From: "Daniel P. Berrange" <berrange(a)redhat.com&gt; Currently any client which can complete the TLS handshake is able to use the NBD server. The server admin can turn on the 'verify-peer' option for the x509 creds to require the client to provide a x509 certificate. This means the client will have to acquire a certificate from the CA before they are permitted to use the NBD server. This is still a fairly low bar to cross. This adds a '--tls-authz OBJECT-ID' option to the qemu-nbd command which takes the ID of a previously added 'QAuthZ' object instance. This will be used to validate the client's x509 distinguished name. Clients failing the authorization check will not be permitted to use the NBD server. For example to setup authorization that only allows connection from a client whose x509 certificate distinguished name is CN=laptop.example.com,O=Example Org,L=London,ST=London,C=GB escape the commas in the name and use: qemu-nbd --object tls-creds-x509,id=tls0,dir=/home/berrange/qemutls,\ endpoint=server,verify-peer=yes \ --object 'authz-simple,id=auth0,identity=CN=laptop.example.com,,\ O=Example Org,,L=London,,ST=London,,C=GB' \ --tls-creds tls0 \ --tls-authz authz0 \ ....other qemu-nbd args... NB: a real shell command line would not have leading whitespace after the line continuation, it is just included here for clarity. Reviewed-by: Juan Quintela <quintela(a)redhat.com&gt; Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange(a)redhat.com&gt; --- include/block/nbd.h | 2 +- nbd/server.c | 10 +++++----- qemu-nbd.c | 14 +++++++++++++- qemu-nbd.texi | 4 ++++ tests/qemu-iotests/233 | 31 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- tests/qemu-iotests/233.out | 11 +++++++++++ 6 files changed, 62 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/block/nbd.h b/include/block/nbd.h index 96cfb1d7d5..554f531c1a 100644 --- a/include/block/nbd.h +++ b/include/block/nbd.h @@ -325,7 +325,7 @@ void nbd_export_close_all(void); void nbd_client_new(QIOChannelSocket *sioc, QCryptoTLSCreds *tlscreds, - const char *tlsaclname, + const char *tlsauthz, void (*close_fn)(NBDClient *, bool)); void nbd_client_get(NBDClient *client); void nbd_client_put(NBDClient *client); diff --git a/nbd/server.c b/nbd/server.c index 0910d09a6d..8ddfd3e319 100644 --- a/nbd/server.c +++ b/nbd/server.c @@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ struct NBDClient { NBDExport *exp; QCryptoTLSCreds *tlscreds; - char *tlsaclname; + char *tlsauthz; QIOChannelSocket *sioc; /* The underlying data channel */ QIOChannel *ioc; /* The current I/O channel which may differ (eg TLS) */ @@ -686,7 +686,7 @@ static QIOChannel *nbd_negotiate_handle_starttls(NBDClient *client, tioc = qio_channel_tls_new_server(ioc, client->tlscreds, - client->tlsaclname, + client->tlsauthz, errp); if (!tioc) { return NULL; @@ -1348,7 +1348,7 @@ void nbd_client_put(NBDClient *client) if (client->tlscreds) { object_unref(OBJECT(client->tlscreds)); } - g_free(client->tlsaclname); + g_free(client->tlsauthz); if (client->exp) { QTAILQ_REMOVE(&client->exp->clients, client, next); nbd_export_put(client->exp); @@ -2425,7 +2425,7 @@ static coroutine_fn void nbd_co_client_start(void *opaque) */ void nbd_client_new(QIOChannelSocket *sioc, QCryptoTLSCreds *tlscreds, - const char *tlsaclname, + const char *tlsauthz, void (*close_fn)(NBDClient *, bool)) { NBDClient *client; @@ -2437,7 +2437,7 @@ void nbd_client_new(QIOChannelSocket *sioc, if (tlscreds) { object_ref(OBJECT(client->tlscreds)); } - client->tlsaclname = g_strdup(tlsaclname); + client->tlsauthz = g_strdup(tlsauthz); client->sioc = sioc; object_ref(OBJECT(client->sioc)); client->ioc = QIO_CHANNEL(sioc); diff --git a/qemu-nbd.c b/qemu-nbd.c index 00c07fd27e..0738073d95 100644 --- a/qemu-nbd.c +++ b/qemu-nbd.c @@ -58,6 +58,7 @@ #define QEMU_NBD_OPT_TLSCREDS 261 #define QEMU_NBD_OPT_IMAGE_OPTS 262 #define QEMU_NBD_OPT_FORK 263 +#define QEMU_NBD_OPT_TLSAUTHZ 264 #define MBR_SIZE 512 @@ -71,6 +72,7 @@ static int shared = 1; static int nb_fds; static QIONetListener *server; static QCryptoTLSCreds *tlscreds; +static const char *tlsauthz; static void usage(const char *name) { @@ -103,6 +105,7 @@ static void usage(const char *name) " --object type,id=ID,... define an object such as 'secret' for providing\n" " passwords and/or encryption keys\n" " --tls-creds=ID use id of an earlier --object to provide TLS\n" +" --tls-authz=ID use id of an earlier --object to provide authorization\n" " -T, --trace [[enable=]<pattern>][,events=<file>][,file=<file>]\n" " specify tracing options\n" " --fork fork off the server process and exit the parent\n" @@ -452,7 +455,7 @@ static void nbd_accept(QIONetListener *listener, QIOChannelSocket *cioc, nb_fds++; nbd_update_server_watch(); - nbd_client_new(cioc, tlscreds, NULL, nbd_client_closed); + nbd_client_new(cioc, tlscreds, tlsauthz, nbd_client_closed); } static void nbd_update_server_watch(void) @@ -643,6 +646,7 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv) { "export-name", required_argument, NULL, 'x' }, { "description", required_argument, NULL, 'D' }, { "tls-creds", required_argument, NULL, QEMU_NBD_OPT_TLSCREDS }, + { "tls-authz", required_argument, NULL, QEMU_NBD_OPT_TLSAUTHZ }, { "image-opts", no_argument, NULL, QEMU_NBD_OPT_IMAGE_OPTS }, { "trace", required_argument, NULL, 'T' }, { "fork", no_argument, NULL, QEMU_NBD_OPT_FORK }, @@ -862,6 +866,9 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv) g_free(trace_file); trace_file = trace_opt_parse(optarg); break; + case QEMU_NBD_OPT_TLSAUTHZ: + tlsauthz = optarg; + break; case QEMU_NBD_OPT_FORK: fork_process = true; break; @@ -940,6 +947,11 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv) error_get_pretty(local_err)); exit(EXIT_FAILURE); } + } else { + if (tlsauthz) { + error_report("--tls-authz is not permitted without --tls-creds"); + exit(EXIT_FAILURE); + } } if (list) { diff --git a/qemu-nbd.texi b/qemu-nbd.texi index d0c5182814..d45ed9e0a0 100644 --- a/qemu-nbd.texi +++ b/qemu-nbd.texi @@ -117,6 +117,10 @@ option; or provide the credentials needed for connecting as a client in list mode. @item --fork Fork off the server process and exit the parent once the server is running. +@item --tls-authz=ID +Specify the ID of a qauthz object previously created with the +--object option. This will be used to authorize connecting users +against their x509 distinguished name. @item -v, --verbose Display extra debugging information. @item -h, --help diff --git a/tests/qemu-iotests/233 b/tests/qemu-iotests/233 index fc345a1a46..4762c380cb 100755 --- a/tests/qemu-iotests/233 +++ b/tests/qemu-iotests/233 @@ -59,6 +59,7 @@ tls_x509_create_root_ca "ca2" tls_x509_create_server "ca1" "server1" tls_x509_create_client "ca1" "client1" tls_x509_create_client "ca2" "client2" +tls_x509_create_client "ca1" "client3" echo echo "== preparing image ==" @@ -91,11 +92,15 @@ $QEMU_NBD_PROG -L -b $nbd_tcp_addr -p $nbd_tcp_port echo echo "== check TLS works ==" -obj=tls-creds-x509,dir=${tls_dir}/client1,endpoint=client,id=tls0 -$QEMU_IMG info --image-opts --object $obj \ +obj1=tls-creds-x509,dir=${tls_dir}/client1,endpoint=client,id=tls0 +obj2=tls-creds-x509,dir=${tls_dir}/client3,endpoint=client,id=tls0 +$QEMU_IMG info --image-opts --object $obj1 \ driver=nbd,host=$nbd_tcp_addr,port=$nbd_tcp_port,tls-creds=tls0 \ 2>&1 | sed "s/$nbd_tcp_port/PORT/g" -$QEMU_NBD_PROG -L -b $nbd_tcp_addr -p $nbd_tcp_port --object $obj \ +$QEMU_IMG info --image-opts --object $obj2 \ + driver=nbd,host=$nbd_tcp_addr,port=$nbd_tcp_port,tls-creds=tls0 \ + 2>&1 | sed "s/$nbd_tcp_port/PORT/g" +$QEMU_NBD_PROG -L -b $nbd_tcp_addr -p $nbd_tcp_port --object $obj1 \ --tls-creds=tls0 echo @@ -117,6 +122,26 @@ $QEMU_IO -c 'r -P 0x11 1m 1m' -c 'w -P 0x22 1m 1m' --image-opts \ $QEMU_IO -f $IMGFMT -r -U -c 'r -P 0x22 1m 1m' "$TEST_IMG" | _filter_qemu_io +echo +echo "== check TLS with authorization ==" + +nbd_server_stop + +nbd_server_start_tcp_socket \ + --object tls-creds-x509,dir=${tls_dir}/server1,endpoint=server,id=tls0,verify-peer=yes \ + --object "authz-simple,identity=CN=localhost,,O=Cthulu Dark Lord Enterprises client1,,L=R'lyeh,,C=South Pacific,id=authz0" \ + --tls-authz authz0 \ + --tls-creds tls0 \ + -f $IMGFMT "$TEST_IMG" 2>> "$TEST_DIR/server.log" + +$QEMU_IMG info --image-opts \ + --object tls-creds-x509,dir=${tls_dir}/client1,endpoint=client,id=tls0 \ + driver=nbd,host=$nbd_tcp_addr,port=$nbd_tcp_port,tls-creds=tls0 + +$QEMU_IMG info --image-opts \ + --object tls-creds-x509,dir=${tls_dir}/client3,endpoint=client,id=tls0 \ + driver=nbd,host=$nbd_tcp_addr,port=$nbd_tcp_port,tls-creds=tls0 + echo echo "== final server log ==" cat "$TEST_DIR/server.log" diff --git a/tests/qemu-iotests/233.out b/tests/qemu-iotests/233.out index 6d45f3b230..5acbc13b54 100644 --- a/tests/qemu-iotests/233.out +++ b/tests/qemu-iotests/233.out @@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ Generating a self signed certificate... Generating a signed certificate... Generating a signed certificate... Generating a signed certificate... +Generating a signed certificate... == preparing image == Formatting 'TEST_DIR/t.IMGFMT', fmt=IMGFMT size=67108864 @@ -29,6 +30,10 @@ image: nbd://127.0.0.1:PORT file format: nbd virtual size: 64M (67108864 bytes) disk size: unavailable +image: nbd://127.0.0.1:PORT +file format: nbd +virtual size: 64M (67108864 bytes) +disk size: unavailable exports available: 1 export: '' size: 67108864 @@ -51,7 +56,13 @@ wrote 1048576/1048576 bytes at offset 1048576 read 1048576/1048576 bytes at offset 1048576 1 MiB, X ops; XX:XX:XX.X (XXX YYY/sec and XXX ops/sec) +== check TLS with authorization == +qemu-img: Could not open 'driver=nbd,host=127.0.0.1,port=10809,tls-creds=tls0': Failed to read option reply: Cannot read from TLS channel: Software caused connection abort +qemu-img: Could not open 'driver=nbd,host=127.0.0.1,port=10809,tls-creds=tls0': Failed to read option reply: Cannot read from TLS channel: Software caused connection abort + == final server log == qemu-nbd: option negotiation failed: Verify failed: No certificate was found. qemu-nbd: option negotiation failed: Verify failed: No certificate was found. +qemu-nbd: option negotiation failed: TLS x509 authz check for CN=localhost,O=Cthulhu Dark Lord Enterprises client1,L=R'lyeh,C=South Pacific is denied +qemu-nbd: option negotiation failed: TLS x509 authz check for CN=localhost,O=Cthulhu Dark Lord Enterprises client3,L=R'lyeh,C=South Pacific is denied *** done -- 2.20.1

