[PATCH v6 0/6] cover: RFE libvirt secret encryption on disk
Libvirt secrets are stored unencrypted on the disk. With this series we want to start encrypting the secrets. 1. Introduce the GnuTLS decryption wrapper functions that work exact opposite to the encryption wrappers. 2. Add a new service called virt-secrets-init-encryption, that is linked to the virtsecretd service. virtsecretd service only starts after the new service generates a random encryption key. 3. Add a new secrets.conf configuration file that helps user to set a. secrets_encryption_key - allows the user to specify the encryption key file path, in case the default key is not to be used. b. encrypt_data - set to 0 or 1. If set to 1, then the newly added secrets will be encrypted. 4. Add encryption scheme or cipher attribute that will allow us to choose the last used cipher. 5. Once we have the encryption key, and a reliable way to tell the daemon what encryption scheme the secret object is using, we can encrypt the secrets on disk and store them in <uuid>.<encryption_scheme> format. It is important to note that if the encryption key is changed between restarts, then the respective secret will not be loaded by the driver. 6. Add documentation. This is a sincere attempt to improve upon the already submitted patch https://lists.libvirt.org/archives/list/devel@lists.libvirt.org/thread/KE6GV... Resolves: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-7125 --- Changes in v6: - changes to use obj->secretValueFile as base - does local suffix lookups - refactors code so that the base64 encoding is in common code paths - moves local variable declaration inside blocks using them - refactors loader to use virFileReadAll instead of open-coding - fixes virSecretObjDeleteData to not rely on the actual filename Changes in v5: - Fix the bug of updating old secrets, prior to 12.1.0. Old secrets, when updated, now are stored with the latest encryption scheme if encryption is on. - Remove any logic in setting the secretValueFile in virSecretObjListAdd. Move it to virSecretLoadValue and virSecretObjSetValue. - Change urandom to random. Change default permission bits to 0077. - Update the documentation. Changes in v4: - Fix the regression of loading unencrypted secrets after an upgrade. Previously the .base64 unencrypted secrets were not being loaded. - Add documentation on encrypted secrets. Changes in v3: - Secrets xml configuration no longer stores the encryption scheme, therefore not allowing the user to toggle between ciphers. - Removed unnecessary socket files of the new service. It now has a general configuration with which it starts. - Addressed review comments from Peter on coding style and design. - Loading of secrets is dependent on the file extension. Most recent cipher is used while saving the secrets. Changes in v2: - Corrected the encryption key length check. It should be 32. - Added a new patch that introduces the encryption scheme attribute. This will help us identify which secrets are encrypted. - A new systemd unit service file added that starts before virtsecretd, helping us to construct a random encryption key and pass it to the virtsecretd service. - Parsing logic of secrets.conf moved to a separate file. - Spec file changes, augeas. Arun Menon (6): util: Add support for GnuTLS decryption secret: Set up default encryption secret key for the virtsecretd service secret: Add secret.conf configuration file and parse it secret: Rename virSecretObj structure attribute from base64File to secretValueFile secret: Add functionality to load and save secrets in encrypted format docs: secret: Add documentation of secret encryption feature docs/drvsecret.rst | 4 + docs/meson.build | 1 + docs/secretencryption.rst | 105 +++++++++ include/libvirt/virterror.h | 1 + libvirt.spec.in | 8 + po/POTFILES | 1 + src/conf/virsecretobj.c | 210 +++++++++++++----- src/conf/virsecretobj.h | 14 +- src/libvirt_private.syms | 1 + src/meson.build | 1 + src/remote/libvirtd.service.in | 4 + src/secret/libvirt_secrets.aug | 40 ++++ src/secret/meson.build | 32 +++ src/secret/secret.conf.in | 14 ++ src/secret/secret_config.c | 179 +++++++++++++++ src/secret/secret_config.h | 40 ++++ src/secret/secret_driver.c | 29 ++- src/secret/test_libvirt_secrets.aug.in | 6 + .../virt-secret-init-encryption.service.in | 8 + src/secret/virtsecretd.service.extra.in | 8 + src/util/vircrypto.c | 126 ++++++++++- src/util/vircrypto.h | 8 + src/util/virerror.c | 3 + tests/vircryptotest.c | 65 ++++++ 24 files changed, 840 insertions(+), 68 deletions(-) create mode 100644 docs/secretencryption.rst create mode 100644 src/secret/libvirt_secrets.aug create mode 100644 src/secret/secret.conf.in create mode 100644 src/secret/secret_config.c create mode 100644 src/secret/secret_config.h create mode 100644 src/secret/test_libvirt_secrets.aug.in create mode 100644 src/secret/virt-secret-init-encryption.service.in -- 2.51.1
From: Arun Menon <armenon@redhat.com> Document the new encryption of secrets feature in secretencryption.rst. Signed-off-by: Arun Menon <armenon@redhat.com> --- docs/drvsecret.rst | 4 ++ docs/meson.build | 1 + docs/secretencryption.rst | 105 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 110 insertions(+) create mode 100644 docs/secretencryption.rst diff --git a/docs/drvsecret.rst b/docs/drvsecret.rst index 76a9097d2b..234551d5ae 100644 --- a/docs/drvsecret.rst +++ b/docs/drvsecret.rst @@ -63,3 +63,7 @@ the traditional system or session libvirt connections to QEMU. Normal practice would be to open the secret driver in embedded mode any time one of the other drivers is opened in embedded mode so that the two drivers can interact in-process. + +Further reading +---------------------------- +- `Secret Encryption <secretencryption.html>`__ diff --git a/docs/meson.build b/docs/meson.build index 21e0b19c25..0e74f9c4bf 100644 --- a/docs/meson.build +++ b/docs/meson.build @@ -97,6 +97,7 @@ docs_rst_files = [ 'programming-languages', 'python', 'remote', + 'secretencryption', 'securityprocess', 'ssh-proxy', 'storage', diff --git a/docs/secretencryption.rst b/docs/secretencryption.rst new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..4908339f2d --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/secretencryption.rst @@ -0,0 +1,105 @@ +.. role:: since + +============================= +Secret storage and encryption +============================= + +.. contents:: + +The secret objects can either be ephemeral or persistent. +Ephemeral secrets are only kept in memory, never stored persistently on the disk. +See `Secrets <formatsecret.html>`__ + +:since:`Since 12.1.0` if a secret is defined as persistent, then it is stored **encrypted** on the disk. + + +Systemd Credentials Sealing +--------------------------- + +Out of the box, secrets are sealed using systemd credentials. This ties the +encrypted secret files to the specific host. + +The `virt-secret-init-encryption` service automatically generates a random +32-byte key and encrypts it using `systemd-creds`, storing the result in +`/var/lib/libvirt/secrets/secrets-encryption-key`. The `virtsecretd` service +then automatically loads this key securely via the systemd `LoadCredentialEncrypted` +mechanism. + +Disabling Systemd Credentials +----------------------------- + +You can control encryption behavior by editing the `secret.conf` configuration +file located in ``@SYSCONFDIR@/libvirt/secret.conf`` or ``$XDG_CONFIG_HOME/libvirt/secret.conf`` +depending on how the daemon was started (system mode or session mode respectively). + +To **disable encryption entirely** (which effectively disables the use of any +systemd credentials for this purpose): + +:: + + encrypt_data = 0 + +Setting ``encrypt_data = 0`` takes precedence over any available systemd +credentials. If you have existing encrypted secrets, this setting will prevent +the secret driver from loading the encryption key, making those secrets +inaccessible. New or updated secrets will be stored in plain base64 format. + +To **use a custom encryption key** instead of the systemd credential. +Defining a custom key path takes precedence over the systemd credential + +:: + + secrets_encryption_key = "/path/to/custom/key" + +Configuring Encryption on Non-Systemd Hosts +------------------------------------------- + +On hosts without systemd, or if you prefer to manage the key manually, you can +create a raw encryption key and configure libvirt to use it. + +Generate a random 32-byte key: + +:: + + dd if=/dev/random of=/path/to/key/file bs=32 count=1 + +Update `secret.conf` to point to this key: + +:: + + secrets_encryption_key = "/path/to/key/file" + +Manual Systemd Credential Creation +---------------------------------- + +If you want to use systemd credentials but need to customize the encryption parameters +(for example, to specify which TPM PCRs to bind to), you can generate the +credential file manually. + +To create the default `/var/lib/libvirt/secrets/secrets-encryption-key` manually +using `systemd-creds` (adjusting arguments to `systemd-creds encrypt` as needed): + +:: + + dd if=/dev/random bs=32 count=1 | \ + systemd-creds encrypt --name=secrets-encryption-key - \ + /var/lib/libvirt/secrets/secrets-encryption-key + +You can pass extra arguments to `systemd-creds encrypt <https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/latest/systemd-creds.html?#encrypt%20input%7C-%20output%7C->`__, +such as ``--tpm2-device=...`` or ``--tpm2-pcrs=...``, to customize the sealing policy. + +Upgrading Libvirt for secret encryption +--------------------------------------- +Starting 12.1.0, secrets can be stored on the disk in an encrypted format, rather than +the default base64 encoding. + +Any secret created before upgrading libvirt, remain stored in their original base64 +format on the disk. +A pre-existing secret will only be encrypted if you explicitly update its value using +**virsh secret-set-value** after the upgrade, provided that encryption is enabled in +secret.conf configuration file. + +It is important to note that encrypted secrets are not backwards compatible. In case of +a downgrade to an older version of libvirt, the encrypted secrets will not be loaded from +the disk. Therefore, before reverting to an older version libvirt, make sure that all the +secrets have been reverted to the standard base64 format, to avoid service disruptions. -- 2.51.1
From: Arun Menon <armenon@redhat.com> Change the attribute name of _virSecretObj because we want it to have a generic name to indicate that secret values can be stored in it in both base64 and encrypted formats. Signed-off-by: Arun Menon <armenon@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Peter Krempa <pkrempa@redhat.com> --- src/conf/virsecretobj.c | 22 +++++++++++----------- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/conf/virsecretobj.c b/src/conf/virsecretobj.c index 66270e2751..a3dd7983bb 100644 --- a/src/conf/virsecretobj.c +++ b/src/conf/virsecretobj.c @@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ VIR_LOG_INIT("conf.virsecretobj"); struct _virSecretObj { virObjectLockable parent; char *configFile; - char *base64File; + char *secretValueFile; virSecretDef *def; unsigned char *value; /* May be NULL */ size_t value_size; @@ -139,7 +139,7 @@ virSecretObjDispose(void *opaque) g_free(obj->value); } g_free(obj->configFile); - g_free(obj->base64File); + g_free(obj->secretValueFile); } @@ -378,11 +378,11 @@ virSecretObjListAdd(virSecretObjList *secrets, if (!(obj = virSecretObjNew())) goto cleanup; - /* Generate the possible configFile and base64File strings + /* Generate the possible configFile and secretValueFile strings * using the configDir, uuidstr, and appropriate suffix */ if (!(obj->configFile = virFileBuildPath(configDir, uuidstr, ".xml")) || - !(obj->base64File = virFileBuildPath(configDir, uuidstr, ".base64"))) + !