10:51 a.m.
Hi all,
commit fceeeda2 added support for adding key objects on hotplug based on a disk's
secinfo for normal drives, but missed out SCSI drives. This patch adds the same support
for SCSI drives, so that it's possible to hotplug SCSI drives requiring authentication
(e.g. rbd-backed drives).
Cheers,
Gema
Gema Gomez (1):
qemu: hotplug: support auth for scsi hotplug
src/qemu/qemu_hotplug.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 21 insertions(+)
--
2.10.0
10:51 a.m.
New subject: [libvirt] [PATCH] qemu: hotplug: support auth for scsi hotplug
Add any key objects to qemu when hotplugging a scsi drive with secinfo.
Support for this was added in a previous commit for normal drives, but
not for SCSI drives.
---
src/qemu/qemu_hotplug.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 21 insertions(+)
diff --git a/src/qemu/qemu_hotplug.c b/src/qemu/qemu_hotplug.c
index 72dd93b..a450492 100644
--- a/src/qemu/qemu_hotplug.c
+++ b/src/qemu/qemu_hotplug.c
@@ -601,13 +601,16 @@ qemuDomainAttachSCSIDisk(virConnectPtr conn,
char *devstr = NULL;
bool driveAdded = false;
bool encobjAdded = false;
+ bool secobjAdded = false;
char *drivealias = NULL;
int ret = -1;
int rv;
virQEMUDriverConfigPtr cfg = virQEMUDriverGetConfig(driver);
virJSONValuePtr encobjProps = NULL;
+ virJSONValuePtr secobjProps = NULL;
qemuDomainDiskPrivatePtr diskPriv;
qemuDomainSecretInfoPtr encinfo;
+ qemuDomainSecretInfoPtr secinfo;
if (qemuDomainPrepareDisk(driver, vm, disk, NULL, false) < 0)
goto cleanup;
@@ -639,6 +642,12 @@ qemuDomainAttachSCSIDisk(virConnectPtr conn,
goto error;
diskPriv = QEMU_DOMAIN_DISK_PRIVATE(disk);
+ secinfo = diskPriv->secinfo;
+ if (secinfo && secinfo->type == VIR_DOMAIN_SECRET_INFO_TYPE_AES) {
+ if (qemuBuildSecretInfoProps(secinfo, &secobjProps) < 0)
+ goto error;
+ }
+
encinfo = diskPriv->encinfo;
if (encinfo && qemuBuildSecretInfoProps(encinfo, &encobjProps) < 0)
goto error;
@@ -657,6 +666,15 @@ qemuDomainAttachSCSIDisk(virConnectPtr conn,
qemuDomainObjEnterMonitor(driver, vm);
+ if (secobjProps) {
+ rv = qemuMonitorAddObject(priv->mon, "secret",
secinfo->s.aes.alias,
+ secobjProps);
+ secobjProps = NULL; /* qemuMonitorAddObject consumes */
+ if (rv < 0)
+ goto exit_monitor;
+ secobjAdded = true;
+ }
+
if (encobjProps) {
rv = qemuMonitorAddObject(priv->mon, "secret",
encinfo->s.aes.alias,
encobjProps);
@@ -682,6 +700,7 @@ qemuDomainAttachSCSIDisk(virConnectPtr conn,
ret = 0;
cleanup:
+ virJSONValueFree(secobjProps);
virJSONValueFree(encobjProps);
qemuDomainSecretDiskDestroy(disk);
VIR_FREE(devstr);
@@ -696,6 +715,8 @@ qemuDomainAttachSCSIDisk(virConnectPtr conn,
VIR_WARN("Unable to remove drive %s (%s) after failed "
"qemuMonitorAddDevice", drivealias, drivestr);
}
+ if (secobjAdded)
+ ignore_value(qemuMonitorDelObject(priv->mon, secinfo->s.aes.alias));
if (encobjAdded)
ignore_value(qemuMonitorDelObject(priv->mon, encinfo->s.aes.alias));
if (orig_err) {
--
2.10.0
3:37 p.m.
