[libvirt] PATCH: 0/3: Run QEMU guests within a CGroup
by Daniel P. Berrange
Recent Linux kernels have a new concept of 'CGroups' which is a way to
group tasks on the system and apply policy to them as a whole. We already
use this in the LXC container driver, to control total memory usage of
things runing within a container.
This patch series is a proof of concept to make use of CGroups in the
QEMU driver. The idea is that we have a 3 level cgroup hierarchy
- Top level; contains the libvirtd daemon itself
- 2nd level: one per libvirt driver, but dos not contain any
processes.
- 3rd level: one per guest VM. Contains the QEMU process
The host admin can do control on the top level and 2nd level to set an
overall system policy. libvirt will then provide APIs / capabilities to
control individual VMs policy.
Daniel
--
|: Red Hat, Engineering, London -o- http://people.redhat.com/berrange/ :|
|: http://libvirt.org -o- http://virt-manager.org -o- http://ovirt.org :|
|: http://autobuild.org -o- http://search.cpan.org/~danberr/ :|
|: GnuPG: 7D3B9505 -o- F3C9 553F A1DA 4AC2 5648 23C1 B3DF F742 7D3B 9505 :|
15 years, 4 months
- 4
- 10
[libvirt] Multpile network interfaces have same MAC address
by David Mueller
I remember seeing this problem before, but I can't remember what the
resolution was, nor can I find a discussion of the issue in
the list archives or Bugzilla.
I've had my setup working for a while now, on both Fedora 8 and Fedora 10.
Now I'm trying to get it to work with CentOS 5 and
running into an old bug. My guest VM has multiple virtual network
interfaces, with the MAC address defined in the XML file used to
define the VM. However, I'm seeing each network interface getting the
same MAC addrss (the last one defined in the XML file) on
all if the interfaces when I run ifconfig in the guest.
Was there a workaround for this, or do I need to upgrade libvirt? CentOS
5.2 is what I'm working with; they haven't released 5.3
yet so I don't know if that will have a newer version.
# rpm -qa libvirt
libvirt-0.3.3-7.el5
# virsh version
Compiled against library: libvir 0.3.3
Using library: libvir 0.3.3
Using API: QEMU 0.3.3
Running hypervisor: QEMU 0.9.1
- David
15 years, 7 months
- 2
- 6
[libvirt] virDomainGetVcpus error with Fedora 10
by Kaitlin Rupert
Hi,
I'm running Fedora 10 with the following libvirt version: libvirt-0.6.0-3
I'm calling virDomainGetVcpus() with the following parameters:
virDomainGetVcpus(dom, info, max, NULL, 0); where max = 2 and dom and
info are both non-NULL.
However, I'm getting the following error from libvirt: libvir: Domain
error : invalid argument in virDomainGetVcpus
I tracked this down, and it's failing the if (cpumaps != NULL && maplen
< 1) check in libvirt.c because cpumaps is non-NULL. Which is very
strange because I'm definitely passing a NULL value.
Here's the relevant libvirtd debug:
15:38:07.332: debug : virGetDomain:287 : New hash entry 0x816ab0
15:38:07.332: debug : virDomainGetVcpus:4080 : domain=0x816ab0,
info=0x800530, maxinfo=2, cpumaps=0x7f8fb0, maplen=0
15:38:07.332: error : invalid argument in virDomainGetVcpus
libvir: Domain error : invalid argument in virDomainGetVcpus
15:38:07.332: debug : virDomainFree:1795 : domain=0x816ab0
Has anyone else hit this same issue?
--
Kaitlin Rupert
IBM Linux Technology Center
kaitlin(a)linux.vnet.ibm.com
15 years, 8 months
- 2
- 6
[libvirt] PATCH: 0/25: Full thread support for libvirt public API
by Daniel P. Berrange
This patch series is (mostly) aimed at providing full support for threads
in the libvirt API. Specifically we remove the restriction that a single
virConnectPtr is tied to a thread. Multiple threads can safely use the
same object (provided one doesn't free it behind another's back :-P )
This is tested to compile on Linux + Win32 (MinGW), hopefully doesn't
break Solaris, but I'll be testing that soon too.
I've tortured the patches in various nasty ways are they're now stable
enough to let loose and probably merge for wider testing. It'll probably
be easier to just fix future problems in tree, rather than maintain this
patchset longer.
The full patchset is also available here
http://berrange.fedorapeople.org/libvirt-threads-2009-01-13/
Daniel
--
|: Red Hat, Engineering, London -o- http://people.redhat.com/berrange/ :|
|: http://libvirt.org -o- http://virt-manager.org -o- http://ovirt.org :|
|: http://autobuild.org -o- http://search.cpan.org/~danberr/ :|
|: GnuPG: 7D3B9505 -o- F3C9 553F A1DA 4AC2 5648 23C1 B3DF F742 7D3B 9505 :|
15 years, 8 months
- 7
- 166
[libvirt] [PATCH 0/1] Merge DanPB's SCSI HBA pool code
by David Allan
This patch contains the implementation Daniel Berrange did of storage pools using SCSI HBAs. I have updated it for the current tree in preparation for implementing NPIV support. Let me know what you think.
I would also like feedback on the integration into the build system, particularly where POLKIT_CFLAGS should go.
Dave
15 years, 8 months
- 6
- 18
[libvirt] [PATCH] Use posix_fallocate() to allocate disk space
by Amit Shah
Hi,
This is an untested patch to make disk allocations faster and
non-fragmented. I'm using posix_fallocate() now but relying on glibc
really calling fallocate() if it exists for the file system to be the
fastest.
- This fails build because libutil needs to be added as a dependency?
../src/.libs/libvirt_driver_storage.a(storage_backend_fs.o): In function
`virStorageBackendFileSystemVolCreate':
/home/amit/src/libvirt/src/storage_backend_fs.c:1023: undefined
reference to `safezero'
- What's vol->capacity? Why is ftruncate() needed after the call to
(current) safewrite()? My assumption is that the user can specify some
max. capacity and wish to allocate only a chunk off it at create-time.
Is that correct?
The best case to get a non-fragmented VM image is to have it allocated
completely at create-time with fallocate().
Currently xfs and ext4 support the fallocate() syscall (btrfs will, too,
when it's ready).
Comments?
Amit
>From dfe4780f5990571f026e02e6187cb64505c982c1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Amit Shah <amit.shah(a)redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 24 Feb 2009 16:55:58 +0530
Subject: [PATCH] Use posix_fallocate() to allocate disk space
Using posix_fallocate() to allocate disk space and fill it with zeros is faster
than writing the zeros block-by-block.
Also, for backing file systems that support the fallocate() syscall, this
operation will give us a big speed boost.
The biggest advantage of using this is the file will not be fragmented for the
allocated chunks.
Signed-off-by: Amit Shah <amit.shah(a)redhat.com>
---
src/storage_backend_fs.c | 23 ++++++++---------------
src/util.c | 5 +++++
src/util.h | 1 +
3 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/storage_backend_fs.c b/src/storage_backend_fs.c
index 240de96..74b0fda 100644
--- a/src/storage_backend_fs.c
+++ b/src/storage_backend_fs.c
@@ -1019,21 +1019,14 @@ virStorageBackendFileSystemVolCreate(virConnectPtr conn,
/* XXX slooooooooooooooooow.
* Need to add in progress bars & bg thread somehow */
if (vol->allocation) {
- unsigned long long remain = vol->allocation;
- static char const zeros[4096];
- while (remain) {
- int bytes = sizeof(zeros);
- if (bytes > remain)
- bytes = remain;
- if ((bytes = safewrite(fd, zeros, bytes)) < 0) {
- virReportSystemError(conn, errno,
- _("cannot fill file '%s'"),
- vol->target.path);
- unlink(vol->target.path);
- close(fd);
- return -1;
- }
- remain -= bytes;
+ int r;
+ if ((r = safezero(fd, 0, 0, vol->allocation)) < 0) {
+ virReportSystemError(conn, r,
+ _("cannot fill file '%s'"),
+ vol->target.path);
+ unlink(vol->target.path);
+ close(fd);
+ return -1;
}
}
diff --git a/src/util.c b/src/util.c
index 990433a..1bee7f0 100644
--- a/src/util.c
+++ b/src/util.c
@@ -117,6 +117,11 @@ ssize_t safewrite(int fd, const void *buf, size_t count)
return nwritten;
}
+int safezero(int fd, int flags, off_t offset, off_t len)
+{
+ return posix_fallocate(fd, offset, len);
+}
+
#ifndef PROXY
int virFileStripSuffix(char *str,
diff --git a/src/util.h b/src/util.h
index a79cfa7..acaabb1 100644
--- a/src/util.h
+++ b/src/util.h
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
int saferead(int fd, void *buf, size_t count);
ssize_t safewrite(int fd, const void *buf, size_t count);
+int safezero(int fd, int flags, off_t offset, off_t len);
enum {
VIR_EXEC_NONE = 0,
--
1.6.0.6
15 years, 8 months
- 3
- 6
[libvirt] Updated James Morris patch to apply to libvirt-0.6.0 version
by Daniel J Walsh
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1
Is this acceptable to upstream?
Dan
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: GnuPG v1.4.9 (GNU/Linux)
Comment: Using GnuPG with Fedora - http://enigmail.mozdev.org
iEYEARECAAYFAkma48EACgkQrlYvE4MpobMSBwCfXJnrlgoM0CuwdxF8BzcoQVvr
5pIAoNcKSrh+YsxNMjk8RgM4E7feUc4R
=iLJG
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
diff -up libvirt-0.6.0/include/libvirt/libvirt.h.in.svirt libvirt-0.6.0/include/libvirt/libvirt.h.in
--- libvirt-0.6.0/include/libvirt/libvirt.h.in.svirt 2009-01-20 08:48:27.000000000 -0500
+++ libvirt-0.6.0/include/libvirt/libvirt.h.in 2009-02-17 10:07:06.215686000 -0500
@@ -111,6 +111,68 @@ typedef enum {
} virDomainCreateFlags;
/**
+ * VIR_SECURITY_LABEL_BUFLEN:
+ *
+ * Macro providing the maximum length of the virSecurityLabel label string.
+ * Note that this value is based on that used by Labeled NFS.
+ */
+#define VIR_SECURITY_LABEL_BUFLEN (4096 + 1)
+
+/**
+ * virSecurityLabel:
+ *
+ * a virSecurityLabel is a structure filled by virDomainGetSecurityLabel(),
+ * providing the security label and associated attributes for the specified
+ * domain.
