'virStorageFileGetEncryptionPayloadOffset' expects payloadOffset + 4 to be in buffer bounds which isn't checked anywhere. For example malicious actor may provide LUKS header with just magic and version like: '4c554b53 babe 0001'. This example successefully passes 'virStorageFileHasEncryptionFormat' and leads to OOB read of 4 bytes. So the fix is to add bounds checks. Fixes: b7d44f450c06803df7df3ad380f7a5c97425c1e6 Closes: https://gitlab.com/libvirt/libvirt/-/work_items/906 Signed-off-by: Sergey Zhidkih <rx1513@altlinux.org> --- src/storage_file/storage_file_probe.c | 8 +++++--- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/storage_file/storage_file_probe.c b/src/storage_file/storage_file_probe.c index cc5854d360..3ac90d698c 100644 --- a/src/storage_file/storage_file_probe.c +++ b/src/storage_file/storage_file_probe.c @@ -938,11 +938,13 @@ virStorageFileHasEncryptionFormat(const struct FileEncryptionInfo *info, static int virStorageFileGetEncryptionPayloadOffset(const struct FileEncryptionInfo *info, - char *buf) + char *buf, + size_t len) { int payload_offset = -1; - if (info->payloadOffset != -1) { + if (info->payloadOffset != -1 && + len >= info->payloadOffset + sizeof(uint32_t)) { if (info->endian == LV_LITTLE_ENDIAN) payload_offset = virReadBufInt32LE(buf + info->payloadOffset); else @@ -999,7 +1001,7 @@ virStorageFileProbeGetMetadata(virStorageSource *meta, } } meta->encryption->payload_offset = - virStorageFileGetEncryptionPayloadOffset(&fileTypeInfo[meta->format].cryptInfo[i], buf); + virStorageFileGetEncryptionPayloadOffset(&fileTypeInfo[meta->format].cryptInfo[i], buf, len); } } } -- 2.50.1