QEMU version >= 2.12 provides support for launching an encrypted VMs on AMD x86 platform using Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) feature. This patch adds support to query the SEV capability from the qemu. Reviewed-by: "Daniel P. Berrangé" <berrange(a)redhat.com&gt; Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh(a)amd.com&gt; --- src/conf/domain_capabilities.h | 13 ++++ src/qemu/qemu_capabilities.c | 38 +++++++++++ src/qemu/qemu_capabilities.h | 1 + src/qemu/qemu_capspriv.h | 4 ++ src/qemu/qemu_monitor.c | 9 +++ src/qemu/qemu_monitor.h | 3 + src/qemu/qemu_monitor_json.c | 73 ++++++++++++++++++++++ src/qemu/qemu_monitor_json.h | 3 + .../caps_2.12.0.x86_64.replies | 10 +++ tests/qemucapabilitiesdata/caps_2.12.0.x86_64.xml | 3 +- 10 files changed, 156 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/src/conf/domain_capabilities.h b/src/conf/domain_capabilities.h index fa4c1e4..72e9daf 100644 --- a/src/conf/domain_capabilities.h +++ b/src/conf/domain_capabilities.h @@ -137,6 +137,19 @@ struct _virDomainCapsCPU { virDomainCapsCPUModelsPtr custom; }; +/* + * SEV capabilities + */ +typedef struct _virSEVCapability virSEVCapability; +typedef virSEVCapability *virSEVCapabilityPtr; +struct _virSEVCapability { + char *pdh; + char *cert_chain; + unsigned int cbitpos; + unsigned int reduced_phys_bits; +}; + + struct _virDomainCaps { virObjectLockable parent; diff --git a/src/qemu/qemu_capabilities.c b/src/qemu/qemu_capabilities.c index e54dde6..0f6e6fb 100644 --- a/src/qemu/qemu_capabilities.c +++ b/src/qemu/qemu_capabilities.c @@ -466,6 +466,7 @@ VIR_ENUM_IMPL(virQEMUCaps, QEMU_CAPS_LAST, /* 285 */ "virtio-mouse-ccw", "virtio-tablet-ccw", + "sev-guest", ); @@ -532,6 +533,8 @@ struct _virQEMUCaps { size_t ngicCapabilities; virGICCapability *gicCapabilities; + virSEVCapability *sevCapabilities; + virQEMUCapsHostCPUData kvmCPU; virQEMUCapsHostCPUData tcgCPU; }; @@ -1705,6 +1708,7 @@ struct virQEMUCapsStringFlags virQEMUCapsObjectTypes[] = { { "virtio-keyboard-ccw", QEMU_CAPS_DEVICE_VIRTIO_KEYBOARD_CCW }, { "virtio-mouse-ccw", QEMU_CAPS_DEVICE_VIRTIO_MOUSE_CCW }, { "virtio-tablet-ccw", QEMU_CAPS_DEVICE_VIRTIO_TABLET_CCW }, + { "sev-guest", QEMU_CAPS_SEV_GUEST }, }; static struct virQEMUCapsStringFlags virQEMUCapsObjectPropsVirtioBalloon[] = { @@ -2784,6 +2788,21 @@ virQEMUCapsSetGICCapabilities(virQEMUCapsPtr qemuCaps, qemuCaps->ngicCapabilities = ncapabilities; } +void +virQEMUCapsSetSEVCapabilities(virQEMUCapsPtr qemuCaps, + virSEVCapability *capabilities) +{ + virSEVCapability *cap = qemuCaps->sevCapabilities; + + if (cap) { + VIR_FREE(cap->pdh); + VIR_FREE(cap->cert_chain); + } + + VIR_FREE(qemuCaps->sevCapabilities); + + qemuCaps->sevCapabilities = capabilities; +} static int virQEMUCapsProbeQMPCommands(virQEMUCapsPtr qemuCaps, @@ -3287,6 +3306,19 @@ virQEMUCapsProbeQMPGICCapabilities(virQEMUCapsPtr qemuCaps, return 0; } +static int +virQEMUCapsProbeQMPSEVCapabilities(virQEMUCapsPtr qemuCaps, + qemuMonitorPtr mon) +{ + virSEVCapability *caps = NULL; + + if (qemuMonitorGetSEVCapabilities(mon, &caps) < 0) + return -1; + + virQEMUCapsSetSEVCapabilities(qemuCaps, caps); + + return 0; +} bool virQEMUCapsCPUFilterFeatures(const char *name, @@ -4768,6 +4800,12 @@ virQEMUCapsInitQMPMonitor(virQEMUCapsPtr qemuCaps, virQEMUCapsGet(qemuCaps, QEMU_CAPS_QUERY_CPU_MODEL_EXPANSION)) virQEMUCapsSet(qemuCaps, QEMU_CAPS_CPU_CACHE); + /* Probe for SEV capabilities */ + if (virQEMUCapsGet(qemuCaps, QEMU_CAPS_SEV_GUEST)) { + if (virQEMUCapsProbeQMPSEVCapabilities(qemuCaps, mon) < 0) + virQEMUCapsClear(qemuCaps, QEMU_CAPS_SEV_GUEST); + } + ret = 0; cleanup: return ret; diff --git a/src/qemu/qemu_capabilities.h b/src/qemu/qemu_capabilities.h index 3f3c29f..9b51cc2 100644 --- a/src/qemu/qemu_capabilities.h +++ b/src/qemu/qemu_capabilities.h @@ -450,6 +450,7 @@ typedef enum { /* 285 */ QEMU_CAPS_DEVICE_VIRTIO_MOUSE_CCW, /* -device virtio-mouse-ccw */ QEMU_CAPS_DEVICE_VIRTIO_TABLET_CCW, /* -device virtio-tablet-ccw */ + QEMU_CAPS_SEV_GUEST, /* -object sev-guest,... */ QEMU_CAPS_LAST /* this must always be the last item */ } virQEMUCapsFlags; diff --git a/src/qemu/qemu_capspriv.h b/src/qemu/qemu_capspriv.h index 222f336..1fa85cc 100644 --- a/src/qemu/qemu_capspriv.h +++ b/src/qemu/qemu_capspriv.h @@ -86,6 +86,10 @@ virQEMUCapsSetGICCapabilities(virQEMUCapsPtr qemuCaps, virGICCapability *capabilities, size_t ncapabilities); +void +virQEMUCapsSetSEVCapabilities(virQEMUCapsPtr qemuCaps, + virSEVCapability *capabilities); + int virQEMUCapsParseHelpStr(const char *qemu, const char *str, diff --git a/src/qemu/qemu_monitor.c b/src/qemu/qemu_monitor.c index e169553..44c2dff 100644 --- a/src/qemu/qemu_monitor.c +++ b/src/qemu/qemu_monitor.c @@ -4007,6 +4007,15 @@ qemuMonitorGetGICCapabilities(qemuMonitorPtr mon, return qemuMonitorJSONGetGICCapabilities(mon, capabilities); } +int +qemuMonitorGetSEVCapabilities(qemuMonitorPtr mon, + virSEVCapability **capabilities) +{ + QEMU_CHECK_MONITOR_JSON(mon); + + return qemuMonitorJSONGetSEVCapabilities(mon, capabilities); +} + int qemuMonitorNBDServerStart(qemuMonitorPtr mon, diff --git a/src/qemu/qemu_monitor.h b/src/qemu/qemu_monitor.h index 7a22323..efd3427 100644 --- a/src/qemu/qemu_monitor.h +++ b/src/qemu/qemu_monitor.h @@ -767,6 +767,9 @@ int qemuMonitorSetMigrationCapability(qemuMonitorPtr mon, int qemuMonitorGetGICCapabilities(qemuMonitorPtr mon, virGICCapability **capabilities); +int qemuMonitorGetSEVCapabilities(qemuMonitorPtr mon, + virSEVCapability **capabilities); + typedef enum { QEMU_MONITOR_MIGRATE_BACKGROUND = 1 << 0, QEMU_MONITOR_MIGRATE_NON_SHARED_DISK = 1 << 1, /* migration with non-shared storage with full disk copy */ diff --git a/src/qemu/qemu_monitor_json.c b/src/qemu/qemu_monitor_json.c index d80c4f1..e67f7b7 100644 --- a/src/qemu/qemu_monitor_json.c +++ b/src/qemu/qemu_monitor_json.c @@ -6398,6 +6398,79 @@ qemuMonitorJSONGetGICCapabilities(qemuMonitorPtr mon, return ret; } +int +qemuMonitorJSONGetSEVCapabilities(qemuMonitorPtr mon, + virSEVCapability **capabilities) +{ + int ret = -1; + virJSONValuePtr cmd; + virJSONValuePtr reply = NULL; + virJSONValuePtr caps; + virSEVCapability *capability = NULL; + const char *pdh = NULL, *cert_chain = NULL; + int cbitpos, reduced_phys_bits; + + *capabilities = NULL; + + if (!(cmd = qemuMonitorJSONMakeCommand("query-sev-capabilities", + NULL))) + return -1; + + if (qemuMonitorJSONCommand(mon, cmd, &reply) < 0) + goto cleanup; + + + if (qemuMonitorJSONCheckError(cmd, reply) < 0) + goto cleanup; + + caps = virJSONValueObjectGetObject(reply, "return"); + + if (virJSONValueObjectGetNumberInt(caps, "cbitpos", &cbitpos) < 0) { + virReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR, "%s", + _("'cbitpos' field is missing")); + goto cleanup; + } + + if (virJSONValueObjectGetNumberInt(caps, "reduced-phys-bits", + &reduced_phys_bits) < 0) { + virReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR, "%s", + _("'reduced-phys-bits' field is missing")); + goto cleanup; + } + + if (!(pdh = virJSONValueObjectGetString(caps, "pdh"))) { + virReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR, "%s", + _("'pdh' field is missing")); + goto cleanup; + } + + if (!(cert_chain = virJSONValueObjectGetString(caps, "cert-chain"))) { + virReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR, "%s", + _("'cert-chain' field is missing")); + goto cleanup; + } + + if (VIR_ALLOC(capability) < 0) + goto cleanup; + + if (VIR_STRDUP(capability->pdh, pdh) < 0) + goto cleanup; + + if (VIR_STRDUP(capability->cert_chain, cert_chain) < 0) + goto cleanup; + + capability->cbitpos = cbitpos; + capability->reduced_phys_bits = reduced_phys_bits; + *capabilities = capability; + ret = 0; + + cleanup: + virJSONValueFree(cmd); + virJSONValueFree(reply); + + return ret; +} + static virJSONValuePtr qemuMonitorJSONBuildInetSocketAddress(const char *host, const char *port) diff --git a/src/qemu/qemu_monitor_json.h b/src/qemu/qemu_monitor_json.h index 846d366..f30ff1f 100644 --- a/src/qemu/qemu_monitor_json.h +++ b/src/qemu/qemu_monitor_json.h @@ -152,6 +152,9 @@ int qemuMonitorJSONSetMigrationCapability(qemuMonitorPtr mon, int qemuMonitorJSONGetGICCapabilities(qemuMonitorPtr mon, virGICCapability **capabilities); +int qemuMonitorJSONGetSEVCapabilities(qemuMonitorPtr mon, + virSEVCapability **capabilities); + int qemuMonitorJSONMigrate(qemuMonitorPtr mon, unsigned int flags, const char *uri); diff --git a/tests/qemucapabilitiesdata/caps_2.12.0.x86_64.replies b/tests/qemucapabilitiesdata/caps_2.12.0.x86_64.replies index c086e04..8287bb7 100644 --- a/tests/qemucapabilitiesdata/caps_2.12.0.x86_64.replies +++ b/tests/qemucapabilitiesdata/caps_2.12.0.x86_64.replies @@ -18942,6 +18942,16 @@ } { + "return" : { + "reduced-phys-bits": 1, + "cbitpos": 47, + "cert-chain": "AQAAAAAOAAAAQAAAAAOAAAAQAAAAAOAAAAQAAAAAOAAAAQAAAAAOAAA", + "pdh": "AQAAAAAOAAAAQAAAAAOAAAAQAAAAAOAAAAQAAAAAOAAAAQAAAAAOAAAAQAAAAAOAAA" + }, + "id": "libvirt-51" +} + +{ "return": { }, "id": "libvirt-1" diff --git a/tests/qemucapabilitiesdata/caps_2.12.0.x86_64.xml b/tests/qemucapabilitiesdata/caps_2.12.0.x86_64.xml index 334296e..43eeef5 100644 --- a/tests/qemucapabilitiesdata/caps_2.12.0.x86_64.xml +++ b/tests/qemucapabilitiesdata/caps_2.12.0.x86_64.xml @@ -225,9 +225,10 @@ <flag name='iscsi.password-secret'/> <flag name='isa-serial'/> <flag name='dump-completed'/> + <flag name='sev-guest'/> <version>2011090</version> <kvmVersion>0</kvmVersion> - <microcodeVersion>390060</microcodeVersion> + <microcodeVersion>390306</microcodeVersion> <package>v2.12.0-rc0</package> <arch>x86_64</arch> <hostCPU type='kvm' model='base' migratability='yes'> -- 2.7.4

