Coverity complained about the usage of the uninitialized cacerts in the event(s) that "access(certFile, R_OK)" and/or "access(cacertFile, R_OK)" fail the for loop used to fill in the certs will have indeterminate data as well as the possibility that both failures would result in the gnutls_x509_crt_deinit() call having a similar fate. Initializing cacerts only would resolve the issue; however, it still would leave the indeterminate action, so rather add a parameter to the virNetTLSContextLoadCACertListFromFile() to pass the max size rather then overloading the returned count parameter. If the the call is never made, then we won't go through the for loops referencing the empty cacerts --- src/rpc/virnettlscontext.c | 8 +++++--- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/rpc/virnettlscontext.c b/src/rpc/virnettlscontext.c index 2beee8f..7cee27c 100644 --- a/src/rpc/virnettlscontext.c +++ b/src/rpc/virnettlscontext.c @@ -545,12 +545,12 @@ cleanup: static int virNetTLSContextLoadCACertListFromFile(const char *certFile, gnutls_x509_crt_t *certs, + unsigned int certMax, size_t *ncerts) { gnutls_datum_t data; char *buf = NULL; int ret = -1; - unsigned int certMax = *ncerts; *ncerts = 0; VIR_DEBUG("certFile %s", certFile); @@ -584,15 +584,17 @@ static int virNetTLSContextSanityCheckCredentials(bool isServer, { gnutls_x509_crt_t cert = NULL; gnutls_x509_crt_t cacerts[MAX_CERTS]; - size_t ncacerts = MAX_CERTS; + size_t ncacerts = 0; size_t i; int ret = -1; + memset(cacerts, 0, sizeof(cacerts)); if ((access(certFile, R_OK) == 0) && !(cert = virNetTLSContextLoadCertFromFile(certFile, isServer))) goto cleanup; if ((access(cacertFile, R_OK) == 0) && - virNetTLSContextLoadCACertListFromFile(cacertFile, cacerts, &ncacerts) < 0) + virNetTLSContextLoadCACertListFromFile(cacertFile, cacerts, + MAX_CERTS, &ncacerts) < 0) goto cleanup; if (cert &&