[libvirt PATCH v4 0/3] Support SEV direct kernel boot
This is the left over pieces from the rest fo the previous SEV series. In this version I've changed the way we probe for capabilities and also changed the way we set the capabilities in the test suite so we don't rely on them being generated on an AMD SEV host. Daniel P. Berrangé (3): conf: add support for setting SEV kernel hashes qemu: probe for sev-guest.kernel-hashes property qemu: format sev-guest.kernel-hashes property docs/formatdomain.rst | 7 +++- docs/schemas/domaincommon.rng | 5 +++ src/conf/domain_conf.c | 8 ++++ src/conf/domain_conf.h | 1 + src/qemu/qemu_capabilities.c | 7 ++++ src/qemu/qemu_capabilities.h | 1 + src/qemu/qemu_command.c | 1 + src/qemu/qemu_validate.c | 7 ++++ .../caps_6.2.0.x86_64.replies | 5 +++ .../caps_6.2.0.x86_64.xml | 1 + ...nch-security-sev-direct.x86_64-latest.args | 40 +++++++++++++++++++ .../launch-security-sev-direct.xml | 39 ++++++++++++++++++ tests/qemuxml2argvtest.c | 5 +++ tests/testutilsqemu.c | 15 ++++--- 14 files changed, 136 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) create mode 100644 tests/qemuxml2argvdata/launch-security-sev-direct.x86_64-latest.args create mode 100644 tests/qemuxml2argvdata/launch-security-sev-direct.xml -- 2.33.1
Normally the SEV measurement only covers the firmware loader contents. When doing a direct kernel boot, however, with new enough OVMF it is possible to ask for the measurement to cover the kernel, ramdisk and command line. It can't be done automatically as that would break existing guests using direct kernel boot with old firmware, so there is a new XML setting allowing this behaviour to be toggled. Reviewed-by: Peter Krempa <pkrempa@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com> --- docs/formatdomain.rst | 7 ++++++- docs/schemas/domaincommon.rng | 5 +++++ src/conf/domain_conf.c | 8 ++++++++ src/conf/domain_conf.h | 1 + 4 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/docs/formatdomain.rst b/docs/formatdomain.rst index 0c5e33c78f..9d064a4af2 100644 --- a/docs/formatdomain.rst +++ b/docs/formatdomain.rst @@ -8215,7 +8215,7 @@ spec <https://support.amd.com/TechDocs/55766_SEV-KM_API_Specification.pdf>`__ <domain> ... - <launchSecurity type='sev'> + <launchSecurity type='sev' kernelHashes='yes'> <policy>0x0001</policy> <cbitpos>47</cbitpos> <reducedPhysBits>1</reducedPhysBits> @@ -8225,6 +8225,11 @@ spec <https://support.amd.com/TechDocs/55766_SEV-KM_API_Specification.pdf>`__ ... </domain> +``kernelHashes`` + The optional ``kernelHashes`` attribute indicates whether the + hashes of the kernel, ramdisk and command line should be included + in the measurement done by the firmware. This is only valid if + using direct kernel boot. :since:`Since 8.0.0` ``cbitpos`` The required ``cbitpos`` element provides the C-bit (aka encryption bit) location in guest page table entry. The value of ``cbitpos`` is hypervisor diff --git a/docs/schemas/domaincommon.rng b/docs/schemas/domaincommon.rng index ce5018f798..7fa5c2b8b5 100644 --- a/docs/schemas/domaincommon.rng +++ b/docs/schemas/domaincommon.rng @@ -499,6 +499,11 @@ <attribute name="type"> <value>sev</value> </attribute> + <optional> + <attribute name="kernelHashes"> + <ref name="virYesNo"/> + </attribute> + </optional> <interleave> <optional> <element name="cbitpos"> diff --git a/src/conf/domain_conf.c b/src/conf/domain_conf.c index 9a21ac10ce..bd372190df 100644 --- a/src/conf/domain_conf.c +++ b/src/conf/domain_conf.c @@ -14804,6 +14804,10 @@ virDomainSEVDefParseXML(virDomainSEVDef *def, unsigned long policy; int rc; + if (virXMLPropTristateBool(ctxt->node, "kernelHashes", VIR_XML_PROP_NONE, + &def->kernel_hashes) < 0) + return -1; + if (virXPathULongHex("string(./policy)", ctxt, &policy) < 0) { virReportError(VIR_ERR_XML_ERROR, "%s", _("failed to get launch security policy")); @@ -27133,6 +27137,10 @@ virDomainSecDefFormat(virBuffer *buf, virDomainSecDef *sec) case VIR_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_SEV: { virDomainSEVDef *sev = &sec->data.sev; + if (sev->kernel_hashes != VIR_TRISTATE_BOOL_ABSENT) + virBufferAsprintf(&attrBuf, " kernelHashes='%s'", + virTristateBoolTypeToString(sev->kernel_hashes)); + if (sev->haveCbitpos) virBufferAsprintf(&childBuf, "<cbitpos>%d</cbitpos>\n", sev->cbitpos); diff --git a/src/conf/domain_conf.h b/src/conf/domain_conf.h index afabcd1b4d..144ba4dd12 100644 --- a/src/conf/domain_conf.h +++ b/src/conf/domain_conf.h @@ -2714,6 +2714,7 @@ struct _virDomainSEVDef { unsigned int cbitpos; bool haveReducedPhysBits; unsigned int reduced_phys_bits; + virTristateBool kernel_hashes; }; struct _virDomainSecDef { -- 2.33.1
This sev-guest object property indicates whether QEMU should expose the kernel, ramdisk, cmdline hashes to the firmware for measurement. The 6.2.0 capabilities are selectively refreshed to pull in the kernel-hashes parameter to the schema. Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com> --- src/qemu/qemu_capabilities.c | 2 ++ src/qemu/qemu_capabilities.h | 1 + tests/qemucapabilitiesdata/caps_6.2.0.x86_64.replies | 5 +++++ tests/qemucapabilitiesdata/caps_6.2.0.x86_64.xml | 1 + 4 files changed, 9 insertions(+) diff --git a/src/qemu/qemu_capabilities.c b/src/qemu/qemu_capabilities.c index ddd61ecfc9..c1b06998af 100644 --- a/src/qemu/qemu_capabilities.c +++ b/src/qemu/qemu_capabilities.c @@ -652,6 +652,7 @@ VIR_ENUM_IMPL(virQEMUCaps, "device.json", /* QEMU_CAPS_DEVICE_JSON */ "query-dirty-rate", /* QEMU_CAPS_QUERY_DIRTY_RATE */ "rbd-encryption", /* QEMU_CAPS_RBD_ENCRYPTION */ + "sev-guest-kernel-hashes", /* QEMU_CAPS_SEV_GUEST_KERNEL_HASHES */ ); @@ -1571,6 +1572,7 @@ static struct virQEMUCapsStringFlags virQEMUCapsQMPSchemaQueries[] = { { "query-named-block-nodes/arg-type/flat", QEMU_CAPS_QMP_QUERY_NAMED_BLOCK_NODES_FLAT }, { "screendump/arg-type/device", QEMU_CAPS_SCREENDUMP_DEVICE }, { "set-numa-node/arg-type/+hmat-lb", QEMU_CAPS_NUMA_HMAT }, + { "object-add/arg-type/+sev-guest/kernel-hashes", QEMU_CAPS_SEV_GUEST_KERNEL_HASHES }, }; typedef struct _virQEMUCapsObjectTypeProps virQEMUCapsObjectTypeProps; diff --git a/src/qemu/qemu_capabilities.h b/src/qemu/qemu_capabilities.h index 716e09123c..aaac20a834 100644 --- a/src/qemu/qemu_capabilities.h +++ b/src/qemu/qemu_capabilities.h @@ -631,6 +631,7 @@ typedef enum { /* virQEMUCapsFlags grouping marker for syntax-check */ QEMU_CAPS_DEVICE_JSON, /* -device accepts JSON */ QEMU_CAPS_QUERY_DIRTY_RATE, /* accepts query-dirty-rate */ QEMU_CAPS_RBD_ENCRYPTION, /* Ceph RBD encryption support */ + QEMU_CAPS_SEV_GUEST_KERNEL_HASHES, /* sev-guest.kernel-hashes= */ QEMU_CAPS_LAST /* this must always be the last item */ } virQEMUCapsFlags; diff --git a/tests/qemucapabilitiesdata/caps_6.2.0.x86_64.replies b/tests/qemucapabilitiesdata/caps_6.2.0.x86_64.replies index 69d3b1b12a..9de8e3bd66 100644 --- a/tests/qemucapabilitiesdata/caps_6.2.0.x86_64.replies +++ b/tests/qemucapabilitiesdata/caps_6.2.0.x86_64.replies @@ -13315,6 +13315,11 @@ { "name": "reduced-phys-bits", "type": "int" + }, + { + "name": "kernel-hashes", + "default": null, + "type": "bool" } ], "meta-type": "object" diff --git a/tests/qemucapabilitiesdata/caps_6.2.0.x86_64.xml b/tests/qemucapabilitiesdata/caps_6.2.0.x86_64.xml index 39179916c5..5aa65679ee 100644 --- a/tests/qemucapabilitiesdata/caps_6.2.0.x86_64.xml +++ b/tests/qemucapabilitiesdata/caps_6.2.0.x86_64.xml @@ -240,6 +240,7 @@ <flag name='device.json'/> <flag name='query-dirty-rate'/> <flag name='rbd-encryption'/> + <flag name='sev-guest-kernel-hashes'/> <version>6001050</version> <kvmVersion>0</kvmVersion> <microcodeVersion>43100244</microcodeVersion> -- 2.33.1
On Tue, Dec 14, 2021 at 16:07:05 +0000, Daniel P. Berrangé wrote:
This sev-guest object property indicates whether QEMU should expose the kernel, ramdisk, cmdline hashes to the firmware for measurement.