Extend hypervisor capabilities to include sev feature. When available, hypervisor supports launching an encrypted VM on AMD platform. The sev feature tag provides additional details like platform diffie-hellman key and certificate chain which can be used by the guest owner to establish a cryptographic session with the SEV firmware to negotiate keys used for attestation or to provide secret during launch. Reviewed-by: "Daniel P. Berrangé" <berrange(a)redhat.com&gt; Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh(a)amd.com&gt; --- docs/formatdomaincaps.html.in | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ docs/schemas/domaincaps.rng | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++ src/conf/domain_capabilities.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++ src/conf/domain_capabilities.h | 1 + src/qemu/qemu_capabilities.c | 2 ++ 5 files changed, 83 insertions(+) diff --git a/docs/formatdomaincaps.html.in b/docs/formatdomaincaps.html.in index 6bfcaf6..f383141 100644 --- a/docs/formatdomaincaps.html.in +++ b/docs/formatdomaincaps.html.in @@ -417,6 +417,12 @@ &lt;value&gt;3&lt;/value&gt; &lt;/enum&gt; &lt;/gic&gt; + &lt;sev&gt; + &lt;pdh&gt; &lt;/pdh&gt; + &lt;cert-chain&gt; &lt;/cert-chain&gt; + &lt;cbitpos&gt; &lt;/cbitpos&gt; + &lt;reduced-phys-bits&gt; &lt;/reduced-phys-bits&gt; + &lt;/sev&gt; &lt;/features&gt; &lt;/domainCapabilities&gt; </pre> @@ -441,5 +447,39 @@ <code>gic</code> element.</dd> </dl> + <h4><a id="elementsSEV">SEV capabilities</a></h4> + + <p>AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) capabilities are exposed under + the <code>sev</code> element. + SEV is an extension to the AMD-V architecture which supports running + virtual machines (VMs) under the control of a hypervisor. When supported, + guest owner can create a VM whose memory contents will be transparently + encrypted with a key unique to that VM. + + For more details on SEV feature see: + <a href="https://support.amd.com/TechDocs/55766_SEV-KM%20API_Specificat... + SEV API spec</a> and <a href="http://amd-dev.wpengine.netdna-cdn.com/wordpress/media/2013/12... + SEV White Paper</a> + + </p> + + <dl> + <dt><code>pdh</code></dt> + <dd>Platform diffie-hellman key, which can be exported to remote entities + which wish to establish a secure transport context with the SEV platform + in order to transmit data securely. The key is encoded in base64</dd> + <dt><code>cert-chain</code></dt> + <dd> Platform certificate chain -- which includes platform endorsement key + (PEK), owners certificate authory (OCA) and chip endorsement key (CEK). + The certificate chain is encoded in base64.</dd> + <dt><code>cbitpos</code></dt> + <dd>When memory encryption is enabled, one of the physical address bit + (aka the C-bit) is utilized to mark if a memory page is protected. The + C-bit position is Hypervisor dependent.</dd> + <dt><code>reduced-phys-bits</code></dt> + <dd>When memory encryption is enabled, we loose certain bits in physical + address space. The number of bits we loose is hypervisor dependent.</dd> + </dl> + </body> </html> diff --git a/docs/schemas/domaincaps.rng b/docs/schemas/domaincaps.rng index 3905318..53b33eb 100644 --- a/docs/schemas/domaincaps.rng +++ b/docs/schemas/domaincaps.rng @@ -173,6 +173,9 @@ <element name='features'> <interleave> <ref name='gic'/> + <optional> + <ref name='sev'/> + </optional> </interleave> </element> </define> @@ -184,6 +187,23 @@ </element> </define> + <define name='sev'> + <element name='sev'> + <element name='pdh'> + <data type='string'/> + </element> + <element name='cert-chain'> + <data type='string'/> + </element> + <element name='cbitpos'> + <data type='unsignedInt'/> + </element> + <element name='reduced-phys-bits'> + <data type='unsignedInt'/> + </element> + </element> + </define> + <define name='value'> <zeroOrMore> <element name='value'> diff --git a/src/conf/domain_capabilities.c b/src/conf/domain_capabilities.c index f7d9be5..082065f 100644 --- a/src/conf/domain_capabilities.c +++ b/src/conf/domain_capabilities.c @@ -549,6 +549,25 @@ virDomainCapsFeatureGICFormat(virBufferPtr buf, FORMAT_EPILOGUE(gic); } +static void +virDomainCapsFeatureSEVFormat(virBufferPtr buf, + virSEVCapabilityPtr const sev) +{ + if (!sev) + return; + + virBufferAddLit(buf, "<sev supported='yes'>\n"); + virBufferAdjustIndent(buf, 2); + virBufferAsprintf(buf, "<cbitpos>%d</cbitpos>\n", sev->cbitpos); + virBufferAsprintf(buf, "<reduced-phys-bits>%d</reduced-phys-bits>\n", + sev->reduced_phys_bits); + virBufferAsprintf(buf, "<pdh>%s</pdh>\n", sev->pdh); + virBufferAsprintf(buf, "<cert-chain>%s</cert-chain>\n", + sev->cert_chain); + virBufferAdjustIndent(buf, -2); + virBufferAddLit(buf, "</sev>\n"); +} + char * virDomainCapsFormat(virDomainCapsPtr const caps) @@ -587,6 +606,7 @@ virDomainCapsFormat(virDomainCapsPtr const caps) virBufferAdjustIndent(&buf, 2); virDomainCapsFeatureGICFormat(&buf, &caps->gic); + virDomainCapsFeatureSEVFormat(&buf, caps->sev); virBufferAdjustIndent(&buf, -2); virBufferAddLit(&buf, "</features>\n"); diff --git a/src/conf/domain_capabilities.h b/src/conf/domain_capabilities.h index 72e9daf..2e8596c 100644 --- a/src/conf/domain_capabilities.h +++ b/src/conf/domain_capabilities.h @@ -170,6 +170,7 @@ struct _virDomainCaps { /* add new domain devices here */ virDomainCapsFeatureGIC gic; + virSEVCapabilityPtr sev; /* add new domain features here */ }; diff --git a/src/qemu/qemu_capabilities.c b/src/qemu/qemu_capabilities.c index 0f6e6fb..3fd4911 100644 --- a/src/qemu/qemu_capabilities.c +++ b/src/qemu/qemu_capabilities.c @@ -5787,6 +5787,8 @@ virQEMUCapsFillDomainCaps(virCapsPtr caps, virQEMUCapsFillDomainDeviceHostdevCaps(qemuCaps, hostdev) < 0 || virQEMUCapsFillDomainFeatureGICCaps(qemuCaps, domCaps) < 0) return -1; + + domCaps->sev = qemuCaps->sevCapabilities; return 0; } -- 2.7.4

