The virConfReadFile API has a fixed 4096 byte buffer it reads the config file into, regardless of the config file size and silently drops any data exceeding this. This manifested itself in the 0.4.0 release by the fact that toggling the 'auth_unix_ro' config param from 'polkit' to 'none' had no effect at all. It turns out that with the user friendly verbose comments I added to the config file /etc/libvirt/libvirtd.cofn, the 'auth_unix_ro' param occurred beyond the 4096 byte mark in the file and was thus never read. In fixing this I decided to make virConfReadFile call to the recently added virFileReadAll() method. Except the latter takes a pre-allocated buffer as its input. So I've switched virFileReadAll() to pass in a char **, and auto-allocate the file as needed. As a sanity check there is also a 'maxlen' param to stop it reading stupidly huge files - for reading large files virFileReadll() shouldn't be used - they should be read incrementally. Finally, also added a larger test data file to trap this error case src/conf.c | 27 ++--- src/qemu_conf.c | 6 - src/util.c | 22 ++-- src/util.h | 4 tests/confdata/libvirtd.conf | 222 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ tests/confdata/libvirtd.out | 180 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ tests/test_conf.sh | 3 7 files changed, 441 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-) Index: src/conf.c =================================================================== RCS file: /data/cvs/libvirt/src/conf.c,v retrieving revision 1.15 diff -u -p -u -p -r1.15 conf.c --- src/conf.c 11 Dec 2007 21:57:29 -0000 1.15 +++ src/conf.c 3 Jan 2008 18:58:47 -0000 @@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ #include "internal.h" #include "buf.h" #include "conf.h" +#include "util.h" /************************************************************************ * * @@ -693,6 +694,9 @@ error: * * ************************************************************************/ +/* 10 MB limit on config file size as a sanity check */ +#define MAX_CONFIG_FILE_SIZE (1024*1024*10) + /** * __virConfReadFile: * @filename: the path to the configuration file. @@ -705,26 +709,25 @@ error: virConfPtr __virConfReadFile(const char *filename) { - char content[4096]; - int fd; + char *content; int len; + virConfPtr conf; if (filename == NULL) { virConfError(NULL, VIR_ERR_INVALID_ARG, __FUNCTION__, 0); return(NULL); } - fd = open(filename, O_RDONLY); - if (fd < 0) { + + if ((len = virFileReadAll(filename, MAX_CONFIG_FILE_SIZE, &content)) < 0) { virConfError(NULL, VIR_ERR_OPEN_FAILED, filename, 0); - return(NULL); + return NULL; } - len = read(fd, content, sizeof(content)); - close(fd); - if (len <= 0) { - virConfError(NULL, VIR_ERR_READ_FAILED, filename, 0); - return(NULL); - } - return(virConfParse(filename, content, len)); + + conf = virConfParse(filename, content, len); + + free(content); + + return conf; } /** Index: src/qemu_conf.c =================================================================== RCS file: /data/cvs/libvirt/src/qemu_conf.c,v retrieving revision 1.24 diff -u -p -u -p -r1.24 qemu_conf.c --- src/qemu_conf.c 11 Dec 2007 21:57:29 -0000 1.24 +++ src/qemu_conf.c 3 Jan 2008 18:58:48 -0000 @@ -2604,7 +2604,7 @@ int qemudScanConfigDir(struct qemud_driv } while ((entry = readdir(dir))) { - char xml[QEMUD_MAX_XML_LEN]; + char *xml; char path[PATH_MAX]; char autostartLink[PATH_MAX]; @@ -2626,13 +2626,15 @@ int qemudScanConfigDir(struct qemud_driv continue; } - if (virFileReadAll(path, xml, QEMUD_MAX_XML_LEN) < 0) + if (virFileReadAll(path, QEMUD_MAX_XML_LEN, &xml) < 0) continue; if (isGuest) qemudLoadConfig(driver, entry->d_name, path, xml, autostartLink); else qemudLoadNetworkConfig(driver, entry->d_name, path, xml, autostartLink); + + free(xml); } closedir(dir); Index: src/util.c =================================================================== RCS file: /data/cvs/libvirt/src/util.c,v retrieving revision 1.10 diff -u -p -u -p -r1.10 util.c --- src/util.c 7 Dec 2007 14:45:39 -0000 1.10 +++ src/util.c 3 Jan 2008 18:58:48 -0000 @@ -272,8 +272,8 @@ ssize_t safewrite(int fd, const void *bu int virFileReadAll(const char *path, - char *buf, - unsigned int buflen) + int maxlen, + char **buf) { FILE *fh; struct stat st; @@ -296,20 +296,28 @@ int virFileReadAll(const char *path, goto error; } - if (st.st_size >= (buflen-1)) { - virLog("File '%s' is too large", path); + if (st.st_size > maxlen) { + virLog("File '%s' is too large %d, max %d", path, st.st_size, maxlen); goto error; } - if ((ret = fread(buf, st.st_size, 1, fh)) != 1) { + *buf = malloc(st.st_size + 1); + if (*buf == NULL) { + virLog("Failed to allocate data"); + goto error; + } + + if ((ret = fread(*buf, st.st_size, 1, fh)) != 1) { + free(buf); + buf = NULL; virLog("Failed to read config file '%s': %s", path, strerror(errno)); goto error; } - buf[st.st_size] = '\0'; + (*buf)[st.st_size] = '\0'; - ret = 0; + ret = st.st_size; error: if (fh) Index: src/util.h =================================================================== RCS file: /data/cvs/libvirt/src/util.h,v retrieving revision 1.4 diff -u -p -u -p -r1.4 util.h --- src/util.h 3 Dec 2007 14:30:47 -0000 1.4 +++ src/util.h 3 Jan 2008 18:58:48 -0000 @@ -33,8 +33,8 @@ int saferead(int fd, void *buf, size_t c ssize_t safewrite(int fd, const void *buf, size_t count); int virFileReadAll(const char *path, - char *buf, - unsigned int buflen); + int maxlen, + char **buf); int virFileMatchesNameSuffix(const char *file, const char *name, Index: tests/test_conf.sh =================================================================== RCS file: /data/cvs/libvirt/tests/test_conf.sh,v retrieving revision 1.2 diff -u -p -u -p -r1.2 test_conf.sh --- tests/test_conf.sh 14 Nov 2007 10:35:59 -0000 1.2 +++ tests/test_conf.sh 3 Jan 2008 18:58:48 -0000 @@ -8,6 +8,9 @@ do diff $outfile conftest.$$ > /dev/null if [ $? != 0 ] then + if [ -n "$DEBUG_TESTS" ]; then + diff -u $outfile conftest.$$ + fi echo "$f FAILED" NOK=1 else Index: tests/confdata/libvirtd.conf =================================================================== RCS file: tests/confdata/libvirtd.conf diff -N tests/confdata/libvirtd.conf --- /dev/null 1 Jan 1970 00:00:00 -0000 +++ tests/confdata/libvirtd.conf 3 Jan 2008 18:58:48 -0000 @@ -0,0 +1,222 @@ +# Master libvirt daemon configuration file +# +# For further information consult http://libvirt.org/format.html + + +################################################################# +# +# Network connectivitiy controls +# + +# Flag listening for secure TLS connections on the public TCP/IP port. +# NB, must pass the --listen flag to the libvirtd process for this to +# have any effect. +# +# It is neccessary to setup a CA and issue server certificates before +# using this capability. +# +# This is enabled by default, uncomment this to disable it +listen_tls = 0 + +# Listen for unencrypted TCP connections on the public TCP/IP port. +# NB, must pass the --listen flag to the libvirtd process for this to +# have any effect. +# +# Using the TCP socket requires SASL authentication by default. Only +# SASL mechanisms which support data encryption are allowed. This is +# DIGEST_MD5 and GSSAPI (Kerberos5) +# +# This is disabled by default, uncomment this to enable it. +listen_tcp = 1 + + + +# Override the port for accepting secure TLS connections +# This can be a port number, or service name +# +tls_port = "16514" + +# Override the port for accepting insecure TCP connections +# This can be a port number, or service name +# +tcp_port = "16509" + + + +# Flag toggling mDNS advertizement of the libvirt service. +# +# Alternatively can disable for all services on a host by +# stopping the Avahi daemon +# +# This is enabled by default, uncomment this to disable it +mdns_adv = 0 + +# Override the default mDNS advertizement name. This must be +# unique on the immediate broadcast network. +# +# The default is "Virtualization Host HOSTNAME", where HOSTNAME +# is subsituted for the short hostname of the machine (without domain) +# +mdns_name = "Virtualization Host Joe Demo" + + +################################################################# +# +# UNIX socket access controls +# + +# Set the UNIX domain socket group ownership. This can be used to +# allow a 'trusted' set of users access to management capabilities +# without becoming root. +# +# This is restricted to 'root' by default. +unix_sock_group = "libvirt" + +# Set the UNIX socket permissions for the R/O socket. This is used +# for monitoring VM status only +# +# Default allows any user. If setting group ownership may want to +# restrict this to: +unix_sock_ro_perms = "0777" + +# Set the UNIX socket permissions for the R/W socket. This is used +# for full management of VMs +# +# Default allows only root. If PolicyKit is enabled on the socket, +# the default will change to allow everyone (eg, 0777) +# +# If not using PolicyKit and setting group ownership for access +# control then you may want to relax this to: +unix_sock_rw_perms = "0770" + + + +################################################################# +# +# Authentication. +# +# - none: do not perform auth checks. If you can connect to the +# socket you are allowed. This is suitable if there are +# restrictions on connecting to the socket (eg, UNIX +# socket permissions), or if there is a lower layer in +# the network providing auth (eg, TLS/x509 certificates) +# +# - sasl: use SASL infrastructure. The actual auth scheme is then +# controlled from /etc/sasl2/libvirt.conf. For the TCP +# socket only GSSAPI & DIGEST-MD5 mechanisms will be used. +# For non-TCP or TLS sockets, any scheme is allowed. +# +# - polkit: use PolicyKit to authenticate. This is only suitable +# for use on the UNIX sockets. The default policy will +# require a user to supply their own password to gain +# full read/write access (aka sudo like), while anyone +# is allowed read/only access. +# +# Set an authentication scheme for UNIX read-only sockets +# By default socket permissions allow anyone to connect +# +# To restrict monitoring of domains you may wish to enable +# an authentication mechanism here +auth_unix_ro = "none" + +# Set an authentication scheme for UNIX read-write sockets +# By default socket permissions only allow root. If PolicyKit +# support was compiled into libvirt, the default will be to +# use 'polkit' auth. +# +# If the unix_sock_rw_perms are changed you may wish to enable +# an authentication mechanism here +auth_unix_rw = "none" + +# Change the authentication scheme for TCP sockets. +# +# If you don't enable SASL, then all TCP traffic is cleartext. +# Don't do this outside of a dev/test scenario. For real world +# use, always enable SASL and use the GSSAPI or DIGEST-MD5 +# mechanism in /etc/sasl2/libvirt.conf +auth_tcp = "sasl" + +# Change the authentication scheme for TLS sockets. +# +# TLS sockets already have encryption provided by the TLS +# layer, and limited authentication is done by certificates +# +# It is possible to make use of any SASL authentication +# mechanism as well, by using 'sasl' for this option +auth_tls = "none" + + + +################################################################# +# +# TLS x509 certificate configuration +# + + +# Override the default server key file path +# +key_file = "/etc/pki/libvirt/private/serverkey.pem" + +# Override the default server certificate file path +# +cert_file = "/etc/pki/libvirt/servercert.pem" + +# Override the default CA certificate path +# +ca_file = "/etc/pki/CA/cacert.pem" + +# Specify a certificate revocation list. +# +# Defaults to not using a CRL, uncomment to enable it +crl_file = "/etc/pki/CA/crl.pem" + + + +################################################################# +# +# Authorization controls +# + + +# Flag to disable verification of client certificates +# +# Client certificate verification is the primary authentication mechanism. +# Any client which does not present a certificate signed by the CA +# will be rejected. +# +# Default is to always verify. Uncommenting this will disable +# verification - make sure an IP whitelist is set +tls_no_verify_certificate = 1 + + +# A whitelist of allowed x509 Distinguished Names +# This list may contain wildcards such as +# +# "C=GB,ST=London,L=London,O=Red