The 6.2.0 capabilities are selectively refreshed to pull in the kernel-hashes parameter to the schema.
The proper refresh to 6.2 released is now pushed.
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com> --- src/qemu/qemu_capabilities.c | 2 ++ src/qemu/qemu_capabilities.h | 1 + tests/qemucapabilitiesdata/caps_6.2.0.x86_64.replies | 5 +++++ tests/qemucapabilitiesdata/caps_6.2.0.x86_64.xml | 1 + 4 files changed, 9 insertions(+)
Reviewed-by: Peter Krempa <pkrempa@redhat.com>
Set the kernel-hashes property on the sev-guest object if the config asked for it explicitly. While QEMU machine types currently default to having this setting off, it is not guaranteed to remain this way. We can't assume that the QEMU capabilities were generated on an AMD host with SEV, so we must force set the QEMU_CAPS_SEV_GUEST. This also means that the 'sev' info in the qemuCaps struct might be NULL, but this is harmless from POV of testing the CLI generator. Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com> --- src/qemu/qemu_capabilities.c | 5 +++ src/qemu/qemu_command.c | 1 + src/qemu/qemu_validate.c | 7 ++++ ...nch-security-sev-direct.x86_64-latest.args | 40 +++++++++++++++++++ .../launch-security-sev-direct.xml | 39 ++++++++++++++++++ tests/qemuxml2argvtest.c | 5 +++ tests/testutilsqemu.c | 15 ++++--- 7 files changed, 107 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) create mode 100644 tests/qemuxml2argvdata/launch-security-sev-direct.x86_64-latest.args create mode 100644 tests/qemuxml2argvdata/launch-security-sev-direct.xml diff --git a/src/qemu/qemu_capabilities.c b/src/qemu/qemu_capabilities.c index c1b06998af..4f63322a9e 100644 --- a/src/qemu/qemu_capabilities.c +++ b/src/qemu/qemu_capabilities.c @@ -1892,6 +1892,11 @@ virQEMUCapsSEVInfoCopy(virSEVCapability **dst, { g_autoptr(virSEVCapability) tmp = NULL; + if (!src) { + *dst = NULL; + return 0; + } + tmp = g_new0(virSEVCapability, 1); tmp->pdh = g_strdup(src->pdh); diff --git a/src/qemu/qemu_command.c b/src/qemu/qemu_command.c index 6d00105b24..4d5f7934cb 100644 --- a/src/qemu/qemu_command.c +++ b/src/qemu/qemu_command.c @@ -9928,6 +9928,7 @@ qemuBuildSEVCommandLine(virDomainObj *vm, virCommand *cmd, "u:policy", sev->policy, "S:dh-cert-file", dhpath, "S:session-file", sessionpath, + "T:kernel-hashes", sev->kernel_hashes, NULL) < 0) return -1; diff --git a/src/qemu/qemu_validate.c b/src/qemu/qemu_validate.c index f9a195e991..c1924eb2ad 100644 --- a/src/qemu/qemu_validate.c +++ b/src/qemu/qemu_validate.c @@ -1217,6 +1217,13 @@ qemuValidateDomainDef(const virDomainDef *def, "this QEMU binary")); return -1; } + + if (def->sec->data.sev.kernel_hashes != VIR_TRISTATE_BOOL_ABSENT && + !virQEMUCapsGet(qemuCaps, QEMU_CAPS_SEV_GUEST_KERNEL_HASHES)) { + virReportError(VIR_ERR_CONFIG_UNSUPPORTED, "%s", + _("SEV measured direct kernel boot is not supported with this QEMU binary")); + return -1; + } break; case VIR_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_PV: if (!virQEMUCapsGet(qemuCaps, QEMU_CAPS_MACHINE_CONFIDENTAL_GUEST_SUPPORT) || diff --git a/tests/qemuxml2argvdata/launch-security-sev-direct.x86_64-latest.args b/tests/qemuxml2argvdata/launch-security-sev-direct.x86_64-latest.args new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..dac312e301 