[libvirt] [PATCH] build: avoid gcc 4.7 warning about inlines
by Eric Blake
gcc 4.7 complains:
util/virhashcode.c:49:17: error: always_inline function might not be inlinable [-Werror=attributes]
util/virhashcode.c:35:17: error: always_inline function might not be inlinable [-Werror=attributes]
Normal 'inline' is a hint that the compiler may ignore; the fact
that the function is static is good enough. We don't care if the
compiler decided not to inline after all.
* src/util/virhashcode.c (getblock, fmix): Relax attribute.
---
Pushing under the build-breaker rule; this lets the build get
further on rawhide (it later fails with:
GEN remote/remote_protocol.h
/usr/bin/rpcgen: C preprocessor failed with exit code 1
cannot shutdown /usr/bin/rpcgen: at ./rpc/genprotocol.pl line 122.
that I still have to investigate).
src/util/virhashcode.c | 6 ++----
1 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/util/virhashcode.c b/src/util/virhashcode.c
index 6d91793..d16d544 100644
--- a/src/util/virhashcode.c
+++ b/src/util/virhashcode.c
@@ -31,8 +31,7 @@
#include "bitrotate.h"
/* slower than original but handles platforms that do only aligned reads */
-__attribute__((always_inline))
-static uint32_t getblock(const uint8_t *p, int i)
+static inline uint32_t getblock(const uint8_t *p, int i)
{
uint32_t r;
size_t size = sizeof(r);
@@ -45,8 +44,7 @@ static uint32_t getblock(const uint8_t *p, int i)
/*
* Finalization mix - force all bits of a hash block to avalanche
*/
-__attribute__((always_inline))
-static uint32_t fmix(uint32_t h)
+static inline uint32_t fmix(uint32_t h)
{
h ^= h >> 16;
h *= 0x85ebca6b;
--
1.7.7.6
12 years, 8 months
[libvirt] [PATCH] storage: Don't unsparsify images when cloning
by Cole Robinson
Input to the volume cloning code is a source volume and an XML
descriptor for the new volume. It is possible for the new volume
to have a greater size than source volume, at which point libvirt
will just stick 0s on the end of the new image (for raw format
anyways).
Unfortunately a logic error messed up our tracking of the of the
excess amount that needed to be written: end result is that sparse
clones were made very much non-sparse, and cloning regular disk
images could end up excessively sized (though data unaltered).
Drop the 'remain' variable entriely here since it's redundant, and
track actual allocation directly against the desired 'total'.
---
src/storage/storage_backend.c | 11 +++--------
1 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/storage/storage_backend.c b/src/storage/storage_backend.c
index 1c22112..caac2f8 100644
--- a/src/storage/storage_backend.c
+++ b/src/storage/storage_backend.c
@@ -127,7 +127,6 @@ virStorageBackendCopyToFD(virStorageVolDefPtr vol,
int inputfd = -1;
int amtread = -1;
int ret = 0;
- unsigned long long remain;
size_t rbytes = READ_BLOCK_SIZE_DEFAULT;
size_t wbytes = 0;
int interval;
@@ -165,13 +164,11 @@ virStorageBackendCopyToFD(virStorageVolDefPtr vol,
goto cleanup;
}
- remain = *total;
-
while (amtread != 0) {
int amtleft;
- if (remain < rbytes)
- rbytes = remain;
+ if (*total < rbytes)
+ rbytes = *total;
if ((amtread = saferead(inputfd, buf, rbytes)) < 0) {
ret = -errno;
@@ -180,7 +177,7 @@ virStorageBackendCopyToFD(virStorageVolDefPtr vol,
inputvol->target.path);
goto cleanup;
}
- remain -= amtread;
+ *total -= amtread;
/* Loop over amt read in 512 byte increments, looking for sparse
* blocks */
@@ -225,8 +222,6 @@ virStorageBackendCopyToFD(virStorageVolDefPtr vol,
}
inputfd = -1;
- *total -= remain;
-
cleanup:
VIR_FORCE_CLOSE(inputfd);
--
1.7.7.5
12 years, 8 months
[libvirt] [PATCH] Bug fix: Allow sysinfo to display processor information
by Prerna Saxena
From: Prerna Saxena <prerna(a)linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Date: Mon, 6 Feb 2012 13:46:10 +0530
Subject: [PATCH] Bugfix: Allow sysinfo to display 'processor' information
Calls to virSysinfoParseBIOS(), virSysinfoParseSystem() would update
the buffer pointer 'base', so the processor information would be lost
before virSysinfoParseProcessor() was called. Sysinfo would therefore
not be able to display processor details -- It only described <bios>,
<system> and <memory_device> details.