(obj->secretValueFile = virFileBuildPath(configDir, uuidstr, ".base64"))) goto cleanup; if (virHashAddEntry(secrets->objs, uuidstr, obj) < 0) @@ -656,7 +656,7 @@ virSecretObjDeleteData(virSecretObj *obj) { /* The configFile will already be removed, so secret won't be * loaded again if this fails */ - unlink(obj->base64File); + unlink(obj->secretValueFile); } @@ -691,7 +691,7 @@ virSecretObjSaveData(virSecretObj *obj) base64 = g_base64_encode(obj->value, obj->value_size); - if (virFileRewriteStr(obj->base64File, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR, base64) < 0) + if (virFileRewriteStr(obj->secretValueFile, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR, base64) < 0) return -1; return 0; @@ -813,26 +813,26 @@ virSecretLoadValue(virSecretObj *obj) struct stat st; g_autofree char *contents = NULL; - if ((fd = open(obj->base64File, O_RDONLY)) == -1) { + if ((fd = open(obj->secretValueFile, O_RDONLY)) == -1) { if (errno == ENOENT) { ret = 0; goto cleanup; } virReportSystemError(errno, _("cannot open '%1$s'"), - obj->base64File); + obj->secretValueFile); goto cleanup; } if (fstat(fd, &st) < 0) { virReportSystemError(errno, _("cannot stat '%1$s'"), - obj->base64File); + obj->secretValueFile); goto cleanup; } if ((size_t)st.st_size != st.st_size) { virReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR, _("'%1$s' file does not fit in memory"), - obj->base64File); + obj->secretValueFile); goto cleanup; } @@ -845,7 +845,7 @@ virSecretLoadValue(virSecretObj *obj) if (saferead(fd, contents, st.st_size) != st.st_size) { virReportSystemError(errno, _("cannot read '%1$s'"), - obj->base64File); + obj->secretValueFile); goto cleanup; } contents[st.st_size] = '\0'; -- 2.51.1
From: Arun Menon <armenon@redhat.com> This commit sets the foundation for encrypting the libvirt secrets by providing a secure way to pass a secret encryption key to the virtsecretd service. A random secret key is generated using the new virt-secret-init-encryption service. This key can be consumed by the virtsecretd service. By using the "Before=" directive in the new virt-secret-init-encryption service and using "Requires=" directive in the virtsecretd service, we make sure that the daemon is run only after we have an encrypted secret key file generated and placed in /var/lib/libvirt/secrets. The virtsecretd service can then read the key from CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY. [1] This setup therefore provides a default key out-of-the-box for initial use. A subsequent commit will introduce the logic for virtsecretd to access and use this key via the $CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY environment variable. [2] [1] https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/latest/systemd-creds.html [2] https://systemd.io/CREDENTIALS/ Signed-off-by: Arun Menon <armenon@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Peter Krempa <pkrempa@redhat.com> --- libvirt.spec.in | 5 +++++ src/meson.build | 1 + src/remote/libvirtd.service.in | 4 ++++ src/secret/meson.build | 13 +++++++++++++ src/secret/virt-secret-init-encryption.service.in | 8 ++++++++ src/secret/virtsecretd.service.extra.in | 8 ++++++++ 6 files changed, 39 insertions(+) create mode 100644 src/secret/virt-secret-init-encryption.service.in diff --git a/libvirt.spec.in b/libvirt.spec.in index 22c9975d9f..34a47d689c 100644 --- a/libvirt.spec.in +++ b/libvirt.spec.in @@ -1891,13 +1891,16 @@ exit 0 %pre daemon-driver-secret %libvirt_sysconfig_pre virtsecretd %libvirt_systemd_unix_pre virtsecretd +%libvirt_systemd_oneshot_pre virt-secret-init-encryption %posttrans daemon-driver-secret %libvirt_sysconfig_posttrans virtsecretd %libvirt_systemd_unix_posttrans virtsecretd +%libvirt_systemd_unix_posttrans virt-secret-init-encryption %preun daemon-driver-secret %libvirt_systemd_unix_preun virtsecretd +%libvirt_systemd_unix_preun virt-secret-init-encryption %pre daemon-driver-storage-core %libvirt_sysconfig_pre virtstoraged @@ -2249,11 +2252,13 @@ exit 0 %{_datadir}/augeas/lenses/virtsecretd.aug %{_datadir}/augeas/lenses/tests/test_virtsecretd.aug %{_unitdir}/virtsecretd.service +%{_unitdir}/virt-secret-init-encryption.service %{_unitdir}/virtsecretd.socket %{_unitdir}/virtsecretd-ro.socket %{_unitdir}/virtsecretd-admin.socket %attr(0755, root, root) %{_sbindir}/virtsecretd %dir %attr(0700, root, root) %{_sysconfdir}/libvirt/secrets/ +%dir %attr(0700, root, root) %{_localstatedir}/lib/libvirt/secrets/ %ghost %dir %attr(0700, root, root) %{_rundir}/libvirt/secrets/ %{_libdir}/libvirt/connection-driver/libvirt_driver_secret.so %{_mandir}/man8/virtsecretd.8* diff --git a/src/meson.build b/src/meson.build index 