4:04 p.m.
V2 of https://listman.redhat.com/archives/libvir-list/2021-November/msg00980.html
Like V1, this series is compile-tested only. I plan to work on functional
testing soon, after wrapping up some tasks.
Changes since V1:
- Optional secret set address changed to unsigned long long
- Improved documentation
- Ensure VM is in paused state
- Other small fixes
Jim Fehlig (3):
libvirt: Introduce virDomainSetLaunchSecurityState public API
remote: Add RPC support for the virDomainSetLaunchSecurityState API
qemu: Implement the virDomainSetLaunchSecurityState API
include/libvirt/libvirt-domain.h | 35 +++++++++++++
src/driver-hypervisor.h | 7 +++
src/libvirt-domain.c | 62 ++++++++++++++++++++++
src/libvirt_public.syms | 5 ++
src/qemu/qemu_driver.c | 88 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
src/qemu/qemu_monitor.c | 14 +++++
src/qemu/qemu_monitor.h | 7 +++
src/qemu/qemu_monitor_json.c | 45 ++++++++++++++++
src/qemu/qemu_monitor_json.h | 6 +++
src/remote/remote_driver.c | 1 +
src/remote/remote_protocol.x | 17 +++++-
src/remote_protocol-structs | 9 ++++
12 files changed, 295 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--
2.34.1
4:04 p.m.
New subject: [PATCH V2 1/3] libvirt: Introduce virDomainSetLaunchSecurityState public API
This API allows setting a launch secret within a guests's memory. The
launch secret is created by the guest owner after retrieving and
verifying the launch measurement with virDomainGetLaunchSecurityInfo.
The API uses virTypedParameter for input, allowing it to be expanded
to support other confidential computing technologies. In the case of
SEV, a basic guest launch workflow is described in the SEV API spec
in section "1.3.1 Launch"
https://www.amd.com/system/files/TechDocs/55766_SEV-KM_API_Specification.pdf
Signed-off-by: Jim Fehlig <jfehlig(a)suse.com>
---
include/libvirt/libvirt-domain.h | 35 ++++++++++++++++++
src/driver-hypervisor.h | 7 ++++
src/libvirt-domain.c | 62 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
src/libvirt_public.syms | 5 +++
4 files changed, 109 insertions(+)
diff --git a/include/libvirt/libvirt-domain.h b/include/libvirt/libvirt-domain.h
index d0dd11ab01..9e7f72e214 100644
--- a/include/libvirt/libvirt-domain.h
+++ b/include/libvirt/libvirt-domain.h
@@ -5101,11 +5101,46 @@ int virDomainSetLifecycleAction(virDomainPtr domain,
*/
# define VIR_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_SEV_MEASUREMENT "sev-measurement"
+/**
+ * VIR_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_SEV_SECRET_HEADER:
+ *
+ * A macro used to represent the SEV launch secret header. The secret header
+ * is a base64-encoded VIR_TYPED_PARAM_STRING containing artifacts needed by
+ * the SEV firmware to recover the plain text of the launch secret. See
+ * section "6.6 LAUNCH_SECRET" in the SEV API specification for a detailed
+ * description of the secret header.
+ */
+# define VIR_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_SEV_SECRET_HEADER "sev-secret-header"
+
+/**
+ * VIR_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_SEV_SECRET:
+ *
+ * A macro used to represent the SEV launch secret. The secret is a
+ * base64-encoded VIR_TYPED_PARAM_STRING containing an encrypted launch
+ * secret. The secret is created by the domain owner after the SEV launch
+ * measurement is retrieved and verified.
+ */
+# define VIR_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_SEV_SECRET "sev-secret"
+
+/**
+ * VIR_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_SEV_SECRET_SET_ADDRESS:
+ *
+ * A macro used to represent the physical address within the guest's memory
+ * where the secret will be set, as VIR_TYPED_PARAM_ULLONG. If not specified,
+ * the address will be determined by the hypervisor.