Before the fix:
---------------
virsh # sysinfo
<sysinfo type='smbios'>
<bios>
....
</bios>
<system>
....
</system>
<memory_device>
....
</memory_device>
After the fix:
-------------
virsh # sysinfo
<sysinfo type='smbios'>
<bios>
....
</bios>
<system>
....
</system>
<processor>
....
</processor>
<memory_device>
....
</memory_device>
---
src/util/sysinfo.c | 9 +++++----
1 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/util/sysinfo.c b/src/util/sysinfo.c
index de3108a..d92d655 100644
--- a/src/util/sysinfo.c
+++ b/src/util/sysinfo.c
@@ -483,16 +483,17 @@ virSysinfoRead(void) {
base = outbuf;
+ ret->nprocessor = 0;
+ ret->processor = NULL;
+ if ((base = virSysinfoParseProcessor(base, ret)) == NULL)
+ goto no_memory;
+
if ((base = virSysinfoParseBIOS(base, ret)) == NULL)
goto no_memory;
if ((base = virSysinfoParseSystem(base, ret)) == NULL)
goto no_memory;
- ret->nprocessor = 0;
- ret->processor = NULL;
- if ((base = virSysinfoParseProcessor(base, ret)) == NULL)
- goto no_memory;
ret->nmemory = 0;
ret->memory = NULL;
--
1.7.3.1
--
Prerna Saxena
Linux Technology Centre,
IBM Systems and Technology Lab,
Bangalore, India
12 years, 8 months
[libvirt] [PATCH 0/2] qemu: Fix stalls during live core dump
by Jiri Denemark
Qemu uses non-blocking I/O which doesn't play nice with regular file
descriptors. We need to pass a pipe to qemu when dumping core to avoid
stalls in live mode.
Jiri Denemark (2):
util: Generalize virFileDirectFd
qemu: Always use iohelper for dumping domain core
src/qemu/qemu_driver.c | 41 +++++++++++---------
src/util/virfile.c | 98 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------------
src/util/virfile.h | 18 +++++----
3 files changed, 86 insertions(+), 71 deletions(-)
--
1.7.8.4
12 years, 8 months
[libvirt] [PATCH] build: don't require avahi during install
by Laine Stump
See: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=785269
The specfile requires avahi during install if libvirt was built with
avahi support, but there are many situations where it is undesirable
to install avahi due to security concerns. If we still Build-require
avahi-devel during the build, but don't require it at install time, it
will be used if present, and ignored if not.
---
libvirt.spec.in | 3 ---
1 files changed, 0 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/libvirt.spec.in b/libvirt.spec.in
index f279d6d..dab9650 100644
--- a/libvirt.spec.in
+++ b/libvirt.spec.in
@@ -272,9 +272,6 @@ Requires: %{name}-client = %{version}-%{release}
Requires: module-init-tools
# for /sbin/ip & /sbin/tc
Requires: iproute
-%if %{with_avahi}
-Requires: avahi
-%endif
%endif
%if %{with_network}
Requires: dnsmasq >= 2.41
--
1.7.7.6
12 years, 8 months
[libvirt] [PATCH] Allow polkit auth for VNC and SSH users
by Cole Robinson
If you are sitting in front of a physical machine and logged in as
a regular user, you can connect to the system libvirtd instance
by providing a root password to policykit. This is how most
virt-manager users talk to libvirt.
However, if you are launching virt-manager over ssh -X, or over
VNC started from say /etc/sysconfig/vncservers, our policykit policy
rejects the user outright, providing no option to provide the root
password. This is confusing to users and doesn't seem to serve much
point.
