[PATCH v4 0/8] Support for launchSecurity type s390-pv
This patch series introduces the launch security type s390-pv. Specifying s390-pv as launch security type in an s390 domain prepares for running the guest in protected virtualization secure mode, also known as IBM Secure Execution. diff to v3: - moved virDomainSEVDef into a union - improved XML formating for launchSecurity - use a shared id on the qemu cmd line for confidential-guest-support - added check for s390-pv host support into XML validation - changed from ignoring to failing if launchSecuroty child elements are provided for s390-pv - reduced test to a single failing test - add availability of s390-pv in domain capabilities diff to v2: - Broke up previous patch one into three patches diff to v1: - Rebased to current master - Added verification check for confidential-guest-support capability Boris Fiuczynski (8): schemas: Make SEV policy on launch security optional conf: rework SEV XML parse and format methods qemu: make KVMSupportsSecureGuest capability available conf: refactor launch security to allow more types qemu: add s390-pv-guest capability conf: add availability of s390-pv in domain capabilities qemu: use common id lsec0 for launchSecurity docs: add s390-pv documentation docs/formatdomain.rst | 7 + docs/kbase/s390_protected_virt.rst | 55 ++++++- docs/schemas/domaincaps.rng | 9 ++ docs/schemas/domaincommon.rng | 13 +- src/conf/domain_capabilities.c | 1 + src/conf/domain_capabilities.h | 1 + src/conf/domain_conf.c | 143 +++++++++++++----- src/conf/domain_conf.h | 17 ++- src/conf/virconftypes.h | 2 + src/qemu/qemu_capabilities.c | 24 +++ src/qemu/qemu_capabilities.h | 4 + src/qemu/qemu_cgroup.c | 4 +- src/qemu/qemu_command.c | 75 +++++++-- src/qemu/qemu_driver.c | 3 +- src/qemu/qemu_firmware.c | 33 ++-- src/qemu/qemu_namespace.c | 21 ++- src/qemu/qemu_process.c | 35 ++++- src/qemu/qemu_validate.c | 32 +++- src/security/security_dac.c | 6 +- tests/domaincapsdata/qemu_2.11.0.s390x.xml | 1 + tests/domaincapsdata/qemu_2.12.0.s390x.xml | 1 + tests/domaincapsdata/qemu_3.0.0.s390x.xml | 1 + tests/domaincapsdata/qemu_4.0.0.s390x.xml | 1 + tests/domaincapsdata/qemu_4.2.0.s390x.xml | 1 + tests/domaincapsdata/qemu_5.2.0.s390x.xml | 1 + tests/domaincapsdata/qemu_6.0.0.s390x.xml | 1 + tests/domaincapsmock.c | 17 +++ .../launch-security-s390-pv.xml | 18 +++ tests/genericxml2xmltest.c | 1 + .../qemucapabilitiesdata/caps_6.0.0.s390x.xml | 1 + ...nch-security-s390-pv-fail.s390x-latest.err | 1 + .../launch-security-s390-pv-fail.xml | 33 ++++ .../launch-security-s390-pv.s390x-latest.args | 35 +++++ .../launch-security-s390-pv.xml | 30 ++++ ...v-missing-platform-info.x86_64-2.12.0.args | 4 +- ...urity-sev-missing-policy.x86_64-2.12.0.err | 1 + .../launch-security-sev-missing-policy.xml | 34 +++++ .../launch-security-sev.x86_64-2.12.0.args | 4 +- .../launch-security-sev.x86_64-6.0.0.args | 4 +- tests/qemuxml2argvmock.c | 16 ++ tests/qemuxml2argvtest.c | 4 + 41 files changed, 588 insertions(+), 107 deletions(-) create mode 100644 tests/genericxml2xmlindata/launch-security-s390-pv.xml create mode 100644 tests/qemuxml2argvdata/launch-security-s390-pv-fail.s390x-latest.err create mode 100644 tests/qemuxml2argvdata/launch-security-s390-pv-fail.xml create mode 100644 tests/qemuxml2argvdata/launch-security-s390-pv.s390x-latest.args create mode 100644 tests/qemuxml2argvdata/launch-security-s390-pv.xml create mode 100644 tests/qemuxml2argvdata/launch-security-sev-missing-policy.x86_64-2.12.0.err create mode 100644 tests/qemuxml2argvdata/launch-security-sev-missing-policy.xml -- 2.31.1
Change launch security policy of type SEV from required to optional and add a test to ensure the required launch security policy remains required when launch security type is SEV. Signed-off-by: Boris Fiuczynski <fiuczy@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Daniel Henrique Barboza <danielhb413@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Pavel Hrdina <phrdina@redhat.com> --- docs/schemas/domaincommon.rng | 12 ++++--- src/conf/domain_conf.c | 3 +- ...urity-sev-missing-policy.x86_64-2.12.0.err | 1 + .../launch-security-sev-missing-policy.xml | 34 +++++++++++++++++++ tests/qemuxml2argvtest.c | 1 + 5 files changed, 46 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) create mode 100644 tests/qemuxml2argvdata/launch-security-sev-missing-policy.x86_64-2.12.0.err create mode 100644 tests/qemuxml2argvdata/launch-security-sev-missing-policy.xml diff --git a/docs/schemas/domaincommon.rng b/docs/schemas/domaincommon.rng index 5ea14b6dbf..8c1b6c3a09 100644 --- a/docs/schemas/domaincommon.rng +++ b/docs/schemas/domaincommon.rng @@ -483,7 +483,9 @@ <define name="launchSecurity"> <element name="launchSecurity"> <attribute name="type"> - <value>sev</value> + <choice> + <value>sev</value> + </choice> </attribute> <interleave> <optional> @@ -496,9 +498,11 @@ <data type="unsignedInt"/> </element> </optional> - <element name="policy"> - <ref name="hexuint"/> - </element> + <optional> + <element name="policy"> + <ref name="hexuint"/> + </element> + </optional> <optional> <element name="handle"> <ref name="unsignedInt"/> diff --git a/src/conf/domain_conf.c b/src/conf/domain_conf.c index 2d8ae7e860..103bb47566 100644 --- a/src/conf/domain_conf.c +++ b/src/conf/domain_conf.c @@ -14734,7 +14734,8 @@ virDomainSEVDefParseXML(xmlNodePtr sevNode, if (virXPathULongHex("string(./policy)", ctxt, &policy) < 0) { virReportError(VIR_ERR_XML_ERROR, "%s", - _("failed to get launch security policy")); + _("failed to get launch security policy for " + "launch security type SEV")); return NULL; } diff --git a/tests/qemuxml2argvdata/launch-security-sev-missing-policy.x86_64-2.12.0.err b/tests/qemuxml2argvdata/launch-security-sev-missing-policy.x86_64-2.12.0.err new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..2019c8bb13 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/qemuxml2argvdata/launch-security-sev-missing-policy.x86_64-2.12.0.err @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +XML error: failed to get launch security policy for launch security type SEV diff --git a/tests/qemuxml2argvdata/launch-security-sev-missing-policy.xml b/tests/qemuxml2argvdata/launch-security-sev-missing-policy.xml new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..5461b06c9d --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/qemuxml2argvdata/launch-security-sev-missing-policy.xml @@ -0,0 +1,34 @@ +<domain type='kvm'> + <name>QEMUGuest1</name> + <uuid>c7a5fdbd-edaf-9455-926a-d65c16db1809</uuid> + <memory unit='KiB'>219100</memory> + <currentMemory unit='KiB'>219100</currentMemory> + <vcpu placement='static'>1</vcpu> + <os> + <type arch='x86_64' machine='pc-1.0'>hvm</type> + <boot dev='hd'/> + </os> + <clock offset='utc'/> + <on_poweroff>destroy</on_poweroff> + <on_reboot>restart</on_reboot> + <on_crash>destroy</on_crash> + <devices> + <emulator>/usr/bin/qemu-system-x86_64</emulator> + <disk type='block' device='disk'> + <driver name='qemu' type='raw'/> + <source dev='/dev/HostVG/QEMUGuest1'/> + <target dev='hda' bus='ide'/> + <address type='drive' controller='0' bus='0' target='0' unit='0'/> + </disk> + <controller type='usb' index='0'/> + <controller type='ide' index='0'/> + <controller type='pci' index='0' model='pci-root'/> + <input type='mouse' bus='ps2'/> + <input type='keyboard' bus='ps2'/> + <memballoon model='none'/> + </devices> + <launchSecurity type='sev'> + <dhCert>AQAAAAAOAAAAQAAAAAOAAAAQAAAAAOAAAAQAAAAAOAAAAQAAAAAOAAA</dhCert> + <session>IHAVENOIDEABUTJUSTPROVIDINGASTRING</session> + </launchSecurity> +</domain> diff --git a/tests/qemuxml2argvtest.c b/tests/qemuxml2argvtest.c index e315335e81..8d32aa7341 100644 --- a/tests/qemuxml2argvtest.c +++ b/tests/qemuxml2argvtest.c @@ -3468,6 +3468,7 @@ mymain(void) DO_TEST_CAPS_VER("launch-security-sev", "2.12.0"); DO_TEST_CAPS_VER("launch-security-sev", "6.0.0"); DO_TEST_CAPS_VER("launch-security-sev-missing-platform-info", "2.12.0"); + DO_TEST_CAPS_VER_PARSE_ERROR("launch-security-sev-missing-policy", "2.12.0"); DO_TEST_CAPS_LATEST("vhost-user-fs-fd-memory"); DO_TEST_CAPS_LATEST("vhost-user-fs-hugepages"); -- 2.31.1