+ */
+# define VIR_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_SEV_SECRET_SET_ADDRESS
"sev-secret-set-address"
+
int virDomainGetLaunchSecurityInfo(virDomainPtr domain,
virTypedParameterPtr *params,
int *nparams,
unsigned int flags);
+int virDomainSetLaunchSecurityState(virDomainPtr domain,
+ virTypedParameterPtr params,
+ int nparams,
+ unsigned int flags);
+
typedef enum {
VIR_DOMAIN_GUEST_INFO_USERS = (1 << 0), /* return active users */
VIR_DOMAIN_GUEST_INFO_OS = (1 << 1), /* return OS information */
diff --git a/src/driver-hypervisor.h b/src/driver-hypervisor.h
index d642af8a37..c83fb648a2 100644
--- a/src/driver-hypervisor.h
+++ b/src/driver-hypervisor.h
@@ -1333,6 +1333,12 @@ typedef int
int *nparams,
unsigned int flags);
+typedef int
+(*virDrvDomainSetLaunchSecurityState)(virDomainPtr domain,
+ virTypedParameterPtr params,
+ int nparams,
+ unsigned int flags);
+
typedef virDomainCheckpointPtr
(*virDrvDomainCheckpointCreateXML)(virDomainPtr domain,
const char *xmlDesc,
@@ -1661,6 +1667,7 @@ struct _virHypervisorDriver {
virDrvConnectBaselineHypervisorCPU connectBaselineHypervisorCPU;
virDrvNodeGetSEVInfo nodeGetSEVInfo;
virDrvDomainGetLaunchSecurityInfo domainGetLaunchSecurityInfo;
+ virDrvDomainSetLaunchSecurityState domainSetLaunchSecurityState;
virDrvDomainCheckpointCreateXML domainCheckpointCreateXML;
virDrvDomainCheckpointGetXMLDesc domainCheckpointGetXMLDesc;
virDrvDomainListAllCheckpoints domainListAllCheckpoints;
diff --git a/src/libvirt-domain.c b/src/libvirt-domain.c
index 5708ff839b..82b0822d12 100644
--- a/src/libvirt-domain.c
+++ b/src/libvirt-domain.c
@@ -12844,6 +12844,68 @@ int virDomainGetLaunchSecurityInfo(virDomainPtr domain,
}
+/**
+ * virDomainSetLaunchSecurityState:
+ * @domain: a domain object
+ * @params: pointer to launch security parameter objects
+ * @nparams: number of launch security parameters
+ * @flags: currently used, set to 0.
+ *
+ * Set a launch security secret in the guest's memory. The guest must be
+ * in a paused state, e.g. in state VIR_DOMIAN_PAUSED as reported by
+ * virDomainGetState. On success, the guest can be transitioned to a
+ * running state. On failure, the guest should be destroyed.
+ *
+ * A basic guest attestation process can be achieved by:
+ * - Start a secure guest in the paused state by passing VIR_DOMAIN_START_PAUSED
+ * to one of the virDomainCreate APIs
+ * - Retrieve the guest launch measurement with virDomainGetLaunchSecurityInfo
+ * - Verify launch measurement and generate a secret for the guest
+ * - Set the secret in the guest's memory with virDomainSetLaunchSecurityState
+ * - Start running the guest with virDomainResume
+ *
+ * See VIR_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_* for a detailed description of accepted
+ * launch security parameters.
+ *
+ * Returns -1 in case of failure, 0 in case of success.
+ */
+int virDomainSetLaunchSecurityState(virDomainPtr domain,
+ virTypedParameterPtr params,
+ int nparams,
+ unsigned int flags)
+{
+ virConnectPtr conn = domain->conn;
+
+ VIR_DOMAIN_DEBUG(domain, "params=%p, nparams=%d flags=0x%x",
+ params, nparams, flags);
+ VIR_TYPED_PARAMS_DEBUG(params, nparams);
+
+ virResetLastError();
+
+ virCheckDomainReturn(domain, -1);
+ virCheckNonNullArgGoto(params, error);
+ virCheckPositiveArgGoto(nparams, error);
+ virCheckReadOnlyGoto(domain->conn->flags, error);
+
+ if (virTypedParameterValidateSet(conn, params, nparams) < 0)
+ goto error;
+
+ if (conn->driver->domainSetLaunchSecurityState) {
+ int ret;
+ ret = conn->driver->domainSetLaunchSecurityState(domain, params,
+ nparams, flags);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto error;
+ return ret;
+ }
+ virReportUnsupportedError();
+
+ error:
+ virDispatchError(domain->conn);
+ return -1;
+}
+
+
/**
* virDomainAgentSetResponseTimeout:
* @domain: a domain object
diff --git a/src/libvirt_public.syms b/src/libvirt_public.syms
index 788a967df7..f93692c427 100644
--- a/src/libvirt_public.syms
+++ b/src/libvirt_public.syms
@@ -911,4 +911,9 @@ LIBVIRT_7.8.0 {
virNetworkCreateXMLFlags;
} LIBVIRT_7.7.0;
+LIBVIRT_8.0.0 {
+ global:
+ virDomainSetLaunchSecurityState;
+} LIBVIRT_7.8.0;
+
# .... define new API here using predicted next version number ....
--
2.34.1
5:38 a.m.