16875622f4..cab52ce7a3 100644 --- a/src/meson.build +++ b/src/meson.build @@ -833,6 +833,7 @@ if conf.has('WITH_LIBVIRTD') 'sbindir': sbindir, 'sysconfdir': sysconfdir, 'initconfdir': initconfdir, + 'localstatedir': localstatedir, 'name': unit['name'], 'service': unit['service'], 'SERVICE': unit['service'].to_upper(), diff --git a/src/remote/libvirtd.service.in b/src/remote/libvirtd.service.in index b0a062e885..7965010a0a 100644 --- a/src/remote/libvirtd.service.in +++ b/src/remote/libvirtd.service.in @@ -12,6 +12,8 @@ After=libvirtd.socket After=libvirtd-ro.socket After=libvirtd-admin.socket Requires=virtlogd.socket +Requires=virt-secret-init-encryption.service +After=virt-secret-init-encryption.service Wants=virtlockd.socket After=virtlogd.socket After=virtlockd.socket @@ -29,6 +31,8 @@ Conflicts=xendomains.service Type=notify-reload Environment=LIBVIRTD_ARGS="--timeout 120" EnvironmentFile=-@initconfdir@/libvirtd +Environment=SECRETS_ENCRYPTION_KEY=%d/secrets-encryption-key +LoadCredentialEncrypted=secrets-encryption-key:@localstatedir@/lib/libvirt/secrets/secrets-encryption-key ExecStart=@sbindir@/libvirtd $LIBVIRTD_ARGS ExecReload=/bin/kill -HUP $MAINPID KillMode=process diff --git a/src/secret/meson.build b/src/secret/meson.build index 3b859ea7b4..b69abe32ab 100644 --- a/src/secret/meson.build +++ b/src/secret/meson.build @@ -31,6 +31,18 @@ if conf.has('WITH_SECRETS') 'name': 'virtsecretd', } + virt_secret_init_encryption_conf = configuration_data() + + virt_secret_init_encryption_conf.set('localstatedir', localstatedir) + + configure_file( + input: 'virt-secret-init-encryption.service.in', + output: '@0@.service'.format('virt-secret-init-encryption'), + configuration: virt_secret_init_encryption_conf, + install: true, + install_dir: unitdir, + ) + virt_daemon_units += { 'service': 'virtsecretd', 'name': 'secret', @@ -50,5 +62,6 @@ if conf.has('WITH_SECRETS') virt_install_dirs += [ confdir / 'secrets', runstatedir / 'libvirt' / 'secrets', + localstatedir / 'lib' / 'libvirt' / 'secrets', ] endif diff --git a/src/secret/virt-secret-init-encryption.service.in b/src/secret/virt-secret-init-encryption.service.in new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..8fd54002a0 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/secret/virt-secret-init-encryption.service.in @@ -0,0 +1,8 @@ +[Unit] +Before=virtsecretd.service +Before=libvirtd.service +ConditionPathExists=!@localstatedir@/lib/libvirt/secrets/secrets-encryption-key + +[Service] +Type=oneshot +ExecStart=/usr/bin/sh -c 'umask 0077 && (dd if=/dev/random status=none bs=32 count=1 | systemd-creds encrypt --name=secrets-encryption-key - @localstatedir@/lib/libvirt/secrets/secrets-encryption-key)' diff --git a/src/secret/virtsecretd.service.extra.in b/src/secret/virtsecretd.service.extra.in index 1fc8c672f7..116458b22a 100644 --- a/src/secret/virtsecretd.service.extra.in +++ b/src/secret/virtsecretd.service.extra.in @@ -1,2 +1,10 @@ # The contents of this unit will be merged into a base template. # Additional units might be merged as well. See meson.build for details. +# +[Unit] +Requires=virt-secret-init-encryption.service +After=virt-secret-init-encryption.service + +[Service] +LoadCredentialEncrypted=secrets-encryption-key:@localstatedir@/lib/libvirt/secrets/secrets-encryption-key +Environment=SECRETS_ENCRYPTION_KEY=%d/secrets-encryption-key -- 2.51.1
On Tue, Feb 10, 2026 at 11:26:39PM +0530, Arun Menon via Devel wrote:
This commit sets the foundation for encrypting the libvirt secrets by providing a secure way to pass a secret encryption key to the virtsecretd service.
A random secret key is generated using the new virt-secret-init-encryption service. This key can be consumed by the virtsecretd service.
By using the "Before=" directive in the new virt-secret-init-encryption service and using "Requires=" directive in the virtsecretd service, we make sure that the daemon is run only after we have an encrypted secret key file generated and placed in /var/lib/libvirt/secrets. The virtsecretd service can then read the key from CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY. [1]
[...]