Make use of virDomainLaunchSecurity enum. Signed-off-by: Boris Fiuczynski <fiuczy@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Daniel Henrique Barboza <danielhb413@gmail.com> --- src/conf/domain_conf.c | 110 ++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------- 1 file changed, 65 insertions(+), 45 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/conf/domain_conf.c b/src/conf/domain_conf.c index 103bb47566..99414cc4cd 100644 --- a/src/conf/domain_conf.c +++ b/src/conf/domain_conf.c @@ -14732,41 +14732,51 @@ virDomainSEVDefParseXML(xmlNodePtr sevNode, &def->sectype) < 0) return NULL; - if (virXPathULongHex("string(./policy)", ctxt, &policy) < 0) { - virReportError(VIR_ERR_XML_ERROR, "%s", - _("failed to get launch security policy for " - "launch security type SEV")); - return NULL; - } + switch ((virDomainLaunchSecurity) def->sectype) { + case VIR_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_SEV: + if (virXPathULongHex("string(./policy)", ctxt, &policy) < 0) { + virReportError(VIR_ERR_XML_ERROR, "%s", + _("failed to get launch security policy for " + "launch security type SEV")); + return NULL; + } - /* the following attributes are platform dependent and if missing, we can - * autofill them from domain capabilities later - */ - rc = virXPathUInt("string(./cbitpos)", ctxt, &def->cbitpos); - if (rc == 0) { - def->haveCbitpos = true; - } else if (rc == -2) { - virReportError(VIR_ERR_XML_ERROR, "%s", - _("Invalid format for launch security cbitpos")); - return NULL; - } + /* the following attributes are platform dependent and if missing, we can + * autofill them from domain capabilities later + */ + rc = virXPathUInt("string(./cbitpos)", ctxt, &def->cbitpos); + if (rc == 0) { + def->haveCbitpos = true; + } else if (rc == -2) { + virReportError(VIR_ERR_XML_ERROR, "%s", + _("Invalid format for launch security cbitpos")); + return NULL; + } - rc = virXPathUInt("string(./reducedPhysBits)", ctxt, - &def->reduced_phys_bits); - if (rc == 0) { - def->haveReducedPhysBits = true; - } else if (rc == -2) { - virReportError(VIR_ERR_XML_ERROR, "%s", - _("Invalid format for launch security " - "reduced-phys-bits")); - return NULL; - } + rc = virXPathUInt("string(./reducedPhysBits)", ctxt, + &def->reduced_phys_bits); + if (rc == 0) { + def->haveReducedPhysBits = true; + } else if (rc == -2) { + virReportError(VIR_ERR_XML_ERROR, "%s", + _("Invalid format for launch security " + "reduced-phys-bits")); + return NULL; + } - def->policy = policy; - def->dh_cert = virXPathString("string(./dhCert)", ctxt); - def->session = virXPathString("string(./session)", ctxt); + def->policy = policy; + def->dh_cert = virXPathString("string(./dhCert)", ctxt); + def->session = virXPathString("string(./session)", ctxt); - return g_steal_pointer(&def); + return g_steal_pointer(&def); + case VIR_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_NONE: + case VIR_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_LAST: + default: + virReportError(VIR_ERR_XML_ERROR, + _("unsupported launch security type '%s'"), + virDomainLaunchSecurityTypeToString(def->sectype)); + return NULL; + } } @@ -26857,28 +26867,38 @@ virDomainKeyWrapDefFormat(virBuffer *buf, virDomainKeyWrapDef *keywrap) static void virDomainSEVDefFormat(virBuffer *buf, virDomainSEVDef *sev) { + g_auto(virBuffer) attrBuf = VIR_BUFFER_INITIALIZER; + g_auto(virBuffer) childBuf = VIR_BUFFER_INIT_CHILD(buf); + if (!sev) return; - virBufferAsprintf(buf, "<launchSecurity type='%s'>\n", + virBufferAsprintf(&attrBuf, " type='%s'", virDomainLaunchSecurityTypeToString(sev->sectype)); - virBufferAdjustIndent(buf, 2); - if (sev->haveCbitpos) - virBufferAsprintf(buf, "<cbitpos>%d</cbitpos>\n", sev->cbitpos); + switch ((virDomainLaunchSecurity) sev->sectype) { + case VIR_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_SEV: { + if (sev->haveCbitpos) + virBufferAsprintf(&childBuf, "<cbitpos>%d</cbitpos>\n", sev->cbitpos); - if (sev->haveReducedPhysBits) - virBufferAsprintf(buf, "<reducedPhysBits>%d</reducedPhysBits>\n", - sev->reduced_phys_bits); - virBufferAsprintf(buf, "<policy>0x%04x</policy>\n", sev->policy); - if (sev->dh_cert) - virBufferEscapeString(buf, "<dhCert>%s</dhCert>\n", sev->dh_cert); + if (sev->haveReducedPhysBits) + virBufferAsprintf(&childBuf, "<reducedPhysBits>%d</reducedPhysBits>\n", + sev->reduced_phys_bits); + virBufferAsprintf(&childBuf, "<policy>0x%04x</policy>\n", sev->policy); + if (sev->dh_cert) + virBufferEscapeString(&childBuf, "<dhCert>%s</dhCert>\n", sev->dh_cert); - if (sev->session) - virBufferEscapeString(buf, "<session>%s</session>\n", sev->session); + if (sev->session) + virBufferEscapeString(&childBuf, "<session>%s</session>\n", sev->session); - virBufferAdjustIndent(buf, -2); - virBufferAddLit(buf, "</launchSecurity>\n"); + break; + } + case VIR_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_NONE: + case VIR_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_LAST: + return; + } + + virXMLFormatElement(buf, "launchSecurity", &attrBuf, &childBuf); } -- 2.31.1
Expose existing KVMSupportsSecureGuest capability. Signed-off-by: Boris Fiuczynski <fiuczy@linux.ibm.com> --- src/qemu/qemu_capabilities.c | 6 ++++++ src/qemu/qemu_capabilities.h | 3 +++ 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+) diff --git a/src/qemu/qemu_capabilities.c b/src/qemu/qemu_capabilities.c index d1cd8f11ac..328bcc51c9 100644 --- a/src/qemu/qemu_capabilities.c +++ b/src/qemu/qemu_capabilities.c @@ -2136,6 +2136,12 @@ const char *virQEMUCapsGetPackage(virQEMUCaps *qemuCaps) } +bool virQEMUCapsGetKVMSupportsSecureGuest(virQEMUCaps *qemuCaps) +{ + return qemuCaps->kvmSupportsSecureGuest; +} + + int virQEMUCapsAddCPUDefinitions(virQEMUCaps *qemuCaps, virDomainVirtType type, diff --git a/src/qemu/qemu_capabilities.h b/src/qemu/qemu_capabilities.h index 7944b9170a..fd754b9ec4 100644 --- a/src/qemu/qemu_capabilities.h +++ b/src/qemu/qemu_capabilities.h @@ -805,5 +805,8 @@ virQEMUCapsCPUFeatureFromQEMU(virQEMUCaps *qemuCaps, virSEVCapability * virQEMUCapsGetSEVCapabilities(virQEMUCaps *qemuCaps); +bool +virQEMUCapsGetKVMSupportsSecureGuest(virQEMUCaps *qemuCaps) G_GNUC_NO_INLINE; + virArch virQEMUCapsArchFromString(const char *arch); const char *virQEMUCapsArchToString(virArch arch); -- 2.31.1
Adding virDomainSecDef for general launch security data and moving virDomainSEVDef as an element for SEV data. Signed-off-by: Boris Fiuczynski <fiuczy@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Daniel Henrique Barboza <danielhb413@gmail.com> --- src/conf/domain_conf.c | 135 +++++++++++++++++++++--------------- src/conf/domain_conf.h | 16 +++-- src/conf/virconftypes.h | 2 + src/qemu/qemu_cgroup.c | 4 +- src/qemu/qemu_command.c | 47 ++++++++++--- src/qemu/qemu_driver.c | 3 +- src/qemu/qemu_firmware.c | 32 +++++---- src/qemu/qemu_namespace.c | 20 ++++-- src/qemu/qemu_process.c | 34 +++++++-- src/qemu/qemu_validate.c | 22 ++++-- src/security/security_dac.c | 6 +- 11 files changed, 218 insertions(+), 103 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/conf/domain_conf.c b/src/conf/domain_conf.c index 99414cc4cd..5c43bb1ba1 100644 --- a/src/conf/domain_conf.c +++ b/src/conf/domain_conf.c @@ -3491,17 +3491,25 @@ virDomainResctrlDefFree(virDomainResctrlDef *resctrl) void -virDomainSEVDefFree(virDomainSEVDef *def) +virDomainSecDefFree(virDomainSecDef *def) { if (!def) return; - g_free(def->dh_cert); - g_free(def->session); + switch ((virDomainLaunchSecurity) def->sectype) { + case VIR_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_SEV: + g_free(def->data.sev.dh_cert); + g_free(def->data.sev.session); + break; + case VIR_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_NONE: + case VIR_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_LAST: + break; + } g_free(def); } + static void virDomainOSDefClear(virDomainOSDef *os) { @@ -3703,7 +3711,7 @@ void virDomainDefFree(virDomainDef *def) if (def->namespaceData && def->ns.free) (def->ns.free)(def->namespaceData); - virDomainSEVDefFree(def->sev); + virDomainSecDefFree(def->sec); xmlFreeNode(def->metadata); @@ -14714,69 +14722,83 @@ virDomainMemoryTargetDefParseXML(xmlNodePtr node, } -static virDomainSEVDef * -virDomainSEVDefParseXML(xmlNodePtr sevNode, +static int +virDomainSEVDefParseXML(virDomainSEVDef *def, + xmlNodePtr sevNode, xmlXPathContextPtr ctxt) { VIR_XPATH_NODE_AUTORESTORE(ctxt) - g_autoptr(virDomainSEVDef) def = NULL; unsigned long policy; int rc; - def = g_new0(virDomainSEVDef, 1); - ctxt->node = sevNode; - if (virXMLPropEnum(sevNode, "type", virDomainLaunchSecurityTypeFromString, - VIR_XML_PROP_NONZERO | VIR_XML_PROP_REQUIRED, - &def->sectype) < 0) - return NULL; + if (virXPathULongHex("string(./policy)", ctxt, &policy) < 0) { + virReportError(VIR_ERR_XML_ERROR, "%s", + _("failed to get launch security policy for " + "launch security type SEV")); + return -1; + } - switch ((virDomainLaunchSecurity) def->sectype) { - case VIR_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_SEV: - if (virXPathULongHex("string(./policy)", ctxt, &policy) < 0) { - virReportError(VIR_ERR_XML_ERROR, "%s", - _("failed to get launch security policy for " - "launch security type SEV")); - return NULL; - } + /* the following attributes are platform dependent and if missing, we can + * autofill them from domain capabilities later + */ + rc = virXPathUInt("string(./cbitpos)", ctxt, &def->cbitpos); + if (rc == 0) { + def->haveCbitpos = true; + } else if (rc == -2) { + virReportError(VIR_ERR_XML_ERROR, "%s", + _("Invalid format for launch security cbitpos")); + return -1; + } - /* the following attributes are platform dependent and if missing, we can - * autofill them from domain capabilities later - */ - rc = virXPathUInt("string(./cbitpos)", ctxt, &def->cbitpos); - if (rc == 0) { - def->haveCbitpos = true; - } else if (rc == -2) { - virReportError(VIR_ERR_XML_ERROR, "%s", - _("Invalid format for launch security cbitpos")); - return NULL; - } + rc = virXPathUInt("string(./reducedPhysBits)", ctxt, + &def->reduced_phys_bits); + if (rc == 0) { + def->haveReducedPhysBits = true; + } else if (rc == -2) { + virReportError(VIR_ERR_XML_ERROR, "%s", + _("Invalid format for launch security " + "reduced-phys-bits")); + return -1; + } + + def->policy = policy; + def->dh_cert = virXPathString("string(./dhCert)", ctxt); + def->session = virXPathString("string(./session)", ctxt); + + return 0; +} - rc = virXPathUInt("string(./reducedPhysBits)", ctxt, - &def->reduced_phys_bits); - if (rc == 0) { - def->haveReducedPhysBits = true; - } else if (rc == -2) { - virReportError(VIR_ERR_XML_ERROR, "%s", - _("Invalid format for launch security " - "reduced-phys-bits")); - return NULL; - } - def->policy = policy; - def->dh_cert = virXPathString("string(./dhCert)", ctxt); - def->session = virXPathString("string(./session)", ctxt); +static virDomainSecDef * +virDomainSecDefParseXML(xmlNodePtr lsecNode, + xmlXPathContextPtr ctxt) +{ + g_autoptr(virDomainSecDef) sec = g_new0(virDomainSecDef, 1); + + ctxt->node = lsecNode; + + if (virXMLPropEnum(lsecNode, "type", virDomainLaunchSecurityTypeFromString, + VIR_XML_PROP_NONZERO | VIR_XML_PROP_REQUIRED, + &sec->sectype) < 0) + return NULL; - return g_steal_pointer(&def); + switch ((virDomainLaunchSecurity) sec->sectype) { + case VIR_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_SEV: + if (virDomainSEVDefParseXML(&sec->data.sev, lsecNode, ctxt) < 0) + return NULL; + break; case VIR_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_NONE: case VIR_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_LAST: default: virReportError(VIR_ERR_XML_ERROR, _("unsupported launch security type '%s'"), - virDomainLaunchSecurityTypeToString(def->sectype)); + virDomainLaunchSecurityTypeToString(sec->sectype)); return NULL; } + + return g_steal_pointer(&sec); } @@ -20131,10 +20153,10 @@ virDomainDefParseXML(xmlDocPtr xml, ctxt->node = node; VIR_FREE(nodes); - /* Check for SEV feature */ + /* Check for launch security e.g. SEV feature */ if ((node = virXPathNode("./launchSecurity", ctxt)) != NULL) { - def->sev = virDomainSEVDefParseXML(node, ctxt); - if (!def->sev) + def->sec = virDomainSecDefParseXML(node, ctxt); + if (!def->sec) goto error; } @@ -26865,19 +26887,21 @@ virDomainKeyWrapDefFormat(virBuffer *buf, virDomainKeyWrapDef *keywrap) static void -virDomainSEVDefFormat(virBuffer *buf, virDomainSEVDef *sev) +virDomainSecDefFormat(virBuffer *buf, virDomainSecDef *sec) { g_auto(virBuffer) attrBuf = VIR_BUFFER_INITIALIZER; g_auto(virBuffer) childBuf = VIR_BUFFER_INIT_CHILD(buf); - if (!sev) + if (!sec) return; virBufferAsprintf(&attrBuf, " type='%s'", - virDomainLaunchSecurityTypeToString(sev->sectype)); + virDomainLaunchSecurityTypeToString(sec->sectype)); - switch ((virDomainLaunchSecurity) sev->sectype) { + switch ((virDomainLaunchSecurity) sec->sectype) { case VIR_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_SEV: { + virDomainSEVDef *sev = &sec->data.sev; + if (sev->haveCbitpos) virBufferAsprintf(&childBuf, "<cbitpos>%d</cbitpos>\n", sev->cbitpos); @@ -26893,6 +26917,7 @@ virDomainSEVDefFormat(virBuffer *buf, virDomainSEVDef *sev) break; } + case VIR_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_NONE: case VIR_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_LAST: return; @@ -28307,7 +28332,7 @@ virDomainDefFormatInternalSetRootName(virDomainDef *def, if (def->keywrap) virDomainKeyWrapDefFormat(buf, def->keywrap); - virDomainSEVDefFormat(buf, def->sev); + virDomainSecDefFormat(buf, def->sec); if (def->namespaceData && def->ns.format) { if ((def->ns.format)(buf, def->namespaceData) < 0) diff --git a/src/conf/domain_conf.h b/src/conf/domain_conf.h index c31531c93b..afda93b995 100644 --- a/src/conf/domain_conf.h +++ b/src/conf/domain_conf.h @@ -2651,7 +2651,6 @@ typedef enum { struct _virDomainSEVDef { - virDomainLaunchSecurity sectype; char *dh_cert; char *session; unsigned int policy; @@ -2661,8 +2660,15 @@ struct _virDomainSEVDef { unsigned int reduced_phys_bits; }; -void virDomainSEVDefFree(virDomainSEVDef *def); -G_DEFINE_AUTOPTR_CLEANUP_FUNC(virDomainSEVDef, virDomainSEVDefFree); +struct _virDomainSecDef { + virDomainLaunchSecurity sectype; + union { + virDomainSEVDef sev; + } data; +}; + +void virDomainSecDefFree(virDomainSecDef *def); +G_DEFINE_AUTOPTR_CLEANUP_FUNC(virDomainSecDef, virDomainSecDefFree); typedef enum { VIR_DOMAIN_IOMMU_MODEL_INTEL, @@ -2873,8 +2879,8 @@ struct _virDomainDef { virDomainKeyWrapDef *keywrap; - /* SEV-specific domain */ - virDomainSEVDef *sev; + /* launch security e.g. SEV */ + virDomainSecDef *sec; /* Application-specific custom metadata */ xmlNodePtr metadata; diff --git a/src/conf/virconftypes.h b/src/conf/virconftypes.h index b21068486e..21420ba8ea 100644 --- a/src/conf/virconftypes.h +++ b/src/conf/virconftypes.h @@ -202,6 +202,8 @@ typedef struct _virDomainResourceDef virDomainResourceDef; typedef struct _virDomainSEVDef virDomainSEVDef; +typedef struct _virDomainSecDef virDomainSecDef; + typedef struct _virDomainShmemDef virDomainShmemDef; typedef struct _virDomainSmartcardDef virDomainSmartcardDef; diff --git a/src/qemu/qemu_cgroup.c b/src/qemu/qemu_cgroup.c index 038d6478b2..f2d99abcfa 100644 --- a/src/qemu/qemu_cgroup.c +++ b/src/qemu/qemu_cgroup.c @@ -856,7 +856,9 @@ qemuSetupDevicesCgroup(virDomainObj *vm) return -1; } - if (vm->def->sev && qemuSetupSEVCgroup(vm) < 0) + if (vm->def->sec && + vm->def->sec->sectype == VIR_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_SEV && + qemuSetupSEVCgroup(vm) < 0) return -1; return 0; diff --git a/src/qemu/qemu_command.c b/src/qemu/qemu_command.c index 0473e7deaa..27b5145d83 100644 --- a/src/qemu/qemu_command.c +++ b/src/qemu/qemu_command.c @@ -6967,11 +6967,20 @@ qemuBuildMachineCommandLine(virCommand *cmd, if (virQEMUCapsGet(qemuCaps, QEMU_CAPS_LOADPARM)) qemuAppendLoadparmMachineParm(&buf, def); - if (def->sev) { - if (virQEMUCapsGet(qemuCaps, QEMU_CAPS_MACHINE_CONFIDENTAL_GUEST_SUPPORT)) { - virBufferAddLit(&buf, ",confidential-guest-support=sev0"); - } else { - virBufferAddLit(&buf, ",memory-encryption=sev0"); + if (def->sec) { + switch ((virDomainLaunchSecurity) def->sec->sectype) { + case VIR_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_SEV: + if (virQEMUCapsGet(qemuCaps, QEMU_CAPS_MACHINE_CONFIDENTAL_GUEST_SUPPORT)) { + virBufferAddLit(&buf, ",confidential-guest-support=sev0"); + } else { + virBufferAddLit(&buf, ",memory-encryption=sev0"); + } + break; + case VIR_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_NONE: + break; + case VIR_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_LAST: + virReportEnumRangeError(virDomainLaunchSecurity, def->sec->sectype); + return -1; } } @@ -9832,9 +9841,6 @@ qemuBuildSEVCommandLine(virDomainObj *vm, virCommand *cmd, g_autofree char *dhpath = NULL; g_autofree char *sessionpath = NULL; - if (!sev) - return 0; - VIR_DEBUG("policy=0x%x cbitpos=%d reduced_phys_bits=%d", sev->policy, sev->cbitpos, sev->reduced_phys_bits); @@ -9861,6 +9867,29 @@ qemuBuildSEVCommandLine(virDomainObj *vm, virCommand *cmd, return 0; } + +static int +qemuBuildSecCommandLine(virDomainObj *vm, virCommand *cmd, + virDomainSecDef *sec) +{ + if (!sec) + return 0; + + switch ((virDomainLaunchSecurity) sec->sectype) { + case VIR_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_SEV: + return qemuBuildSEVCommandLine(vm, cmd, &sec->data.sev); + break; + case VIR_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_NONE: + break; + case VIR_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_LAST: + virReportEnumRangeError(virDomainLaunchSecurity, sec->sectype); + return -1; + } + + return 0; +} + + static int qemuBuildVMCoreInfoCommandLine(virCommand *cmd, const virDomainDef *def) @@ -10560,7 +10589,7 @@ qemuBuildCommandLine(virQEMUDriver *driver, if (qemuBuildVMCoreInfoCommandLine(cmd, def) < 0) return NULL; - if (qemuBuildSEVCommandLine(vm, cmd, def->sev) < 0) + if (qemuBuildSecCommandLine(vm, cmd, def->sec) < 0) return NULL; if (snapshot) diff --git a/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c b/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c index 235f575901..9973875092 100644 --- a/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c +++ b/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c @@ -19830,7 +19830,8 @@ qemuDomainGetLaunchSecurityInfo(virDomainPtr domain, if (virDomainGetLaunchSecurityInfoEnsureACL(domain->conn, vm->def) < 0) goto cleanup; - if (vm->def->sev) { + if (vm->def->sec && + vm->def->sec->sectype == VIR_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_SEV) { if (qemuDomainGetSEVMeasurement(driver, vm, params, nparams, flags) < 0) goto cleanup; } diff --git a/src/qemu/qemu_firmware.c b/src/qemu/qemu_firmware.c