New subject: [PATCH V2 1/3] libvirt: Introduce virDomainSetLaunchSecurityState public API
On Thu, Dec 09, 2021 at 03:04:13PM -0700, Jim Fehlig wrote:
This API allows setting a launch secret within a guests's memory.
The
launch secret is created by the guest owner after retrieving and
verifying the launch measurement with virDomainGetLaunchSecurityInfo.
The API uses virTypedParameter for input, allowing it to be expanded
to support other confidential computing technologies. In the case of
SEV, a basic guest launch workflow is described in the SEV API spec
in section "1.3.1 Launch"
https://www.amd.com/system/files/TechDocs/55766_SEV-KM_API_Specification.pdf
Signed-off-by: Jim Fehlig <jfehlig(a)suse.com>
---
include/libvirt/libvirt-domain.h | 35 ++++++++++++++++++
src/driver-hypervisor.h | 7 ++++
src/libvirt-domain.c | 62 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
src/libvirt_public.syms | 5 +++
4 files changed, 109 insertions(+)
Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange(a)redhat.com>
Regards,
Daniel
--
|: https://berrange.com -o- https://www.flickr.com/photos/dberrange :|
|: https://libvirt.org -o- https://fstop138.berrange.com :|
|: https://entangle-photo.org -o- https://www.instagram.com/dberrange :|
4:04 p.m.
New subject: [PATCH V2 2/3] remote: Add RPC support for the virDomainSetLaunchSecurityState API
Signed-off-by: Jim Fehlig <jfehlig(a)suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange(a)redhat.com>
---
src/remote/remote_driver.c | 1 +
src/remote/remote_protocol.x | 17 ++++++++++++++++-
src/remote_protocol-structs | 9 +++++++++
3 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/src/remote/remote_driver.c b/src/remote/remote_driver.c
index 235c406a5a..604239951c 100644
--- a/src/remote/remote_driver.c
+++ b/src/remote/remote_driver.c
@@ -8574,6 +8574,7 @@ static virHypervisorDriver hypervisor_driver = {
.domainAuthorizedSSHKeysSet = remoteDomainAuthorizedSSHKeysSet, /* 6.10.0 */
.domainGetMessages = remoteDomainGetMessages, /* 7.1.0 */
.domainStartDirtyRateCalc = remoteDomainStartDirtyRateCalc, /* 7.2.0 */
+ .domainSetLaunchSecurityState = remoteDomainSetLaunchSecurityState, /* 8.0.0 */
};
static virNetworkDriver network_driver = {
diff --git a/src/remote/remote_protocol.x b/src/remote/remote_protocol.x
index 60010778ca..4f13cef662 100644
--- a/src/remote/remote_protocol.x
+++ b/src/remote/remote_protocol.x
@@ -272,6 +272,9 @@ const REMOTE_NODE_SEV_INFO_MAX = 64;
/* Upper limit on number of launch security information entries */
const REMOTE_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_INFO_PARAMS_MAX = 64;
+/* Upper limit on number of launch security state entries */
+const REMOTE_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_STATE_PARAMS_MAX = 64;
+
/* Upper limit on number of parameters describing a guest */
const REMOTE_DOMAIN_GUEST_INFO_PARAMS_MAX = 2048;
@@ -3642,6 +3645,12 @@ struct remote_domain_get_launch_security_info_ret {
remote_typed_param params<REMOTE_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_INFO_PARAMS_MAX>;
};
+struct remote_domain_set_launch_security_state_args {
+ remote_nonnull_domain dom;
+ remote_typed_param params<REMOTE_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_STATE_PARAMS_MAX>;
+ unsigned int flags;
+};
+
/* nwfilter binding */
struct remote_nwfilter_binding_lookup_by_port_dev_args {
@@ -6905,5 +6914,11 @@ enum remote_procedure {
* @generate: both
* @acl: none
*/
- REMOTE_PROC_DOMAIN_EVENT_MEMORY_DEVICE_SIZE_CHANGE = 438
+ REMOTE_PROC_DOMAIN_EVENT_MEMORY_DEVICE_SIZE_CHANGE = 438,
+
+ /**
+ * @generate: both
+ * @acl: domain:write
+ */
+ REMOTE_PROC_DOMAIN_SET_LAUNCH_SECURITY_STATE = 439
};
diff --git a/src/remote_protocol-structs b/src/remote_protocol-structs
index dbef4ace79..d88176781d 100644
--- a/src/remote_protocol-structs
+++ b/src/remote_protocol-structs
@@ -3005,6 +3005,14 @@ struct remote_domain_get_launch_security_info_ret {
remote_typed_param * params_val;
} params;
};
+struct remote_domain_set_launch_security_state_args {
+ remote_nonnull_domain dom;
+ struct {
+ u_int params_len;
+ remote_typed_param * params_val;
+ } params;
+ u_int flags;
+};
struct remote_nwfilter_binding_lookup_by_port_dev_args {
remote_nonnull_string name;
};
@@ -3680,4 +3688,5 @@ enum remote_procedure {
REMOTE_PROC_NODE_DEVICE_IS_ACTIVE = 436,
REMOTE_PROC_NETWORK_CREATE_XML_FLAGS = 437,
REMOTE_PROC_DOMAIN_EVENT_MEMORY_DEVICE_SIZE_CHANGE = 438,
+ REMOTE_PROC_DOMAIN_SET_LAUNCH_SECURITY_STATE = 439,
};
--
2.34.1
4:04 p.m.
