Sorry for misunderstood the code ,test and submit the patch mistakenly, will submit a new one.
On Tue, Jun 05, 2012 at 02:21:10PM +0800, Royce Lv wrote:
The bug you quote above talks about being unable to connect> Libvirt-socket-rw and libvirt-socket-ro are not used only for libvirt or
> root user,
> but also for unprivileged application such as vdsm,
> Restrain the rundir only read/search for libvirt prevent comunication
> with unprivileged client,change rundir the permission equals to the sockets
> permission.
> See bug:
> https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=828073
>
> Signed-off-by: lvroyce <lvroyce@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
> ---
> daemon/libvirtd.c | 2 +-
> 1 files changed, 1 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/daemon/libvirtd.c b/daemon/libvirtd.c
> index c74cd43..6095072 100644
> --- a/daemon/libvirtd.c
> +++ b/daemon/libvirtd.c
> @@ -293,7 +293,7 @@ daemonUnixSocketPaths(struct daemonConfig *config,
> if (!(rundir = virGetUserRuntimeDirectory()))
> goto error;
>
> - old_umask = umask(077);
> + old_umask = umask(022);
> if (virFileMakePath(rundir) < 0) {
> umask(old_umask);
> goto error;
to /var/run/libvirt/libvirt-sock for the privileged libvirtd.
The change you are proposing here only touches unprivileged
libvirtd when it creates $XDG_RUNTIME_DIR/libvirt.
Furthermore the change you are proposing is a security flaw,
since the $XDG_RUNTIME_DIR/libvirt directory is *only* intended
to be accessed by the current unprivileged user. Using a umask
of 022 lets it be accessible to any user.
So NACK to this
Daniel
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