Hat,CN=*" +# +# See the POSIX fnmatch function for the format of the wildcards. +# +# NB If this is an empty list, no client can connect, so comment out +# entirely rather than using empty list to disable these checks +# +# By default, no DN's are checked +tls_allowed_dn_list = ["DN1", "DN2"] + + +# A whitelist of allowed SASL usernames. The format for usernames +# depends on the SASL authentication mechanism. Kerberos usernames +# look like username@REALM +# +# This list may contain wildcards such as +# +# "*@EXAMPLE.COM" +# +# See the POSIX fnmatch function for the format of the wildcards. +# +# NB If this is an empty list, no client can connect, so comment out +# entirely rather than using empty list to disable these checks +# +# By default, no Username's are checked +sasl_allowed_username_list = ["joe@EXAMPLE.COM", "fred@EXAMPLE.COM" ] + + Index: tests/confdata/libvirtd.out =================================================================== RCS file: tests/confdata/libvirtd.out diff -N tests/confdata/libvirtd.out --- /dev/null 1 Jan 1970 00:00:00 -0000 +++ tests/confdata/libvirtd.out 3 Jan 2008 18:58:48 -0000 @@ -0,0 +1,180 @@ +# Master libvirt daemon configuration file +# +# For further information consult http://libvirt.org/format.html +################################################################# +# +# Network connectivitiy controls +# +# Flag listening for secure TLS connections on the public TCP/IP port. +# NB, must pass the --listen flag to the libvirtd process for this to +# have any effect. +# +# It is neccessary to setup a CA and issue server certificates before +# using this capability. +# +# This is enabled by default, uncomment this to disable it +listen_tls = 0 +# Listen for unencrypted TCP connections on the public TCP/IP port. +# NB, must pass the --listen flag to the libvirtd process for this to +# have any effect. +# +# Using the TCP socket requires SASL authentication by default. Only +# SASL mechanisms which support data encryption are allowed. This is +# DIGEST_MD5 and GSSAPI (Kerberos5) +# +# This is disabled by default, uncomment this to enable it. +listen_tcp = 1 +# Override the port for accepting secure TLS connections +# This can be a port number, or service name +# +tls_port = "16514" +# Override the port for accepting insecure TCP connections +# This can be a port number, or service name +# +tcp_port = "16509" +# Flag toggling mDNS advertizement of the libvirt service. +# +# Alternatively can disable for all services on a host by +# stopping the Avahi daemon +# +# This is enabled by default, uncomment this to disable it +mdns_adv = 0 +# Override the default mDNS advertizement name. This must be +# unique on the immediate broadcast network. +# +# The default is "Virtualization Host HOSTNAME", where HOSTNAME +# is subsituted for the short hostname of the machine (without domain) +# +mdns_name = "Virtualization Host Joe Demo" +################################################################# +# +# UNIX socket access controls +# +# Set the UNIX domain socket group ownership. This can be used to +# allow a 'trusted' set of users access to management capabilities +# without becoming root. +# +# This is restricted to 'root' by default. +unix_sock_group = "libvirt" +# Set the UNIX socket permissions for the R/O socket. This is used +# for monitoring VM status only +# +# Default allows any user. If setting group ownership may want to +# restrict this to: +unix_sock_ro_perms = "0777" +# Set the UNIX socket permissions for the R/W socket. This is used +# for full management of VMs +# +# Default allows only root. If PolicyKit is enabled on the socket, +# the default will change to allow everyone (eg, 0777) +# +# If not using PolicyKit and setting group ownership for access +# control then you may want to relax this to: +unix_sock_rw_perms = "0770" +################################################################# +# +# Authentication. +# +# - none: do not perform auth checks. If you can connect to the +# socket you are allowed. This is suitable if there are +# restrictions on connecting