Re: [libvirt] [patch]make rundir permission equals to socket permission to support unprivileged access

On Tue, Jun 05, 2012 at 02:21:10PM +0800, Royce Lv wrote: > Libvirt-socket-rw and libvirt-socket-ro are not used only for libvirt or > root user, > but also for unprivileged application such as vdsm, > Restrain the rundir only read/search for libvirt prevent comunication > with unprivileged client,change rundir the permission equals to the sockets > permission. > See bug: > https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=828073 > > Signed-off-by: lvroyce <lvroyce(a)linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt; > --- > daemon/libvirtd.c | 2 +- > 1 files changed, 1 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/daemon/libvirtd.c b/daemon/libvirtd.c > index c74cd43..6095072 100644 > --- a/daemon/libvirtd.c > +++ b/daemon/libvirtd.c > @@ -293,7 +293,7 @@ daemonUnixSocketPaths(struct daemonConfig *config, > if (!(rundir = virGetUserRuntimeDirectory())) > goto error; > > - old_umask = umask(077); > + old_umask = umask(022); > if (virFileMakePath(rundir) < 0) { > umask(old_umask); > goto error; The bug you quote above talks about being unable to connect to /var/run/libvirt/libvirt-sock for the privileged libvirtd. The change you are proposing here only touches unprivileged libvirtd when it creates $XDG_RUNTIME_DIR/libvirt. Furthermore the change you are proposing is a security flaw, since the $XDG_RUNTIME_DIR/libvirt directory is *only* intended to be accessed by the current unprivileged user. Using a umask of 022 lets it be accessible to any user. So NACK to this Daniel -- |: http://berrange.com -o- http://www.flickr.com/photos/dberrange/:| |: http://libvirt.org -o- http://virt-manager.org:| |: http://autobuild.org -o- http://search.cpan.org/~danberr/:| |: http://entangle-photo.org -o- http://live.gnome.org/gtk-vnc:|