From: "Daniel P. Berrange" <berrange(a)redhat.com&gt; The QEMU instance that runs as the server for the migration data transport (ie the target QEMU) needs to be able to configure access control so it can prevent unauthorized clients initiating an incoming migration. This adds a new 'tls-authz' migration parameter that is used to provide the QOM ID of a QAuthZ subclass instance that provides the access control check. This is checked against the x509 certificate obtained during the TLS handshake. For example, when starting a QEMU for incoming migration, it is possible to give an example identity of the source QEMU that is intended to be connecting later: $QEMU \ -monitor stdio \ -incoming defer \ ...other args... (qemu) object_add tls-creds-x509,id=tls0,dir=/home/berrange/qemutls,\ endpoint=server,verify-peer=yes \ (qemu) object_add authz-simple,id=auth0,identity=CN=laptop.example.com,,\ O=Example Org,,L=London,,ST=London,,C=GB \ (qemu) migrate_incoming tcp:localhost:9000 Reviewed-by: Juan Quintela <quintela(a)redhat.com&gt; Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange(a)redhat.com&gt; --- hmp.c | 9 +++++++++ migration/migration.c | 8 ++++++++ migration/tls.c | 2 +- qapi/migration.json | 14 +++++++++++++- 4 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/hmp.c b/hmp.c index c234634f8a..0aea14e9d4 100644 --- a/hmp.c +++ b/hmp.c @@ -398,6 +398,9 @@ void hmp_info_migrate_parameters(Monitor *mon, const QDict *qdict) monitor_printf(mon, "%s: %" PRIu64 "\n", MigrationParameter_str(MIGRATION_PARAMETER_MAX_POSTCOPY_BANDWIDTH), params->max_postcopy_bandwidth); + monitor_printf(mon, " %s: '%s'\n", + MigrationParameter_str(MIGRATION_PARAMETER_TLS_AUTHZ), + params->has_tls_authz ? params->tls_authz : ""); } qapi_free_MigrationParameters(params); @@ -1709,6 +1712,12 @@ void hmp_migrate_set_parameter(Monitor *mon, const QDict *qdict) p->tls_hostname->type = QTYPE_QSTRING; visit_type_str(v, param, &p->tls_hostname->u.s, &err); break; + case MIGRATION_PARAMETER_TLS_AUTHZ: + p->has_tls_authz = true; + p->tls_authz = g_new0(StrOrNull, 1); + p->tls_authz->type = QTYPE_QSTRING; + visit_type_str(v, param, &p->tls_authz->u.s, &err); + break; case MIGRATION_PARAMETER_MAX_BANDWIDTH: p->has_max_bandwidth = true; /* diff --git a/migration/migration.c b/migration/migration.c index 37e06b76dc..3a2f0b6c54 100644 --- a/migration/migration.c +++ b/migration/migration.c @@ -721,6 +721,8 @@ MigrationParameters *qmp_query_migrate_parameters(Error **errp) params->tls_creds = g_strdup(s->parameters.tls_creds); params->has_tls_hostname = true; params->tls_hostname = g_strdup(s->parameters.tls_hostname); + params->has_tls_authz = true; + params->tls_authz = g_strdup(s->parameters.tls_authz); params->has_max_bandwidth = true; params->max_bandwidth = s->parameters.max_bandwidth; params->has_downtime_limit = true; @@ -1234,6 +1236,12 @@ static void migrate_params_apply(MigrateSetParameters *params, Error **errp) s->parameters.tls_hostname = g_strdup(params->tls_hostname->u.s); } + if (params->has_tls_authz) { + g_free(s->parameters.tls_authz); + assert(params->tls_authz->type == QTYPE_QSTRING); + s->parameters.tls_authz = g_strdup(params->tls_authz->u.s); + } + if (params->has_max_bandwidth) { s->parameters.max_bandwidth = params->max_bandwidth; if (s->to_dst_file) { diff --git a/migration/tls.c b/migration/tls.c index 3b9e8c9263..5171afc6c4 100644 --- a/migration/tls.c +++ b/migration/tls.c @@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ void migration_tls_channel_process_incoming(MigrationState *s, tioc = qio_channel_tls_new_server( ioc, creds, - NULL, /* XXX pass ACL name */ + s->parameters.tls_authz, errp); if (!tioc) { return; diff --git a/qapi/migration.json b/qapi/migration.json index 7a795ecc16..1ece4a8756 100644 --- a/qapi/migration.json +++ b/qapi/migration.json @@ -522,6 +522,12 @@ # hostname must be provided so that the server's x509 # certificate identity can be validated. (Since 2.7) # +# @tls-authz: ID of the 'authz' object subclass that provides access control +# checking of the TLS x509 certificate distinguished name. +# This object is only resolved at time of use, so can be deleted +# and recreated on the fly while the migration server is active. +# If missing, it will default to denying access (Since 3.1) +# # @max-bandwidth: to set maximum speed for migration. maximum speed in # bytes per second. (Since 2.8) # @@ -563,7 +569,7 @@ 'data': ['compress-level', 'compress-threads', 'decompress-threads', 'compress-wait-thread', 'cpu-throttle-initial', 'cpu-throttle-increment', - 'tls-creds', 'tls-hostname', 'max-bandwidth', + 'tls-creds', 'tls-hostname', 'tls-authz', 'max-bandwidth', 'downtime-limit', 'x-checkpoint-delay', 'block-incremental', 'x-multifd-channels', 'x-multifd-page-count', 'xbzrle-cache-size', 'max-postcopy-bandwidth', @@ -661,6 +667,7 @@ '*cpu-throttle-increment': 'int', '*tls-creds': 'StrOrNull', '*tls-hostname': 'StrOrNull', + '*tls-authz': 'StrOrNull', '*max-bandwidth': 'int', '*downtime-limit': 'int', '*x-checkpoint-delay': 'int', @@ -730,6 +737,10 @@ # associated with the migration URI, if any. (Since 2.9) # Note: 2.8 reports this by omitting tls-hostname instead. # +# @tls-authz: ID of the 'authz' object subclass that provides access control +# checking of the TLS x509 certificate distinguished name. (Since +# 3.1) +# # @max-bandwidth: to set maximum speed for migration. maximum speed in # bytes per second. (Since 2.8) # @@ -777,6 +788,7 @@ '*cpu-throttle-increment': 'uint8', '*tls-creds': 'str', '*tls-hostname': 'str', + '*tls-authz': 'str', '*max-bandwidth': 'size', '*downtime-limit': 'uint64', '*x-checkpoint-delay': 'uint32', -- 2.20.1

From: "Daniel P. Berrange" <berrange(a)redhat.com&gt; The VNC server has historically had support for ACLs to check both the SASL username and the TLS x509 distinguished name. The VNC server was responsible for creating the initial ACL, and the client app was then responsible for populating it with rules using the HMP 'acl_add' command. This is not satisfactory for a variety of reasons. There is no way to populate the ACLs from the command line, users are forced to use the HMP. With multiple network services all supporting TLS and ACLs now, it is desirable to be able to define a single ACL that is referenced by all services. To address these limitations, two new options are added to the VNC server CLI. The 'tls-authz' option takes the ID of a QAuthZ object to use for checking TLS x509 distinguished names, and the 'sasl-authz' option takes the ID