On 04/02/2018 12:33 PM, John Ferlan wrote: Yes, I will use camel case in next patch. Noted, I will fill in some random values. Noted. Noted. Noted, makes it much cleaner. thanks Noted. Noted I have been trying keep the same naming convension as sev-guest object name (which uses dashes). I am flexible, if libvirt community prefers camelCase over the dashes then I am okay with it. Noted. -Brijesh

The launch-security element can be used to define the security model to use when launching a domain. Currently we support 'sev'. When 'sev' is used, the VM will be launched with AMD SEV feature enabled. SEV feature supports running encrypted VM under the control of KVM. Encrypted VMs have their pages (code and data) secured such that only the guest itself has access to the unencrypted version. Each encrypted VM is associated with a unique encryption key; if its data is accessed to a different entity using a different key the encrypted guests data will be incorrectly decrypted, leading to unintelligible data. Reviewed-by: "Daniel P. Berrangé" <berrange(a)redhat.com&gt; Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh(a)amd.com&gt; --- docs/formatdomain.html.in | 120 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ docs/schemas/domaincommon.rng | 39 ++++++++++++++ src/conf/domain_conf.c | 110 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ src/conf/domain_conf.h | 26 +++++++++ 4 files changed, 295 insertions(+) diff --git a/docs/formatdomain.html.in b/docs/formatdomain.html.in index 82e7d7c..2a6bed7 100644 --- a/docs/formatdomain.html.in +++ b/docs/formatdomain.html.in @@ -8200,6 +8200,126 @@ qemu-kvm -net nic,model=? /dev/null <p>Note: DEA/TDEA is synonymous with DES/TDES.</p> + <h3><a id="sev">Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV)</a></h3> + + <p> + The contents of the <code>&lt;launch-security type='sev'&gt;</code> element + is used to provide the guest owners input used for creating an encrypted + VM using the AMD SEV feature. + + SEV is an extension to the AMD-V architecture which supports running + encrypted virtual machine (VMs) under the control of KVM. Encrypted + VMs have their pages (code and data) secured such that only the guest + itself has access to the unencrypted version. Each encrypted VM is + associated with a unique encryption key; if its data is accessed to a + different entity using a different key the encrypted guests data will + be incorrectly decrypted, leading to unintelligible data. + + For more information see various input parameters and its format see SEV API spec + <a href="https://support.amd.com/TechDocs/55766_SEV-KM%20API_Specificat... https://support.amd.com/TechDocs/55766_SEV-KM%20API_Specification.pdf </a> + <span class="since">Since 4.2.0</span> + </p> + <pre> +&lt;domain&gt; + ... + &lt;launch-security type='sev'&gt; + &lt;policy&gt; 0 &lt;/policy&gt; + &lt;cbitpos&gt; 47 &lt;/cbitpos&gt; + &lt;reduced-phys-bits&gt; 5 &lt;/reduced-phys-bits&gt; + &lt;session&gt; ... &lt;/session&gt; + &lt;dh-cert&gt; ... &lt;/dh&gt; + &lt;/sev&gt; + ... +&lt;/domain&gt; +</pre> + + <p> + A least <code>cbitpos</code> and <code>reduced-phys-bits</code> must be + nested within the <code>launch-security</code> element. + </p> + <dl> + <dt><code>cbitpos</code></dt> + <dd>The <code>cbitpos</code> element provides the C-bit (aka encryption bit) + location in guest page table entry. The value of <code>cbitpos</code> is + hypervisor dependent and can be obtained through the <code>sev</code> element + from domaincapabilities. + </dd> + <dt><code>reduced-phys-bits</code></dt> + <dd>The <code>reduced-phys-bits</code> element provides the physical + address bit reducation. Similar to <code>cbitpos</code> the value of <code> + reduced-phys-bit</code> is hypervisor dependent and can be obtained + through the <code>sev</code> element from domaincapabilities. + </dd> + <dt><code>policy</code></dt> + <dd>The optional <code>policy</code> element provides the guest policy + which must be maintained by the SEV firmware. This policy is enforced by + the firmware and restricts what configuration and operational commands + can be performed on this guest by the hypervisor. The guest policy + provided during guest launch is bound to the guest and cannot be changed + throughout the lifetime of the guest. The policy is also transmitted + during snapshot and migration flows and enforced on the destination platform. + + The guest policy is a 4-byte structure with the fields shown in Table: + + <table class="top_table"> + <tr> + <th> Bit(s) </th> + <th> Description </th> + </tr> + <tr> + <td> 0 </td> + <td> Debugging of the guest is disallowed when set </td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td> 1 </td> + <td> Sharing keys with other guests is disallowed when set </td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td> 2 </td> + <td> SEV-ES is required when set</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td> 3 </td> + <td> Sending the guest to another platform is disallowed when set</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td> 4 </td> + <td> The guest must not be transmitted to another platform that is + not in the domain when set. </td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td> 5 </td> + <td> The guest must not be transmitted to another platform that is + not SEV capable when set. </td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td> 15:6 </td> + <td> reserved </td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td> 16:32 </td> + <td> The guest must not be transmitted to another platform with a + lower firmware version. </td> + </tr> + </table> + Default value is 0x1 + + </dd> + <dt><code>dh-cert</code></dt> + <dd>The optional <code>dh-cert</code> element provides the guest owners public + Diffie-Hellman (DH) key. The key is used to negotiate a master secret + key between the SEV firmware and guest owner. This master secret key is + then used to establish a trusted channel between SEV firmware and guest + owner. The value must be encoded in base64. + </dd> + <dt><code>session</code></dt> + <dd>The optional <code>session</code> element provides the guest owners + session blob defined in SEV API spec. The value must be encoded in base64. + + See SEV spec LAUNCH_START section for session blob format. + </dd> + </dl> + <h2><a id="examples">Example configs</a></h2> <p> diff --git a/docs/schemas/domaincommon.rng b/docs/schemas/domaincommon.rng index a72c919..6a0e129 100644 --- a/docs/schemas/domaincommon.rng +++ b/docs/schemas/domaincommon.rng @@ -77,6 +77,9 @@ <optional> <ref name='keywrap'/> </optional> + <optional> + <ref name='launch-security'/> + </optional> </interleave> </element> </define> @@ -436,6 +439,42 @@ </element> </define> + <define name="launch-security"> + <element name="launch-security"> + <attribute name="type"> + <value>sev</value> + </attribute> + <interleave> + <element name="cbitpos"> + <data type='unsignedInt'/> + </element> + <element name="reduced-phys-bits"> + <data type='unsignedInt'/> + </element> + <optional> + <element name="policy"> + <ref name='hexuint'/> + </element> + </optional> + <optional> + <element name="handle"> + <ref name='unsignedInt'/> + </element> + </optional> + <optional> + <element name="dh-cert"> + <data type="string"/> + </element> + </optional> + <optional> + <element name="session"> + <data type="string"/> + </element> + </optional> + </interleave> + </element> + </define> + <!-- Enable or disable perf events for the domain. For each of the events the following rules apply: diff --git a/src/conf/domain_conf.c b/src/conf/domain_conf.c index ae7c0d9..4acf45c 100644 --- a/src/conf/domain_conf.c +++ b/src/conf/domain_conf.c @@ -929,6 +929,10 @@ VIR_ENUM_IMPL(virDomainShmemModel, VIR_DOMAIN_SHMEM_MODEL_LAST, "ivshmem-plain", "ivshmem-doorbell") +VIR_ENUM_IMPL(virDomainLaunchSecurity, VIR_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_LAST, + "", + "sev") + static virClassPtr virDomainObjClass; static virClassPtr virDomainXMLOptionClass; static void virDomainObjDispose(void *obj); @@ -2897,6 +2901,14 @@ virDomainCachetuneDefFree(virDomainCachetuneDefPtr cachetune) VIR_FREE(cachetune); } +static void +virDomainSevDefFree(virDomainSevDefPtr def) +{ + VIR_FREE(def->dh_cert); + VIR_FREE(def->session); + + VIR_FREE(def); +} void virDomainDefFree(virDomainDefPtr def) { @@ -3079,6 +3091,9 @@ void virDomainDefFree(virDomainDefPtr def) if (def->namespaceData && def->ns.free) (def->ns.free)(def->namespaceData); + if (def->sev) + virDomainSevDefFree(def->sev); + xmlFreeNode(def->metadata); VIR_FREE(def); @@ -15537,6 +15552,70 @@ virDomainMemoryTargetDefParseXML(xmlNodePtr node, return ret; } +static virDomainSevDefPtr +virDomainSevDefParseXML(xmlNodePtr sevNode, xmlXPathContextPtr ctxt) +{ + char *tmp = NULL, *type = NULL; + xmlNodePtr save = ctxt->node; + virDomainSevDefPtr def; + unsigned long policy; + + ctxt->node = sevNode; + + if (VIR_ALLOC(def) < 0) + return NULL; + + if (!(type = virXMLPropString(sevNode, "type"))) { + virReportError(VIR_ERR_XML_ERROR, "%s", + _("missing launch-security type")); + goto error; + } + + if (virDomainLaunchSecurityTypeFromString(type) != + VIR_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_SEV) { + goto error; + } + + if (virXPathUInt("string(./cbitpos)", ctxt, &def->cbitpos) < 0) { + virReportError(VIR_ERR_XML_ERROR, "%s", _("failed to get cbitpos")); + goto error; + } + + if (virXPathUInt("string(./reduced-phys-bits)", ctxt, + &def->reduced_phys_bits) < 0) { + virReportError(VIR_ERR_XML_ERROR, "%s", + _("failed to get reduced-phys-bits")); + goto error; + } + + if (virXPathULongHex("string(./policy)", ctxt, &policy) < 0) + policy = 0x1; + + def->policy = policy; + + if ((tmp = virXPathString("string(./dh-cert)", ctxt))) { + if (VIR_STRDUP(def->dh_cert, tmp) < 0) + goto error; + + VIR_FREE(tmp); + } + + if ((tmp = virXPathString("string(./session)", ctxt))) { + if (VIR_STRDUP(def->session, tmp) < 0) + goto error; + + VIR_FREE(tmp); + } + + ctxt->node = save; + return def; + + error: + VIR_FREE(tmp); + virDomainSevDefFree(def); + ctxt->node = save; + return NULL; +} static virDomainMemoryDefPtr virDomainMemoryDefParseXML(virDomainXMLOptionPtr xmlopt, @@ -20210,6 +20289,13 @@ virDomainDefParseXML(xmlDocPtr xml, ctxt->node = node; VIR_FREE(nodes); + /* Check for SEV feature */ + if ((node = virXPathNode("./launch-security", ctxt)) != NULL) { + def->sev = virDomainSevDefParseXML(node, ctxt); + if (!def->sev) + goto error; + } + /* analysis of memory devices */ if ((n = virXPathNodeSet("./devices/memory", ctxt, &nodes)) < 0) goto error; @@ -26087,6 +26173,27 @@ virDomainKeyWrapDefFormat(virBufferPtr buf, virDomainKeyWrapDefPtr keywrap) } static void +virDomainSevDefFormat(virBufferPtr buf, virDomainSevDefPtr sev) +{ + virBufferAddLit(buf, "<launch-security type='sev'>\n"); + virBufferAdjustIndent(buf, 2); + + virBufferAsprintf(buf, "<cbitpos>%d</cbitpos>\n", sev->cbitpos); + virBufferAsprintf(buf, "<reduced-phys-bits>%d</reduced-phys-bits>\n", + sev->reduced_phys_bits); + virBufferAsprintf(buf, "<policy>%d</policy>\n", sev->policy); + if (sev->dh_cert) + virBufferAsprintf(buf, "<dh_cert>%s</dh_cert>\n", sev->dh_cert); + + if (sev->session) + virBufferAsprintf(buf, "<session>%s</session>\n", sev->session); + + virBufferAdjustIndent(buf, -2); + virBufferAddLit(buf, "</launch-security>\n"); +} + + +static void virDomainPerfDefFormat(virBufferPtr buf, virDomainPerfDefPtr perf) { size_t i; @@ -27258,6 +27365,9 @@ virDomainDefFormatInternal(virDomainDefPtr def, if (def->keywrap) virDomainKeyWrapDefFormat(buf, def->keywrap); + if (def->sev) + virDomainSevDefFormat(buf, def->sev); + virBufferAdjustIndent(buf, -2); virBufferAddLit(buf, "</domain>\n"); diff --git a/src/conf/domain_conf.h b/src/conf/domain_conf.h index 61379e5..60f9dd2 100644 --- a/src/conf/domain_conf.h +++ b/src/conf/domain_conf.h @@ -142,6 +142,9 @@ typedef virDomainPanicDef *virDomainPanicDefPtr; typedef struct _virDomainMemoryDef virDomainMemoryDef; typedef virDomainMemoryDef *virDomainMemoryDefPtr; +typedef struct _virDomainSevDef virDomainSevDef; +typedef virDomainSevDef *virDomainSevDefPtr; + /* forward declarations virDomainChrSourceDef, required by * virDomainNetDef */ @@ -2290,6 +2293,25 @@ struct _virDomainKeyWrapDef { }; typedef enum { + VIR_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_NONE, + VIR_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_SEV, + + VIR_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_LAST, +} virDomainLaunchSecurity; + +typedef struct _virDomainSevDef virDomainSevDef; +typedef virDomainSevDef *virDomainSevDefPtr; + +struct _virDomainSevDef { + char *dh_cert; + char *session; + unsigned int policy; + unsigned int cbitpos; + unsigned int reduced_phys_bits; +}; + + +typedef enum { VIR_DOMAIN_IOMMU_MODEL_INTEL, VIR_DOMAIN_IOMMU_MODEL_LAST @@ -2454,6 +2476,9 @@ struct _virDomainDef { virDomainKeyWrapDefPtr keywrap; + /* SEV-specific domain */ + virDomainSevDefPtr sev; + /* Application-specific custom metadata */ xmlNodePtr metadata; @@ -3345,6 +3370,7 @@ VIR_ENUM_DECL(virDomainMemorySource) VIR_ENUM_DECL(virDomainMemoryAllocation) VIR_ENUM_DECL(virDomainIOMMUModel) VIR_ENUM_DECL(virDomainShmemModel) +VIR_ENUM_DECL(virDomainLaunchSecurity) /* from libvirt.h */ VIR_ENUM_DECL(virDomainState) VIR_ENUM_DECL(virDomainNostateReason) -- 2.7.4