On 10/09/2016 11:51 AM, Gema Gomez wrote:
Hi all,
commit fceeeda2 added support for adding key objects on hotplug based on a disk's
secinfo for normal drives, but missed out SCSI drives. This patch adds the same support
for SCSI drives, so that it's possible to hotplug SCSI drives requiring authentication
(e.g. rbd-backed drives).
Cheers,
Gema
Need to teach your mailer to truncate long lines...
So could you provide a bit more information about the configuration.
Are you indicating that you have an RBD pool with a volume that's being
used as a SCSI device on the guest?
Reason I ask - not modifying qemuDomainAttachSCSIDisk was by choice
mainly because it's generally used with the iSCSI pool which at this
point in time cannot support this new secret model.
Tks,
John
Gema Gomez (1):
qemu: hotplug: support auth for scsi hotplug
src/qemu/qemu_hotplug.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 21 insertions(+)
9:04 a.m.
Hi John,
On 13/10/16 21:37, John Ferlan wrote:
So could you provide a bit more information about the configuration.
Are you indicating that you have an RBD pool with a volume that's being
used as a SCSI device on the guest?
We are indeed using Ceph (RBD) pool volumes, attached via virtio-scsi to
the guests.
Reason I ask - not modifying qemuDomainAttachSCSIDisk was by choice
mainly because it's generally used with the iSCSI pool which at this
point in time cannot support this new secret model.
Even though iSCSI doesn't support secrets this way, doesn't mean it
isn't necessary for RBD. In particular, the current handling is
inconsistent between domain creation and hotplugging of a volume. On
domain creation, the secret object is added just fine.
On hotplug, when libvirt talks to the qemu monitor, it tells qemu to
create a virtio-scsi device, rbd-backed, with the secret pointing to a
secret object. However, that secret object is *NOT* currently being
inserted via the qemu mon communication, and so the command fails to
actually attach the disk.
Considering libvirt is already telling qemu on hotplug that there is
some secret with a given name, it sounds logical to actually add that
secret object. Plus, that's consistent, as I said, with how domain
creation works.
As for iSCSI not supporting it - I'm not sure I see the problem. The
patch I submitted qualifies the creation of the aes key object with
whether secinfo is present for the disk, and it's of AES type.
And for reference, below is the conversation libvirt and the qemu
monitor were having before this patch, including the XML. Since libvirt
wasn't adding the scsi0-0-0-1-secret0 object, it all failed rather
miserably.
2016-10-07 14:09:40.974+0000: 13608: info : qemuMonitorIOWrite:534 :
QEMU_MONITOR_IO_WRITE: mon=0x7f7c00eb60
buf={"execute":"human-monitor-command","arguments":{"command-line":"drive_add
dummy
file=rbd:volumes/volume-e51d02fc-7399-4e51-bdde-84577ba79990:id=nova:auth_supported=cephx\\;none:mon_host=10.10.0.101\\:6789\\;10.10.0.111\\:6789\\;10.10.0.112\\:6789,file.password-secret=scsi0-0-0-1-secret0,format=raw,if=none,id=drive-scsi0-0-0-1,serial=e51d02fc-7399-4e51-bdde-84577ba79990,cache=none"},"id":"libvirt-14"}
2016-10-07 14:09:40.987+0000: 13608: info : qemuMonitorIOProcess:429 :
QEMU_MONITOR_IO_PROCESS: mon=0x7f7c00eb60 buf={"return": "No secret with
id 'scsi0-0-0-1-secret0'\r\n", "id": "libvirt-14"}
len=79
for this XML:
<disk type="network" device="disk">
<driver name="qemu" type="raw" cache="none"/>
<source protocol="rbd"
name="volumes/volume-e51d02fc-7399-4e51-bdde-84577ba79990">
<host name="10.10.0.101" port="6789"/>
<host name="10.10.0.111" port="6789"/>
<host name="10.10.0.112" port="6789"/>
</source>
<auth username="nova">
<secret type="ceph" uuid="some-uuid..."/>
</auth>
<target bus="scsi" dev="sdb"/>
<serial>e51d02fc-7399-4e51-bdde-84577ba79990</serial>
</disk>
Thanks,
Gema
--
Gema Gomez-Solano
Tech Lead, SDI
Linaro Ltd
IRC: gema@#linaro on irc.freenode.net
6:01 p.m.