+ *
+ */
+typedef struct _virSecurityLabel {
+ char label[VIR_SECURITY_LABEL_BUFLEN]; /* security label string */
+ int enforcing; /* 1 if security policy is being enforced for domain */
+} virSecurityLabel;
+
+/**
+ * virSecurityLabelPtr:
+ *
+ * a virSecurityLabelPtr is a pointer to a virSecurityLabel.
+ */
+typedef virSecurityLabel *virSecurityLabelPtr;
+
+/**
+ * VIR_SECURITY_MODEL_BUFLEN:
+ *
+ * Macro providing the maximum length of the virSecurityModel model string.
+ */
+#define VIR_SECURITY_MODEL_BUFLEN (256 + 1)
+
+/**
+ * VIR_SECURITY_DOI_BUFLEN:
+ *
+ * Macro providing the maximum length of the virSecurityModel doi string.
+ */
+#define VIR_SECURITY_DOI_BUFLEN (256 + 1)
+
+/**
+ * virSecurityModel:
+ *
+ * a virSecurityModel is a structure filled by virNodeGetSecurityModel(),
+ * providing the per-hypervisor security model and DOI attributes for the
+ * specified domain.
+ *
+ */
+typedef struct _virSecurityModel {
+ char model[VIR_SECURITY_MODEL_BUFLEN]; /* security model string */
+ char doi[VIR_SECURITY_DOI_BUFLEN]; /* domain of interpetation */
+} virSecurityModel;
+
+/**
+ * virSecurityModelPtr:
+ *
+ * a virSecurityModelPtr is a pointer to a virSecurityModel.
+ */
+typedef virSecurityModel *virSecurityModelPtr;
+
+/**
* virNodeInfoPtr:
*
* a virNodeInfo is a structure filled by virNodeGetInfo() and providing
@@ -417,6 +479,9 @@ char * virConnectGetCap
unsigned long long virNodeGetFreeMemory (virConnectPtr conn);
+int virNodeGetSecurityModel (virConnectPtr conn,
+ virSecurityModelPtr secmodel);
+
/*
* Gather list of running domains
*/
@@ -506,6 +571,8 @@ int virDomainSetMaxM
int virDomainSetMemory (virDomainPtr domain,
unsigned long memory);
int virDomainGetMaxVcpus (virDomainPtr domain);
+int virDomainGetSecurityLabel (virDomainPtr domain,
+ virSecurityLabelPtr seclabel);
/*
* XML domain description
diff -up libvirt-0.6.0/include/libvirt/libvirt.h.svirt libvirt-0.6.0/include/libvirt/libvirt.h
--- libvirt-0.6.0/include/libvirt/libvirt.h.svirt 2009-01-31 04:20:10.000000000 -0500
+++ libvirt-0.6.0/include/libvirt/libvirt.h 2009-02-17 10:07:32.421570000 -0500
@@ -111,6 +111,68 @@ typedef enum {
} virDomainCreateFlags;
/**
+ * VIR_SECURITY_LABEL_BUFLEN:
+ *
+ * Macro providing the maximum length of the virSecurityLabel label string.
+ * Note that this value is based on that used by Labeled NFS.
+ */
+#define VIR_SECURITY_LABEL_BUFLEN (4096 + 1)
+
+/**
+ * virSecurityLabel:
+ *
+ * a virSecurityLabel is a structure filled by virDomainGetSecurityLabel(),
+ * providing the security label and associated attributes for the specified
+ * domain.
+ *
+ */
+typedef struct _virSecurityLabel {
+ char label[VIR_SECURITY_LABEL_BUFLEN]; /* security label string */
+ int enforcing; /* 1 if security policy is being enforced for domain */
+} virSecurityLabel;
+
+/**
+ * virSecurityLabelPtr:
+ *
+ * a virSecurityLabelPtr is a pointer to a virSecurityLabel.
+ */
+typedef virSecurityLabel *virSecurityLabelPtr;
+
+/**
+ * VIR_SECURITY_MODEL_BUFLEN:
+ *
+ * Macro providing the maximum length of the virSecurityModel model string.
+ */
+#define VIR_SECURITY_MODEL_BUFLEN (256 + 1)
+
+/**
+ * VIR_SECURITY_DOI_BUFLEN:
+ *
+ * Macro providing the maximum length of the virSecurityModel doi string.
+ */
+#define VIR_SECURITY_DOI_BUFLEN (256 + 1)
+
+/**
+ * virSecurityModel:
+ *
+ * a virSecurityModel is a structure filled by virNodeGetSecurityModel(),
+ * providing the per-hypervisor security model and DOI attributes for the
+ * specified domain.
+ *
+ */
+typedef struct _virSecurityModel {
+ char model[VIR_SECURITY_MODEL_BUFLEN]; /* security model string */
+ char doi[VIR_SECURITY_DOI_BUFLEN]; /* domain of interpetation */
+} virSecurityModel;
+
+/**
+ * virSecurityModelPtr:
+ *
+ * a virSecurityModelPtr is a pointer to a virSecurityModel.
+ */
+typedef virSecurityModel *virSecurityModelPtr;
+
+/**
* virNodeInfoPtr:
*
* a virNodeInfo is a structure filled by virNodeGetInfo() and providing
@@ -417,6 +479,9 @@ char * virConnectGetCap
unsigned long long virNodeGetFreeMemory (virConnectPtr conn);
+int virNodeGetSecurityModel (virConnectPtr conn,
+ virSecurityModelPtr secmodel);
+
/*
* Gather list of running domains
*/
@@ -506,6 +571,8 @@ int virDomainSetMaxM
int virDomainSetMemory (virDomainPtr domain,
unsigned long memory);
int virDomainGetMaxVcpus (virDomainPtr domain);
+int virDomainGetSecurityLabel (virDomainPtr domain,
+ virSecurityLabelPtr seclabel);
/*
* XML domain description
diff -up libvirt-0.6.0/include/libvirt/virterror.h.svirt libvirt-0.6.0/include/libvirt/virterror.h
--- libvirt-0.6.0/include/libvirt/virterror.h.svirt 2008-11-25 08:42:33.000000000 -0500
+++ libvirt-0.6.0/include/libvirt/virterror.h 2009-02-17 10:07:06.223677000 -0500
@@ -61,6 +61,7 @@ typedef enum {
VIR_FROM_UML, /* Error at the UML driver */
VIR_FROM_NODEDEV, /* Error from node device monitor */
VIR_FROM_XEN_INOTIFY, /* Error from xen inotify layer */
+ VIR_FROM_SECURITY, /* Error from security framework */
} virErrorDomain;
@@ -154,6 +155,7 @@ typedef enum {
VIR_WAR_NO_NODE, /* failed to start node driver */
VIR_ERR_INVALID_NODE_DEVICE,/* invalid node device object */
VIR_ERR_NO_NODE_DEVICE,/* node device not found */
+ VIR_ERR_NO_SECURITY_MODEL, /* security model not found */
} virErrorNumber;
/**
diff -up libvirt-0.6.0/po/POTFILES.in.svirt libvirt-0.6.0/po/POTFILES.in
--- libvirt-0.6.0/po/POTFILES.in.svirt 2009-01-31 04:04:17.000000000 -0500
+++ libvirt-0.6.0/po/POTFILES.in 2009-02-17 10:07:06.226679000 -0500
@@ -22,6 +22,8 @@ src/proxy_internal.c
src/qemu_conf.c
src/qemu_driver.c
src/remote_internal.c
+src/security.c
+src/security_selinux.c
src/storage_backend.c
src/storage_backend_disk.c
src/storage_backend_fs.c
diff -up libvirt-0.6.0/python/generator.py.svirt libvirt-0.6.0/python/generator.py
--- libvirt-0.6.0/python/generator.py.svirt 2008-11-21 07:47:32.000000000 -0500
+++ libvirt-0.6.0/python/generator.py 2009-02-17 10:07:06.230676000 -0500
@@ -342,6 +342,8 @@ skip_function = (
'virCopyLastError', # Python API is called virGetLastError instead
'virConnectOpenAuth', # Python C code is manually written
'virDefaultErrorFunc', # Python virErrorFuncHandler impl calls this from C
+ 'virDomainGetSecurityLabel', # Needs investigation...
+ 'virNodeGetSecurityModel', # Needs investigation...