Hi John, Thanks for very details review feedbacks. On 04/02/2018 01:26 PM, John Ferlan wrote: Noted, I will merge the hunks from last patch in this patch. Yes, I can see us doing v6 and will roll all other review feedbacks. Noted. Sure, I will add some realistic value. Ah make sense. thanks Noted. Noted. Noted. Noted. Noted. OK, while I updating the file to address your other review feedbacks, will wrap characters to fit in 80 char range. I was trying to copy wording from SEV spec so that if anyone is trying to look at spec and then come to see our libvirt html then it matches. It's actually 8 bit value which will be packed with the firmware major and minor numbers. The policy value is blob to us from the Guest owner. libvirt/qemu should simply pass as-is (any policy changes done by libvirt or qemu user will be caught by the SEV firmware). Since policy values can't be modified by the hypervisor hence I was not too keen on documenting it. But in previous patch the feedback was to document it hence I tried to copy/paste the value from spec. It's libvirt default (in cases where guest owner did not provide policy value). We also pass a valid policy value while invoking qemu from the libvirt. So we don't depend on QEMU default changing in future. Noted. Noted. Noted. Noted. IIRC, I was not able to find anything other than hexuint in basictypes.rng and also was not able to a function like virXPathUIntHex(..). If you can point me to the function which can be used to get the hexuint then I am good with it. Also, I am open to adding such function if it does not exist and anyone else sees the need for it. Yes agree, lets see what everyone else thinks about naming before I go off and change the series. Noted. OK. OK Noted. Noted. I will add error message. Works with me, thanks Firmware does not have default policy, a caller must provide the policy value. In our cases, we are saying if caller does not provide a policy in xml then we default to 0x1. ah thats good information, I was not aware of -2 thing. Right, this is where I was struggling because there is no such function as virXPathUIntHex(...) which ca be used to get uint32_t. Please let me know your thoughts on how do you want me to handle this situation.

QEMU uses /dev/sev device while creating the SEV guest, lets add /dev/sev in the list of devices allowed to be accessed by the QEMU. Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <&lt;brijesh.singh(a)amd.com&gt;&gt; --- docs/drvqemu.html.in | 1 + src/qemu/qemu.conf | 2 +- src/qemu/qemu_cgroup.c | 2 +- 3 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/docs/drvqemu.html.in b/docs/drvqemu.html.in index cbd159d..7c33a18 100644 --- a/docs/drvqemu.html.in +++ b/docs/drvqemu.html.in @@ -397,6 +397,7 @@ chmod o+x /path/to/directory /dev/random, /dev/urandom, /dev/ptmx, /dev/kvm, /dev/kqemu, /dev/rtc, /dev/hpet, /dev/net/tun +/dev/sev </pre> <p> diff --git a/src/qemu/qemu.conf b/src/qemu/qemu.conf index 07eab7e..d328d96 100644 --- a/src/qemu/qemu.conf +++ b/src/qemu/qemu.conf @@ -451,7 +451,7 @@ # "/dev/null", "/dev/full", "/dev/zero", # "/dev/random", "/dev/urandom", # "/dev/ptmx", "/dev/kvm", "/dev/kqemu", -# "/dev/rtc","/dev/hpet" +# "/dev/rtc","/dev/hpet", "/dev/sev" #] # # RDMA migration requires the following extra files to be added to the list: diff --git a/src/qemu/qemu_cgroup.c b/src/qemu/qemu_cgroup.c index b604edb..1a271df 100644 --- a/src/qemu/qemu_cgroup.c +++ b/src/qemu/qemu_cgroup.c @@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ const char *const defaultDeviceACL[] = { "/dev/null", "/dev/full", "/dev/zero", "/dev/random", "/dev/urandom", "/dev/ptmx", "/dev/kvm", "/dev/kqemu", - "/dev/rtc", "/dev/hpet", + "/dev/rtc", "/dev/hpet", "/dev/sev", NULL, }; #define DEVICE_PTY_MAJOR 136 -- 2.7.4