New subject: [PATCH V2 3/3] qemu: Implement the virDomainSetLaunchSecurityState API
Set a launch secret in guest memory using the sev-inject-launch-secret
QMP API. Only supported for SEV-enabled guests in a paused state.
Signed-off-by: Jim Fehlig <jfehlig(a)suse.com>
---
src/qemu/qemu_driver.c | 88 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
src/qemu/qemu_monitor.c | 14 ++++++
src/qemu/qemu_monitor.h | 7 +++
src/qemu/qemu_monitor_json.c | 45 ++++++++++++++++++
src/qemu/qemu_monitor_json.h | 6 +++
5 files changed, 160 insertions(+)
diff --git a/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c b/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c
index 8093b8f69b..b38a246d37 100644
--- a/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c
+++ b/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c
@@ -20042,6 +20042,93 @@ qemuDomainGetLaunchSecurityInfo(virDomainPtr domain,
return ret;
}
+
+static int
+qemuDomainSetLaunchSecurityState(virDomainPtr domain,
+ virTypedParameterPtr params,
+ int nparams,
+ unsigned int flags)
+{
+ virQEMUDriver *driver = domain->conn->privateData;
+ virDomainObj *vm;
+ int ret = -1;
+ int rc;
+ size_t i;
+ g_autofree char *secrethdr = NULL;
+ g_autofree char *secret = NULL;
+ unsigned long long setaddr = 0;
+ bool hasSetaddr = false;
+ int state;
+
+ virCheckFlags(0, -1);
+ if (virTypedParamsValidate(params, nparams,
+ VIR_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_SEV_SECRET_HEADER,
+ VIR_TYPED_PARAM_STRING,
+ VIR_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_SEV_SECRET,
+ VIR_TYPED_PARAM_STRING,
+ VIR_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_SEV_SECRET_SET_ADDRESS,
+ VIR_TYPED_PARAM_ULLONG,
+ NULL) < 0)
+ return -1;
+
+ if (!(vm = qemuDomainObjFromDomain(domain)))
+ goto cleanup;
+
+ if (virDomainSetLaunchSecurityStateEnsureACL(domain->conn, vm->def) < 0)
+ goto cleanup;
+
+ /* Currently only SEV is supported */
+ if (!vm->def->sec ||
+ vm->def->sec->sectype != VIR_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_SEV) {
+ virReportError(VIR_ERR_OPERATION_UNSUPPORTED, "%s",
+ _("setting a launch secret is only supported in SEV-enabled
domains"));
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < nparams; i++) {
+ virTypedParameterPtr param = ¶ms[i];
+
+ if (STREQ(param->field, VIR_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_SEV_SECRET_HEADER)) {
+ secrethdr = g_strdup(param->value.s);
+ } else if (STREQ(param->field, VIR_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_SEV_SECRET)) {
+ secret = g_strdup(param->value.s);
+ } else if (STREQ(param->field,
VIR_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_SEV_SECRET_SET_ADDRESS)) {
+ setaddr = param->value.ul;
+ hasSetaddr = true;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (qemuDomainObjBeginJob(driver, vm, QEMU_JOB_MODIFY) < 0)
+ goto cleanup;
+
+ if (virDomainObjCheckActive(vm) < 0)
+ goto endjob;
+
+ state = virDomainObjGetState(vm, NULL);
+ if (state != VIR_DOMAIN_PAUSED) {
+ virReportError(VIR_ERR_OPERATION_INVALID,
+ "%s", _("domain must be in a paused state"));
+ goto endjob;
+ }
+
+ qemuDomainObjEnterMonitor(driver, vm);