'virConnectDomainEventRegister', # overridden in virConnect.py
'virConnectDomainEventDeregister', # overridden in virConnect.py
)
diff -up libvirt-0.6.0/qemud/Makefile.am.svirt libvirt-0.6.0/qemud/Makefile.am
--- libvirt-0.6.0/qemud/Makefile.am.svirt 2009-01-31 04:04:17.000000000 -0500
+++ libvirt-0.6.0/qemud/Makefile.am 2009-02-17 10:07:06.237678000 -0500
@@ -130,6 +130,7 @@ libvirtd_LDADD += ../src/libvirt_driver_
endif
endif
+libvirtd_LDADD += ../src/libvirt_driver_security.la
libvirtd_LDADD += ../src/libvirt.la
if HAVE_POLKIT
diff -up libvirt-0.6.0/qemud/remote.c.svirt libvirt-0.6.0/qemud/remote.c
--- libvirt-0.6.0/qemud/remote.c.svirt 2009-01-31 04:04:17.000000000 -0500
+++ libvirt-0.6.0/qemud/remote.c 2009-02-17 10:07:06.246680000 -0500
@@ -1340,6 +1340,76 @@ remoteDispatchDomainGetMaxVcpus (struct
}
static int
+remoteDispatchDomainGetSecurityLabel(struct qemud_server *server ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED,
+ struct qemud_client *client ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED,
+ virConnectPtr conn,
+ remote_error *rerr,
+ remote_domain_get_security_label_args *args,
+ remote_domain_get_security_label_ret *ret)
+{
+ virDomainPtr dom;
+ virSecurityLabel seclabel;
+
+ dom = get_nonnull_domain(conn, args->dom);
+ if (dom == NULL) {
+ remoteDispatchConnError(rerr, conn);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ memset(&seclabel, 0, sizeof seclabel);
+ if (virDomainGetSecurityLabel(dom, &seclabel) == -1) {
+ virDomainFree(dom);
+ remoteDispatchFormatError(rerr, "%s", _("unable to get security label"));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ ret->label.label_len = strlen(seclabel.label) + 1;
+ if (VIR_ALLOC_N(ret->label.label_val, ret->label.label_len) < 0) {
+ virDomainFree(dom);
+ remoteDispatchOOMError(rerr);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ strcpy(ret->label.label_val, seclabel.label);
+ ret->enforcing = seclabel.enforcing;
+ virDomainFree(dom);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+remoteDispatchNodeGetSecurityModel(struct qemud_server *server ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED,
+ struct qemud_client *client ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED,
+ virConnectPtr conn,
+ remote_error *rerr,
+ void *args ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED,
+ remote_node_get_security_model_ret *ret)
+{
+ virSecurityModel secmodel;
+
+ memset(&secmodel, 0, sizeof secmodel);
+ if (virNodeGetSecurityModel(conn, &secmodel) == -1) {
+ remoteDispatchFormatError(rerr, "%s", _("unable to get security model"));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ ret->model.model_len = strlen(secmodel.model) + 1;
+ if (VIR_ALLOC_N(ret->model.model_val, ret->model.model_len) < 0) {
+ remoteDispatchOOMError(rerr);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ strcpy(ret->model.model_val, secmodel.model);
+
+ ret->doi.doi_len = strlen(secmodel.doi) + 1;
+ if (VIR_ALLOC_N(ret->doi.doi_val, ret->doi.doi_len) < 0) {
+ remoteDispatchOOMError(rerr);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ strcpy(ret->doi.doi_val, secmodel.doi);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
remoteDispatchDomainGetOsType (struct qemud_server *server ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED,
struct qemud_client *client ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED,
virConnectPtr conn,
diff -up libvirt-0.6.0/qemud/remote_dispatch_args.h.svirt libvirt-0.6.0/qemud/remote_dispatch_args.h
--- libvirt-0.6.0/qemud/remote_dispatch_args.h.svirt 2008-12-19 09:00:02.000000000 -0500
+++ libvirt-0.6.0/qemud/remote_dispatch_args.h 2009-02-17 10:07:06.250678000 -0500
@@ -99,3 +99,4 @@
remote_node_device_get_parent_args val_remote_node_device_get_parent_args;
remote_node_device_num_of_caps_args val_remote_node_device_num_of_caps_args;
remote_node_device_list_caps_args val_remote_node_device_list_caps_args;
+ remote_domain_get_security_label_args val_remote_domain_get_security_label_args;
diff -up libvirt-0.6.0/qemud/remote_dispatch_prototypes.h.svirt libvirt-0.6.0/qemud/remote_dispatch_prototypes.h
--- libvirt-0.6.0/qemud/remote_dispatch_prototypes.h.svirt 2008-12-19 09:00:02.000000000 -0500
+++ libvirt-0.6.0/qemud/remote_dispatch_prototypes.h 2009-02-17 10:07:06.255676000 -0500
@@ -184,6 +184,13 @@ static int remoteDispatchDomainGetSchedu
remote_error *err,
remote_domain_get_scheduler_type_args *args,
remote_domain_get_scheduler_type_ret *ret);
+static int remoteDispatchDomainGetSecurityLabel(
+ struct qemud_server *server,
+ struct qemud_client *client,
+ virConnectPtr conn,
+ remote_error *err,
+ remote_domain_get_security_label_args *args,
+ remote_domain_get_security_label_ret *ret);
static int remoteDispatchDomainGetVcpus(
struct qemud_server *server,
struct qemud_client *client,
@@ -576,6 +583,13 @@ static int remoteDispatchNodeGetInfo(
remote_error *err,
void *args,
remote_node_get_info_ret *ret);
+static int remoteDispatchNodeGetSecurityModel(
+ struct qemud_server *server,
+ struct qemud_client *client,
+ virConnectPtr conn,
+ remote_error *err,
+ void *args,
+ remote_node_get_security_model_ret *ret);
static int remoteDispatchNodeListDevices(
struct qemud_server *server,
struct qemud_client *client,
diff -up libvirt-0.6.0/qemud/remote_dispatch_ret.h.svirt libvirt-0.6.0/qemud/remote_dispatch_ret.h
--- libvirt-0.6.0/qemud/remote_dispatch_ret.h.svirt 2008-12-19 09:00:02.000000000 -0500
+++ libvirt-0.6.0/qemud/remote_dispatch_ret.h 2009-02-17 10:07:06.259676000 -0500
@@ -86,3 +86,5 @@
remote_node_device_get_parent_ret val_remote_node_device_get_parent_ret;
remote_node_device_num_of_caps_ret val_remote_node_device_num_of_caps_ret;
remote_node_device_list_caps_ret val_remote_node_device_list_caps_ret;
+ remote_domain_get_security_label_ret val_remote_domain_get_security_label_ret;
+ remote_node_get_security_model_ret val_remote_node_get_security_model_ret;
diff -up libvirt-0.6.0/qemud/remote_dispatch_table.h.svirt libvirt-0.6.0/qemud/remote_dispatch_table.h
--- libvirt-0.6.0/qemud/remote_dispatch_table.h.svirt 2008-12-19 09:00:02.000000000 -0500
+++ libvirt-0.6.0/qemud/remote_dispatch_table.h 2009-02-17 10:07:06.263676000 -0500
@@ -592,3 +592,13 @@
.args_filter = (xdrproc_t) xdr_remote_node_device_list_caps_args,
.ret_filter = (xdrproc_t) xdr_remote_node_device_list_caps_ret,
},
+{ /* DomainGetSecurityLabel => 118 */
+ .fn = (dispatch_fn) remoteDispatchDomainGetSecurityLabel,
+ .args_filter = (xdrproc_t) xdr_remote_domain_get_security_label_args,
+ .ret_filter = (xdrproc_t) xdr_remote_domain_get_security_label_ret,
+},
+{ /* NodeGetSecurityModel => 119 */
+ .fn = (dispatch_fn) remoteDispatchNodeGetSecurityModel,
+ .args_filter = (xdrproc_t) xdr_void,
+ .ret_filter = (xdrproc_t) xdr_remote_node_get_security_model_ret,
+},
diff -up libvirt-0.6.0/qemud/remote_protocol.c.svirt libvirt-0.6.0/qemud/remote_protocol.c
--- libvirt-0.6.0/qemud/remote_protocol.c.svirt 2009-01-31 04:04:17.000000000 -0500
+++ libvirt-0.6.0/qemud/remote_protocol.c 2009-02-17 10:07:06.268676000 -0500
@@ -1166,6 +1166,43 @@ xdr_remote_domain_get_max_vcpus_ret (XDR
}
bool_t
+xdr_remote_domain_get_security_label_args (XDR *xdrs, remote_domain_get_security_label_args *objp)
+{
+
+ if (!xdr_remote_nonnull_domain (xdrs, &objp->dom))
+ return FALSE;
+ return TRUE;
+}
+
+bool_t
+xdr_remote_domain_get_security_label_ret (XDR *xdrs, remote_domain_get_security_label_ret *objp)
+{
+ char **objp_cpp0 = (char **) (void *) &objp->label.label_val;
+
+ if (!xdr_array (xdrs, objp_cpp0, (u_int *) &objp->label.label_len, REMOTE_SECURITY_LABEL_MAX,
+ sizeof (char), (xdrproc_t) xdr_char))
+ return FALSE;
+ if (!xdr_int (xdrs, &objp->enforcing))
+ return FALSE;
+ return TRUE;
+}
+
+bool_t
+xdr_remote_node_get_security_model_ret (XDR *xdrs, remote_node_get_security_model_ret *objp)
+{
+ char **objp_cpp1 = (char **) (void *) &objp->doi.doi_val;
+ char **objp_cpp0 = (char **) (void *) &objp->model.model_val;
+
+ if (!xdr_array (xdrs, objp_cpp0, (u_int *) &objp->model.model_len, REMOTE_SECURITY_MODEL_MAX,
+ sizeof (char), (xdrproc_t) xdr_char))
+ return FALSE;
+ if (!xdr_array (xdrs, objp_cpp1, (u_int *) &objp->doi.doi_len, REMOTE_SECURITY_DOI_MAX,
+ sizeof (char), (xdrproc_t) xdr_char))
+ return FALSE;
+ return TRUE;
+}
+
+bool_t
xdr_remote_domain_attach_device_args (XDR *xdrs, remote_domain_attach_device_args *objp)
{
diff -up libvirt-0.6.0/qemud/remote_protocol.h.svirt libvirt-0.6.0/qemud/remote_protocol.h
--- libvirt-0.6.0/qemud/remote_protocol.h.svirt 2009-01-31 04:04:17.000000000 -0500
+++ libvirt-0.6.0/qemud/remote_protocol.h 2009-02-17 10:07:06.274679000 -0500
@@ -38,6 +38,9 @@ typedef remote_nonnull_string *remote_st
#define REMOTE_AUTH_TYPE_LIST_MAX 20
#define REMOTE_DOMAIN_BLOCK_PEEK_BUFFER_MAX 65536
#define REMOTE_DOMAIN_MEMORY_PEEK_BUFFER_MAX 65536
+#define REMOTE_SECURITY_MODEL_MAX VIR_SECURITY_MODEL_BUFLEN
+#define REMOTE_SECURITY_LABEL_MAX VIR_SECURITY_LABEL_BUFLEN
+#define REMOTE_SECURITY_DOI_MAX VIR_SECURITY_DOI_BUFLEN
typedef char remote_uuid[VIR_UUID_BUFLEN];
@@ -637,6 +640,32 @@ struct remote_domain_get_max_vcpus_ret {
};
typedef struct remote_domain_get_max_vcpus_ret remote_domain_get_max_vcpus_ret;
+struct remote_domain_get_security_label_args {
+ remote_nonnull_domain dom;
+};
+typedef struct remote_domain_get_security_label_args remote_domain_get_security_label_args;
+
+struct remote_domain_get_security_label_ret {
+ struct {
+ u_int label_len;
+ char *label_val;
+ } label;
+ int enforcing;
+};
+typedef struct remote_domain_get_security_label_ret remote_domain_get_security_label_ret;
+
+struct remote_node_get_security_model_ret {
+ struct {
+ u_int model_len;
+ char *model_val;
+ } model;
+ struct {
+ u_int doi_len;
+ char *doi_val;
+ } doi;
+};
+typedef struct remote_node_get_security_model_ret remote_node_get_security_model_ret;
+
struct remote_domain_attach_device_args {
remote_nonnull_domain dom;
remote_nonnull_string xml;
@@ -1348,6 +1377,8 @@ enum remote_procedure {
REMOTE_PROC_NODE_DEVICE_GET_PARENT = 115,
REMOTE_PROC_NODE_DEVICE_NUM_OF_CAPS = 116,
REMOTE_PROC_NODE_DEVICE_LIST_CAPS = 117,
+ REMOTE_PROC_DOMAIN_GET_SECURITY_LABEL = 118,
+ REMOTE_PROC_NODE_GET_SECURITY_MODEL = 119,
};
typedef enum remote_procedure remote_procedure;
@@ -1474,6 +1505,9 @@ extern bool_t xdr_remote_domain_get_vcp
extern bool_t xdr_remote_domain_get_vcpus_ret (XDR *, remote_domain_get_vcpus_ret*);
extern bool_t xdr_remote_domain_get_max_vcpus_args (XDR *, remote_domain_get_max_vcpus_args*);
extern bool_t xdr_remote_domain_get_max_vcpus_ret (XDR *, remote_domain_get_max_vcpus_ret*);
+extern bool_t xdr_remote_domain_get_security_label_args (XDR *, remote_domain_get_security_label_args*);
+extern bool_t xdr_remote_domain_get_security_label_ret (XDR *, remote_domain_get_security_label_ret*);
+extern bool_t xdr_remote_node_get_security_model_ret (XDR *, remote_node_get_security_model_ret*);
extern bool_t xdr_remote_domain_attach_device_args (XDR *, remote_domain_attach_device_args*);
extern bool_t xdr_remote_domain_detach_device_args (XDR *, remote_domain_detach_device_args*);
extern bool_t xdr_remote_domain_get_autostart_args (XDR *, remote_domain_get_autostart_args*);
@@ -1679,6 +1713,9 @@ extern bool_t xdr_remote_domain_get_vcpu
extern bool_t xdr_remote_domain_get_vcpus_ret ();
extern bool_t xdr_remote_domain_get_max_vcpus_args ();
extern bool_t xdr_remote_domain_get_max_vcpus_ret ();
+extern bool_t xdr_remote_domain_get_security_label_args ();
+extern bool_t xdr_remote_domain_get_security_label_ret ();
+extern bool_t xdr_remote_node_get_security_model_ret ();
extern bool_t xdr_remote_domain_attach_device_args ();
extern bool_t xdr_remote_domain_detach_device_args ();
extern bool_t xdr_remote_domain_get_autostart_args ();
diff -up libvirt-0.6.0/qemud/remote_protocol.x.svirt libvirt-0.6.0/qemud/remote_protocol.x
--- libvirt-0.6.0/qemud/remote_protocol.x.svirt 2008-12-19 07:51:11.000000000 -0500
+++ libvirt-0.6.0/qemud/remote_protocol.x 2009-02-17 10:07:06.279676000 -0500
@@ -115,6 +115,21 @@ const REMOTE_DOMAIN_BLOCK_PEEK_BUFFER_MA
*/
const REMOTE_DOMAIN_MEMORY_PEEK_BUFFER_MAX = 65536;
+/*
+ * Maximum length of a security model field.