QEMU >= 2.12 provides 'sev-guest' object which is used to launch encrypted VMs on AMD platform using SEV feature. The various inputs required to launch SEV guest is provided through the <launch-security> tag. A typical SEV guest launch command line looks like this: # $QEMU ...\ -object sev-guest,id=sev0,cbitpos=47,reduced-phys-bits=5 ...\ -machine memory-encryption=sev0 \ Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh(a)amd.com&gt; --- src/qemu/qemu_command.c | 35 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ src/qemu/qemu_process.c | 58 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 93 insertions(+) diff --git a/src/qemu/qemu_command.c b/src/qemu/qemu_command.c index 682d714..55bbfa2 100644 --- a/src/qemu/qemu_command.c +++ b/src/qemu/qemu_command.c @@ -7405,6 +7405,9 @@ qemuBuildMachineCommandLine(virCommandPtr cmd, virQEMUCapsGet(qemuCaps, QEMU_CAPS_LOADPARM)) qemuAppendLoadparmMachineParm(&buf, def); + if (virQEMUCapsGet(qemuCaps, QEMU_CAPS_SEV_GUEST) && def->sev) + virBufferAddLit(&buf, ",memory-encryption=sev0"); + virCommandAddArgBuffer(cmd, &buf); } @@ -9750,6 +9753,35 @@ qemuBuildTPMCommandLine(virCommandPtr cmd, return 0; } +static void +qemuBuildSevCommandLine(virDomainObjPtr vm, virCommandPtr cmd, + virDomainSevDefPtr sev) +{ + virBuffer obj = VIR_BUFFER_INITIALIZER; + qemuDomainObjPrivatePtr priv = vm->privateData; + char *path = NULL; + + VIR_DEBUG("policy=0x%x cbitpos=%d reduced_phys_bits=%d", + sev->policy, sev->cbitpos, sev->reduced_phys_bits); + + virBufferAsprintf(&obj, "sev-guest,id=sev0,cbitpos=%d", sev->cbitpos); + virBufferAsprintf(&obj, ",reduced-phys-bits=%d", sev->reduced_phys_bits); + virBufferAsprintf(&obj, ",policy=0x%x", sev->policy); + + if (sev->dh_cert) { + ignore_value(virAsprintf(&path, "%s/dh_cert.base64", priv->libDir)); + virBufferAsprintf(&obj, ",dh-cert-file=%s", path); + VIR_FREE(path); + } + + if (sev->session) { + ignore_value(virAsprintf(&path, "%s/session.base64", priv->libDir)); + virBufferAsprintf(&obj, ",session-file=%s", path); + VIR_FREE(path); + } + + virCommandAddArgList(cmd, "-object", virBufferContentAndReset(&obj), NULL); +} static int qemuBuildVMCoreInfoCommandLine(virCommandPtr cmd, @@ -10195,6 +10227,9 @@ qemuBuildCommandLine(virQEMUDriverPtr driver, if (qemuBuildVMCoreInfoCommandLine(cmd, def, qemuCaps) < 0) goto error; + if (virQEMUCapsGet(qemuCaps, QEMU_CAPS_SEV_GUEST) && def->sev) + qemuBuildSevCommandLine(vm, cmd, def->sev); + if (snapshot) virCommandAddArgList(cmd, "-loadvm", snapshot->def->name, NULL); diff --git a/src/qemu/qemu_process.c b/src/qemu/qemu_process.c index c0105c8..0c93f15 100644 --- a/src/qemu/qemu_process.c +++ b/src/qemu/qemu_process.c @@ -5745,6 +5745,61 @@ qemuProcessPrepareDomain(virQEMUDriverPtr driver, return ret; } +static int +qemuBuildSevCreateFile(const char *configDir, const char *name, + const char *data) +{ + char *configFile; + + if (!(configFile = virFileBuildPath(configDir, name, ".base64"))) + return -1; + + if (virFileRewriteStr(configFile, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR, data) < 0) { + virReportSystemError(errno, _("failed to write data to config '%s'"), + configFile); + goto error; + } + + VIR_FREE(configFile); + return 0; + + error: + VIR_FREE(configFile); + return -1; +} + +static int +qemuProcessPrepareSevGuestInput(virDomainObjPtr vm) +{ + qemuDomainObjPrivatePtr priv = vm->privateData; + virDomainDefPtr def = vm->def; + virQEMUCapsPtr qemuCaps = priv->qemuCaps; + virDomainSevDefPtr sev = def->sev; + + if (!sev) + return 0; + + VIR_DEBUG("Prepare SEV guest"); + + if (!virQEMUCapsGet(qemuCaps, QEMU_CAPS_SEV_GUEST)) { + virReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR, + _("Domain %s asked for 'sev' launch but " + "QEMU does not support SEV feature"), vm->def->name); + return -1; + } + + if (sev->dh_cert) { + if (qemuBuildSevCreateFile(priv->libDir, "dh_cert", sev->dh_cert) < 0) + return -1; + } + + if (sev->session) { + if (qemuBuildSevCreateFile(priv->libDir, "session", sev->session) < 0) + return -1; + } + + return 0; +} static int qemuProcessPrepareHostStorage(virQEMUDriverPtr driver, @@ -5870,6 +5925,9 @@ qemuProcessPrepareHost(virQEMUDriverPtr driver, if (qemuProcessPrepareHostStorage(driver, vm, flags) < 0) goto cleanup; + if (qemuProcessPrepareSevGuestInput(vm) < 0) + goto cleanup; + ret = 0; cleanup: virObjectUnref(cfg); -- 2.7.4

On 4/2/18 6:04 PM, John Ferlan wrote: Yes, probably we can avoid the SEV_GUEST cap check in this case. I will make the changes in next rev. I think it will be unlikely that this function will fail hence I was using void. The only time it can fail is when we fail to create a dh-cert and session blob file (e.g disk is full). I will propagate the error. OK. OK, then I will remove the comment from html about the default value since I was trying to not depend on QEMU default. Sure, will do. Yep The data is public in this case, we do not need to protect it with secret. Hence I am keeping all this certificate keys in unsecure place. Noted. Got it.

The API can be used outside the libvirt to get the launch security information. When SEV is enabled, the API can be used to get the measurement of the launch process. Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh(a)amd.com&gt; --- include/libvirt/libvirt-domain.h | 17 ++++++++++++++ src/driver-hypervisor.h | 7 ++++++ src/libvirt-domain.c | 48 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ src/libvirt_public.syms | 5 +++++ 4 files changed, 77 insertions(+) diff --git a/include/libvirt/libvirt-domain.h b/include/libvirt/libvirt-domain.h index 12fd340..6870a1a 100644 --- a/include/libvirt/libvirt-domain.h +++ b/include/libvirt/libvirt-domain.h @@ -4764,4 +4764,21 @@ int virDomainSetLifecycleAction(virDomainPtr domain, unsigned int action, unsigned int flags); +/** + * Launch Security API + */ + +/** + * VIR_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_SEV_MEASUREMENT: + * + * Macro represents the launch measurement of the SEV guest, + * as VIR_TYPED_PARAM_STRING. + */ +#define VIR_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_SEV_MEASUREMENT "sev-measurement" + +int virDomainGetLaunchSecurityInfo(virDomainPtr domain, + virTypedParameterPtr *params, + int *nparams, + unsigned int flags); + #endif /* __VIR_LIBVIRT_DOMAIN_H__ */ diff --git a/src/driver-hypervisor.h b/src/driver-hypervisor.h index ce0e2b2..b066413 100644 --- a/src/driver-hypervisor.h +++ b/src/driver-hypervisor.h @@ -1283,6 +1283,12 @@ typedef int unsigned int action, unsigned int flags); +typedef int +(*virDrvDomainGetLaunchSecurityInfo)(virDomainPtr domain, + virTypedParameterPtr *params, + int *nparams, + unsigned int flags); + typedef struct _virHypervisorDriver virHypervisorDriver; typedef virHypervisorDriver *virHypervisorDriverPtr; @@ -1528,6 +1534,7 @@ struct _virHypervisorDriver { virDrvDomainSetVcpu domainSetVcpu; virDrvDomainSetBlockThreshold domainSetBlockThreshold; virDrvDomainSetLifecycleAction domainSetLifecycleAction; + virDrvDomainGetLaunchSecurityInfo domainGetLaunchSecurityInfo; }; diff --git a/src/libvirt-domain.c b/src/libvirt-domain.c index 63d2ae2..5b63a3c 100644 --- a/src/libvirt-domain.c +++ b/src/libvirt-domain.c @@ -12101,3 +12101,51 @@ int virDomainSetLifecycleAction(virDomainPtr domain, virDispatchError(domain->conn); return -1; } + +/** + * virDomainGetLaunchSecurityInfo: + * @domain: a domain object + * @params: where to store security info + * @nparams: number of items in @params + * @flags: currently used, set to 0. + * + * Get the launch security info. In case of the SEV guest, this will + * return the launch measurement. + * + * Returns -1 in case of failure, 0 in case of success. + */ +int virDomainGetLaunchSecurityInfo(virDomainPtr domain, + virTypedParameterPtr *params, + int *nparams, + unsigned int flags) +{ + virConnectPtr conn = domain->conn; + + VIR_DOMAIN_DEBUG(domain, "params=%p, nparams=%p flags=0x%x", + params, nparams, flags); + + virResetLastError(); + + virCheckDomainReturn(domain, -1); + virCheckNonNullArgGoto(params, error); + virCheckNonNullArgGoto(nparams, error); + virCheckReadOnlyGoto(conn->flags, error); + + if (VIR_DRV_SUPPORTS_FEATURE(domain->conn->driver, domain->conn, + VIR_DRV_FEATURE_TYPED_PARAM_STRING)) + flags |= VIR_TYPED_PARAM_STRING_OKAY; + + if (conn->driver->domainGetLaunchSecurityInfo) { + int ret; + ret = conn->driver->domainGetLaunchSecurityInfo(domain, params, + nparams, flags); + if (ret < 0) + goto error; + return ret; + } + virReportUnsupportedError(); + + error: + virDispatchError(domain->conn); + return -1; +} diff --git a/src/libvirt_public.syms b/src/libvirt_public.syms index 95df3a0..caba286 100644 --- a/src/libvirt_public.syms +++ b/src/libvirt_public.syms @@ -785,4 +785,9 @@ LIBVIRT_4.1.0 { virStoragePoolLookupByTargetPath; } LIBVIRT_3.9.0; +LIBVIRT_4.2.0 { + global: + virDomainGetLaunchSecurityInfo; +} LIBVIRT_4.1.0; + # .... define new API here using predicted next version number .... -- 2.7.4