+ rc = qemuMonitorSetLaunchSecurityState(QEMU_DOMAIN_PRIVATE(vm)->mon,
+ secrethdr, secret, setaddr, hasSetaddr);
+ qemuDomainObjExitMonitor(driver, vm);
+ if (rc < 0)
+ goto endjob;
+
+ ret = 0;
+
+ endjob:
+ qemuDomainObjEndJob(driver, vm);
+
+ cleanup:
+ virDomainObjEndAPI(&vm);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+
static const unsigned int qemuDomainGetGuestInfoSupportedTypes =
VIR_DOMAIN_GUEST_INFO_USERS |
VIR_DOMAIN_GUEST_INFO_OS |
@@ -20915,6 +21002,7 @@ static virHypervisorDriver qemuHypervisorDriver = {
.domainAuthorizedSSHKeysSet = qemuDomainAuthorizedSSHKeysSet, /* 6.10.0 */
.domainGetMessages = qemuDomainGetMessages, /* 7.1.0 */
.domainStartDirtyRateCalc = qemuDomainStartDirtyRateCalc, /* 7.2.0 */
+ .domainSetLaunchSecurityState = qemuDomainSetLaunchSecurityState, /* 8.0.0 */
};
diff --git a/src/qemu/qemu_monitor.c b/src/qemu/qemu_monitor.c
index 75e0e4ed92..b1de6383f4 100644
--- a/src/qemu/qemu_monitor.c
+++ b/src/qemu/qemu_monitor.c
@@ -4366,6 +4366,20 @@ qemuMonitorGetSEVMeasurement(qemuMonitor *mon)
}
+int
+qemuMonitorSetLaunchSecurityState(qemuMonitor *mon,
+ const char *secrethdr,
+ const char *secret,
+ unsigned long long setaddr,
+ bool hasSetaddr)
+{
+ QEMU_CHECK_MONITOR(mon);
+
+ return qemuMonitorJSONSetLaunchSecurityState(mon, secrethdr, secret,
+ setaddr, hasSetaddr);
+}
+
+
int
qemuMonitorGetPRManagerInfo(qemuMonitor *mon,
GHashTable **retinfo)
diff --git a/src/qemu/qemu_monitor.h b/src/qemu/qemu_monitor.h
index edc2b01a66..621d785d80 100644
--- a/src/qemu/qemu_monitor.h
+++ b/src/qemu/qemu_monitor.h
@@ -1445,6 +1445,13 @@ int qemuMonitorBlockdevMediumInsert(qemuMonitor *mon,
char *
qemuMonitorGetSEVMeasurement(qemuMonitor *mon);
+int
+qemuMonitorSetLaunchSecurityState(qemuMonitor *mon,
+ const char *secrethdr,
+ const char *secret,
+ unsigned long long setaddr,
+ bool hasSetaddr);
+
typedef struct _qemuMonitorPRManagerInfo qemuMonitorPRManagerInfo;
struct _qemuMonitorPRManagerInfo {
bool connected;
diff --git a/src/qemu/qemu_monitor_json.c b/src/qemu/qemu_monitor_json.c
index e00d785c20..f3efc3fe79 100644
--- a/src/qemu/qemu_monitor_json.c
+++ b/src/qemu/qemu_monitor_json.c
@@ -8216,6 +8216,51 @@ qemuMonitorJSONGetSEVMeasurement(qemuMonitor *mon)
}
+/**
+ * Set a launch secret in guest memory
+ *
+ * Example JSON:
+ *
+ * { "execute" : "sev-inject-launch-secret",
+ * "data": { "packet-header": "str", "secret":
"str", "gpa": "uint64" } }
+ *
+ * The guest physical address (gpa) parameter is optional
+ */
+int
+qemuMonitorJSONSetLaunchSecurityState(qemuMonitor *mon,
+ const char *secrethdr,
+ const char *secret,
+ unsigned long long setaddr,
+ bool hasSetaddr)
+{
+ g_autoptr(virJSONValue) cmd = NULL;
+ g_autoptr(virJSONValue) reply = NULL;
+
+ if (hasSetaddr) {
+ cmd = qemuMonitorJSONMakeCommand("sev-inject-launch-secret",
+ "s:packet-header", secrethdr,
+ "s:secret", secret,
+ "U:gpa", setaddr,
+ NULL);
+ } else {
+ cmd = qemuMonitorJSONMakeCommand("sev-inject-launch-secret",
+ "s:packet-header", secrethdr,
+ "s:secret", secret,
+ NULL);
+ }
+ if (cmd == NULL)
+ return -1;
+
+ if (qemuMonitorJSONCommand(mon, cmd, &reply) < 0)
+ return -1;
+
+ if (qemuMonitorJSONCheckError(cmd, reply) < 0)