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/qemuxml2argvdata/launch-security-sev-direct.x86_64-latest.args @@ -0,0 +1,40 @@ +LC_ALL=C \ +PATH=/bin \ +HOME=/tmp/lib/domain--1-QEMUGuest1 \ +USER=test \ +LOGNAME=test \ +XDG_DATA_HOME=/tmp/lib/domain--1-QEMUGuest1/.local/share \ +XDG_CACHE_HOME=/tmp/lib/domain--1-QEMUGuest1/.cache \ +XDG_CONFIG_HOME=/tmp/lib/domain--1-QEMUGuest1/.config \ +/usr/bin/qemu-system-x86_64 \ +-name guest=QEMUGuest1,debug-threads=on \ +-S \ +-object '{"qom-type":"secret","id":"masterKey0","format":"raw","file":"/tmp/lib/domain--1-QEMUGuest1/master-key.aes"}' \ +-machine pc,usb=off,dump-guest-core=off,confidential-guest-support=lsec0,memory-backend=pc.ram \ +-accel kvm \ +-cpu qemu64 \ +-m 214 \ +-object '{"qom-type":"memory-backend-ram","id":"pc.ram","size":224395264}' \ +-overcommit mem-lock=off \ +-smp 1,sockets=1,cores=1,threads=1 \ +-uuid c7a5fdbd-edaf-9455-926a-d65c16db1809 \ +-display none \ +-no-user-config \ +-nodefaults \ +-chardev socket,id=charmonitor,fd=1729,server=on,wait=off \ +-mon chardev=charmonitor,id=monitor,mode=control \ +-rtc base=utc \ +-no-shutdown \ +-no-acpi \ +-boot strict=on \ +-kernel /vmlinuz \ +-initrd /initrd \ +-append runme \ +-device '{"driver":"piix3-usb-uhci","id":"usb","bus":"pci.0","addr":"0x1.0x2"}' \ +-blockdev '{"driver":"host_device","filename":"/dev/HostVG/QEMUGuest1","node-name":"libvirt-1-storage","auto-read-only":true,"discard":"unmap"}' \ +-blockdev '{"node-name":"libvirt-1-format","read-only":false,"driver":"raw","file":"libvirt-1-storage"}' \ +-device '{"driver":"ide-hd","bus":"ide.0","unit":0,"drive":"libvirt-1-format","id":"ide0-0-0","bootindex":1}' \ +-audiodev '{"id":"audio1","driver":"none"}' \ +-object '{"qom-type":"sev-guest","id":"lsec0","cbitpos":47,"reduced-phys-bits":1,"policy":1,"dh-cert-file":"/tmp/lib/domain--1-QEMUGuest1/dh_cert.base64","session-file":"/tmp/lib/domain--1-QEMUGuest1/session.base64","kernel-hashes":true}' \ +-sandbox on,obsolete=deny,elevateprivileges=deny,spawn=deny,resourcecontrol=deny \ +-msg timestamp=on diff --git a/tests/qemuxml2argvdata/launch-security-sev-direct.xml b/tests/qemuxml2argvdata/launch-security-sev-direct.xml new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..80ce6412dd --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/qemuxml2argvdata/launch-security-sev-direct.xml @@ -0,0 +1,39 @@ +<domain type='kvm'> + <name>QEMUGuest1</name> + <uuid>c7a5fdbd-edaf-9455-926a-d65c16db1809</uuid> + <memory unit='KiB'>219100</memory> + <currentMemory unit='KiB'>219100</currentMemory> + <vcpu placement='static'>1</vcpu> + <os> + <type arch='x86_64' machine='pc'>hvm</type> + <kernel>/vmlinuz</kernel> + <initrd>/initrd</initrd> + <cmdline>runme</cmdline> + </os> + <clock offset='utc'/> + <on_poweroff>destroy</on_poweroff> + <on_reboot>restart</on_reboot> + <on_crash>destroy</on_crash> + <devices> + <emulator>/usr/bin/qemu-system-x86_64</emulator> + <disk type='block' device='disk'> + <driver name='qemu' type='raw'/> + <source dev='/dev/HostVG/QEMUGuest1'/> + <target dev='hda' bus='ide'/> + <address type='drive' controller='0' bus='0' target='0' unit='0'/> + </disk> + <controller type='usb' index='0'/> + <controller type='ide' index='0'/> + <controller type='pci' index='0' model='pci-root'/> + <input