+++ b/src/remote/libvirtd.service.in @@ -12,6 +12,8 @@ After=libvirtd.socket After=libvirtd-ro.socket After=libvirtd-admin.socket Requires=virtlogd.socket +Requires=virt-secret-init-encryption.service +After=virt-secret-init-encryption.service Wants=virtlockd.socket After=virtlogd.socket After=virtlockd.socket @@ -29,6 +31,8 @@ Conflicts=xendomains.service Type=notify-reload Environment=LIBVIRTD_ARGS="--timeout 120" EnvironmentFile=-@initconfdir@/libvirtd +Environment=SECRETS_ENCRYPTION_KEY=%d/secrets-encryption-key +LoadCredentialEncrypted=secrets-encryption-key:@localstatedir@/lib/libvirt/secrets/secrets-encryption-key
A bit late to the party, sorry. This change breaks the scenario in which the monolithic daemon is in use and the secret driver is not installed. The error messages is quite clear about what's wrong: $ sudo systemctl start libvirtd.service Failed to start libvirtd.service: Unit virt-secret-init-encryption.service not found. I thought I could fix things by weakening the Requires= into a Want=, which would feel appropriate for an optional component, however that doesn't work either: systemd[1]: Starting libvirtd.service - libvirt legacy monolithic daemon... (libvirtd)[20437]: libvirtd.service: Failed to set up credentials: No such file or directory (libvirtd)[20437]: libvirtd.service: Failed at step CREDENTIALS spawning /usr/sbin/libvirtd: No such file or directory systemd[1]: libvirtd.service: Main process exited, code=exited, status=243/CREDENTIALS systemd[1]: libvirtd.service: Failed with result 'exit-code'. Based on my reading of systemd.exec(5), there doesn't seem to be a way to make this conditional. ImportCredential= is supposed to behave gracefully when the credential doesn't exist, but I don't think it suits our needs otherwise. Of course the monolithic daemon could just grow a hard dependency on the secret driver, but I wouldn't consider that to be a very satisfactory outcome. Thoughts from someone more familiar with the topic than I am? :) -- Andrea Bolognani / Red Hat / Virtualization
Hi Andrea, Thank you for finding this. On Sun, Mar 29, 2026 at 03:12:25PM -0500, Andrea Bolognani wrote:
On Tue, Feb 10, 2026 at 11:26:39PM +0530, Arun Menon via Devel wrote:
This commit sets the foundation for encrypting the libvirt secrets by providing a secure way to pass a secret encryption key to the virtsecretd service.
A random secret key is generated using the new virt-secret-init-encryption service. This key can be consumed by the virtsecretd service.
By using the "Before=" directive in the new virt-secret-init-encryption service and using "Requires=" directive in the virtsecretd service, we make sure that the daemon is run only after we have an encrypted secret key file generated and placed in /var/lib/libvirt/secrets. The virtsecretd service can then read the key from CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY. [1]
[...]
+++ b/src/remote/libvirtd.service.in @@ -12,6 +12,8 @@ After=libvirtd.socket After=libvirtd-ro.socket After=libvirtd-admin.socket Requires=virtlogd.socket +Requires=virt-secret-init-encryption.service +After=virt-secret-init-encryption.service Wants=virtlockd.socket After=virtlogd.socket After=virtlockd.socket @@ -29,6 +31,8 @@ Conflicts=xendomains.service Type=notify-reload Environment=LIBVIRTD_ARGS="--timeout 120" EnvironmentFile=-@initconfdir@/libvirtd +Environment=SECRETS_ENCRYPTION_KEY=%d/secrets-encryption-key +LoadCredentialEncrypted=secrets-encryption-key:@localstatedir@/lib/libvirt/secrets/secrets-encryption-key
A bit late to the party, sorry.
This change breaks the scenario in which the monolithic daemon is in use and the secret driver is not installed. The error messages is quite clear about what's wrong:
$ sudo systemctl start libvirtd.service Failed to start libvirtd.service: Unit virt-secret-init-encryption.service not found.
I thought I could fix things by weakening the Requires= into a Want=, which would feel appropriate for an optional component, however that doesn't work either:
systemd[1]: Starting libvirtd.service - libvirt legacy monolithic daemon... (libvirtd)[20437]: libvirtd.service: Failed to set up credentials: No such file or directory (libvirtd)[20437]: libvirtd.service: Failed at step CREDENTIALS spawning /usr/sbin/libvirtd: No such file or directory systemd[1]: libvirtd.service: Main process exited, code=exited, status=243/CREDENTIALS systemd[1]: libvirtd.service: Failed with result 'exit-code'.