On 10/15/2016 10:04 AM, Gema Gomez wrote:
Hi John,
On 13/10/16 21:37, John Ferlan wrote:
> So could you provide a bit more information about the configuration.
> Are you indicating that you have an RBD pool with a volume that's being
> used as a SCSI device on the guest?
We are indeed using Ceph (RBD) pool volumes, attached via virtio-scsi to
the guests.
> Reason I ask - not modifying qemuDomainAttachSCSIDisk was by choice
> mainly because it's generally used with the iSCSI pool which at this
> point in time cannot support this new secret model.
Even though iSCSI doesn't support secrets this way, doesn't mean it
isn't necessary for RBD. In particular, the current handling is
inconsistent between domain creation and hotplugging of a volume. On
domain creation, the secret object is added just fine.
On hotplug, when libvirt talks to the qemu monitor, it tells qemu to
create a virtio-scsi device, rbd-backed, with the secret pointing to a
secret object. However, that secret object is *NOT* currently being
inserted via the qemu mon communication, and so the command fails to
actually attach the disk.
Considering libvirt is already telling qemu on hotplug that there is
some secret with a given name, it sounds logical to actually add that
secret object. Plus, that's consistent, as I said, with how domain
creation works.
As for iSCSI not supporting it - I'm not sure I see the problem. The
patch I submitted qualifies the creation of the aes key object with
whether secinfo is present for the disk, and it's of AES type.
And for reference, below is the conversation libvirt and the qemu
monitor were having before this patch, including the XML. Since libvirt
wasn't adding the scsi0-0-0-1-secret0 object, it all failed rather
miserably.
2016-10-07 14:09:40.974+0000: 13608: info : qemuMonitorIOWrite:534 :
QEMU_MONITOR_IO_WRITE: mon=0x7f7c00eb60
buf={"execute":"human-monitor-command","arguments":{"command-line":"drive_add
dummy
file=rbd:volumes/volume-e51d02fc-7399-4e51-bdde-84577ba79990:id=nova:auth_supported=cephx\\;none:mon_host=10.10.0.101\\:6789\\;10.10.0.111\\:6789\\;10.10.0.112\\:6789,file.password-secret=scsi0-0-0-1-secret0,format=raw,if=none,id=drive-scsi0-0-0-1,serial=e51d02fc-7399-4e51-bdde-84577ba79990,cache=none"},"id":"libvirt-14"}
2016-10-07 14:09:40.987+0000: 13608: info : qemuMonitorIOProcess:429 :
QEMU_MONITOR_IO_PROCESS: mon=0x7f7c00eb60 buf={"return": "No secret with
id 'scsi0-0-0-1-secret0'\r\n", "id": "libvirt-14"}
len=79
for this XML:
<disk type="network" device="disk">
<driver name="qemu" type="raw" cache="none"/>
<source protocol="rbd"
name="volumes/volume-e51d02fc-7399-4e51-bdde-84577ba79990">
<host name="10.10.0.101" port="6789"/>
<host name="10.10.0.111" port="6789"/>
<host name="10.10.0.112" port="6789"/>
</source>
<auth username="nova">
<secret type="ceph" uuid="some-uuid..."/>
</auth>
<target bus="scsi" dev="sdb"/>
<serial>e51d02fc-7399-4e51-bdde-84577ba79990</serial>
</disk>
Thanks,
Gema
OK thanks for confirming my suspicion...
I'd like to add/merge the attached to this patch. Essentially it's a
test that uses XML like above. Although it's added to the qemu_command
processing - it shows the need to have the SCSI hotplug code to also
have the secret processing. I still haven't figured out those hotplug
tests - if you want to take a shot, be my guest!
Just let me know and I'll merge it with yours and push.
Thanks and congrats on your first libvirt patch!
John
2990
days inactive
3000
days old
4 comments
2 participants
participants (2)
-
Gema Gomez -
John Ferlan