of another object to use for checking SASL usernames. In this example, we setup two authorization rules. The first allows any client with a certificate issued by the 'RedHat' organization in the 'London' locality. The second ACL allows clients with either the &#39;joe(a)REDHAT.COM&#39; or &#39;fred(a)REDHAT.COM&#39; kerberos usernames. Both checks must pass for the user to be allowed. $QEMU -object tls-creds-x509,id=tls0,dir=/home/berrange/qemutls,\ endpoint=server,verify-peer=yes \ -object authz-simple,id=authz0,policy=deny,\ rules.0.match=O=RedHat,,L=London,rules.0.policy=allow \ -object authz-simple,id=authz1,policy=deny,\ rules.0.match=fred(a)REDHAT.COM,rules.0.policy=allow \ rules.0.match=joe(a)REDHAT.COM,rules.0.policy=allow \ -vnc 0.0.0.0:1,tls-creds=tls0,tls-authz=authz0, sasl,sasl-authz=authz1 \ ...other QEMU args... Reviewed-by: Juan Quintela <quintela(a)redhat.com&gt; Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange(a)redhat.com&gt; --- qemu-deprecated.texi | 5 ++++ qemu-options.hx | 35 ++++++++++++++++++-------- ui/vnc.c | 58 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------- 3 files changed, 79 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-) diff --git a/qemu-deprecated.texi b/qemu-deprecated.texi index fe905551c5..6139d09793 100644 --- a/qemu-deprecated.texi +++ b/qemu-deprecated.texi @@ -60,6 +60,11 @@ Support for invalid topologies will be removed, the user must ensure topologies described with -smp include all possible cpus, i.e. @math{@var{sockets} * @var{cores} * @var{threads} = @var{maxcpus}}. +@subsection -vnc acl (since 4.0.0) + +The @code{acl} option to the @code{-vnc} argument has been replaced +by the @code{tls-authz} and @code{sasl-authz} options. + @section QEMU Machine Protocol (QMP) commands @subsection block-dirty-bitmap-add "autoload" parameter (since 2.12.0) diff --git a/qemu-options.hx b/qemu-options.hx index 2bbcc743a4..316b3dd621 100644 --- a/qemu-options.hx +++ b/qemu-options.hx @@ -1619,6 +1619,14 @@ will cause the VNC server socket to enable the VeNCrypt auth mechanism. The credentials should have been previously created using the @option{-object tls-creds} argument. +@item tls-authz=@var{ID} + +Provides the ID of the QAuthZ authorization object against which +the client's x509 distinguished name will validated. This object is +only resolved at time of use, so can be deleted and recreated on the +fly while the VNC server is active. If missing, it will default +to denying access. + @item sasl Require that the client use SASL to authenticate with the VNC server. @@ -1634,18 +1642,25 @@ ensures a data encryption preventing compromise of authentication credentials. See the @ref{vnc_security} section for details on using SASL authentication. +@item sasl-authz=@var{ID} + +Provides the ID of the QAuthZ authorization object against which +the client's SASL username will validated. This object is +only resolved at time of use, so can be deleted and recreated on the +fly while the VNC server is active. If missing, it will default +to denying access. + @item acl -Turn on access control lists for checking of the x509 client certificate -and SASL party. For x509 certs, the ACL check is made against the -certificate's distinguished name. This is something that looks like -@code{C=GB,O=ACME,L=Boston,CN=bob}. For SASL party, the ACL check is -made against the username, which depending on the