+ */
+const REMOTE_SECURITY_MODEL_MAX = VIR_SECURITY_MODEL_BUFLEN;
+
+/*
+ * Maximum length of a security label field.
+ */
+const REMOTE_SECURITY_LABEL_MAX = VIR_SECURITY_LABEL_BUFLEN;
+
+/*
+ * Maximum length of a security DOI field.
+ */
+const REMOTE_SECURITY_DOI_MAX = VIR_SECURITY_DOI_BUFLEN;
+
/* UUID. VIR_UUID_BUFLEN definition comes from libvirt.h */
typedef opaque remote_uuid[VIR_UUID_BUFLEN];
@@ -617,6 +632,20 @@ struct remote_domain_get_max_vcpus_ret {
int num;
};
+struct remote_domain_get_security_label_args {
+ remote_nonnull_domain dom;
+};
+
+struct remote_domain_get_security_label_ret {
+ char label<REMOTE_SECURITY_LABEL_MAX>;
+ int enforcing;
+};
+
+struct remote_node_get_security_model_ret {
+ char model<REMOTE_SECURITY_MODEL_MAX>;
+ char doi<REMOTE_SECURITY_DOI_MAX>;
+};
+
struct remote_domain_attach_device_args {
remote_nonnull_domain dom;
remote_nonnull_string xml;
@@ -1223,7 +1252,10 @@ enum remote_procedure {
REMOTE_PROC_NODE_DEVICE_DUMP_XML = 114,
REMOTE_PROC_NODE_DEVICE_GET_PARENT = 115,
REMOTE_PROC_NODE_DEVICE_NUM_OF_CAPS = 116,
- REMOTE_PROC_NODE_DEVICE_LIST_CAPS = 117
+ REMOTE_PROC_NODE_DEVICE_LIST_CAPS = 117,
+
+ REMOTE_PROC_DOMAIN_GET_SECURITY_LABEL = 118,
+ REMOTE_PROC_NODE_GET_SECURITY_MODEL = 119
};
/* Custom RPC structure. */
diff -up libvirt-0.6.0/src/capabilities.c.svirt libvirt-0.6.0/src/capabilities.c
--- libvirt-0.6.0/src/capabilities.c.svirt 2009-01-31 04:04:17.000000000 -0500
+++ libvirt-0.6.0/src/capabilities.c 2009-02-17 10:07:06.285678000 -0500
@@ -150,6 +150,8 @@ virCapabilitiesFree(virCapsPtr caps) {
VIR_FREE(caps->host.migrateTrans);
VIR_FREE(caps->host.arch);
+ VIR_FREE(caps->host.secModel.model);
+ VIR_FREE(caps->host.secModel.doi);
VIR_FREE(caps);
}
@@ -599,6 +601,14 @@ virCapabilitiesFormatXML(virCapsPtr caps
virBufferAddLit(&xml, " </cells>\n");
virBufferAddLit(&xml, " </topology>\n");
}
+
+ if (caps->host.secModel.model) {
+ virBufferAddLit(&xml, " <secmodel>\n");
+ virBufferVSprintf(&xml, " <model>%s</model>\n", caps->host.secModel.model);
+ virBufferVSprintf(&xml, " <doi>%s</doi>\n", caps->host.secModel.doi);
+ virBufferAddLit(&xml, " </secmodel>\n");
+ }
+
virBufferAddLit(&xml, " </host>\n\n");
diff -up libvirt-0.6.0/src/capabilities.h.svirt libvirt-0.6.0/src/capabilities.h
--- libvirt-0.6.0/src/capabilities.h.svirt 2009-01-31 04:04:17.000000000 -0500
+++ libvirt-0.6.0/src/capabilities.h 2009-02-17 10:07:06.292677000 -0500
@@ -78,6 +78,12 @@ struct _virCapsHostNUMACell {
int *cpus;
};
+typedef struct _virCapsHostSecModel virCapsHostSecModel;
+struct _virCapsHostSecModel {
+ char *model;
+ char *doi;
+};
+
typedef struct _virCapsHost virCapsHost;
typedef virCapsHost *virCapsHostPtr;
struct _virCapsHost {
@@ -90,6 +96,7 @@ struct _virCapsHost {
char **migrateTrans;
int nnumaCell;
virCapsHostNUMACellPtr *numaCell;
+ virCapsHostSecModel secModel;
};
typedef struct _virCaps virCaps;
diff -up libvirt-0.6.0/src/domain_conf.c.svirt libvirt-0.6.0/src/domain_conf.c
--- libvirt-0.6.0/src/domain_conf.c.svirt 2009-02-17 10:07:06.195708000 -0500
+++ libvirt-0.6.0/src/domain_conf.c 2009-02-17 10:07:06.300677000 -0500
@@ -379,6 +379,16 @@ void virDomainDeviceDefFree(virDomainDev
VIR_FREE(def);
}
+void virSecurityLabelDefFree(virDomainDefPtr def);
+
+void virSecurityLabelDefFree(virDomainDefPtr def)
+{
+ if (def->seclabel.model)
+ VIR_FREE(def->seclabel.model);
+ if (def->seclabel.label)
+ VIR_FREE(def->seclabel.label);
+}
+
void virDomainDefFree(virDomainDefPtr def)
{
unsigned int i;
@@ -437,6 +447,8 @@ void virDomainDefFree(virDomainDefPtr de
VIR_FREE(def->cpumask);
VIR_FREE(def->emulator);
+ virSecurityLabelDefFree(def);
+
VIR_FREE(def);
}
@@ -1818,6 +1830,34 @@ static int virDomainLifecycleParseXML(vi
return 0;
}
+static int
+virSecurityLabelDefParseXML(virConnectPtr conn,
+ const virDomainDefPtr def,
+ xmlXPathContextPtr ctxt)
+{
+ char *p;
+
+ if (virXPathNode(conn, "./seclabel", ctxt) == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ p = virXPathStringLimit(conn, "string(./seclabel/label[1])",
+ VIR_SECURITY_LABEL_BUFLEN-1, ctxt);
+ if (p == NULL)
+ goto error;
+ def->seclabel.label = p;
+
+ p = virXPathStringLimit(conn, "string(./seclabel/@model)",
+ VIR_SECURITY_MODEL_BUFLEN-1, ctxt);
+ if (p == NULL)
+ goto error;
+ def->seclabel.model = p;
+
+ return 0;
+
+error:
+ virSecurityLabelDefFree(def);
+ return -1;
+}
virDomainDeviceDefPtr virDomainDeviceDefParse(virConnectPtr conn,
virCapsPtr caps,
@@ -2403,6 +2443,10 @@ static virDomainDefPtr virDomainDefParse
}
VIR_FREE(nodes);
+ /* analysis of security label */
+ if (virSecurityLabelDefParseXML(conn, def, ctxt) == -1)
+ goto error;
+
return def;
no_memory:
@@ -3420,6 +3464,13 @@ char *virDomainDefFormat(virConnectPtr c
goto cleanup;
virBufferAddLit(&buf, " </devices>\n");
+
+ if (def->seclabel.model) {
+ virBufferEscapeString(&buf, " <seclabel model='%s'>\n", def->seclabel.model);
+ virBufferEscapeString(&buf, " <label>%s</label>\n", def->seclabel.label);
+ virBufferAddLit(&buf, " </seclabel>\n");
+ }
+
virBufferAddLit(&buf, "</domain>\n");
if (virBufferError(&buf))
diff -up libvirt-0.6.0/src/domain_conf.h.svirt libvirt-0.6.0/src/domain_conf.h
--- libvirt-0.6.0/src/domain_conf.h.svirt 2009-01-31 04:04:17.000000000 -0500
+++ libvirt-0.6.0/src/domain_conf.h 2009-02-17 10:07:06.307676000 -0500
@@ -407,6 +407,14 @@ struct _virDomainOSDef {
char *bootloaderArgs;
};
+/* Security configuration for domain */
+typedef struct _virSecurityLabelDef virSecurityLabelDef;
+typedef virSecurityLabelDef *virSecurityLabelDefPtr;
+struct _virSecurityLabelDef {
+ char *model; /* name of security model */
+ char *label; /* security label string */
+};
+
#define VIR_DOMAIN_CPUMASK_LEN 1024
/* Guest VM main configuration */
@@ -464,6 +472,7 @@ struct _virDomainDef {
/* Only 1 */
virDomainChrDefPtr console;
+ virSecurityLabelDef seclabel;
};
/* Guest VM runtime state */
diff -up libvirt-0.6.0/src/driver.h.svirt libvirt-0.6.0/src/driver.h
--- libvirt-0.6.0/src/driver.h.svirt 2008-12-19 07:51:11.000000000 -0500
+++ libvirt-0.6.0/src/driver.h 2009-02-17 10:07:06.313676000 -0500
@@ -181,6 +181,12 @@ typedef int
typedef int
(*virDrvDomainGetMaxVcpus) (virDomainPtr domain);
typedef int
+ (*virDrvDomainGetSecurityLabel) (virDomainPtr domain,
+ virSecurityLabelPtr seclabel);
+typedef int
+ (*virDrvNodeGetSecurityModel) (virConnectPtr conn,
+ virSecurityModelPtr secmodel);
+typedef int
(*virDrvDomainAttachDevice) (virDomainPtr domain,
const char *xml);
typedef int
@@ -361,6 +367,8 @@ struct _virDriver {
virDrvDomainPinVcpu domainPinVcpu;
virDrvDomainGetVcpus domainGetVcpus;
virDrvDomainGetMaxVcpus domainGetMaxVcpus;
+ virDrvDomainGetSecurityLabel domainGetSecurityLabel;
+ virDrvNodeGetSecurityModel nodeGetSecurityModel;
virDrvDomainDumpXML domainDumpXML;
virDrvListDefinedDomains listDefinedDomains;
virDrvNumOfDefinedDomains numOfDefinedDomains;
diff -up libvirt-0.6.0/src/libvirt.c.svirt libvirt-0.6.0/src/libvirt.c
--- libvirt-0.6.0/src/libvirt.c.svirt 2009-01-31 04:04:17.000000000 -0500
+++ libvirt-0.6.0/src/libvirt.c 2009-02-17 10:07:06.332683000 -0500
@@ -4156,6 +4156,70 @@ error:
return -1;
}
+/**
+ * virDomainGetSecurityLabel:
+ * @domain: a domain object
+ * @seclabel: pointer to a virSecurityLabel structure
+ *
+ * Extract security label of an active domain.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 in case of success, -1 in case of failure, and -2
+ * if the operation is not supported (caller decides if that's
+ * an error).
