We read from the agent until seeing a \r\n pair to indicate a completed reply or event. To avoid memory denial-of-service though, we must have a size limit on amount of data we buffer. 10 MB is large enough that it ought to cope with normal agent replies, and small enough that we're not consuming unreasonable mem. This is identical to the flaw we had reading from the QEMU monitor as CVE-2018-5748, so rather embarrassing that we forgot to fix the agent code at the same time. Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com> --- Pushed as a security patch pre-reviewed via the libvirt-security list src/qemu/qemu_agent.c | 15 +++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+) diff --git a/src/qemu/qemu_agent.c b/src/qemu/qemu_agent.c index 0f36054a61..89183c3f76 100644 --- a/src/qemu/qemu_agent.c +++ b/src/qemu/qemu_agent.c @@ -53,6 +53,15 @@ VIR_LOG_INIT("qemu.qemu_agent"); #define DEBUG_IO 0 #define DEBUG_RAW_IO 0 +/* We read from QEMU until seeing a \r\n pair to indicate a + * completed reply or event. To avoid memory denial-of-service + * though, we must have a size limit on amount of data we + * buffer. 10 MB is large enough that it ought to cope with + * normal QEMU replies, and small enough that we're not + * consuming unreasonable mem. + */ +#define QEMU_AGENT_MAX_RESPONSE (10 * 1024 * 1024) + /* When you are the first to uncomment this, * don't forget to uncomment the corresponding * part in qemuAgentIOProcessEvent as well. @@ -535,6 +544,12 @@ qemuAgentIORead(qemuAgentPtr mon) int ret = 0; if (avail < 1024) { + if (mon->bufferLength >= QEMU_AGENT_MAX_RESPONSE) { + virReportSystemError(ERANGE, + _("No complete agent response found in %d bytes"), + QEMU_AGENT_MAX_RESPONSE); + return -1; + } if (VIR_REALLOC_N(mon->buffer, mon->bufferLength + 1024) < 0) return -1; -- 2.14.3