Add remote support for launch security info. Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh(a)amd.com&gt; --- src/remote/remote_daemon_dispatch.c | 47 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ src/remote/remote_driver.c | 42 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- src/remote/remote_protocol.x | 20 +++++++++++++++- src/remote_protocol-structs | 11 +++++++++ 4 files changed, 118 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/remote/remote_daemon_dispatch.c b/src/remote/remote_daemon_dispatch.c index 121d114..0959604 100644 --- a/src/remote/remote_daemon_dispatch.c +++ b/src/remote/remote_daemon_dispatch.c @@ -3088,6 +3088,53 @@ remoteDispatchNodeGetMemoryStats(virNetServerPtr server ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED, } static int +remoteDispatchDomainGetLaunchSecurityInfo(virNetServerPtr server ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED, + virNetServerClientPtr client ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED, + virNetMessagePtr msg ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED, + virNetMessageErrorPtr rerr, + remote_domain_get_launch_security_info_args *args, + remote_domain_get_launch_security_info_ret *ret) +{ + virDomainPtr dom = NULL; + virTypedParameterPtr params = NULL; + int nparams = 0; + int rv = -1; + struct daemonClientPrivate *priv = + virNetServerClientGetPrivateData(client); + + if (!priv->conn) { + virReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR, "%s", _("connection not open")); + goto cleanup; + } + + if (!(dom = get_nonnull_domain(priv->conn, args->dom))) + goto cleanup; + + if (virDomainGetLaunchSecurityInfo(dom, &params, &nparams, args->flags) < 0) + goto cleanup; + + if (nparams > REMOTE_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_INFO_PARAMS_MAX) { + virReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR, "%s", _("nparams too large")); + goto cleanup; + } + + if (virTypedParamsSerialize(params, nparams, + (virTypedParameterRemotePtr *) &ret->params.params_val, + &ret->params.params_len, + args->flags) < 0) + goto cleanup; + + rv = 0; + + cleanup: + if (rv < 0) + virNetMessageSaveError(rerr); + virTypedParamsFree(params, nparams); + virObjectUnref(dom); + return rv; +} + +static int remoteDispatchDomainGetPerfEvents(virNetServerPtr server ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED, virNetServerClientPtr client ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED, virNetMessagePtr msg ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED, diff --git a/src/remote/remote_driver.c b/src/remote/remote_driver.c index 325ef3f..b52faa1 100644 --- a/src/remote/remote_driver.c +++ b/src/remote/remote_driver.c @@ -1948,6 +1948,45 @@ remoteDomainGetNumaParameters(virDomainPtr domain, } static int +remoteDomainGetLaunchSecurityInfo(virDomainPtr domain, + virTypedParameterPtr *params, + int *nparams, + unsigned int flags) +{ + int rv = -1; + remote_domain_get_launch_security_info_args args; + remote_domain_get_launch_security_info_ret ret; + struct private_data *priv = domain->conn->privateData; + + remoteDriverLock(priv); + + make_nonnull_domain(&args.dom, domain); + args.flags = flags; + + memset(&ret, 0, sizeof(ret)); + if (call(domain->conn, priv, 0, REMOTE_PROC_DOMAIN_GET_LAUNCH_SECURITY_INFO, + (xdrproc_t) xdr_remote_domain_get_launch_security_info_args, (char *) &args, + (xdrproc_t) xdr_remote_domain_get_launch_security_info_ret, (char *) &ret) == -1) + goto done; + + if (virTypedParamsDeserialize((virTypedParameterRemotePtr) ret.params.params_val, + ret.params.params_len, + REMOTE_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_INFO_PARAMS_MAX, + params, + nparams) < 0) + goto cleanup; + + rv = 0; + + cleanup: + xdr_free((xdrproc_t) xdr_remote_domain_get_launch_security_info_ret, + (char *) &ret); + done: + remoteDriverUnlock(priv); + return rv; +} + +static int remoteDomainGetPerfEvents(virDomainPtr domain, virTypedParameterPtr *params, int *nparams, @@ -8430,7 +8469,8 @@ static virHypervisorDriver hypervisor_driver = { .domainSetGuestVcpus = remoteDomainSetGuestVcpus, /* 2.0.0 */ .domainSetVcpu = remoteDomainSetVcpu, /* 3.1.0 */ .domainSetBlockThreshold = remoteDomainSetBlockThreshold, /* 3.2.0 */ - .domainSetLifecycleAction = remoteDomainSetLifecycleAction /* 3.9.0 */ + .domainSetLifecycleAction = remoteDomainSetLifecycleAction, /* 3.9.0 */ + .domainGetLaunchSecurityInfo = remoteDomainGetLaunchSecurityInfo /* 4.2.0 */ }; static virNetworkDriver network_driver = { diff --git a/src/remote/remote_protocol.x b/src/remote/remote_protocol.x index 9dbd497..4c0144c 100644 --- a/src/remote/remote_protocol.x +++ b/src/remote/remote_protocol.x @@ -253,6 +253,9 @@ const REMOTE_DOMAIN_IP_ADDR_MAX = 2048; /* Upper limit on number of guest vcpu information entries */ const REMOTE_DOMAIN_GUEST_VCPU_PARAMS_MAX = 64; +/* Upper limit on number of launch security information entries */ +const REMOTE_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_INFO_PARAMS_MAX = 64; + /* UUID. VIR_UUID_BUFLEN definition comes from libvirt.h */ typedef opaque remote_uuid[VIR_UUID_BUFLEN]; @@ -3448,6 +3451,15 @@ struct remote_domain_set_lifecycle_action_args { unsigned int flags; }; +struct remote_domain_get_launch_security_info_args { + remote_nonnull_domain dom; + unsigned int flags; +}; + +struct remote_domain_get_launch_security_info_ret { + remote_typed_param params<REMOTE_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_INFO_PARAMS_MAX>; +}; + /*----- Protocol. -----*/ /* Define the program number, protocol version and procedure numbers here. */ @@ -6135,5 +6147,11 @@ enum remote_procedure { * @priority: high * @acl: storage_pool:getattr */ - REMOTE_PROC_STORAGE_POOL_LOOKUP_BY_TARGET_PATH = 391 + REMOTE_PROC_STORAGE_POOL_LOOKUP_BY_TARGET_PATH = 391, + + /** + * @generate: none + * @acl: domain:read + */ + REMOTE_PROC_DOMAIN_GET_LAUNCH_SECURITY_INFO = 392 }; diff --git a/src/remote_protocol-structs b/src/remote_protocol-structs index f45aba2..8f19d98 100644 --- a/src/remote_protocol-structs +++ b/src/remote_protocol-structs @@ -2877,6 +2877,16 @@ struct remote_domain_set_lifecycle_action_args { u_int action; u_int flags; }; +struct remote_domain_get_launch_security_info_args { + remote_nonnull_domain dom; + u_int flags; +}; +struct remote_domain_get_launch_security_info_ret { + struct { + u_int params_len; + remote_typed_param * params_val; + } params; +}; enum remote_procedure { REMOTE_PROC_CONNECT_OPEN = 1, REMOTE_PROC_CONNECT_CLOSE = 2, @@ -3269,4 +3279,5 @@ enum remote_procedure { REMOTE_PROC_DOMAIN_MANAGED_SAVE_DEFINE_XML = 389, REMOTE_PROC_DOMAIN_SET_LIFECYCLE_ACTION = 390, REMOTE_PROC_STORAGE_POOL_LOOKUP_BY_TARGET_PATH = 391, + REMOTE_PROC_DOMAIN_GET_LAUNCH_SECURITY_INFO = 392, }; -- 2.7.4