+ */
+int
+virDomainGetSecurityLabel(virDomainPtr domain, virSecurityLabelPtr seclabel)
+{
+ virConnectPtr conn;
+
+ if (!VIR_IS_CONNECTED_DOMAIN(domain)) {
+ virLibDomainError(NULL, VIR_ERR_INVALID_DOMAIN, __FUNCTION__);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (seclabel == NULL) {
+ virLibDomainError(domain, VIR_ERR_INVALID_ARG, __FUNCTION__);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ conn = domain->conn;
+
+ if (conn->driver->domainGetSecurityLabel)
+ return conn->driver->domainGetSecurityLabel(domain, seclabel);
+
+ virLibConnWarning(conn, VIR_ERR_NO_SUPPORT, __FUNCTION__);
+ return -2;
+}
+
+/**
+ * virNodeGetSecurityModel:
+ * @conn: a connection object
+ * @secmodel: pointer to a virSecurityModel structure
+ *
+ * Extract the security model of a hypervisor.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 in case of success, -1 in case of failure, and -2 if the
+ * operation is not supported (caller decides if that's an error).
+ */
+int
+virNodeGetSecurityModel(virConnectPtr conn, virSecurityModelPtr secmodel)
+{
+ if (!VIR_IS_CONNECT(conn)) {
+ virLibConnError(conn, VIR_ERR_INVALID_CONN, __FUNCTION__);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (secmodel == NULL) {
+ virLibConnError(conn, VIR_ERR_INVALID_ARG, __FUNCTION__);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (conn->driver->nodeGetSecurityModel)
+ return conn->driver->nodeGetSecurityModel(conn, secmodel);
+
+ virLibConnWarning(conn, VIR_ERR_NO_SUPPORT, __FUNCTION__);
+ return -2;
+}
/**
* virDomainAttachDevice:
diff -up libvirt-0.6.0/src/libvirt_private.syms.svirt libvirt-0.6.0/src/libvirt_private.syms
--- libvirt-0.6.0/src/libvirt_private.syms.svirt 2009-01-31 04:04:17.000000000 -0500
+++ libvirt-0.6.0/src/libvirt_private.syms 2009-02-17 10:36:52.867582000 -0500
@@ -334,3 +334,4 @@ virXPathNode;
virXPathNodeSet;
virXPathString;
virXMLPropString;
+virXPathStringLimit;
diff -up libvirt-0.6.0/src/libvirt_public.syms.svirt libvirt-0.6.0/src/libvirt_public.syms
--- libvirt-0.6.0/src/libvirt_public.syms.svirt 2009-01-20 08:48:28.000000000 -0500
+++ libvirt-0.6.0/src/libvirt_public.syms 2009-02-17 10:37:09.630287000 -0500
@@ -244,7 +244,8 @@ LIBVIRT_0.6.0 {
virStoragePoolRef;
virStorageVolRef;
virNodeDeviceRef;
-
+ virDomainGetSecurityLabel;
+ virNodeGetSecurityModel;
} LIBVIRT_0.5.0;
# .... define new API here using predicted next version number ....
diff -up libvirt-0.6.0/src/lxc_driver.c.svirt libvirt-0.6.0/src/lxc_driver.c
--- libvirt-0.6.0/src/lxc_driver.c.svirt 2009-01-31 04:04:17.000000000 -0500
+++ libvirt-0.6.0/src/lxc_driver.c 2009-02-17 10:07:06.339677000 -0500
@@ -1430,6 +1430,8 @@ static virDriver lxcDriver = {
NULL, /* domainPinVcpu */
NULL, /* domainGetVcpus */
NULL, /* domainGetMaxVcpus */
+ NULL, /* domainGetSecurityLabel */
+ NULL, /* nodeGetSecurityModel */
lxcDomainDumpXML, /* domainDumpXML */
lxcListDefinedDomains, /* listDefinedDomains */
lxcNumDefinedDomains, /* numOfDefinedDomains */
diff -up libvirt-0.6.0/src/Makefile.am.svirt libvirt-0.6.0/src/Makefile.am
--- libvirt-0.6.0/src/Makefile.am.svirt 2009-01-31 04:04:17.000000000 -0500
+++ libvirt-0.6.0/src/Makefile.am 2009-02-17 10:07:06.346676000 -0500
@@ -139,7 +139,7 @@ UML_DRIVER_SOURCES = \
NETWORK_DRIVER_SOURCES = \
network_driver.h network_driver.c
-# And finally storage backend specific impls
+# Storage backend specific impls
STORAGE_DRIVER_SOURCES = \
storage_driver.h storage_driver.c \
storage_backend.h storage_backend.c
@@ -164,6 +164,12 @@ STORAGE_DRIVER_DISK_SOURCES = \
STORAGE_HELPER_DISK_SOURCES = \
parthelper.c
+# Security framework and drivers for various models
+SECURITY_DRIVER_SOURCES = \
+ security.h security.c
+
+SECURITY_DRIVER_SELINUX_SOURCES = \
+ security_selinux.h security_selinux.c
NODE_DEVICE_DRIVER_SOURCES = \
node_device.c node_device.h
@@ -377,6 +383,19 @@ libvirt_driver_nodedev_la_LDFLAGS += -mo
endif
endif
+libvirt_driver_security_la_SOURCES = $(SECURITY_DRIVER_SOURCES)
+if WITH_DRIVER_MODULES
+mod_LTLIBRARIES += libvirt_driver_security.la
+else
+noinst_LTLIBRARIES += libvirt_driver_security.la
+endif
+if WITH_DRIVER_MODULES
+libvirt_driver_security_la_LDFLAGS = -module -avoid-version
+endif
+
+if HAVE_SELINUX
+libvirt_driver_security_la_SOURCES += $(SECURITY_DRIVER_SELINUX_SOURCES)