index e17b024b06..6f83ebafe9 100644 --- a/src/qemu/qemu_firmware.c +++ b/src/qemu/qemu_firmware.c @@ -1053,19 +1053,27 @@ qemuFirmwareMatchDomain(const virDomainDef *def, return false; } - if (def->sev && - def->sev->sectype == VIR_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_SEV) { - if (!supportsSEV) { - VIR_DEBUG("Domain requires SEV, firmware '%s' doesn't support it", - path); - return false; - } + if (def->sec) { + switch ((virDomainLaunchSecurity) def->sec->sectype) { + case VIR_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_SEV: + if (!supportsSEV) { + VIR_DEBUG("Domain requires SEV, firmware '%s' doesn't support it", + path); + return false; + } - if (def->sev->policy & VIR_QEMU_FIRMWARE_AMD_SEV_ES_POLICY && - !supportsSEVES) { - VIR_DEBUG("Domain requires SEV-ES, firmware '%s' doesn't support it", - path); - return false; + if (def->sec->data.sev.policy & VIR_QEMU_FIRMWARE_AMD_SEV_ES_POLICY && + !supportsSEVES) { + VIR_DEBUG("Domain requires SEV-ES, firmware '%s' doesn't support it", + path); + return false; + } + break; + case VIR_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_NONE: + break; + case VIR_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_LAST: + virReportEnumRangeError(virDomainLaunchSecurity, def->sec->sectype); + return -1; } } diff --git a/src/qemu/qemu_namespace.c b/src/qemu/qemu_namespace.c index 98495e8ef8..35c8eb83fd 100644 --- a/src/qemu/qemu_namespace.c +++ b/src/qemu/qemu_namespace.c @@ -594,16 +594,26 @@ static int qemuDomainSetupLaunchSecurity(virDomainObj *vm, GSList **paths) { - virDomainSEVDef *sev = vm->def->sev; + virDomainSecDef *sec = vm->def->sec; - if (!sev || sev->sectype != VIR_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_SEV) + if (!sec) return 0; - VIR_DEBUG("Setting up launch security"); + switch ((virDomainLaunchSecurity) sec->sectype) { + case VIR_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_SEV: + VIR_DEBUG("Setting up launch security for SEV"); - *paths = g_slist_prepend(*paths, g_strdup(QEMU_DEV_SEV)); + *paths = g_slist_prepend(*paths, g_strdup(QEMU_DEV_SEV)); + + VIR_DEBUG("Set up launch security for SEV"); + break; + case VIR_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_NONE: + break; + case VIR_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_LAST: + virReportEnumRangeError(virDomainLaunchSecurity, sec->sectype); + return -1; + } - VIR_DEBUG("Set up launch security"); return 0; } diff --git a/src/qemu/qemu_process.c b/src/qemu/qemu_process.c index 2b03b0ab98..6960249bb4 100644 --- a/src/qemu/qemu_process.c +++ b/src/qemu/qemu_process.c @@ -6480,7 +6480,7 @@ qemuProcessUpdateSEVInfo(virDomainObj *vm) { qemuDomainObjPrivate *priv = vm->privateData; virQEMUCaps *qemuCaps = priv->qemuCaps; - virDomainSEVDef *sev = vm->def->sev; + virDomainSEVDef *sev = &vm->def->sec->data.sev; virSEVCapability *sevCaps = NULL; /* if platform specific info like 'cbitpos' and 'reducedPhysBits' have @@ -6636,7 +6636,8 @@ qemuProcessPrepareDomain(virQEMUDriver *driver, for (i = 0; i < vm->def->nshmems; i++) qemuDomainPrepareShmemChardev(vm->def->shmems[i]); - if (vm->def->sev) { + if (vm->def->sec && + vm->def->sec->sectype == VIR_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_SEV) { VIR_DEBUG("Updating SEV platform info"); if (qemuProcessUpdateSEVInfo(vm) < 0) return -1; @@ -6674,10 +6675,7 @@ qemuProcessSEVCreateFile(virDomainObj *vm, static int qemuProcessPrepareSEVGuestInput(virDomainObj *vm) { - virDomainSEVDef *sev = vm->def->sev; - - if (!sev) - return 0; + virDomainSEVDef *sev = &vm->def->sec->data.sev; VIR_DEBUG("Preparing SEV guest"); @@ -6695,6 +6693,28 @@ qemuProcessPrepareSEVGuestInput(virDomainObj *vm) } +static int +qemuProcessPrepareLaunchSecurityGuestInput(virDomainObj *vm) +{ + virDomainSecDef *sec = vm->def->sec; + + if (!sec) + return 0; + + switch ((virDomainLaunchSecurity) sec->sectype) { + case VIR_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_SEV: + return qemuProcessPrepareSEVGuestInput(vm); + case VIR_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_NONE: + break; + case VIR_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_LAST: + virReportEnumRangeError(virDomainLaunchSecurity, sec->sectype); + return -1; + } + + return 0; +} + + static int qemuProcessPrepareHostStorage(virQEMUDriver *driver, virDomainObj *vm, @@ -6874,7 +6894,7 @@ qemuProcessPrepareHost(virQEMUDriver *driver, if (qemuExtDevicesPrepareHost(driver, vm) < 0) return -1; - if (qemuProcessPrepareSEVGuestInput(vm) < 0) + if (qemuProcessPrepareLaunchSecurityGuestInput(vm) < 0) return -1; return 0; diff --git a/src/qemu/qemu_validate.c b/src/qemu/qemu_validate.c index b133ce3cd6..c54c18160e 100644 --- a/src/qemu/qemu_validate.c +++ b/src/qemu/qemu_validate.c @@ -1214,12 +1214,22 @@ qemuValidateDomainDef(const virDomainDef *def, if (qemuValidateDomainDefPanic(def, qemuCaps) < 0) return -1; - if (def->sev && - !virQEMUCapsGet(qemuCaps, QEMU_CAPS_SEV_GUEST)) { - virReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR, "%s", - _("SEV launch security is not supported with " - "this QEMU binary")); - return -1; + if (def->sec) { + switch ((virDomainLaunchSecurity) def->sec->sectype) { + case VIR_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_SEV: + if (!virQEMUCapsGet(qemuCaps, QEMU_CAPS_SEV_GUEST)) { + virReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR, "%s", + _("SEV launch security is not supported with " + "this QEMU binary")); + return -1; + } + break; + case VIR_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_NONE: + break; + case VIR_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_LAST: + virReportEnumRangeError(virDomainLaunchSecurity, def->sec->sectype); + return -1; + } } if (def->naudios > 1 && diff --git a/src/security/security_dac.c b/src/security/security_dac.c index 4909107fcc..b874dd4ab6 100644 --- a/src/security/security_dac.c +++ b/src/security/security_dac.c @@ -1958,7 +1958,8 @@ virSecurityDACRestoreAllLabel(virSecurityManager *mgr, rc = -1; } - if (def->sev) { + if (def->sec && + def->sec->sectype == VIR_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_SEV) { if (virSecurityDACRestoreSEVLabel(mgr, def) < 0) rc = -1; } @@ -2165,7 +2166,8 @@ virSecurityDACSetAllLabel(virSecurityManager *mgr, return -1; } - if (def->sev) { + if (def->sec && + def->sec->sectype == VIR_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_SEV) { if (virSecurityDACSetSEVLabel(mgr, def) < 0) return -1; } -- 2.31.1
Add s390-pv-guest capability. Signed-off-by: Boris Fiuczynski <fiuczy@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Daniel Henrique Barboza <danielhb413@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Pavel Hrdina <phrdina@redhat.com> --- docs/schemas/domaincommon.rng | 1 + src/conf/domain_conf.c | 17 +++++++++ src/conf/domain_conf.h | 1 + src/qemu/qemu_capabilities.c | 2 ++ src/qemu/qemu_capabilities.h | 1 + src/qemu/qemu_command.c | 26 ++++++++++++++ src/qemu/qemu_firmware.c | 1 + src/qemu/qemu_namespace.c | 1 + src/qemu/qemu_process.c | 1 + src/qemu/qemu_validate.c | 10 ++++++ .../launch-security-s390-pv.xml | 18 ++++++++++ tests/genericxml2xmltest.c | 1 + .../qemucapabilitiesdata/caps_6.0.0.s390x.xml | 1 + ...nch-security-s390-pv-fail.s390x-latest.err | 1 + .../launch-security-s390-pv-fail.xml | 33 +++++++++++++++++ .../launch-security-s390-pv.s390x-latest.args | 35 +++++++++++++++++++ .../launch-security-s390-pv.xml | 30 ++++++++++++++++ tests/qemuxml2argvmock.c | 16 +++++++++ tests/qemuxml2argvtest.c | 3 ++ 19 files changed, 199 insertions(+) create mode 100644 tests/genericxml2xmlindata/launch-security-s390-pv.xml create mode 100644 tests/qemuxml2argvdata/launch-security-s390-pv-fail.s390x-latest.err create mode 100644 tests/qemuxml2argvdata/launch-security-s390-pv-fail.xml create mode 100644 tests/qemuxml2argvdata/launch-security-s390-pv.s390x-latest.args create mode 100644 tests/qemuxml2argvdata/launch-security-s390-pv.xml diff --git a/docs/schemas/domaincommon.rng b/docs/schemas/domaincommon.rng index 8c1b6c3a09..b81c51728d 100644 --- a/docs/schemas/domaincommon.rng +++ b/docs/schemas/domaincommon.rng @@ -485,6 +485,7 @@ <attribute name="type"> <choice> <value>sev</value> + <value>s390-pv</value> </choice> </attribute> <interleave> diff --git a/src/conf/domain_conf.c b/src/conf/domain_conf.c index 5c43bb1ba1..f479037d08 100644 --- a/src/conf/domain_conf.c +++ b/src/conf/domain_conf.c @@ -1401,6 +1401,7 @@ VIR_ENUM_IMPL(virDomainLaunchSecurity, VIR_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_LAST, "", "sev", + "s390-pv", ); static virClass *virDomainObjClass; @@ -3501,6 +3502,7 @@ virDomainSecDefFree(virDomainSecDef *def) g_free(def->data.sev.dh_cert); g_free(def->data.sev.session); break; + case VIR_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_PV: case VIR_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_NONE: case VIR_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_LAST: break; @@ -14776,6 +14778,7 @@ virDomainSecDefParseXML(xmlNodePtr lsecNode, xmlXPathContextPtr ctxt) { g_autoptr(virDomainSecDef) sec = g_new0(virDomainSecDef, 1); + int n; ctxt->node = lsecNode; @@ -14789,6 +14792,17 @@ virDomainSecDefParseXML(xmlNodePtr lsecNode, if (virDomainSEVDefParseXML(&sec->data.sev, lsecNode, ctxt) < 0) return NULL; break; + case VIR_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_PV: + if ((n = virXPathNodeSet("./*", ctxt, NULL)) < 0) + return NULL; + if (n != 0) { + virReportError(VIR_ERR_XML_ERROR, + _("launch security type '%s' must be defined " + "without any configuration data"), + virDomainLaunchSecurityTypeToString(sec->sectype)); + return NULL; + } + break; case VIR_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_NONE: case VIR_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_LAST: default: @@ -26918,6 +26932,9 @@ virDomainSecDefFormat(virBuffer *buf, virDomainSecDef *sec) break; } + case VIR_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_PV: + break; + case VIR_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_NONE: case VIR_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_LAST: return; diff --git a/src/conf/domain_conf.h b/src/conf/domain_conf.h index afda93b995..6713dcbe12 100644 --- a/src/conf/domain_conf.h +++ b/src/conf/domain_conf.h @@ -2645,6 +2645,7 @@ struct _virDomainKeyWrapDef { typedef enum { VIR_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_NONE, VIR_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_SEV, + VIR_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_PV, VIR_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_LAST, } virDomainLaunchSecurity; diff --git a/src/qemu/qemu_capabilities.c b/src/qemu/qemu_capabilities.c index 328bcc51c9..69c4f1a592 100644 --- a/src/qemu/qemu_capabilities.c +++ b/src/qemu/qemu_capabilities.c @@ -636,6 +636,7 @@ VIR_ENUM_IMPL(virQEMUCaps, /* 405 */ "confidential-guest-support", "query-display-options", + "s390-pv-guest", ); @@ -1354,6 +1355,7 @@ struct virQEMUCapsStringFlags virQEMUCapsObjectTypes[] = { { "input-linux", QEMU_CAPS_INPUT_LINUX }, { "virtio-gpu-gl-pci", QEMU_CAPS_VIRTIO_GPU_GL_PCI }, { "virtio-vga-gl", QEMU_CAPS_VIRTIO_VGA_GL }, + { "s390-pv-guest", QEMU_CAPS_S390_PV_GUEST }, }; diff --git a/src/qemu/qemu_capabilities.h b/src/qemu/qemu_capabilities.h index fd754b9ec4..f99bb211e0 100644 --- a/src/qemu/qemu_capabilities.h +++ b/src/qemu/qemu_capabilities.h @@ -616,6 +616,7 @@ typedef enum { /* virQEMUCapsFlags grouping marker for syntax-check */ /* 405 */ QEMU_CAPS_MACHINE_CONFIDENTAL_GUEST_SUPPORT, /* -machine confidential-guest-support */ QEMU_CAPS_QUERY_DISPLAY_OPTIONS, /* 'query-display-options' qmp command present */ + QEMU_CAPS_S390_PV_GUEST, /* -object s390-pv-guest,... */ QEMU_CAPS_LAST /* this must always be the last item */ } virQEMUCapsFlags; diff --git a/src/qemu/qemu_command.c b/src/qemu/qemu_command.c index 27b5145d83..87621e8a2f 100644 --- a/src/qemu/qemu_command.c +++ b/src/qemu/qemu_command.c @@ -6976,6 +6976,9 @@ qemuBuildMachineCommandLine(virCommand *cmd, virBufferAddLit(&buf, ",memory-encryption=sev0"); } break; + case VIR_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_PV: + virBufferAddLit(&buf, ",confidential-guest-support=pv0"); + break; case VIR_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_NONE: break; case VIR_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_LAST: @@ -9868,6 +9871,26 @@ qemuBuildSEVCommandLine(virDomainObj *vm, virCommand *cmd, } +static int +qemuBuildPVCommandLine(virDomainObj *vm, virCommand *cmd) +{ + g_autoptr(virJSONValue) props = NULL; + g_auto(virBuffer) buf = VIR_BUFFER_INITIALIZER; + qemuDomainObjPrivate *priv = vm->privateData; + + if (qemuMonitorCreateObjectProps(&props, "s390-pv-guest", "pv0", + NULL) < 0) + return -1; + + if (qemuBuildObjectCommandlineFromJSON(&buf, props, priv->qemuCaps) < 0) + return -1; + + virCommandAddArg(cmd, "-object"); + virCommandAddArgBuffer(cmd, &buf); + return 0; +} + + static int qemuBuildSecCommandLine(virDomainObj *vm, virCommand *cmd, virDomainSecDef *sec) @@ -9879,6 +9902,9 @@ qemuBuildSecCommandLine(virDomainObj *vm, virCommand *cmd, case VIR_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_SEV: return qemuBuildSEVCommandLine(vm, cmd, &sec->data.sev); break; + case VIR_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_PV: + return qemuBuildPVCommandLine(vm, cmd); + break; case VIR_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_NONE: break; case VIR_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_LAST: diff --git a/src/qemu/qemu_firmware.c b/src/qemu/qemu_firmware.c index 6f83ebafe9..77c452746f 100644 --- a/src/qemu/qemu_firmware.c +++ b/src/qemu/qemu_firmware.c @@ -1069,6 +1069,7 @@ qemuFirmwareMatchDomain(const virDomainDef *def, return false; } break; + case VIR_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_PV: case VIR_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_NONE: break; case VIR_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_LAST: diff --git a/src/qemu/qemu_namespace.c b/src/qemu/qemu_namespace.c index 35c8eb83fd..156ee84292 100644 --- a/src/qemu/qemu_namespace.c +++ b/src/qemu/qemu_namespace.c @@ -607,6 +607,7 @@ qemuDomainSetupLaunchSecurity(virDomainObj *vm, VIR_DEBUG("Set up launch security for SEV"); break; + case VIR_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_PV: case VIR_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_NONE: break; case VIR_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_LAST: diff --git a/src/qemu/qemu_process.c b/src/qemu/qemu_process.c index 6960249bb4..308b17cf26 100644 --- a/src/qemu/qemu_process.c +++ b/src/qemu/qemu_process.c @@ -6704,6 +6704,7 @@ qemuProcessPrepareLaunchSecurityGuestInput(virDomainObj *vm) switch ((virDomainLaunchSecurity) sec->sectype) { case VIR_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_SEV: return qemuProcessPrepareSEVGuestInput(vm); + case VIR_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_PV: case VIR_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_NONE: break; case VIR_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_LAST: diff --git a/src/qemu/qemu_validate.c b/src/qemu/qemu_validate.c index c54c18160e..7482bedee6 100644 --- a/src/qemu/qemu_validate.c +++ b/src/qemu/qemu_validate.c @@ -1224,6 +1224,16 @@ qemuValidateDomainDef(const virDomainDef *def, return -1; } break; + case VIR_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_PV: + if (!virQEMUCapsGet(qemuCaps, QEMU_CAPS_MACHINE_CONFIDENTAL_GUEST_SUPPORT) || + !virQEMUCapsGet(qemuCaps, QEMU_CAPS_S390_PV_GUEST) || + !virQEMUCapsGetKVMSupportsSecureGuest(qemuCaps)) { + virReportError(VIR_ERR_CONFIG_UNSUPPORTED, "%s", + _("S390 PV launch security is not supported with " + "this QEMU binary")); + return -1; + } + break; case VIR_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_NONE: break; case VIR_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_LAST: diff --git a/tests/genericxml2xmlindata/launch-security-s390-pv.xml b/tests/genericxml2xmlindata/launch-security-s390-pv.xml new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..29c7fc152d --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/genericxml2xmlindata/launch-security-s390-pv.xml @@ -0,0 +1,18 @@ +<domain type='kvm'> + <name>QEMUGuest1</name> + <uuid>c7a5fdbd-edaf-9455-926a-d65c16db1809</uuid> + <memory unit='KiB'>219100</memory> + <currentMemory unit='KiB'>219100</currentMemory> + <vcpu placement='static'>1</vcpu> + <os> + <type arch='s390x' machine='s390-ccw-virtio'>hvm</type> + <boot dev='hd'/> + </os> + <clock offset='utc'/> + <on_poweroff>destroy</on_poweroff> + <on_reboot>restart</on_reboot> + <on_crash>destroy</on_crash> + <devices> + </devices> + <launchSecurity type='s390-pv'/> +</domain> diff --git a/tests/genericxml2xmltest.c b/tests/genericxml2xmltest.c index ac89422a32..8f817e2cb5 100644 --- a/tests/genericxml2xmltest.c +++ b/tests/genericxml2xmltest.c @@ -233,6 +233,7 @@ mymain(void) DO_TEST("tseg"); DO_TEST("launch-security-sev"); + DO_TEST("launch-security-s390-pv"); DO_TEST_DIFFERENT("cputune"); DO_TEST("device-backenddomain"); diff --git a/tests/qemucapabilitiesdata/caps_6.0.0.s390x.xml b/tests/qemucapabilitiesdata/caps_6.0.0.s390x.xml index 1806c064c9..aae6364e37 100644 --- a/tests/qemucapabilitiesdata/caps_6.0.0.s390x.xml +++ b/tests/qemucapabilitiesdata/caps_6.0.0.s390x.xml @@ -169,6 +169,7 @@ <flag name='input-linux'/> <flag name='confidential-guest-support'/> <flag name='query-display-options'/> + <flag name='s390-pv-guest'/> <version>6000000</version> <kvmVersion>0</kvmVersion> <microcodeVersion>39100242</microcodeVersion> diff --git a/tests/qemuxml2argvdata/launch-security-s390-pv-fail.s390x-latest.err b/tests/qemuxml2argvdata/launch-security-s390-pv-fail.s390x-latest.err new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..f363190917 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/qemuxml2argvdata/launch-security-s390-pv-fail.s390x-latest.err @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +XML error: launch security type 's390-pv' must be defined without any configuration data diff --git a/tests/qemuxml2argvdata/launch-security-s390-pv-fail.xml b/tests/qemuxml2argvdata/launch-security-s390-pv-fail.xml new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..052d96dedb --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/qemuxml2argvdata/launch-security-s390-pv-fail.xml @@ -0,0 +1,33 @@ +<domain type='kvm'> + <name>QEMUGuest1</name> + <uuid>c7a5fdbd-edaf-9455-926a-d65c16db1809</uuid> + <memory unit='KiB'>219100</memory> + <currentMemory unit='KiB'>219100</currentMemory> + <vcpu placement='static'>1</vcpu> + <os> + <type arch='s390x' machine='s390-ccw-virtio'>hvm</type> + <boot dev='hd'/> + </os> + <clock offset='utc'/> + <on_poweroff>destroy</on_poweroff> + <on_reboot>restart</on_reboot> + <on_crash>destroy</on_crash> + <devices> + <emulator>/usr/bin/qemu-system-s390x</emulator> + <disk type='block' device='disk'> + <driver name='qemu' type='raw'/> + <source dev='/dev/HostVG/QEMUGuest1'/> + <target dev='hda' bus='virtio'/> + <address type='ccw' cssid='0xfe' ssid='0x0' devno='0x0000'/> + </disk> + <controller type='pci' index='0' model='pci-root'/> + <memballoon model='virtio'> + <address type='ccw' cssid='0xfe' ssid='0x0' devno='0x0001'/> + </memballoon> + <panic model='s390'/> + </devices> + <launchSecurity type='s390-pv'> + <dhCert>AQAAAAAOAAAAQAAAAAOAAAAQAAAAAOAAAAQAAAAAOAAAAQAAAAAOAAA</dhCert> + <session>IHAVENOIDEABUTJUSTPROVIDINGASTRING</session> + </launchSecurity> +</domain> diff --git a/tests/qemuxml2argvdata/launch-security-s390-pv.s390x-latest.args b/tests/qemuxml2argvdata/launch-security-s390-pv.s390x-latest.args new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..c9d9b84dd3 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/qemuxml2argvdata/launch-security-s390-pv.s390x-latest.args @@ -0,0 +1,35 @@ +LC_ALL=C \ +PATH=/bin \ +HOME=/tmp/lib/domain--1-QEMUGuest1 \ +USER=test \ +LOGNAME=test \ +XDG_DATA_HOME=/tmp/lib/domain--1-QEMUGuest1/.local/share \ +XDG_CACHE_HOME=/tmp/lib/domain--1-QEMUGuest1/.cache \ +XDG_CONFIG_HOME=/tmp/lib/domain--1-QEMUGuest1/.config \ +/usr/bin/qemu-system-s390x \ +-name guest=QEMUGuest1,debug-threads=on \ +-S \ +-object '{"qom-type":"secret","id":"masterKey0","format":"raw","file":"/tmp/lib/domain--1-QEMUGuest1/master-key.aes"}' \ +-machine s390-ccw-virtio,accel=kvm,usb=off,dump-guest-core=off,confidential-guest-support=pv0,memory-backend=s390.ram \ +-cpu gen15a-base,aen=on,cmmnt=on,vxpdeh=on,aefsi=on,diag318=on,csske=on,mepoch=on,msa9=on,msa8=on,msa7=on,msa6=on,msa5=on,msa4=on,msa3=on,msa2=on,msa1=on,sthyi=on,edat=on,ri=on,deflate=on,edat2=on,etoken=on,vx=on,ipter=on,mepochptff=on,ap=on,vxeh=on,vxpd=on,esop=on,msa9_pckmo=on,vxeh2=on,esort=on,apqi=on,apft=on,els=on,iep=on,apqci=on,cte=on,ais=on,bpb=on,gs=on,ppa15=on,zpci=on,sea_esop2=on,te=on,cmm=on \ +-m 214 \ +-object '{"qom-type":"memory-backend-ram","id":"s390.ram","size":224395264}' \ +-overcommit mem-lock=off \ +-smp 1,sockets=1,cores=1,threads=1 \ +-uuid c7a5fdbd-edaf-9455-926a-d65c16db1809 \ +-display none \ +-no-user-config \ +-nodefaults \ +-chardev socket,id=charmonitor,fd=1729,server=on,wait=off \ +-mon chardev=charmonitor,id=monitor,mode=control \ +-rtc base=utc \ +-no-shutdown \ +-boot strict=on \ +-blockdev '{"driver":"host_device","filename":"/dev/HostVG/QEMUGuest1","node-name":"libvirt-1-storage","auto-read-only":true,"discard":"unmap"}' \ +-blockdev '{"node-name":"libvirt-1-format","read-only":false,"driver":"raw","file":"libvirt-1-storage"}' \ +-device virtio-blk-ccw,devno=fe.0.0000,drive=libvirt-1-format,id=virtio-disk0,bootindex=1 \ +-audiodev id=audio1,driver=none \ +-device virtio-balloon-ccw,id=balloon0,devno=fe.0.0001 \ +-object '{"qom-type":"s390-pv-guest","id":"pv0"}' \ +-sandbox on,obsolete=deny,elevateprivileges=deny,spawn=deny,resourcecontrol=deny \ +-msg timestamp=on diff --git a/tests/qemuxml2argvdata/launch-security-s390-pv.xml b/tests/qemuxml2argvdata/launch-security-s390-pv.xml new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..c40c2b4bf2 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/qemuxml2argvdata/launch-security-s390-pv.xml @@ -0,0 +1,30 @@ +<domain type='kvm'> + <name>QEMUGuest1</name> + <uuid>c7a5fdbd-edaf-9455-926a-d65c16db1809</uuid> + <memory unit='KiB'>219100</memory> + <currentMemory unit='KiB'>219100</currentMemory> + <vcpu placement='static'>1</vcpu> + <os> + <type arch='s390x' machine='s390-ccw-virtio'>hvm</type> + <boot dev='hd'/> + </os> + <clock offset='utc'/> + <on_poweroff>destroy</on_poweroff> + <on_reboot>restart</on_reboot> + <on_crash>destroy</on_crash> + <devices> + <emulator>/usr/bin/qemu-system-s390x</emulator> + <disk type='block' device='disk'> + <driver name='qemu' type='raw'/> + <source dev='/dev/HostVG/QEMUGuest1'/> + <target dev='hda' bus='virtio'/> + <address type='ccw' cssid='0xfe' ssid='0x0' devno='0x0000'/> + </disk> + <controller type='pci' index='0' model='pci-root'/> + <memballoon model='virtio'> + <address type='ccw' cssid='0xfe' ssid='0x0' devno='0x0001'/> + </memballoon> + <panic model='s390'/> + </devices> + <launchSecurity type='s390-pv'/> +</domain> diff --git a/tests/qemuxml2argvmock.c b/tests/qemuxml2argvmock.c index 2265492f1e..d7f77eabf7 100644 --- a/tests/qemuxml2argvmock.c +++ b/tests/qemuxml2argvmock.c @@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ #include "virutil.h" #include "qemu/qemu_interface.h" #include "qemu/qemu_command.h" +#include "qemu/qemu_capabilities.h" #include <time.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <fcntl.h> @@ -301,3 +302,18 @@ virIdentityEnsureSystemToken(void) { return g_strdup("3de80bcbf22d4833897f1638e01be9b2"); } + +static bool (*real_virQEMUCapsGetKVMSupportsSecureGuest)(virQEMUCaps *qemuCaps); + +bool +virQEMUCapsGetKVMSupportsSecureGuest(virQEMUCaps *qemuCaps) +{ + if (virQEMUCapsGet(qemuCaps, QEMU_CAPS_MACHINE_CONFIDENTAL_GUEST_SUPPORT) && + virQEMUCapsGet(qemuCaps, QEMU_CAPS_S390_PV_GUEST)) + return true; + + if (!real_virQEMUCapsGetKVMSupportsSecureGuest) + VIR_MOCK_REAL_INIT(virQEMUCapsGetKVMSupportsSecureGuest); + + return real_virQEMUCapsGetKVMSupportsSecureGuest(qemuCaps); +} diff --git a/tests/qemuxml2argvtest.c b/tests/qemuxml2argvtest.c index 8d32aa7341..47182e0110 100644 --- a/tests/qemuxml2argvtest.c +++ b/tests/qemuxml2argvtest.c @@ -3470,6 +3470,9 @@ mymain(void) DO_TEST_CAPS_VER("launch-security-sev-missing-platform-info", "2.12.0"); DO_TEST_CAPS_VER_PARSE_ERROR("launch-security-sev-missing-policy", "2.12.0"); + DO_TEST_CAPS_ARCH_LATEST("launch-security-s390-pv", "s390x"); + DO_TEST_CAPS_ARCH_LATEST_PARSE_ERROR("launch-security-s390-pv-fail", "s390x"); + DO_TEST_CAPS_LATEST("vhost-user-fs-fd-memory"); DO_TEST_CAPS_LATEST("vhost-user-fs-hugepages"); DO_TEST_CAPS_LATEST_PARSE_ERROR("vhost-user-fs-readonly"); -- 2.31.1
Adding availability of s390-pv in domain capabilities and adjust tests. Signed-off-by: Boris Fiuczynski <fiuczy@linux.ibm.com> --- docs/schemas/domaincaps.rng | 9 +++++++++ src/conf/domain_capabilities.c | 1 + src/conf/domain_capabilities.h | 1 + src/qemu/qemu_capabilities.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++ tests/domaincapsdata/qemu_2.11.0.s390x.xml | 1 + tests/domaincapsdata/qemu_2.12.0.s390x.xml | 1 + tests/domaincapsdata/qemu_3.0.0.s390x.xml | 1 + tests/domaincapsdata/qemu_4.0.0.s390x.xml | 1 + tests/domaincapsdata/qemu_4.2.0.s390x.xml | 1 + tests/domaincapsdata/qemu_5.2.0.s390x.xml | 1 + tests/domaincapsdata/qemu_6.0.0.s390x.xml | 1 + tests/domaincapsmock.