This patch implement the internal driver API for launch event into qemu driver. When SEV is enabled, execute 'query-sev-launch-measurement' to get the measurement of memory encrypted through launch sequence. Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh(a)amd.com&gt; --- src/qemu/qemu_driver.c | 66 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ src/qemu/qemu_monitor.c | 8 ++++++ src/qemu/qemu_monitor.h | 3 ++ src/qemu/qemu_monitor_json.c | 32 +++++++++++++++++++++ src/qemu/qemu_monitor_json.h | 2 ++ 5 files changed, 111 insertions(+) diff --git a/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c b/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c index 072eb54..898aaf0 100644 --- a/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c +++ b/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c @@ -21332,6 +21332,71 @@ qemuDomainSetLifecycleAction(virDomainPtr dom, return ret; } +static int qemuDomainGetSevMeasurement(virQEMUDriverPtr driver, + virDomainObjPtr vm, + virTypedParameterPtr *params, + int *nparams, + unsigned int flags) +{ + int ret = -1; + char *tmp; + int maxpar = 0; + + virCheckFlags(VIR_TYPED_PARAM_STRING_OKAY, -1); + + if (qemuDomainObjBeginJob(driver, vm, QEMU_JOB_QUERY) < 0) + return -1; + + if (qemuDomainObjEnterMonitorAsync(driver, vm, QEMU_ASYNC_JOB_NONE) < 0) + goto endjob; + + tmp = qemuMonitorGetSevMeasurement(QEMU_DOMAIN_PRIVATE(vm)->mon); + if (tmp == NULL) + goto endjob; + + if (qemuDomainObjExitMonitor(driver, vm) < 0) + goto endjob; + + if (virTypedParamsAddString(params, nparams, &maxpar, + VIR_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_SEV_MEASUREMENT, + tmp) < 0) + goto endjob; + + ret = 0; + + endjob: + qemuDomainObjEndJob(driver, vm); + return ret; +} + + +static int +qemuDomainGetLaunchSecurityInfo(virDomainPtr domain, + virTypedParameterPtr *params, + int *nparams, + unsigned int flags) +{ + virQEMUDriverPtr driver = domain->conn->privateData; + virDomainObjPtr vm; + int ret = -1; + + if (!(vm = qemuDomObjFromDomain(domain))) + goto cleanup; + + if (virDomainGetLaunchSecurityInfoEnsureACL(domain->conn, vm->def) < 0) + goto cleanup; + + if (vm->def->sev) { + if (qemuDomainGetSevMeasurement(driver, vm, params, nparams, flags) < 0) + goto cleanup; + } + + ret = 0; + + cleanup: + virDomainObjEndAPI(&vm); + return ret; +} static virHypervisorDriver qemuHypervisorDriver = { .name = QEMU_DRIVER_NAME, @@ -21552,6 +21617,7 @@ static virHypervisorDriver qemuHypervisorDriver = { .domainSetVcpu = qemuDomainSetVcpu, /* 3.1.0 */ .domainSetBlockThreshold = qemuDomainSetBlockThreshold, /* 3.2.0 */ .domainSetLifecycleAction = qemuDomainSetLifecycleAction, /* 3.9.0 */ + .domainGetLaunchSecurityInfo = qemuDomainGetLaunchSecurityInfo, /* 4.2.0 */ }; diff --git a/src/qemu/qemu_monitor.c b/src/qemu/qemu_monitor.c index 44c2dff..877aaa56 100644 --- a/src/qemu/qemu_monitor.c +++ b/src/qemu/qemu_monitor.c @@ -4417,3 +4417,11 @@ qemuMonitorSetWatchdogAction(qemuMonitorPtr mon, return qemuMonitorJSONSetWatchdogAction(mon, action); } + +char * +qemuMonitorGetSevMeasurement(qemuMonitorPtr mon) +{ + QEMU_CHECK_MONITOR_NULL(mon); + + return qemuMonitorJSONGetSevMeasurement(mon); +} diff --git a/src/qemu/qemu_monitor.h b/src/qemu/qemu_monitor.h index efd3427..c475b73 100644 --- a/src/qemu/qemu_monitor.h +++ b/src/qemu/qemu_monitor.h @@ -1188,4 +1188,7 @@ virJSONValuePtr qemuMonitorQueryNamedBlockNodes(qemuMonitorPtr mon); int qemuMonitorSetWatchdogAction(qemuMonitorPtr mon, const char *action); +char * +qemuMonitorGetSevMeasurement(qemuMonitorPtr mon); + #endif /* QEMU_MONITOR_H */ diff --git a/src/qemu/qemu_monitor_json.c b/src/qemu/qemu_monitor_json.c index e67f7b7..be5731b 100644 --- a/src/qemu/qemu_monitor_json.c +++ b/src/qemu/qemu_monitor_json.c @@ -7960,3 +7960,35 @@ qemuMonitorJSONSetWatchdogAction(qemuMonitorPtr mon, virJSONValueFree(reply); return ret; } + +char * +qemuMonitorJSONGetSevMeasurement(qemuMonitorPtr mon) +{ + const char *tmp; + char *measurement = NULL; + virJSONValuePtr cmd; + virJSONValuePtr reply = NULL; + virJSONValuePtr data; + + if (!(cmd = qemuMonitorJSONMakeCommand("query-sev-launch-measure", NULL))) + return NULL; + + if (qemuMonitorJSONCommand(mon, cmd, &reply) < 0) + goto cleanup; + + if (qemuMonitorJSONCheckError(cmd, reply) < 0) + goto cleanup; + + data = virJSONValueObjectGetObject(reply, "return"); + + if (!(tmp = virJSONValueObjectGetString(data, "data"))) + goto cleanup; + + if (VIR_STRDUP(measurement, tmp) < 0) + goto cleanup; + + cleanup: + virJSONValueFree(cmd); + virJSONValueFree(reply); + return measurement; +} diff --git a/src/qemu/qemu_monitor_json.h b/src/qemu/qemu_monitor_json.h index f30ff1f..7d5e1f0 100644 --- a/src/qemu/qemu_monitor_json.h +++ b/src/qemu/qemu_monitor_json.h @@ -342,6 +342,8 @@ int qemuMonitorJSONGetBlockIoThrottle(qemuMonitorPtr mon, int qemuMonitorJSONSystemWakeup(qemuMonitorPtr mon); +char *qemuMonitorJSONGetSevMeasurement(qemuMonitorPtr mon); + int qemuMonitorJSONGetVersion(qemuMonitorPtr mon, int *major, int *minor, -- 2.7.4

Add new 'launch-security' command, the command can be used to get or set the launch security information when booting encrypted VMs. Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh(a)amd.com&gt; --- tools/virsh-domain.c | 84 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 84 insertions(+) diff --git a/tools/virsh-domain.c b/tools/virsh-domain.c index 2b775fc..4dca191 100644 --- a/tools/virsh-domain.c +++ b/tools/virsh-domain.c @@ -13877,6 +13877,84 @@ cmdDomFSInfo(vshControl *ctl, const vshCmd *cmd) return ret >= 0; } +/* + * "launch-security" command + */ +static const vshCmdInfo info_launch_security[] = { + {.name = "help", + .data = N_("Get or set launch-security information") + }, + {.name = "desc", + .data = N_("Get or set the current launch-security information for a guest" + " domain.\n" + " To get the launch-security information use following command: \n\n" + " virsh # launch-security <domain>") + }, + {.name = NULL} +}; + +static const vshCmdOptDef opts_launch_security[] = { + VIRSH_COMMON_OPT_DOMAIN_FULL(0), + {.name = "get", + .type = VSH_OT_STRING, + .help = N_("Show the launch-security info") + }, + VIRSH_COMMON_OPT_DOMAIN_CONFIG, + VIRSH_COMMON_OPT_DOMAIN_LIVE, + VIRSH_COMMON_OPT_DOMAIN_CURRENT, + {.name = NULL} +}; + +static void +virshPrintLaunchSecurityInfo(vshControl *ctl, virTypedParameterPtr params, + int nparams) +{ + size_t i; + + for (i = 0; i < nparams; i++) { + if (params[i].type == VIR_TYPED_PARAM_STRING) + vshPrintExtra(ctl, "%-15s: %s\n", params[i].field, params[i].value.s); + } +} + +static bool +cmdLaunchSecurity(vshControl *ctl, const vshCmd *cmd) +{ + virDomainPtr dom; + int nparams = 0; + virTypedParameterPtr params = NULL; + bool ret = false; + unsigned int flags = VIR_DOMAIN_AFFECT_CURRENT; + bool current = vshCommandOptBool(cmd, "current"); + bool config = vshCommandOptBool(cmd, "config"); + bool live = vshCommandOptBool(cmd, "live"); + + VSH_EXCLUSIVE_OPTIONS_VAR(current, live); + VSH_EXCLUSIVE_OPTIONS_VAR(current, config); + + if (config) + flags |= VIR_DOMAIN_AFFECT_CONFIG; + if (live) + flags |= VIR_DOMAIN_AFFECT_LIVE; + + if (!(dom = virshCommandOptDomain(ctl, cmd, NULL))) + return false; + + if (virDomainGetLaunchSecurityInfo(dom, &params, &nparams, flags) != 0) { + vshError(ctl, "%s", _("Unable to get launch security info")); + goto cleanup; + } + + virshPrintLaunchSecurityInfo(ctl, params, nparams); + + ret = true; + cleanup: + virTypedParamsFree(params, nparams); + virshDomainFree(dom); + return ret; +} + + const vshCmdDef domManagementCmds[] = { {.name = "attach-device", .handler = cmdAttachDevice, @@ -14492,5 +14570,11 @@ const vshCmdDef domManagementCmds[] = { .info = info_domblkthreshold, .flags = 0 }, + {.name = "launch-security", + .handler = cmdLaunchSecurity, + .opts = opts_launch_security, + .info = info_launch_security, + .flags = 0 + }, {.name = NULL} }; -- 2.7.4

On 4/2/18 6:31 PM, John Ferlan wrote: Ah, I missed that. Will add help in next rev. Yes, I tried to follow other commands. OK. For now we have only one column and I am not too sure if we need to add a header file for it, if it grows then we can revisit.