+endif
# Add all conditional sources just in case...
EXTRA_DIST += \
@@ -395,7 +414,9 @@ EXTRA_DIST += \
$(STORAGE_DRIVER_DISK_SOURCES) \
$(NODE_DEVICE_DRIVER_SOURCES) \
$(NODE_DEVICE_DRIVER_HAL_SOURCES) \
- $(NODE_DEVICE_DRIVER_DEVKIT_SOURCES)
+ $(NODE_DEVICE_DRIVER_DEVKIT_SOURCES) \
+ $(SECURITY_DRIVER_SOURCES) \
+ $(SECURITY_DRIVER_SELINUX_SOURCES)
#
# Build our version script. This is composed of three parts:
diff -up libvirt-0.6.0/src/openvz_driver.c.svirt libvirt-0.6.0/src/openvz_driver.c
--- libvirt-0.6.0/src/openvz_driver.c.svirt 2009-01-31 04:04:18.000000000 -0500
+++ libvirt-0.6.0/src/openvz_driver.c 2009-02-17 10:07:06.362676000 -0500
@@ -1299,6 +1299,8 @@ static virDriver openvzDriver = {
NULL, /* domainPinVcpu */
NULL, /* domainGetVcpus */
openvzDomainGetMaxVcpus, /* domainGetMaxVcpus */
+ NULL, /* domainGetSecurityLabel */
+ NULL, /* nodeGetSecurityModel */
openvzDomainDumpXML, /* domainDumpXML */
openvzListDefinedDomains, /* listDomains */
openvzNumDefinedDomains, /* numOfDomains */
diff -up libvirt-0.6.0/src/qemu_conf.h.svirt libvirt-0.6.0/src/qemu_conf.h
--- libvirt-0.6.0/src/qemu_conf.h.svirt 2009-01-31 04:04:18.000000000 -0500
+++ libvirt-0.6.0/src/qemu_conf.h 2009-02-17 10:07:06.368680000 -0500
@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@
#include "domain_conf.h"
#include "domain_event.h"
#include "threads.h"
+#include "security.h"
#define qemudDebug(fmt, ...) do {} while(0)
@@ -83,6 +84,8 @@ struct qemud_driver {
virDomainEventQueuePtr domainEventQueue;
int domainEventTimer;
int domainEventDispatching;
+
+ virSecurityDriverPtr securityDriver;
};
/* Status needed to reconenct to running VMs */
diff -up libvirt-0.6.0/src/qemu_driver.c.svirt libvirt-0.6.0/src/qemu_driver.c
--- libvirt-0.6.0/src/qemu_driver.c.svirt 2009-01-31 04:04:18.000000000 -0500
+++ libvirt-0.6.0/src/qemu_driver.c 2009-02-17 10:07:06.378682000 -0500
@@ -68,6 +68,7 @@
#include "memory.h"
#include "uuid.h"
#include "domain_conf.h"
+#include "security.h"
#define VIR_FROM_THIS VIR_FROM_QEMU
@@ -383,6 +384,50 @@ next:
return 0;
}
+static int
+qemudSecurityInit(struct qemud_driver *qemud_drv)
+{
+ int ret;
+ const char *doi, *model;
+ virCapsPtr caps;
+ virSecurityDriverPtr security_drv;
+
+ ret = virSecurityDriverStartup(&security_drv);
+ if (ret == -1) {
+ qemudLog(QEMUD_ERR, _("Failed to start security driver"));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ /* No security driver wanted to be enabled: just return */
+ if (ret == -2)
+ return 0;
+
+ qemud_drv->securityDriver = security_drv;
+ doi = virSecurityDriverGetDOI(security_drv);
+ model = virSecurityDriverGetModel(security_drv);
+
+ qemudLog(QEMUD_DEBUG, "Initialized security driver \"%s\" with "
+ "DOI \"%s\".\n", model, doi);
+
+ /*
+ * Add security policy host caps now that the security driver is
+ * initialized.
+ */
+ caps = qemud_drv->caps;
+
+ caps->host.secModel.model = strdup(model);
+ if (!caps->host.secModel.model) {
+ qemudLog(QEMUD_ERR, _("Failed to copy secModel model: %s"), strerror(errno));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ caps->host.secModel.doi = strdup(doi);
+ if (!caps->host.secModel.doi) {
+ qemudLog(QEMUD_ERR, _("Failed to copy secModel DOI: %s"), strerror(errno));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
/**
* qemudStartup:
@@ -474,6 +519,11 @@ qemudStartup(void) {
if ((qemu_driver->caps = qemudCapsInit()) == NULL)
goto out_of_memory;
+ if (qemudSecurityInit(qemu_driver) < 0) {
+ qemudShutdown();
+ return -1;
+ }
+
if (qemudLoadDriverConfig(qemu_driver, driverConf) < 0) {
goto error;
}
@@ -1111,6 +1161,15 @@ static int qemudNextFreeVNCPort(struct q
return -1;
}
+static int qemudDomainSetSecurityLabel(virConnectPtr conn, struct qemud_driver *driver, virDomainObjPtr vm)
+{
+ if (vm->def->seclabel.label != NULL)
+ if (driver->securityDriver && driver->securityDriver->domainSetSecurityLabel)
+ return driver->securityDriver->domainSetSecurityLabel(conn, driver->securityDriver,
+ &vm->def->seclabel);
+ return 0;
+}
+
static virDomainPtr qemudDomainLookupByName(virConnectPtr conn,
const char *name);
@@ -1178,6 +1237,16 @@ static int qemudStartVMDaemon(virConnect
return -1;
}
+ /*
+ * Set up the security label for the domain here, before doing
+ * too much else.
+ */
+ if (qemudDomainSetSecurityLabel(conn, driver, vm) < 0) {
+ qemudReportError(conn, NULL, NULL, VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+ _("Failed to set security label"));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
if (qemudExtractVersionInfo(emulator,
NULL,
&qemuCmdFlags) < 0) {
@@ -2721,7 +2790,94 @@ cleanup:
return ret;
}
+static int qemudDomainGetSecurityLabel(virDomainPtr dom, virSecurityLabelPtr seclabel)
+{
+ struct qemud_driver *driver = (struct qemud_driver *)dom->conn->privateData;
+ virDomainObjPtr vm;
+ const char *type;
+ int ret = -1;
+
+ qemuDriverLock(driver);
+ vm = virDomainFindByUUID(&driver->domains, dom->uuid);
+ qemuDriverUnlock(driver);
+
+ if (!vm) {
+ char uuidstr[VIR_UUID_STRING_BUFLEN];
+
+ virUUIDFormat(dom->uuid, uuidstr);
+ qemudReportError(dom->conn, dom, NULL, VIR_ERR_INVALID_DOMAIN,
+ _("no domain with matching uuid '%s'"), uuidstr);
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ if (!(type = virDomainVirtTypeToString(vm->def->virtType))) {
+ qemudReportError(dom->conn, dom, NULL, VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+ _("unknown virt type in domain definition '%d'"),
+ vm->def->virtType);
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Theoretically, the pid can be replaced during this operation and
+ * return the label of a different process. If atomicity is needed,
+ * further validation will be required.
+ *
+ * Comment from Dan Berrange:
+ *
+ * Well the PID as stored in the virDomainObjPtr can't be changed
+ * because you've got a locked object. The OS level PID could have
+ * exited, though and in extreme circumstances have cycled through all
+ * PIDs back to ours. We could sanity check that our PID still exists
+ * after reading the label, by checking that our FD connecting to the
+ * QEMU monitor hasn't seen SIGHUP/ERR on poll().
+ */
+ if (virDomainIsActive(vm)) {
+ if (driver->securityDriver && driver->securityDriver->domainGetSecurityLabel) {
+ if (driver->securityDriver->domainGetSecurityLabel(dom->conn, vm, seclabel) == -1) {
+ qemudReportError(dom->conn, dom, NULL, VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+ _("Failed to get security label"));
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ ret = 0;
+
+cleanup:
+ if (vm)
+ virDomainObjUnlock(vm);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int qemudNodeGetSecurityModel(virConnectPtr conn, virSecurityModelPtr secmodel)
+{
+ struct qemud_driver *driver = (struct qemud_driver *)conn->privateData;
+ char *p;
+
+ if (!driver->securityDriver)
+ return -2;
+
+ p = driver->caps->host.secModel.model;
+ if (strlen(p) >= VIR_SECURITY_MODEL_BUFLEN-1) {
+ qemudReportError(conn, NULL, NULL, VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+ _("security model string exceeds max %d bytes"),
+ VIR_SECURITY_MODEL_BUFLEN-1);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ strcpy(secmodel->model, p);
+
+ p = driver->caps->host.secModel.doi;
+ if (strlen(p) >= VIR_SECURITY_DOI_BUFLEN-1) {
+ qemudReportError(conn, NULL, NULL, VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+ _("security DOI string exceeds max %d bytes"),
+ VIR_SECURITY_DOI_BUFLEN-1);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ strcpy(secmodel->doi, p);
+ return 0;
+}
+/* TODO: check seclabel restore */
static int qemudDomainRestore(virConnectPtr conn,
const char *path) {
struct qemud_driver *driver = conn->privateData;
@@ -4475,6 +4631,8 @@ static virDriver qemuDriver = {
NULL, /* domainGetVcpus */
#endif
qemudDomainGetMaxVcpus, /* domainGetMaxVcpus */
+ qemudDomainGetSecurityLabel, /* domainGetSecurityLabel */
+ qemudNodeGetSecurityModel, /* nodeGetSecurityModel */
qemudDomainDumpXML, /* domainDumpXML */
qemudListDefinedDomains, /* listDomains */
qemudNumDefinedDomains, /* numOfDomains */
diff -up libvirt-0.6.0/src/remote_internal.c.svirt libvirt-0.6.0/src/remote_internal.c
--- libvirt-0.6.0/src/remote_internal.c.svirt 2009-02-17 10:07:06.207699000 -0500
+++ libvirt-0.6.0/src/remote_internal.c 2009-02-17 10:14:28.509959000 -0500
@@ -2299,6 +2299,67 @@ done:
return rv;
}
+static int
+remoteDomainGetSecurityLabel (virDomainPtr domain, virSecurityLabelPtr seclabel)
+{
+ remote_domain_get_security_label_args args;
+ remote_domain_get_security_label_ret ret;
+ struct private_data *priv = domain->conn->privateData;
+
+ make_nonnull_domain (&args.dom, domain);
+ memset (&ret, 0, sizeof ret);
+ if (call (domain->conn, priv, 0, REMOTE_PROC_DOMAIN_GET_SECURITY_LABEL,
+ (xdrproc_t) xdr_remote_domain_get_security_label_args, (char *)&args,
+ (xdrproc_t) xdr_remote_domain_get_security_label_ret, (char *)&ret) == -1) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (ret.label.label_val != NULL) {
+ if (strlen (ret.label.label_val) >= sizeof seclabel->label) {
+ errorf (domain->conn, VIR_ERR_RPC, _("security label exceeds maximum: %zd"),
+ sizeof seclabel->label - 1);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ strcpy (seclabel->label, ret.label.label_val);
+ seclabel->enforcing = ret.enforcing;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+remoteNodeGetSecurityModel (virConnectPtr conn, virSecurityModelPtr secmodel)
+{
+ remote_node_get_security_model_ret ret;
+ struct private_data *priv = conn->privateData;
+
+ memset (&ret, 0, sizeof ret);
+ if (call (conn, priv, 0, REMOTE_PROC_NODE_GET_SECURITY_MODEL,
+ (xdrproc_t) xdr_void, NULL,
+ (xdrproc_t) xdr_remote_node_get_security_model_ret, (char *)&ret) == -1) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (ret.model.model_val != NULL) {
+ if (strlen (ret.model.model_val) >= sizeof secmodel->model) {
+ errorf (conn, VIR_ERR_RPC, _("security model exceeds maximum: %zd"),
+ sizeof secmodel->model - 1);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ strcpy (secmodel->model, ret.model.model_val);
+ }
+
+ if (ret.doi.doi_val != NULL) {
+ if (strlen (ret.doi.doi_val) >= sizeof secmodel->doi) {
+ errorf (conn, VIR_ERR_RPC, _("security doi exceeds maximum: %zd"),
+ sizeof secmodel->doi - 1);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ strcpy (secmodel->doi, ret.doi.doi_val);
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
static char *
remoteDomainDumpXML (virDomainPtr domain, int flags)
{
@@ -6721,6 +6782,8 @@ static virDriver driver = {
.domainPinVcpu = remoteDomainPinVcpu,
.domainGetVcpus = remoteDomainGetVcpus,
.domainGetMaxVcpus = remoteDomainGetMaxVcpus,
+ .domainGetSecurityLabel = remoteDomainGetSecurityLabel,
+ .nodeGetSecurityModel = remoteNodeGetSecurityModel,
.domainDumpXML = remoteDomainDumpXML,
.listDefinedDomains = remoteListDefinedDomains,
.numOfDefinedDomains = remoteNumOfDefinedDomains,
diff -up /dev/null libvirt-0.6.0/src/security.c
--- /dev/null 2009-02-11 16:31:53.992012235 -0500
+++ libvirt-0.6.0/src/security.c 2009-02-17 10:07:06.396676000 -0500
@@ -0,0 +1,133 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2008 Red Hat, Inc.