to the socket (eg, UNIX +# socket permissions), or if there is a lower layer in +# the network providing auth (eg, TLS/x509 certificates) +# +# - sasl: use SASL infrastructure. The actual auth scheme is then +# controlled from /etc/sasl2/libvirt.conf. For the TCP +# socket only GSSAPI & DIGEST-MD5 mechanisms will be used. +# For non-TCP or TLS sockets, any scheme is allowed. +# +# - polkit: use PolicyKit to authenticate. This is only suitable +# for use on the UNIX sockets. The default policy will +# require a user to supply their own password to gain +# full read/write access (aka sudo like), while anyone +# is allowed read/only access. +# +# Set an authentication scheme for UNIX read-only sockets +# By default socket permissions allow anyone to connect +# +# To restrict monitoring of domains you may wish to enable +# an authentication mechanism here +auth_unix_ro = "none" +# Set an authentication scheme for UNIX read-write sockets +# By default socket permissions only allow root. If PolicyKit +# support was compiled into libvirt, the default will be to +# use 'polkit' auth. +# +# If the unix_sock_rw_perms are changed you may wish to enable +# an authentication mechanism here +auth_unix_rw = "none" +# Change the authentication scheme for TCP sockets. +# +# If you don't enable SASL, then all TCP traffic is cleartext. +# Don't do this outside of a dev/test scenario. For real world +# use, always enable SASL and use the GSSAPI or DIGEST-MD5 +# mechanism in /etc/sasl2/libvirt.conf +auth_tcp = "sasl" +# Change the authentication scheme for TLS sockets. +# +# TLS sockets already have encryption provided by the TLS +# layer, and limited authentication is done by certificates +# +# It is possible to make use of any SASL authentication +# mechanism as well, by using 'sasl' for this option +auth_tls = "none" +################################################################# +# +# TLS x509 certificate configuration +# +# Override the default server key file path +# +key_file = "/etc/pki/libvirt/private/serverkey.pem" +# Override the default server certificate file path +# +cert_file = "/etc/pki/libvirt/servercert.pem" +# Override the default CA certificate path +# +ca_file = "/etc/pki/CA/cacert.pem" +# Specify a certificate revocation list. +# +# Defaults to not using a CRL, uncomment to enable it +crl_file = "/etc/pki/CA/crl.pem" +################################################################# +# +# Authorization controls +# +# Flag to disable verification of client certificates +# +# Client certificate verification is the primary authentication mechanism. +# Any client which does not present a certificate signed by the CA +# will be rejected. +# +# Default is to always verify. Uncommenting this will disable +# verification - make sure an IP whitelist is set +tls_no_verify_certificate = 1 +# A whitelist of allowed x509 Distinguished Names +# This list may contain wildcards such as +# +# "C=GB,ST=London,L=London,O=Red Hat,CN=*" +# +# See the POSIX fnmatch function for the format of the wildcards. +# +# NB If this is an empty list, no client can connect, so comment out +# entirely rather than using empty list to disable these checks +# +# By default, no DN's are checked +tls_allowed_dn_list = [ "DN1", "DN2" ] +# A whitelist of allowed SASL usernames. The format for usernames +# depends on the SASL authentication mechanism. Kerberos usernames +# look like username@REALM +# +# This list may contain wildcards such as +# +# "*@EXAMPLE.COM" +# +# See the POSIX fnmatch function for the format of the wildcards. +# +# NB If this is an empty list, no client can connect, so comment out +# entirely rather than using empty list to disable these checks +# +# By default, no Username's are checked +sasl_allowed_username_list = [ "joe@EXAMPLE.COM", "fred@EXAMPLE.COM" ] Dan. -- |=- Red Hat, Engineering, Emerging Technologies, Boston. +1 978 392 2496 -=| |=- Perl modules: http://search.cpan.org/~danberr/ -=| |=- Projects: http://freshmeat.net/~danielpb/ -=| |=- GnuPG: 7D3B9505 F3C9 553F A1DA 4AC2 5648 23C1 B3DF F742 7D3B 9505 -=|