Change the policy to allow inactive (VNC) and non-local (SSH, VNC)
to provide root credentials for accessing system libvirtd. We use
auth_admin rather than auth_admin_keep so that credentials aren't
cached at all, and every subsequent reconnection to libvirt requires
auth.
Fixes: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=625115
Similar change to PackageKit policy:
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=528511
---
daemon/libvirtd.policy-0 | 4 ++--
daemon/libvirtd.policy-1 | 4 ++--
2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/daemon/libvirtd.policy-0 b/daemon/libvirtd.policy-0
index b6da946..5d6845c 100644
--- a/daemon/libvirtd.policy-0
+++ b/daemon/libvirtd.policy-0
@@ -34,8 +34,8 @@ file are instantly applied.
<defaults>
<!-- Only a program in the active host session can use libvirt in
read-write mode for management, and we require user password -->
- <allow_any>no</allow_any>
- <allow_inactive>no</allow_inactive>
+ <allow_any>auth_admin</allow_any>
+ <allow_inactive>auth_admin</allow_inactive>
<allow_active>auth_admin_keep_session</allow_active>
</defaults>
</action>
diff --git a/daemon/libvirtd.policy-1 b/daemon/libvirtd.policy-1
index 6fa3a5e..c2bec1f 100644
--- a/daemon/libvirtd.policy-1
+++ b/daemon/libvirtd.policy-1
@@ -34,8 +34,8 @@ file are instantly applied.
<defaults>
<!-- Only a program in the active host session can use libvirt in
read-write mode for management, and we require user password -->
- <allow_any>no</allow_any>
- <allow_inactive>no</allow_inactive>
+ <allow_any>auth_admin</allow_any>
+ <allow_inactive>auth_admin</allow_inactive>
<allow_active>auth_admin_keep</allow_active>
</defaults>
</action>
--
1.7.7.5
12 years, 8 months
[libvirt] [PATCH] qemu_agent: Issue guest-sync prior to every command
by Michal Privoznik
If we issue guest command and GA is not running, the issuing thread
will block endlessly. We can check for GA presence by issuing
guest-sync with unique ID (timestamp). We don't want to issue real
command as even if GA is not running, once it is started, it process
all commands written to GA socket.
If we receive reply, it might be from a previous sync command, so
we need to compare received ID for equality with the given one.
---
Some background on this:
-GA socked is always writeable, even with no GA running (!)
-writing something to dead socket (=without any GA listening) will thus
succeed. However, when one will (after a period of time) start the GA,
it will read and process all written data. This makes timeout
implementation harder.
-Therefore issuing a GA command without any GA running will block indefinitely.
My solution to this is: Issue harmless guest-sync command which returns
given identifier. To avoid blocking, do a timed wait (5 seconds).
This is the only case where we do a timed wait, regular GA commands
will of course wait without any timeout.
If GA didn't reply within those 5 seconds, we store an ID so we can compare
it later and report 'GA unavailable'; Note that guest won't get into
a different state as libvirt thinks it is in.
Then, if GA is ever started, it start to process our sync commands.
And all we have to do is check if we have ever issued such ID.
If not an error is reported.
However, there is still race:
1) GA will reply to our guest-sync
2) GA gets terminated
3) we issue regular command (e.g. fs-freeze)
I am not sure this is avoidable. But this patch makes current situation bearable.