+ *
+ * This library is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
+ * License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either
+ * version 2.1 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * Authors:
+ * James Morris <jmorris(a)namei.org>
+ *
+ */
+#include <config.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "virterror_internal.h"
+
+#include "security.h"
+
+#if HAVE_SELINUX
+#include "security_selinux.h"
+#endif
+
+static virSecurityDriverStatus testSecurityDriverProbe(void)
+{
+ return SECURITY_DRIVER_DISABLE;
+}
+
+virSecurityDriver virTestSecurityDriver = {
+ .name = "test",
+ .probe = testSecurityDriverProbe,
+};
+
+static virSecurityDriverPtr security_drivers[] = {
+ &virTestSecurityDriver,
+#ifdef HAVE_SELINUX
+ &virSELinuxSecurityDriver,
+#endif
+};
+
+/*
+ * Probe each security driver: each should perform a test to see if it
+ * should be loaded, e.g. if the currently active host security mechanism
+ * matches. If the probe succeeds, initialize the driver and return it.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, and -1 on error. If no security driver wanted to
+ * be enabled, then return -2 and let the caller determine what this really
+ * means.
+ */
+int
+virSecurityDriverStartup(virSecurityDriverPtr * drv)
+{
+ unsigned int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < (sizeof(security_drivers) / sizeof(security_drivers[0])); i++) {
+ virSecurityDriverPtr tmp = security_drivers[i];
+ virSecurityDriverStatus ret = tmp->probe();
+
+ switch (ret) {
+ case SECURITY_DRIVER_ENABLE:
+ virSecurityDriverInit(tmp);
+ if (tmp->open(NULL, tmp) == -1) {
+ return -1;
+ } else {
+ *drv = tmp;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case SECURITY_DRIVER_DISABLE:
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+ return -2;
+}
+
+void
+virSecurityReportError(virConnectPtr conn, int code, const char *fmt, ...)
+{
+ va_list args;
+ char errorMessage[1024];
+
+ if (fmt) {
+ va_start(args, fmt);
+ vsnprintf(errorMessage, sizeof(errorMessage) - 1, fmt, args);
+ va_end(args);
+ } else
+ errorMessage[0] = '\0';
+
+ virRaiseError(conn, NULL, NULL, VIR_FROM_SECURITY, code,
+ VIR_ERR_ERROR, NULL, NULL, NULL, -1, -1, "%s",
+ errorMessage);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Helpers
+ */
+void
+virSecurityDriverInit(virSecurityDriverPtr drv)
+{
+ memset(&drv->_private, 0, sizeof drv->_private);
+}
+
+int
+virSecurityDriverSetDOI(virConnectPtr conn,
+ virSecurityDriverPtr drv,
+ const char *doi)
+{
+ if (strlen(doi) >= VIR_SECURITY_DOI_BUFLEN) {
+ virSecurityReportError(conn, VIR_ERR_ERROR,
+ _("%s: DOI \'%s\' is "
+ "longer than the maximum allowed length of %d"),
+ __func__, doi, VIR_SECURITY_DOI_BUFLEN - 1);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ strcpy(drv->_private.doi, doi);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+const char *
+virSecurityDriverGetDOI(virSecurityDriverPtr drv)
+{
+ return drv->_private.doi;
+}
+
+const char *
+virSecurityDriverGetModel(virSecurityDriverPtr drv)
+{
+ return drv->name;
+}
diff -up /dev/null libvirt-0.6.0/src/security.h
--- /dev/null 2009-02-11 16:31:53.992012235 -0500
+++ libvirt-0.6.0/src/security.h 2009-02-17 10:07:06.402676000 -0500
@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2008 Red Hat, Inc.
+ *
+ * This library is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
+ * License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either
+ * version 2.1 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * Authors:
+ * James Morris <jmorris(a)namei.org>
+ *
+ */
+#ifndef __VIR_SECURITY_H__
+#define __VIR_SECURITY_H__
+
+#include "internal.h"
+#include "domain_conf.h"
+
+/*
+ * Return values for security driver probing: the driver will determine
+ * whether it should be enabled or disabled.
+ */
+typedef enum {
+ SECURITY_DRIVER_ENABLE = 0,
+ SECURITY_DRIVER_ERROR = -1,
+ SECURITY_DRIVER_DISABLE = -2,
+} virSecurityDriverStatus;
+
+typedef struct _virSecurityDriver virSecurityDriver;
+typedef virSecurityDriver *virSecurityDriverPtr;
+typedef virSecurityDriverStatus (*virSecurityDriverProbe) (void);
+typedef int (*virSecurityDriverOpen) (virConnectPtr conn,
+ virSecurityDriverPtr drv);
+typedef int (*virSecurityDomainGetLabel) (virConnectPtr conn,
+ virDomainObjPtr vm,
+ virSecurityLabelPtr sec);
+typedef int (*virSecurityDomainSetLabel) (virConnectPtr conn,
+ virSecurityDriverPtr drv,
+ virSecurityLabelDefPtr secdef);
+
+struct _virSecurityDriver {
+ const char *name;
+ virSecurityDriverProbe probe;
+ virSecurityDriverOpen open;
+ virSecurityDomainGetLabel domainGetSecurityLabel;
+ virSecurityDomainSetLabel domainSetSecurityLabel;
+
+ /*
+ * This is internally managed driver state and should only be accessed
+ * via helpers below.
+ */
+ struct {
+ char doi[VIR_SECURITY_DOI_BUFLEN];
+ } _private;
+};
+
+/* Global methods */
+int virSecurityDriverStartup(virSecurityDriverPtr * drv);
+
+void
+virSecurityReportError(virConnectPtr conn, int code, const char *fmt, ...)
+ ATTRIBUTE_FORMAT(printf, 3, 4);
+
+/* Helpers */
+void virSecurityDriverInit(virSecurityDriverPtr drv);
+int virSecurityDriverSetDOI(virConnectPtr conn,
+ virSecurityDriverPtr drv,
+ const char *doi);
+const char *virSecurityDriverGetDOI(virSecurityDriverPtr drv);
+const char *virSecurityDriverGetModel(virSecurityDriverPtr drv);
+
+#endif /* __VIR_SECURITY_H__ */
diff -up /dev/null libvirt-0.6.0/src/security_selinux.c
--- /dev/null 2009-02-11 16:31:53.992012235 -0500
+++ libvirt-0.6.0/src/security_selinux.c 2009-02-17 10:07:06.407678000 -0500
@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2008 Red Hat, Inc.
+ *
+ * This library is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
+ * License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either
+ * version 2.1 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * Authors:
+ * James Morris <jmorris(a)namei.org>
+ *
+ * SELinux security driver.
+ */
+#include <config.h>
+#include <selinux/selinux.h>
+
+#include "security.h"
+#include "security_selinux.h"
+
+#define SECURITY_SELINUX_VOID_DOI "0"
+
+static int
+SELinuxSecurityDriverProbe(void)
+{
+ return is_selinux_enabled() ? SECURITY_DRIVER_ENABLE : SECURITY_DRIVER_DISABLE;
+}
+
+static int
+SELinuxSecurityDriverOpen(virConnectPtr conn, virSecurityDriverPtr drv)
+{
+ /*
+ * Where will the DOI come from? SELinux configuration, or qemu
+ * configuration? For the moment, we'll just set it to "0".
+ */
+ virSecurityDriverSetDOI(conn, drv, SECURITY_SELINUX_VOID_DOI);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+SELinuxSecurityDomainGetSecurityLabel(virConnectPtr conn,
+ virDomainObjPtr vm,
+ virSecurityLabelPtr sec)
+{
+ security_context_t ctx;
+
+ if (getpidcon(vm->pid, &ctx) == -1) {
+ virSecurityReportError(conn, VIR_ERR_ERROR, _("%s: error calling "
+ "getpidcon(): %s"), __func__,
+ strerror(errno));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (strlen((char *) ctx) >= VIR_SECURITY_LABEL_BUFLEN) {
+ virSecurityReportError(conn, VIR_ERR_ERROR,
+ _("%s: security label exceeds "
+ "maximum length: %d"), __func__,
+ VIR_SECURITY_LABEL_BUFLEN - 1);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ strcpy(sec->label, (char *) ctx);
+ free(ctx);
+
+ sec->enforcing = security_getenforce();
+ if (sec->enforcing == -1) {
+ virSecurityReportError(conn, VIR_ERR_ERROR, _("%s: error calling "
+ "security_getenforce(): %s"), __func__,
+ strerror(errno));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+SELinuxSecurityDomainSetSecurityLabel(virConnectPtr conn,
+ virSecurityDriverPtr drv,
+ const virSecurityLabelDefPtr secdef)
+{
+ /* TODO: verify DOI */
+
+ if (!STREQ(drv->name, secdef->model)) {
+ virSecurityReportError(conn, VIR_ERR_ERROR,
+ _("%s: security label driver mismatch: "
+ "\'%s\' model configured for domain, but "
+ "hypervisor driver is \'%s\'."),
+ __func__, secdef->model, drv->name);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (setexeccon(secdef->label) == -1) {
+ virSecurityReportError(conn, VIR_ERR_ERROR,
+ _("%s: unable to set security context "
+ "'\%s\': %s."), __func__, secdef->label,
+ strerror(errno));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+virSecurityDriver virSELinuxSecurityDriver = {
+ .name = "selinux",
+ .probe = SELinuxSecurityDriverProbe,
+ .open = SELinuxSecurityDriverOpen,
+ .domainGetSecurityLabel = SELinuxSecurityDomainGetSecurityLabel,
+ .domainSetSecurityLabel = SELinuxSecurityDomainSetSecurityLabel,
+};
diff -up /dev/null libvirt-0.6.0/src/security_selinux.h
--- /dev/null 2009-02-11 16:31:53.992012235 -0500
+++ libvirt-0.6.0/src/security_selinux.h 2009-02-17 10:07:06.413677000 -0500
@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2008 Red Hat, Inc.