type='mouse' bus='ps2'/> + <input type='keyboard' bus='ps2'/> + <memballoon model='none'/> + </devices> + <launchSecurity type='sev' kernelHashes='yes'> + <cbitpos>47</cbitpos> + <reducedPhysBits>1</reducedPhysBits> + <policy>0x0001</policy> + <dhCert>AQAAAAAOAAAAQAAAAAOAAAAQAAAAAOAAAAQAAAAAOAAAAQAAAAAOAAA</dhCert> + <session>IHAVENOIDEABUTJUSTPROVIDINGASTRING</session> + </launchSecurity> +</domain> diff --git a/tests/qemuxml2argvtest.c b/tests/qemuxml2argvtest.c index 0b88b580c5..6c67b36d5c 100644 --- a/tests/qemuxml2argvtest.c +++ b/tests/qemuxml2argvtest.c @@ -3425,6 +3425,11 @@ mymain(void) DO_TEST_CAPS_VER("launch-security-sev", "2.12.0"); DO_TEST_CAPS_VER("launch-security-sev", "6.0.0"); DO_TEST_CAPS_VER("launch-security-sev-missing-platform-info", "2.12.0"); + DO_TEST_CAPS_ARCH_LATEST_FULL("launch-security-sev-direct", + "x86_64", + ARG_QEMU_CAPS, + QEMU_CAPS_SEV_GUEST, + QEMU_CAPS_LAST); DO_TEST_CAPS_ARCH_LATEST("launch-security-s390-pv", "s390x"); diff --git a/tests/testutilsqemu.c b/tests/testutilsqemu.c index 7b19575d8b..7fdb82daec 100644 --- a/tests/testutilsqemu.c +++ b/tests/testutilsqemu.c @@ -772,11 +772,6 @@ testQemuInfoInitArgs(struct testQemuInfo *info) bool stripmachinealiases = false; virQEMUCaps *cachedcaps = NULL; - if (info->args.fakeCapsUsed) { - fprintf(stderr, "ARG_QEMU_CAPS can not be combined with ARG_CAPS_ARCH or ARG_CAPS_VER\n"); - return -1; - } - info->arch = virArchFromString(info->args.capsarch); if (STREQ(info->args.capsver, "latest")) { @@ -805,6 +800,16 @@ testQemuInfoInitArgs(struct testQemuInfo *info) if (!(info->qemuCaps = virQEMUCapsNewCopy(cachedcaps))) return -1; + if (info->args.fakeCapsUsed) { + size_t i; + for (i = 0; i < QEMU_CAPS_LAST; i++) { + if (virQEMUCapsGet(info->args.fakeCaps, i)) { + virQEMUCapsSet(info->qemuCaps, i); + } + } + } + + if (stripmachinealiases) virQEMUCapsStripMachineAliases(info->qemuCaps); -- 2.33.1
On Tue, Dec 14, 2021 at 16:07:06 +0000, Daniel P. Berrangé wrote:
Set the kernel-hashes property on the sev-guest object if the config asked for it explicitly. While QEMU machine types currently default to having this setting off, it is not guaranteed to remain this way.
We can't assume that the QEMU capabilities were generated on an AMD host with SEV, so we must force set the QEMU_CAPS_SEV_GUEST. This also means that the 'sev' info in the qemuCaps struct might be NULL, but this is harmless from POV of testing the CLI generator.
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com> --- src/qemu/qemu_capabilities.c | 5 +++ src/qemu/qemu_command.c | 1 + src/qemu/qemu_validate.c | 7 ++++ ...nch-security-sev-direct.x86_64-latest.args | 40 +++++++++++++++++++ .../launch-security-sev-direct.xml | 39 ++++++++++++++++++ tests/qemuxml2argvtest.c | 5 +++ tests/testutilsqemu.c | 15 ++++---
Please split out the testutils change to a separate commit, you can use my R-b for that without posting to the list.
7 files changed, 107 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) create mode 100644 tests/qemuxml2argvdata/launch-security-sev-direct.x86_64-latest.args create mode 100644 tests/qemuxml2argvdata/launch-security-sev-direct.xml
Reviewed-by: Peter Krempa <pkrempa@redhat.com>
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Peter Krempa