+ return -1;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+
/*
* Example return data
*
diff --git a/src/qemu/qemu_monitor_json.h b/src/qemu/qemu_monitor_json.h
index 0984717675..8b9d3a2a77 100644
--- a/src/qemu/qemu_monitor_json.h
+++ b/src/qemu/qemu_monitor_json.h
@@ -369,6 +369,12 @@ int qemuMonitorJSONSystemWakeup(qemuMonitor *mon);
char *qemuMonitorJSONGetSEVMeasurement(qemuMonitor *mon);
+int qemuMonitorJSONSetLaunchSecurityState(qemuMonitor *mon,
+ const char *secrethdr,
+ const char *secret,
+ unsigned long long setaddr,
+ bool hasSetaddr);
+
int qemuMonitorJSONGetVersion(qemuMonitor *mon,
int *major,
int *minor,
--
2.34.1
5:40 a.m.
New subject: [PATCH V2 3/3] qemu: Implement the virDomainSetLaunchSecurityState API
On Thu, Dec 09, 2021 at 03:04:15PM -0700, Jim Fehlig wrote:
Set a launch secret in guest memory using the
sev-inject-launch-secret
QMP API. Only supported for SEV-enabled guests in a paused state.
Signed-off-by: Jim Fehlig <jfehlig(a)suse.com>
---
src/qemu/qemu_driver.c | 88 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
src/qemu/qemu_monitor.c | 14 ++++++
src/qemu/qemu_monitor.h | 7 +++
src/qemu/qemu_monitor_json.c | 45 ++++++++++++++++++
src/qemu/qemu_monitor_json.h | 6 +++
5 files changed, 160 insertions(+)
LGTM aside from the tests thing Peter mentions
Regards,
Daniel
--
|: https://berrange.com -o- https://www.flickr.com/photos/dberrange :|
|: https://libvirt.org -o- https://fstop138.berrange.com :|
|: https://entangle-photo.org -o- https://www.instagram.com/dberrange :|
2:48 a.m.
On Thu, Dec 09, 2021 at 15:04:12 -0700, Jim Fehlig wrote:
V2 of
https://listman.redhat.com/archives/libvir-list/2021-November/msg00980.html
Like V1, this series is compile-tested only. I plan to work on functional
testing soon, after wrapping up some tasks.
I have 2 minor comments:
- virsh impl is missing and it's not justified why
- 'qemuMonitorJSONSetLaunchSecurityState' is missing a test case in
qemumonitorjsontest. A simple test with GEN_TEST_FUNC/DO_TEST_GEN is
enough, it validates the arguments against the QMP monitor schema.
5:41 a.m.
On Fri, Dec 10, 2021 at 09:48:00AM +0100, Peter Krempa wrote:
On Thu, Dec 09, 2021 at 15:04:12 -0700, Jim Fehlig wrote:
> V2 of https://listman.redhat.com/archives/libvir-list/2021-November/msg00980.html
>
> Like V1, this series is compile-tested only. I plan to work on functional
> testing soon, after wrapping up some tasks.
I have 2 minor comments:
- virsh impl is missing and it's not justified why
virsh is missing for all the sev related commands, but I've just
addressed that in my series, so agree it makes sense to add in
this series too.
- 'qemuMonitorJSONSetLaunchSecurityState' is missing a test
case in
qemumonitorjsontest. A simple test with GEN_TEST_FUNC/DO_TEST_GEN is
enough, it validates the arguments against the QMP monitor schema.
Regards,
Daniel
--
|: https://berrange.com -o- https://www.flickr.com/photos/dberrange :|
|: https://libvirt.org -o- https://fstop138.berrange.com :|
|: https://entangle-photo.org -o- https://www.instagram.com/dberrange :|
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7 comments
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Peter Krempa