Based on my reading of systemd.exec(5), there doesn't seem to be a way to make this conditional. ImportCredential= is supposed to behave gracefully when the credential doesn't exist, but I don't think it suits our needs otherwise.
We can change the Requires= to Wants=, like you mentioned, it will gracefully skip if the encryption service is not found. Can we move the LoadCredentialEncrypted= and Environment= out of libvirtd.service.in in to a separate file, and then use meson.build to optionally install the new file to the configuration directory systemd/system/libvirtd.service.d/ if conf.has('WITH_SECRETS') is set?
Of course the monolithic daemon could just grow a hard dependency on the secret driver, but I wouldn't consider that to be a very satisfactory outcome.
Thoughts from someone more familiar with the topic than I am? :)
-- Andrea Bolognani / Red Hat / Virtualization
Regards, Arun Menon
On Mon, Mar 30, 2026 at 12:24:06PM +0530, Arun Menon wrote:
Hi Andrea,
Thank you for finding this.
On Sun, Mar 29, 2026 at 03:12:25PM -0500, Andrea Bolognani wrote:
On Tue, Feb 10, 2026 at 11:26:39PM +0530, Arun Menon via Devel wrote:
This commit sets the foundation for encrypting the libvirt secrets by providing a secure way to pass a secret encryption key to the virtsecretd service.
A random secret key is generated using the new virt-secret-init-encryption service. This key can be consumed by the virtsecretd service.
By using the "Before=" directive in the new virt-secret-init-encryption service and using "Requires=" directive in the virtsecretd service, we make sure that the daemon is run only after we have an encrypted secret key file generated and placed in /var/lib/libvirt/secrets. The virtsecretd service can then read the key from CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY. [1]
[...]
+++ b/src/remote/libvirtd.service.in @@ -12,6 +12,8 @@ After=libvirtd.socket After=libvirtd-ro.socket After=libvirtd-admin.socket Requires=virtlogd.socket +Requires=virt-secret-init-encryption.service +After=virt-secret-init-encryption.service Wants=virtlockd.socket After=virtlogd.socket After=virtlockd.socket @@ -29,6 +31,8 @@ Conflicts=xendomains.service Type=notify-reload Environment=LIBVIRTD_ARGS="--timeout 120" EnvironmentFile=-@initconfdir@/libvirtd +Environment=SECRETS_ENCRYPTION_KEY=%d/secrets-encryption-key +LoadCredentialEncrypted=secrets-encryption-key:@localstatedir@/lib/libvirt/secrets/secrets-encryption-key
A bit late to the party, sorry.
This change breaks the scenario in which the monolithic daemon is in use and the secret driver is not installed. The error messages is quite clear about what's wrong:
$ sudo systemctl start libvirtd.service Failed to start libvirtd.service: Unit virt-secret-init-encryption.service not found.
I thought I could fix things by weakening the Requires= into a Want=, which would feel appropriate for an optional component, however that doesn't work either:
systemd[1]: Starting libvirtd.service - libvirt legacy monolithic daemon... (libvirtd)[20437]: libvirtd.service: Failed to set up credentials: No such file or directory (libvirtd)[20437]: libvirtd.service: Failed at step CREDENTIALS spawning /usr/sbin/libvirtd: No such file or directory systemd[1]: libvirtd.service: Main process exited, code=exited, status=243/CREDENTIALS systemd[1]: libvirtd.service: Failed with result 'exit-code'.
Based on my reading of systemd.exec(5), there doesn't seem to be a way to make this conditional. ImportCredential= is supposed to behave gracefully when the credential doesn't exist, but I don't think it suits our needs otherwise.
We can change the Requires= to Wants=, like you mentioned, it will gracefully skip if the encryption service is not found.
Yeah, this part is easy.
Can we move the LoadCredentialEncrypted= and Environment= out of libvirtd.service.in in to a separate file, and then use meson.build to optionally install the new file to the configuration directory systemd/system/libvirtd.service.d/ if conf.has('WITH_SECRETS') is set?
That won't work, because when building distro packages all features get enabled at compile time. The decision about whether the rpm/deb/whatever containing the secret driver gets installed is made later, by the local admin, and is completely out of our control. -- Andrea Bolognani / Red Hat / Virtualization
On Mon, Mar 30, 2026 at 03:45:31AM -0500, Andrea Bolognani wrote:
On Mon, Mar 30, 2026 at 12:24:06PM +0530, Arun Menon wrote:
Hi Andrea,
Thank you for finding this.