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++ 12 files changed, 51 insertions(+) diff --git a/docs/schemas/domaincaps.rng b/docs/schemas/domaincaps.rng index fc668e0c78..d7ee60dd16 100644 --- a/docs/schemas/domaincaps.rng +++ b/docs/schemas/domaincaps.rng @@ -247,6 +247,9 @@ <optional> <ref name="backup"/> </optional> + <optional> + <ref name="s390-pv"/> + </optional> <optional> <ref name="sev"/> </optional> @@ -284,6 +287,12 @@ </element> </define> + <define name="s390-pv"> + <element name="s390-pv"> + <ref name="supported"/> + </element> + </define> + <define name="sev"> <element name="sev"> <ref name="supported"/> diff --git a/src/conf/domain_capabilities.c b/src/conf/domain_capabilities.c index cb90ae0176..83d3320980 100644 --- a/src/conf/domain_capabilities.c +++ b/src/conf/domain_capabilities.c @@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ VIR_ENUM_IMPL(virDomainCapsFeature, "genid", "backingStoreInput", "backup", + "s390-pv", ); static virClass *virDomainCapsClass; diff --git a/src/conf/domain_capabilities.h b/src/conf/domain_capabilities.h index b6433b20c9..34b9b8a693 100644 --- a/src/conf/domain_capabilities.h +++ b/src/conf/domain_capabilities.h @@ -179,6 +179,7 @@ typedef enum { VIR_DOMAIN_CAPS_FEATURE_GENID, VIR_DOMAIN_CAPS_FEATURE_BACKING_STORE_INPUT, VIR_DOMAIN_CAPS_FEATURE_BACKUP, + VIR_DOMAIN_CAPS_FEATURE_S390_PV, VIR_DOMAIN_CAPS_FEATURE_LAST } virDomainCapsFeature; diff --git a/src/qemu/qemu_capabilities.c b/src/qemu/qemu_capabilities.c index 69c4f1a592..0d93cc2052 100644 --- a/src/qemu/qemu_capabilities.c +++ b/src/qemu/qemu_capabilities.c @@ -6315,6 +6315,21 @@ virQEMUCapsFillDomainFeatureSEVCaps(virQEMUCaps *qemuCaps, } +static void +virQEMUCapsFillDomainFeatureS390PVCaps(virQEMUCaps *qemuCaps, + virDomainCaps *domCaps) +{ + if (ARCH_IS_S390(qemuCaps->arch)) { + if (virQEMUCapsGet(qemuCaps, QEMU_CAPS_MACHINE_CONFIDENTAL_GUEST_SUPPORT) && + virQEMUCapsGet(qemuCaps, QEMU_CAPS_S390_PV_GUEST) && + virQEMUCapsGetKVMSupportsSecureGuest(qemuCaps)) + domCaps->features[VIR_DOMAIN_CAPS_FEATURE_S390_PV] = VIR_TRISTATE_BOOL_YES; + else + domCaps->features[VIR_DOMAIN_CAPS_FEATURE_S390_PV] = VIR_TRISTATE_BOOL_NO; + } +} + + int virQEMUCapsFillDomainCaps(virQEMUCaps *qemuCaps, virArch hostarch, @@ -6361,6 +6376,7 @@ virQEMUCapsFillDomainCaps(virQEMUCaps *qemuCaps, virQEMUCapsFillDomainDeviceFSCaps(qemuCaps, filesystem); virQEMUCapsFillDomainFeatureGICCaps(qemuCaps, domCaps); virQEMUCapsFillDomainFeatureSEVCaps(qemuCaps, domCaps); + virQEMUCapsFillDomainFeatureS390PVCaps(qemuCaps, domCaps); return 0; } diff --git a/tests/domaincapsdata/qemu_2.11.0.s390x.xml b/tests/domaincapsdata/qemu_2.11.0.s390x.xml index cd3ab38bc4..be2f0c6c66 100644 --- a/tests/domaincapsdata/qemu_2.11.0.s390x.xml +++ b/tests/domaincapsdata/qemu_2.11.0.s390x.xml @@ -206,6 +206,7 @@ <genid supported='no'/> <backingStoreInput supported='no'/> <backup supported='no'/> + <s390-pv supported='no'/> <sev supported='no'/> </features> </domainCapabilities> diff --git a/tests/domaincapsdata/qemu_2.12.0.s390x.xml b/tests/domaincapsdata/qemu_2.12.0.s390x.xml index 418db98294..55da03d928 100644 --- a/tests/domaincapsdata/qemu_2.12.0.s390x.xml +++ b/tests/domaincapsdata/qemu_2.12.0.s390x.xml @@ -205,6 +205,7 @@ <genid supported='no'/> <backingStoreInput supported='no'/> <backup supported='no'/> + <s390-pv supported='no'/> <sev supported='no'/> </features> </domainCapabilities> diff --git a/tests/domaincapsdata/qemu_3.0.0.s390x.xml b/tests/domaincapsdata/qemu_3.0.0.s390x.xml index d4443bde20..3440c4d936 100644 --- a/tests/domaincapsdata/qemu_3.0.0.s390x.xml +++ b/tests/domaincapsdata/qemu_3.0.0.s390x.xml @@ -212,6 +212,7 @@ <genid supported='no'/> <backingStoreInput supported='no'/> <backup supported='no'/> + <s390-pv supported='no'/> <sev supported='no'/> </features> </domainCapabilities> diff --git a/tests/domaincapsdata/qemu_4.0.0.s390x.xml b/tests/domaincapsdata/qemu_4.0.0.s390x.xml index e0ff109ead..1d3b5465d1 100644 --- a/tests/domaincapsdata/qemu_4.0.0.s390x.xml +++ b/tests/domaincapsdata/qemu_4.0.0.s390x.xml @@ -222,6 +222,7 @@ <genid supported='no'/> <backingStoreInput supported='no'/> <backup supported='no'/> + <s390-pv supported='no'/> <sev supported='no'/> </features> </domainCapabilities> diff --git a/tests/domaincapsdata/qemu_4.2.0.s390x.xml b/tests/domaincapsdata/qemu_4.2.0.s390x.xml index a610c417f7..1719cc49a8 100644 --- a/tests/domaincapsdata/qemu_4.2.0.s390x.xml +++ b/tests/domaincapsdata/qemu_4.2.0.s390x.xml @@ -237,6 +237,7 @@ <genid supported='no'/> <backingStoreInput supported='yes'/> <backup supported='no'/> + <s390-pv supported='no'/> <sev supported='no'/> </features> </domainCapabilities> diff --git a/tests/domaincapsdata/qemu_5.2.0.s390x.xml b/tests/domaincapsdata/qemu_5.2.0.s390x.xml index 43905a6a85..876cb8b2f8 100644 --- a/tests/domaincapsdata/qemu_5.2.0.s390x.xml +++ b/tests/domaincapsdata/qemu_5.2.0.s390x.xml @@ -239,6 +239,7 @@ <genid supported='no'/> <backingStoreInput supported='yes'/> <backup supported='no'/> + <s390-pv supported='no'/> <sev supported='no'/> </features> </domainCapabilities> diff --git a/tests/domaincapsdata/qemu_6.0.0.s390x.xml b/tests/domaincapsdata/qemu_6.0.0.s390x.xml index d384f0859b..5f2278b57e 100644 --- a/tests/domaincapsdata/qemu_6.0.0.s390x.xml +++ b/tests/domaincapsdata/qemu_6.0.0.s390x.xml @@ -240,6 +240,7 @@ <genid supported='no'/> <backingStoreInput supported='yes'/> <backup supported='no'/> + <s390-pv supported='yes'/> <sev supported='no'/> </features> </domainCapabilities> diff --git a/tests/domaincapsmock.c b/tests/domaincapsmock.c index b03f75199b..7b02c0e890 100644 --- a/tests/domaincapsmock.c +++ b/tests/domaincapsmock.c @@ -17,6 +17,8 @@ #include <config.h> #include "virhostcpu.h" +#include "virmock.h" +#include "qemu/qemu_capabilities.h" int virHostCPUGetKVMMaxVCPUs(void) @@ -29,3 +31,18 @@ virHostCPUGetMicrocodeVersion(virArch hostArch G_GNUC_UNUSED) { return 0; } + +static bool (*real_virQEMUCapsGetKVMSupportsSecureGuest)(virQEMUCaps *qemuCaps); + +bool +virQEMUCapsGetKVMSupportsSecureGuest(virQEMUCaps *qemuCaps) +{ + if (virQEMUCapsGet(qemuCaps, QEMU_CAPS_MACHINE_CONFIDENTAL_GUEST_SUPPORT) && + virQEMUCapsGet(qemuCaps, QEMU_CAPS_S390_PV_GUEST)) + return true; + + if (!real_virQEMUCapsGetKVMSupportsSecureGuest) + VIR_MOCK_REAL_INIT(virQEMUCapsGetKVMSupportsSecureGuest); + + return real_virQEMUCapsGetKVMSupportsSecureGuest(qemuCaps); +} -- 2.31.1
Use the common id 'lsec0' for all launchSecurity types in the QEMU command line construction. Signed-off-by: Boris Fiuczynski <fiuczy@linux.ibm.com> --- src/qemu/qemu_command.c | 10 +++++----- .../launch-security-s390-pv.s390x-latest.args | 4 ++-- ...curity-sev-missing-platform-info.x86_64-2.12.0.args | 4 ++-- .../launch-security-sev.x86_64-2.12.0.args | 4 ++-- .../launch-security-sev.x86_64-6.0.0.args | 4 ++-- 5 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/qemu/qemu_command.c b/src/qemu/qemu_command.c index 87621e8a2f..3c03ca8cdb 100644 --- a/src/qemu/qemu_command.c +++ b/src/qemu/qemu_command.c @@ -6971,13 +6971,13 @@ qemuBuildMachineCommandLine(virCommand *cmd, switch ((virDomainLaunchSecurity) def->sec->sectype) { case VIR_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_SEV: if (virQEMUCapsGet(qemuCaps, QEMU_CAPS_MACHINE_CONFIDENTAL_GUEST_SUPPORT)) { - virBufferAddLit(&buf, ",confidential-guest-support=sev0"); + virBufferAddLit(&buf, ",confidential-guest-support=lsec0"); } else { - virBufferAddLit(&buf, ",memory-encryption=sev0"); + virBufferAddLit(&buf, ",memory-encryption=lsec0"); } break; case VIR_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_PV: - virBufferAddLit(&buf, ",confidential-guest-support=pv0"); + virBufferAddLit(&buf, ",confidential-guest-support=lsec0"); break; case VIR_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_NONE: break; @@ -9853,7 +9853,7 @@ qemuBuildSEVCommandLine(virDomainObj *vm, virCommand *cmd, if (sev->session) sessionpath = g_strdup_printf("%s/session.base64", priv->libDir); - if (qemuMonitorCreateObjectProps(&props, "sev-guest", "sev0", + if (qemuMonitorCreateObjectProps(&props, "sev-guest", "lsec0", "u:cbitpos", sev->cbitpos, "u:reduced-phys-bits", sev->reduced_phys_bits, "u:policy", sev->policy, @@ -9878,7 +9878,7 @@ qemuBuildPVCommandLine(virDomainObj *vm, virCommand *cmd) g_auto(virBuffer) buf = VIR_BUFFER_INITIALIZER; qemuDomainObjPrivate *priv = vm->privateData; - if (qemuMonitorCreateObjectProps(&props, "s390-pv-guest", "pv0", + if (qemuMonitorCreateObjectProps(&props, "s390-pv-guest", "lsec0", NULL) < 0) return -1; diff --git a/tests/qemuxml2argvdata/launch-security-s390-pv.s390x-latest.args b/tests/qemuxml2argvdata/launch-security-s390-pv.s390x-latest.args index c9d9b84dd3..cb0dac0149 100644 --- a/tests/qemuxml2argvdata/launch-security-s390-pv.s390x-latest.args +++ b/tests/qemuxml2argvdata/launch-security-s390-pv.s390x-latest.args @@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ XDG_CONFIG_HOME=/tmp/lib/domain--1-QEMUGuest1/.config \ -name guest=QEMUGuest1,debug-threads=on \ -S \ -object '{"qom-type":"secret","id":"masterKey0","format":"raw","file":"/tmp/lib/domain--1-QEMUGuest1/master-key.aes"}' \ --machine s390-ccw-virtio,accel=kvm,usb=off,dump-guest-core=off,confidential-guest-support=pv0,memory-backend=s390.ram \ +-machine s390-ccw-virtio,accel=kvm,usb=off,dump-guest-core=off,confidential-guest-support=lsec0,memory-backend=s390.ram \ -cpu gen15a-base,aen=on,cmmnt=on,vxpdeh=on,aefsi=on,diag318=on,csske=on,mepoch=on,msa9=on,msa8=on,msa7=on,msa6=on,msa5=on,msa4=on,msa3=on,msa2=on,msa1=on,sthyi=on,edat=on,ri=on,deflate=on,edat2=on,etoken=on,vx=on,ipter=on,mepochptff=on,ap=on,vxeh=on,vxpd=on,esop=on,msa9_pckmo=on,vxeh2=on,esort=on,apqi=on,apft=on,els=on,iep=on,apqci=on,cte=on,ais=on,bpb=on,gs=on,ppa15=on,zpci=on,sea_esop2=on,te=on,cmm=on \ -m 214 \ -object '{"qom-type":"memory-backend-ram","id":"s390.ram","size":224395264}' \ @@ -30,6 +30,6 @@ XDG_CONFIG_HOME=/tmp/lib/domain--1-QEMUGuest1/.config \ -device virtio-blk-ccw,devno=fe.0.0000,drive=libvirt-1-format,id=virtio-disk0,bootindex=1 \ -audiodev id=audio1,driver=none \ -device virtio-balloon-ccw,id=balloon0,devno=fe.0.0001 \ --object '{"qom-type":"s390-pv-guest","id":"pv0"}' \ +-object '{"qom-type":"s390-pv-guest","id":"lsec0"}' \ -sandbox