On 4/3/18 9:32 AM, Erik Skultety wrote: Yes, without any command line it should be getter otherwise settter. Currently, we don't have anything in setter yet. The command will return a measurement of encrypted image. The measurement value can be used by guest owner to validate the image before it launches the VM. In a typical scenario we may have something like this: # virsh create guest.xml --paused # virsh launch-security --domain guest // validate the measurement obtained through above command if measurement is wrong then;  destory the guest else  // optionally inject secret in guest using virsh launch-security set <....>  resume the guest

From: Xiaogang Chen <Xiaogang.Chen(a)amd.com&gt; Update qemuxml2xmltest, genericxml2xmltest and qemuxml2argvtest to include sev specific tag, a typical SEV specific tag looks like <launch-security type='sev> <cbitpos>47</cbitpos> <reduced-phys-bits>1</reduced-phys-bits> <policy>1</policy> </launch-security> Signed-off-by: Xiaogang Chen <Xiaogang.Chen(a)amd.com&gt; Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh(a)amd.com&gt; --- tests/genericxml2xmlindata/sev.xml | 20 +++++++++++++++++++ tests/genericxml2xmloutdata/sev.xml | 22 +++++++++++++++++++++ tests/genericxml2xmltest.c | 2 ++ tests/qemuxml2argvdata/sev.args | 24 +++++++++++++++++++++++ tests/qemuxml2argvdata/sev.xml | 35 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ tests/qemuxml2argvtest.c | 2 ++ tests/qemuxml2xmloutdata/sev.xml | 39 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ tests/qemuxml2xmltest.c | 2 ++ 8 files changed, 146 insertions(+) create mode 100644 tests/genericxml2xmlindata/sev.xml create mode 100644 tests/genericxml2xmloutdata/sev.xml create mode 100644 tests/qemuxml2argvdata/sev.args create mode 100644 tests/qemuxml2argvdata/sev.xml create mode 100644 tests/qemuxml2xmloutdata/sev.xml diff --git a/tests/genericxml2xmlindata/sev.xml b/tests/genericxml2xmlindata/sev.xml new file mode 100644 index 0000000..aeb0c6a --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/genericxml2xmlindata/sev.xml @@ -0,0 +1,20 @@ +<domain type='kvm'> + <name>QEMUGuest1</name> + <uuid>c7a5fdbd-edaf-9455-926a-d65c16db1809</uuid> + <memory unit='KiB'>219100</memory> + <currentMemory unit='KiB'>219100</currentMemory> + <vcpu placement='static'>1</vcpu> + <os> + <type arch='x86_64' machine='pc-1.0'>hvm</type> + <boot dev='hd'/> + </os> + <clock offset='utc'/> + <on_poweroff>destroy</on_poweroff> + <on_reboot>restart</on_reboot> + <on_crash>destroy</on_crash> + <launch-security type='sev'> + <cbitpos>47</cbitpos> + <reduced-phys-bits>1</reduced-phys-bits> + <policy>1</policy> + </launch-security> +</domain> diff --git a/tests/genericxml2xmloutdata/sev.xml b/tests/genericxml2xmloutdata/sev.xml new file mode 100644 index 0000000..70065b8 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/genericxml2xmloutdata/sev.xml @@ -0,0 +1,22 @@ +<domain type='kvm'> + <name>QEMUGuest1</name> + <uuid>c7a5fdbd-edaf-9455-926a-d65c16db1809</uuid> + <memory unit='KiB'>219100</memory> + <currentMemory unit='KiB'>219100</currentMemory> + <vcpu placement='static'>1</vcpu> + <os> + <type arch='x86_64' machine='pc-1.0'>hvm</type> + <boot dev='hd'/> + </os> + <clock offset='utc'/> + <on_poweroff>destroy</on_poweroff> + <on_reboot>restart</on_reboot> + <on_crash>destroy</on_crash> + <devices> + </devices> + <launch-security type='sev'> + <cbitpos>47</cbitpos> + <reduced-phys-bits>1</reduced-phys-bits> + <policy>1</policy> + </launch-security> +</domain> diff --git a/tests/genericxml2xmltest.c b/tests/genericxml2xmltest.c index d8270a6..3b75b43 100644 --- a/tests/genericxml2xmltest.c +++ b/tests/genericxml2xmltest.c @@ -141,6 +141,8 @@ mymain(void) DO_TEST_FULL("cachetune-colliding-types", false, true, TEST_COMPARE_DOM_XML2XML_RESULT_FAIL_PARSE); + DO_TEST_DIFFERENT("sev"); + virObjectUnref(caps); virObjectUnref(xmlopt); diff --git a/tests/qemuxml2argvdata/sev.args b/tests/qemuxml2argvdata/sev.args new file mode 100644 index 0000000..312dbcf --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/qemuxml2argvdata/sev.args @@ -0,0 +1,24 @@ +LC_ALL=C \ +PATH=/bin \ +HOME=/home/test \ +USER=test \ +LOGNAME=test \ +QEMU_AUDIO_DRV=none \ +/usr/bin/qemu-system-x86_64 \ +-name QEMUGuest1 \ +-S \ +-machine pc-1.0,accel=kvm,memory-encryption=sev0 \ +-m 214 \ +-smp 1,sockets=1,cores=1,threads=1 \ +-uuid c7a5fdbd-edaf-9455-926a-d65c16db1809 \ +-nographic \ +-nodefaults \ +-chardev socket,id=charmonitor,path=/tmp/lib/domain--1-QEMUGuest1/monitor.sock,\ +server,nowait \ +-mon chardev=charmonitor,id=monitor,mode=readline \ +-no-acpi \ +-boot c \ +-usb \ +-drive file=/dev/HostVG/QEMUGuest1,format=raw,if=none,id=drive-ide0-0-0 \ +-device ide-drive,bus=ide.0,unit=0,drive=drive-ide0-0-0,id=ide0-0-0 \ +-object sev-guest,id=sev0,cbitpos=47,reduced-phys-bits=1,policy=0x1 diff --git a/tests/qemuxml2argvdata/sev.xml b/tests/qemuxml2argvdata/sev.xml new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2476b58 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/qemuxml2argvdata/sev.xml @@ -0,0 +1,35 @@ +<domain type='kvm'> + <name>QEMUGuest1</name> + <uuid>c7a5fdbd-edaf-9455-926a-d65c16db1809</uuid> + <memory unit='KiB'>219100</memory> + <currentMemory unit='KiB'>219100</currentMemory> + <vcpu placement='static'>1</vcpu> + <os> + <type arch='x86_64' machine='pc-1.0'>hvm</type> + <boot dev='hd'/> + </os> + <clock offset='utc'/> + <on_poweroff>destroy</on_poweroff> + <on_reboot>restart</on_reboot> + <on_crash>destroy</on_crash> + <devices> + <emulator>/usr/bin/qemu-system-x86_64</emulator> + <disk type='block' device='disk'> + <driver name='qemu' type='raw'/> + <source dev='/dev/HostVG/QEMUGuest1'/> + <target dev='hda' bus='ide'/> + <address type='drive' controller='0' bus='0' target='0' unit='0'/> + </disk> + <controller type='usb' index='0'/> + <controller type='ide' index='0'/> + <controller type='pci' index='0' model='pci-root'/> + <input type='mouse' bus='ps2'/> + <input type='keyboard' bus='ps2'/> + <memballoon model='none'/> + </devices> + <launch-security type='sev'> + <cbitpos>47</cbitpos> + <reduced-phys-bits>1</reduced-phys-bits> + <policy>1</policy> + </launch-security> +</domain> diff --git a/tests/qemuxml2argvtest.c b/tests/qemuxml2argvtest.c index 308d71f..de0ac58 100644 --- a/tests/qemuxml2argvtest.c +++ b/tests/qemuxml2argvtest.c @@ -3023,6 +3023,8 @@ mymain(void) QEMU_CAPS_DEVICE_VIRTIO_MOUSE_CCW, QEMU_CAPS_DEVICE_VIRTIO_TABLET_CCW); + DO_TEST("sev", QEMU_CAPS_MACHINE_OPT, QEMU_CAPS_KVM, QEMU_CAPS_SEV_GUEST); + if (getenv("LIBVIRT_SKIP_CLEANUP") == NULL) virFileDeleteTree(fakerootdir); diff --git a/tests/qemuxml2xmloutdata/sev.xml b/tests/qemuxml2xmloutdata/sev.xml new file mode 100644 index 0000000..80017fe --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/qemuxml2xmloutdata/sev.xml @@ -0,0 +1,39 @@ +<domain type='kvm'> + <name>QEMUGuest1</name> + <uuid>c7a5fdbd-edaf-9455-926a-d65c16db1809</uuid> + <memory unit='KiB'>219100</memory> + <currentMemory unit='KiB'>219100</currentMemory> + <vcpu placement='static'>1</vcpu> + <os> + <type arch='x86_64' machine='pc-1.0'>hvm</type> + <boot dev='hd'/> + </os> + <clock offset='utc'/> + <on_poweroff>destroy</on_poweroff> + <on_reboot>restart</on_reboot> + <on_crash>destroy</on_crash> + <devices> + <emulator>/usr/bin/qemu-system-x86_64</emulator> + <disk type='block' device='disk'> + <driver name='qemu' type='raw'/> + <source dev='/dev/HostVG/QEMUGuest1'/> + <target dev='hda' bus='ide'/> + <address type='drive' controller='0' bus='0' target='0' unit='0'/> + </disk> + <controller type='usb' index='0'> + <address type='pci' domain='0x0000' bus='0x00' slot='0x01' function='0x2'/> + </controller> + <controller type='ide' index='0'> + <address type='pci' domain='0x0000' bus='0x00' slot='0x01' function='0x1'/> + </controller> + <controller type='pci' index='0' model='pci-root'/> + <input type='mouse' bus='ps2'/> + <input type='keyboard' bus='ps2'/> + <memballoon model='none'/> + </devices> + <launch-security type='sev'> + <cbitpos>47</cbitpos> + <reduced-phys-bits>1</reduced-phys-bits> + <policy>1</policy> + </launch-security> +</domain> diff --git a/tests/qemuxml2xmltest.c b/tests/qemuxml2xmltest.c index 0f56029..328ef66 100644 --- a/tests/qemuxml2xmltest.c +++ b/tests/qemuxml2xmltest.c @@ -1265,6 +1265,8 @@ mymain(void) DO_TEST_STATUS("modern"); DO_TEST_STATUS("migration-out-nbd"); + DO_TEST("sev", NONE); + if (getenv("LIBVIRT_SKIP_CLEANUP") == NULL) virFileDeleteTree(fakerootdir); -- 2.7.4

On 04/02/2018 10:18 AM, Brijesh Singh wrote: I think the .args part of this can be merged into patch 5 using the launch-security-sev.args name. Of course you'll have to include the : dh-cert-file=/tmp/lib/domain--1-QEMUGuest1/dh_cert.base64,\ session-file=/tmp/lib/domain--1-QEMUGuest1/session.base64 In the output too, but that'll be obvious... John