src/qemu/qemu_agent.c | 165 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
1 files changed, 159 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/qemu/qemu_agent.c b/src/qemu/qemu_agent.c
index 9df5546..5ecf893 100644
--- a/src/qemu/qemu_agent.c
+++ b/src/qemu/qemu_agent.c
@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@
#include "virterror_internal.h"
#include "json.h"
#include "virfile.h"
+#include "virtime.h"
#define VIR_FROM_THIS VIR_FROM_QEMU
@@ -106,6 +107,10 @@ struct _qemuAgent {
/* If anything went wrong, this will be fed back
* the next monitor msg */
virError lastError;
+
+ /* Array of IDs issued to GA via guest-sync */
+ unsigned long long *ids;
+ size_t ids_size;
};
#if DEBUG_RAW_IO
@@ -147,6 +152,7 @@ static void qemuAgentFree(qemuAgentPtr mon)
(mon->cb->destroy)(mon, mon->vm);
ignore_value(virCondDestroy(&mon->notify));
virMutexDestroy(&mon->lock);
+ VIR_FREE(mon->ids);
VIR_FREE(mon->buffer);
VIR_FREE(mon);
}
@@ -316,6 +322,8 @@ qemuAgentIOProcessLine(qemuAgentPtr mon,
{
virJSONValuePtr obj = NULL;
int ret = -1;
+ size_t i;
+ unsigned long long id;
VIR_DEBUG("Line [%s]", line);
@@ -340,6 +348,40 @@ qemuAgentIOProcessLine(qemuAgentPtr mon,
obj = NULL;
ret = 0;
} else {
+ /* If we've received something like:
+ * {"return": 1234}
+ * it is likely that somebody started GA
+ * which is now processing our previous
+ * guest-sync command. Check this and if so,
+ * don't report an error however return silently
+ */
+ if (virJSONValueObjectGetNumberUlong(obj, "return", &id) == 0) {
+ for (i = 0; i < mon->ids_size; i++) {
+ if (mon->ids[i] != id)
+ continue;
+
+ VIR_DEBUG("Received delayed reply to guest-sync: %llu",
+ id);
+
+ if (mon->ids_size > 1) {
+ memmove(&mon->ids[i],
+ &mon->ids[i + 1],
+ sizeof(*mon->ids) * (mon->ids_size - (i + 1)));
+
+ mon->ids_size--;
+ if (VIR_REALLOC_N(mon->ids, mon->ids_size) < 0) {
+ /* Ignore, harmless */
+ }
+ } else {
+ VIR_FREE(mon->ids);
+ mon->ids_size = 0;
+ }
+
+ ret = 0;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ }
+
qemuReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR,
_("Unexpected JSON reply '%s'"), line);
}
@@ -813,11 +855,28 @@ void qemuAgentClose(qemuAgentPtr mon)
qemuAgentUnlock(mon);
}
+#define QEMU_AGENT_WAIT_TIME (1000ull * 5)
+/**
+ * qemuAgentSend:
+ * @mon: Monitor
+ * @msg: Message
+ * @timeout: use timeout?
+ *
+ * Send @msg to agent @mon.
+ * Wait max QEMU_AGENT_WAIT_TIME for agent
+ * to reply.
+ *
+ * Returns: 0 on success,
+ * -2 on timeout,
+ * -1 otherwise
+ */
static int qemuAgentSend(qemuAgentPtr mon,
- qemuAgentMessagePtr msg)
+ qemuAgentMessagePtr msg,
+ bool timeout)
{
int ret = -1;
+ unsigned long long now, then;
/* Check whether qemu quit unexpectedly */
if (mon->lastError.code != VIR_ERR_OK) {
@@ -827,13 +886,26 @@ static int qemuAgentSend(qemuAgentPtr mon,
return -1;
}
+ if (timeout) {
+ if (virTimeMillisNow(&now) < 0)
+ return -1;
+ then = now + QEMU_AGENT_WAIT_TIME;
+ }
+
mon->msg = msg;
qemuAgentUpdateWatch(mon);
while (!mon->msg->finished) {
- if (virCondWait(&mon->notify, &mon->lock) < 0) {
- qemuReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR, "%s",
- _("Unable to wait on monitor condition"));
+ if ((timeout && virCondWaitUntil(&mon->notify, &mon->lock, then) < 0) ||
+ (!timeout && virCondWait(&mon->notify, &mon->lock) < 0)) {
+ if (errno == ETIMEDOUT) {
+ qemuReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR, "%s",
+ _("Guest agent not available for now"));
+ ret = -2;
+ } else {
+ qemuReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR, "%s",
+ _("Unable to wait on monitor condition"));
+ }
goto cleanup;
}
}
@@ -855,6 +927,83 @@ cleanup:
}
+/**
+ * qemuAgentGuestSync:
+ * @mon: Monitor
+ *
+ * Send guest-sync with unique ID and wait for
+ * reply. If we get one, check if received ID
+ * is equal to given.