on,obsolete=deny,elevateprivileges=deny,spawn=deny,resourcecontrol=deny \ -msg timestamp=on diff --git a/tests/qemuxml2argvdata/launch-security-sev-missing-platform-info.x86_64-2.12.0.args b/tests/qemuxml2argvdata/launch-security-sev-missing-platform-info.x86_64-2.12.0.args index 4e281e2e59..daa271c35c 100644 --- a/tests/qemuxml2argvdata/launch-security-sev-missing-platform-info.x86_64-2.12.0.args +++ b/tests/qemuxml2argvdata/launch-security-sev-missing-platform-info.x86_64-2.12.0.args @@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ QEMU_AUDIO_DRV=none \ -name guest=QEMUGuest1,debug-threads=on \ -S \ -object secret,id=masterKey0,format=raw,file=/tmp/lib/domain--1-QEMUGuest1/master-key.aes \ --machine pc-1.0,accel=kvm,usb=off,dump-guest-core=off,memory-encryption=sev0 \ +-machine pc-1.0,accel=kvm,usb=off,dump-guest-core=off,memory-encryption=lsec0 \ -m 214 \ -realtime mlock=off \ -smp 1,sockets=1,cores=1,threads=1 \ @@ -28,6 +28,6 @@ QEMU_AUDIO_DRV=none \ -device piix3-usb-uhci,id=usb,bus=pci.0,addr=0x1.0x2 \ -drive file=/dev/HostVG/QEMUGuest1,format=raw,if=none,id=drive-ide0-0-0 \ -device ide-hd,bus=ide.0,unit=0,drive=drive-ide0-0-0,id=ide0-0-0,bootindex=1 \ --object sev-guest,id=sev0,cbitpos=47,reduced-phys-bits=1,policy=1,dh-cert-file=/tmp/lib/domain--1-QEMUGuest1/dh_cert.base64,session-file=/tmp/lib/domain--1-QEMUGuest1/session.base64 \ +-object sev-guest,id=lsec0,cbitpos=47,reduced-phys-bits=1,policy=1,dh-cert-file=/tmp/lib/domain--1-QEMUGuest1/dh_cert.base64,session-file=/tmp/lib/domain--1-QEMUGuest1/session.base64 \ -sandbox on,obsolete=deny,elevateprivileges=deny,spawn=deny,resourcecontrol=deny \ -msg timestamp=on diff --git a/tests/qemuxml2argvdata/launch-security-sev.x86_64-2.12.0.args b/tests/qemuxml2argvdata/launch-security-sev.x86_64-2.12.0.args index 40f79d377b..818d29be9f 100644 --- a/tests/qemuxml2argvdata/launch-security-sev.x86_64-2.12.0.args +++ b/tests/qemuxml2argvdata/launch-security-sev.x86_64-2.12.0.args @@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ QEMU_AUDIO_DRV=none \ -name guest=QEMUGuest1,debug-threads=on \ -S \ -object secret,id=masterKey0,format=raw,file=/tmp/lib/domain--1-QEMUGuest1/master-key.aes \ --machine pc-i440fx-2.12,accel=kvm,usb=off,dump-guest-core=off,memory-encryption=sev0 \ +-machine pc-i440fx-2.12,accel=kvm,usb=off,dump-guest-core=off,memory-encryption=lsec0 \ -m 214 \ -realtime mlock=off \ -smp 1,sockets=1,cores=1,threads=1 \ @@ -28,6 +28,6 @@ QEMU_AUDIO_DRV=none \ -device piix3-usb-uhci,id=usb,bus=pci.0,addr=0x1.0x2 \ -drive file=/dev/HostVG/QEMUGuest1,format=raw,if=none,id=drive-ide0-0-0 \ -device ide-hd,bus=ide.0,unit=0,drive=drive-ide0-0-0,id=ide0-0-0,bootindex=1 \ --object sev-guest,id=sev0,cbitpos=47,reduced-phys-bits=1,policy=1,dh-cert-file=/tmp/lib/domain--1-QEMUGuest1/dh_cert.base64,session-file=/tmp/lib/domain--1-QEMUGuest1/session.base64 \ +-object sev-guest,id=lsec0,cbitpos=47,reduced-phys-bits=1,policy=1,dh-cert-file=/tmp/lib/domain--1-QEMUGuest1/dh_cert.base64,session-file=/tmp/lib/domain--1-QEMUGuest1/session.base64 \ -sandbox on,obsolete=deny,elevateprivileges=deny,spawn=deny,resourcecontrol=deny \ -msg timestamp=on diff --git a/tests/qemuxml2argvdata/launch-security-sev.x86_64-6.0.0.args b/tests/qemuxml2argvdata/launch-security-sev.x86_64-6.0.0.args index f3330719dd..f2bb147a14 100644 --- a/tests/qemuxml2argvdata/launch-security-sev.x86_64-6.0.0.args +++ b/tests/qemuxml2argvdata/launch-security-sev.x86_64-6.0.0.args @@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ XDG_CONFIG_HOME=/tmp/lib/domain--1-QEMUGuest1/.config \ -name guest=QEMUGuest1,debug-threads=on \ -S \ -object '{"qom-type":"secret","id":"masterKey0","format":"raw","file":"/tmp/lib/domain--1-QEMUGuest1/master-key.aes"}' \ --machine pc-i440fx-6.0,accel=kvm,usb=off,dump-guest-core=off,confidential-guest-support=sev0,memory-backend=pc.ram \ +-machine pc-i440fx-6.0,accel=kvm,usb=off,dump-guest-core=off,confidential-guest-support=lsec0,memory-backend=pc.ram \ -cpu qemu64 \ -m 214 \ -object '{"qom-type":"memory-backend-ram","id":"pc.ram","size":224395264}' \ @@ -31,6 +31,6 @@ XDG_CONFIG_HOME=/tmp/lib/domain--1-QEMUGuest1/.config \ -blockdev '{"node-name":"libvirt-1-format","read-only":false,"driver":"raw","file":"libvirt-1-storage"}' \ -device ide-hd,bus=ide.0,unit=0,drive=libvirt-1-format,id=ide0-0-0,bootindex=1 \ -audiodev id=audio1,driver=none \ --object '{"qom-type":"sev-guest","id":"sev0","cbitpos":47,"reduced-phys-bits":1,"policy":1,"dh-cert-file":"/tmp/lib/domain--1-QEMUGuest1/dh_cert.base64","session-file":"/tmp/lib/domain--1-QEMUGuest1/session.base64"}' \ +-object '{"qom-type":"sev-guest","id":"lsec0","cbitpos":47,"reduced-phys-bits":1,"policy":1,"dh-cert-file":"/tmp/lib/domain--1-QEMUGuest1/dh_cert.base64","session-file":"/tmp/lib/domain--1-QEMUGuest1/session.base64"}' \ -sandbox on,obsolete=deny,elevateprivileges=deny,spawn=deny,resourcecontrol=deny \ -msg timestamp=on -- 2.31.1
Add documentation for launch security type s390-pv. Signed-off-by: Boris Fiuczynski <fiuczy@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Daniel Henrique Barboza <danielhb413@gmail.com> --- docs/formatdomain.rst | 7 ++++ docs/kbase/s390_protected_virt.rst | 55 +++++++++++++++++++++++++----- 2 files changed, 54 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/docs/formatdomain.rst b/docs/formatdomain.rst index 25e6bf73ba..4c3c24d9df 100644 --- a/docs/formatdomain.rst +++ b/docs/formatdomain.rst @@ -8081,6 +8081,13 @@ Note: DEA/TDEA is synonymous with DES/TDES. Launch Security --------------- +Specifying ``<launchSecurity type='s390-pv'\>`` in a s390 domain prepares +the guest to run in protected virtualization secure mode, also known as +IBM Secure Execution. For more required host and guest preparation steps, see +`Protected Virtualization on s390 <kbase/s390_protected_virt.html>`__ +:since:`Since 7.6.0` + + The contents of the ``<launchSecurity type='sev'>`` element is used to provide the guest owners input used for creating an encrypted VM using the AMD SEV feature (Secure Encrypted Virtualization). SEV is an extension to the AMD-V diff --git a/docs/kbase/s390_protected_virt.rst b/docs/kbase/s390_protected_virt.rst index 1718a556d4..4cbdeea7ed 100644 --- a/docs/kbase/s390_protected_virt.rst +++ b/docs/kbase/s390_protected_virt.rst @@ -127,10 +127,13 @@ Protected virtualization guests support I/O using virtio devices. As the virtio data structures of secure guests are not accessible by the host, it is necessary to use shared memory ('bounce buffers'). -To enable virtio devices to use shared buffers, it is necessary -to configure them with platform_iommu enabled. This can done by adding -``iommu='on'`` to the driver element of a virtio device definition in the -guest's XML, e.g. +Since libvirt 7.6.0 the +`<launchSecurity> <https://libvirt.org/formatdomain.html#launchSecurity>`__ +element with type ``s390-pv`` should be used on protected virtualization guests. +Without ``launchSecurity`` you must enable all virtio devices to use shared +buffers by configuring them with platform_iommu enabled. +This can done by adding ``iommu='on'`` to the driver element of a virtio +device definition in the guest's XML, e.g. :: @@ -140,8 +143,10 @@ guest's XML, e.g. <driver name='vhost' iommu='on'/> </interface> -It is mandatory to define all virtio bus devices in this way to -prevent the host from attempting to access protected memory. +Unless you are using ``launchSecurity`` you must define all virtio bus +devices in this way to prevent the host from attempting to access +protected memory. + Ballooning will not work and is fenced by QEMU. It should be disabled by specifying @@ -158,8 +163,42 @@ allocated 2K entries. A commonly used value for swiotlb is 262144. Example guest definition ======================== -Minimal domain XML for a protected virtualization guest, essentially -it's mostly about the ``iommu`` property +Minimal domain XML for a protected virtualization guest with +the ``launchSecurity`` element of type ``s390-pv`` + +:: + + <domain type='kvm'> + <name>protected</name> + <memory unit='KiB'>2048000</memory> + <currentMemory unit='KiB'>2048000</currentMemory> + <vcpu>1</vcpu> + <os> + <type arch='s390x'>hvm</type> + </os> + <cpu mode='host-model'/> + <devices> + <disk type='file' device='disk'> + <driver name='qemu' type='qcow2' cache='none' io='native'> + <source file='/var/lib/libvirt/images/protected.qcow2'/> + <target dev='vda' bus='virtio'/> + </disk> + <interface type='network'> + <source network='default'/> + <model type='virtio'/> + </interface> + <console type='pty'/> + <memballoon model='none'/> + </devices> + <launchSecurity type='s390-pv'/> + </domain> + + +Example guest definition without launchSecurity +=============================================== + +Minimal domain XML for a protected virtualization guest using the +``iommu='on'`` setting for each virtio device. :: -- 2.31.1
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-
Boris Fiuczynski