SASL plugin, may -include a realm component, eg @code{bob} or @code{bob@(a)EXAMPLE.COM}. -When the @option{acl} flag is set, the initial access list will be -empty, with a @code{deny} policy. Thus no one will be allowed to -use the VNC server until the ACLs have been loaded. This can be -achieved using the @code{acl} monitor command. +Legacy method for enabling authorization of clients against the +x509 distinguished name and SASL username. It results in the creation +of two @code{authz-list} objects with IDs of @code{vnc.username} and +(a)code{vnc.x509dname}. The rules for these objects must be configured +with the HMP ACL commands. + +This option is deprecated and should no longer be used. The new +@option{sasl-authz} and @option{tls-authz} options are a +replacement. @item lossy diff --git a/ui/vnc.c b/ui/vnc.c index f4b335eb5f..9a4164d412 100644 --- a/ui/vnc.c +++ b/ui/vnc.c @@ -3356,6 +3356,12 @@ static QemuOptsList qemu_vnc_opts = { },{ .name = "acl", .type = QEMU_OPT_BOOL, + },{ + .name = "tls-authz", + .type = QEMU_OPT_STRING, + },{ + .name = "sasl-authz", + .type = QEMU_OPT_STRING, },{ .name = "lossy", .type = QEMU_OPT_BOOL, @@ -3795,6 +3801,8 @@ void vnc_display_open(const char *id, Error **errp) const char *credid; bool sasl = false; int acl = 0; + const char *tlsauthz; + const char *saslauthz; int lock_key_sync = 1; int key_delay_ms; @@ -3866,7 +3874,33 @@ void vnc_display_open(const char *id, Error **errp) goto fail; } } + if (qemu_opt_get(opts, "acl")) { + error_report("The 'acl' option to -vnc is deprecated. " + "Please use the 'tls-authz' and 'sasl-authz' " + "options instead"); + } acl = qemu_opt_get_bool(opts, "acl", false); + tlsauthz = qemu_opt_get(opts, "tls-authz"); + if (acl && tlsauthz) { + error_setg(errp, "'acl' option is mutually exclusive with the " + "'tls-authz' option"); + goto fail; + } + if (tlsauthz && !vd->tlscreds) { + error_setg(errp, "'tls-authz' provided but TLS is not enabled"); + goto fail; + } + + saslauthz = qemu_opt_get(opts, "sasl-authz"); + if (acl && saslauthz) { + error_setg(errp, "'acl' option is mutually exclusive with the " + "'sasl-authz' option"); + goto fail; + } + if (saslauthz && !sasl) { + error_setg(errp, "'sasl-authz' provided but SASL auth is not enabled"); + goto fail; + } share = qemu_opt_get(opts, "share"); if (share) { @@ -3896,7 +3930,9 @@ void vnc_display_open(const char *id, Error **errp) vd->non_adaptive = true; } - if (acl) { + if (tlsauthz) { + vd->tlsauthzid = g_strdup(tlsauthz); + } else if (acl) { if (strcmp(vd->id, "default") == 0) { vd->tlsauthzid = g_strdup("vnc.x509dname"); } else { @@ -3907,15 +3943,19 @@ void vnc_display_open(const char *id, Error **errp) &error_abort)); } #ifdef CONFIG_VNC_SASL - if (acl && sasl) { - if (strcmp(vd->id, "default") == 0) { - vd->sasl.authzid = g_strdup("vnc.username"); - } else { - vd->sasl.authzid = g_strdup_printf("vnc.%s.username", vd->id); + if (sasl) { + if (saslauthz) { + vd->sasl.authzid = g_strdup(saslauthz); + } else if (acl) { + if (strcmp(vd->id, "default") == 0) { + vd->sasl.authzid = g_strdup("vnc.username"); + } else { + vd->sasl.authzid = g_strdup_printf("vnc.%s.username", vd->id); + } + vd->sasl.authz = QAUTHZ(qauthz_list_new(vd->sasl.authzid, + QAUTHZ_LIST_POLICY_DENY, + &error_abort)); } - vd->sasl.authz = QAUTHZ(qauthz_list_new(vd->sasl.authzid, - QAUTHZ_LIST_POLICY_DENY, - &error_abort)); } #endif -- 2.20.1