_autolabel is set to 'yes', then if the app passes an explicit security context this is used, otherwise it will auto-generate one at startup of the VM.