+ *
+ * This library is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
+ * License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either
+ * version 2.1 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * Authors:
+ * James Morris <jmorris(a)namei.org>
+ *
+ */
+#ifndef __VIR_SECURITY_SELINUX_H__
+#define __VIR_SECURITY_SELINUX_H__
+
+extern virSecurityDriver virSELinuxSecurityDriver;
+
+#endif /* __VIR_SECURITY_SELINUX_H__ */
diff -up libvirt-0.6.0/src/storage_backend.c.svirt libvirt-0.6.0/src/storage_backend.c
--- libvirt-0.6.0/src/storage_backend.c.svirt 2009-01-31 04:04:18.000000000 -0500
+++ libvirt-0.6.0/src/storage_backend.c 2009-02-17 10:07:06.419677000 -0500
@@ -276,6 +276,7 @@ virStorageBackendUpdateVolTargetInfoFD(v
VIR_FREE(target->perms.label);
#if HAVE_SELINUX
+ /* XXX: make this a security driver call */
if (fgetfilecon(fd, &filecon) == -1) {
if (errno != ENODATA && errno != ENOTSUP) {
virReportSystemError(conn, errno,
diff -up libvirt-0.6.0/src/test.c.svirt libvirt-0.6.0/src/test.c
--- libvirt-0.6.0/src/test.c.svirt 2009-01-20 15:39:28.000000000 -0500
+++ libvirt-0.6.0/src/test.c 2009-02-17 10:07:06.428677000 -0500
@@ -3510,6 +3510,8 @@ static virDriver testDriver = {
NULL, /* domainPinVcpu */
NULL, /* domainGetVcpus */
NULL, /* domainGetMaxVcpus */
+ NULL, /* domainGetSecurityLabel */
+ NULL, /* nodeGetSecurityModel */
testDomainDumpXML, /* domainDumpXML */
testListDefinedDomains, /* listDefinedDomains */
testNumOfDefinedDomains, /* numOfDefinedDomains */
diff -up libvirt-0.6.0/src/uml_driver.c.svirt libvirt-0.6.0/src/uml_driver.c
--- libvirt-0.6.0/src/uml_driver.c.svirt 2009-01-31 04:04:18.000000000 -0500
+++ libvirt-0.6.0/src/uml_driver.c 2009-02-17 10:07:06.436676000 -0500
@@ -1852,6 +1852,8 @@ static virDriver umlDriver = {
NULL, /* domainPinVcpu */
NULL, /* domainGetVcpus */
NULL, /* domainGetMaxVcpus */
+ NULL, /* domainGetSecurityLabel */
+ NULL, /* nodeGetSecurityModel */
umlDomainDumpXML, /* domainDumpXML */
umlListDefinedDomains, /* listDomains */
umlNumDefinedDomains, /* numOfDomains */
diff -up libvirt-0.6.0/src/virsh.c.svirt libvirt-0.6.0/src/virsh.c
--- libvirt-0.6.0/src/virsh.c.svirt 2009-01-31 04:04:18.000000000 -0500
+++ libvirt-0.6.0/src/virsh.c 2009-02-17 10:07:06.447677000 -0500
@@ -954,6 +954,7 @@ static const vshCmdOptDef opts_undefine[
{NULL, 0, 0, NULL}
};
+/* XXX MAC policy for defining & undefining domains ?? */
static int
cmdUndefine(vshControl *ctl, const vshCmd *cmd)
{
@@ -1515,6 +1516,8 @@ cmdDominfo(vshControl *ctl, const vshCmd
{
virDomainInfo info;
virDomainPtr dom;
+ virSecurityModel secmodel;
+ virSecurityLabel seclabel;
int ret = TRUE, autostart;
unsigned int id;
char *str, uuid[VIR_UUID_STRING_BUFLEN];
@@ -1573,6 +1576,29 @@ cmdDominfo(vshControl *ctl, const vshCmd
autostart ? _("enable") : _("disable") );
}
+ /* Security model and label information */
+ memset(&secmodel, 0, sizeof secmodel);
+ if (virNodeGetSecurityModel(ctl->conn, &secmodel) == -1) {
+ virDomainFree(dom);
+ return FALSE;
+ } else {
+ /* Only print something if a security model is active */
+ if (secmodel.model[0] != '\0') {
+ vshPrint(ctl, "%-15s %s\n", _("Security model:"), secmodel.model);
+ vshPrint(ctl, "%-15s %s\n", _("Security DOI:"), secmodel.doi);
+
+ /* Security labels are only valid for active domains */
+ memset(&seclabel, 0, sizeof seclabel);
+ if (virDomainGetSecurityLabel(dom, &seclabel) == -1) {
+ virDomainFree(dom);
+ return FALSE;
+ } else {
+ if (seclabel.label[0] != '\0')
+ vshPrint(ctl, "%-15s %s (%s)\n", _("Security label:"),
+ seclabel.label, seclabel.enforcing ? "enforcing" : "permissive");
+ }
+ }
+ }
virDomainFree(dom);
return ret;
}
diff -up libvirt-0.6.0/src/virterror.c.svirt libvirt-0.6.0/src/virterror.c
--- libvirt-0.6.0/src/virterror.c.svirt 2009-01-31 04:04:18.000000000 -0500
+++ libvirt-0.6.0/src/virterror.c 2009-02-17 10:07:06.454684000 -0500
@@ -151,6 +151,9 @@ static const char *virErrorDomainName(vi
case VIR_FROM_UML:
dom = "UML ";
break;
+ case VIR_FROM_SECURITY:
+ dom = "Security Labeling ";
+ break;
}
return(dom);
}
@@ -962,6 +965,12 @@ virErrorMsg(virErrorNumber error, const
else
errmsg = _("Node device not found: %s");
break;
+ case VIR_ERR_NO_SECURITY_MODEL:
+ if (info == NULL)
+ errmsg = _("Security model not found");
+ else
+ errmsg = _("Security model not found: %s");
+ break;
}
return (errmsg);
}
diff -up libvirt-0.6.0/src/xml.c.svirt libvirt-0.6.0/src/xml.c
--- libvirt-0.6.0/src/xml.c.svirt 2009-01-31 04:04:18.000000000 -0500
+++ libvirt-0.6.0/src/xml.c 2009-02-17 10:07:06.461676000 -0500
@@ -77,6 +77,39 @@ virXPathString(virConnectPtr conn,
}
/**
+ * virXPathStringLimit:
+ * @xpath: the XPath string to evaluate
+ * @maxlen: maximum length permittred string
+ * @ctxt: an XPath context
+ *
+ * Wrapper for virXPathString, which validates the length of the returned
+ * string.
+ *
+ * Returns a new string which must be deallocated by the caller or NULL if
+ * the evaluation failed.
+ */
+char *
+virXPathStringLimit(virConnectPtr conn,
+ const char *xpath,
+ size_t maxlen,
+ xmlXPathContextPtr ctxt)
+{
+ char *tmp = virXPathString(conn, xpath, ctxt);
+
+ if (tmp != NULL) {
+ if (strlen(tmp) >= maxlen) {
+ virXMLError(conn, VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+ _("\'%s\' value longer than %Zd bytes in virXPathStringLimit()"),
+ xpath, maxlen);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ } else
+ virXMLError(conn, VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+ _("\'%s\' missing in virXPathStringLimit()"), xpath);
+ return tmp;
+}
+
+/**
* virXPathNumber:
* @xpath: the XPath string to evaluate
* @ctxt: an XPath context
diff -up libvirt-0.6.0/src/xml.h.svirt libvirt-0.6.0/src/xml.h
--- libvirt-0.6.0/src/xml.h.svirt 2008-08-12 03:13:00.000000000 -0400
+++ libvirt-0.6.0/src/xml.h 2009-02-17 10:07:06.467677000 -0500
@@ -17,6 +17,10 @@ int virXPathBoolean (virConnectPtr conn
char * virXPathString (virConnectPtr conn,
const char *xpath,
xmlXPathContextPtr ctxt);
+char * virXPathStringLimit(virConnectPtr conn,
+ const char *xpath,
+ size_t maxlen,
+ xmlXPathContextPtr ctxt);
int virXPathNumber (virConnectPtr conn,
const char *xpath,
xmlXPathContextPtr ctxt,
diff -up libvirt-0.6.0/tests/daemon-conf.svirt libvirt-0.6.0/tests/daemon-conf
--- libvirt-0.6.0/tests/daemon-conf.svirt 2008-12-22 08:21:49.000000000 -0500
+++ libvirt-0.6.0/tests/daemon-conf 2009-02-17 10:07:06.470678000 -0500
@@ -63,6 +63,9 @@ while :; do
-e '/^libnuma: Warning: .sys not mounted or no numa system/d' \
err > k && mv k err
+ # Filter out this diagnostic, too.
+ sed '/^Initialized security driver/d' err > k && mv k err
+
printf '%s\n\n' "remoteReadConfigFile: $f: $param_name: $msg" > expected-err
diff -u expected-err err || fail=1
15 years, 8 months
- 5
- 24
[libvirt] [PATCH] Account for defined networks when generating bridge names
by Cole Robinson
This is the second part of the fix for rhbz 479622. If we are generating
a bridge name for a virtual network, don't collide with any bridge name
in a defined network. This patch also generates a bridge name at network
define time, if none was passed in the xml.
The downside to all this is that it won't fix things for existing
victims of the bug: if they have 2 networks with the same bridge device
in the xml, we can't intelligently remedy the situation. This patch just
helps prevent future users getting into that predicament.
Thanks,
Cole
15 years, 8 months
- 3
- 6
[libvirt] [PATCH] Remove redundant monitorWatch
by Cole Robinson
For some reason there are two VMDef members being used to keep track of
monitor event handles: monitor_watch and monitorWatch. Remove the latter.
Thanks,
Cole
15 years, 8 months
- 3
- 5
[libvirt] [PATCH] Better error reporting in qemu AttachDevice
by Cole Robinson
The attached patch fixes qemu AttachDevice to show the invalid disk bus
or type in it's error messages. This also adds an error message where
previously we could fall through, leading virsh to print 'Unknown Error'
if attempting to hotplug an IDE disk.
Thanks,
Cole
15 years, 8 months
- 3
- 3