+ *
+ * Returns: 0 on success,
+ * -1 otherwise
+ */
+static int
+qemuAgentGuestSync(qemuAgentPtr mon)
+{
+ int ret = -1;
+ int send_ret;
+ unsigned long long id, id_ret;
+ qemuAgentMessage sync_msg;
+
+ memset(&sync_msg, 0, sizeof sync_msg);
+
+ if (virTimeMillisNow(&id) < 0)
+ return -1;
+
+ if (virAsprintf(&sync_msg.txBuffer,
+ "{\"execute\":\"guest-sync\", "
+ "\"arguments\":{\"id\":%llu}}", id) < 0) {
+ virReportOOMError();
+ return -1;
+ }
+ sync_msg.txLength = strlen(sync_msg.txBuffer);
+
+ VIR_DEBUG("Sending guest-sync command with ID: %llu", id);
+
+ send_ret = qemuAgentSend(mon, &sync_msg, true);
+
+ VIR_DEBUG("Agent guest-sync returned: %d", send_ret);
+
+ if (send_ret == -1) {
+ /* error reported */
+ goto cleanup;
+ } else if (send_ret == -2) {
+ /* don't report errors as we don't want to
+ * overwrite the one from qemuAgentSend() */
+ if (VIR_REALLOC_N(mon->ids, mon->ids_size) == 0)
+ mon->ids[mon->ids_size++] = id;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ if (!sync_msg.rxObject) {
+ qemuReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR, "%s",
+ _("Missing monitor reply object"));
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ if (virJSONValueObjectGetNumberUlong(sync_msg.rxObject,
+ "return", &id_ret) < 0) {
+ qemuReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR, "%s",
+ _("Malformed return value"));
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ VIR_DEBUG("Guest returned ID: %llu", id_ret);
+ if (id_ret != id) {
+ qemuReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+ _("Guest agent returned ID: %llu instead of %llu"),
+ id_ret, id);
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ ret = 0;
+
+cleanup:
+ virJSONValueFree(sync_msg.rxObject);
+ VIR_FREE(sync_msg.txBuffer);
+ return ret;
+}
+
static int
qemuAgentCommand(qemuAgentPtr mon,
virJSONValuePtr cmd,
@@ -866,6 +1015,11 @@ qemuAgentCommand(qemuAgentPtr mon,
*reply = NULL;
+ if (qemuAgentGuestSync(mon) < 0) {
+ /* helper reported the error */
+ return -1;
+ }
+
memset(&msg, 0, sizeof msg);
if (!(cmdstr = virJSONValueToString(cmd))) {
@@ -880,12 +1034,11 @@ qemuAgentCommand(qemuAgentPtr mon,
VIR_DEBUG("Send command '%s' for write", cmdstr);
- ret = qemuAgentSend(mon, &msg);
+ ret = qemuAgentSend(mon, &msg, false);
VIR_DEBUG("Receive command reply ret=%d rxObject=%p",
ret, msg.rxObject);
-
if (ret == 0) {
if (!msg.rxObject) {
qemuReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR, "%s",
--
1.7.3.4
12 years, 8 months
[libvirt] [PATCH] pyhton: Don't link against libvirt_util.la
by Michal Privoznik
As we already link with libvirt.la which contains libvirt_utils.la.
Double linking causes global symbols to be presented twice and
thus confusion. This partially reverts c700613b8d463212d142c97108b7a2352e23e559
---
python/Makefile.am | 2 --
1 files changed, 0 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/python/Makefile.am b/python/Makefile.am
index 9b791d7..0305bcc 100644
--- a/python/Makefile.am
+++ b/python/Makefile.am
@@ -41,11 +41,9 @@ EXTRA_DIST = \
if WITH_PYTHON
mylibs = \
$(top_builddir)/src/libvirt.la \
- $(top_builddir)/src/libvirt_util.la \
$(top_builddir)/gnulib/lib/libgnu.la
myqemulibs = \
$(top_builddir)/src/libvirt-qemu.la \
- $(top_builddir)/src/libvirt_util.la \
$(top_builddir)/gnulib/lib/libgnu.la
all-local: libvirt.py libvirt_qemu.py
--
1.7.3.4
12 years, 8 months