On Sun, Mar 29, 2026 at 03:12:25PM -0500, Andrea Bolognani wrote:
On Tue, Feb 10, 2026 at 11:26:39PM +0530, Arun Menon via Devel wrote:
This commit sets the foundation for encrypting the libvirt secrets by providing a secure way to pass a secret encryption key to the virtsecretd service.
A random secret key is generated using the new virt-secret-init-encryption service. This key can be consumed by the virtsecretd service.
By using the "Before=" directive in the new virt-secret-init-encryption service and using "Requires=" directive in the virtsecretd service, we make sure that the daemon is run only after we have an encrypted secret key file generated and placed in /var/lib/libvirt/secrets. The virtsecretd service can then read the key from CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY. [1]
[...]
+++ b/src/remote/libvirtd.service.in @@ -12,6 +12,8 @@ After=libvirtd.socket After=libvirtd-ro.socket After=libvirtd-admin.socket Requires=virtlogd.socket +Requires=virt-secret-init-encryption.service +After=virt-secret-init-encryption.service Wants=virtlockd.socket After=virtlogd.socket After=virtlockd.socket @@ -29,6 +31,8 @@ Conflicts=xendomains.service Type=notify-reload Environment=LIBVIRTD_ARGS="--timeout 120" EnvironmentFile=-@initconfdir@/libvirtd +Environment=SECRETS_ENCRYPTION_KEY=%d/secrets-encryption-key +LoadCredentialEncrypted=secrets-encryption-key:@localstatedir@/lib/libvirt/secrets/secrets-encryption-key
A bit late to the party, sorry.
This change breaks the scenario in which the monolithic daemon is in use and the secret driver is not installed. The error messages is quite clear about what's wrong:
$ sudo systemctl start libvirtd.service Failed to start libvirtd.service: Unit virt-secret-init-encryption.service not found.
I thought I could fix things by weakening the Requires= into a Want=, which would feel appropriate for an optional component, however that doesn't work either:
systemd[1]: Starting libvirtd.service - libvirt legacy monolithic daemon... (libvirtd)[20437]: libvirtd.service: Failed to set up credentials: No such file or directory (libvirtd)[20437]: libvirtd.service: Failed at step CREDENTIALS spawning /usr/sbin/libvirtd: No such file or directory systemd[1]: libvirtd.service: Main process exited, code=exited, status=243/CREDENTIALS systemd[1]: libvirtd.service: Failed with result 'exit-code'.
Based on my reading of systemd.exec(5), there doesn't seem to be a way to make this conditional. ImportCredential= is supposed to behave gracefully when the credential doesn't exist, but I don't think it suits our needs otherwise.
We can change the Requires= to Wants=, like you mentioned, it will gracefully skip if the encryption service is not found.
Yeah, this part is easy.
Can we move the LoadCredentialEncrypted= and Environment= out of libvirtd.service.in in to a separate file, and then use meson.build to optionally install the new file to the configuration directory systemd/system/libvirtd.service.d/ if conf.has('WITH_SECRETS') is set?
That won't work, because when building distro packages all features get enabled at compile time. The decision about whether the rpm/deb/whatever containing the secret driver gets installed is made later, by the local admin, and is completely out of our control.
We could, however, ship that override snippet as part of the libvirt-daemon-driver-secret package. That seems to work: $ grep -i secret /usr/lib/systemd/system/libvirtd.service $ cat /usr/lib/systemd/system/libvirtd.service.d/secret.conf [Unit] Requires=virt-secret-init-encryption.service After=virt-secret-init-encryption.service [Service] Environment=SECRETS_ENCRYPTION_KEY=%d/secrets-encryption-key LoadCredentialEncrypted=secrets-encryption-key:/var/lib/libvirt/secrets/secrets-encryption-key $ sudo systemctl start libvirtd Failed to start libvirtd.service: Unit virt-secret-init-encryption.service not found. Not the most elegant solution perhaps, but I can't come up with anything better. I wonder how many system packages ship systemd unit overrides this way. The mechanism clearly exists though... -- Andrea Bolognani / Red Hat / Virtualization
Hi Andrea, On Mon, Mar 30, 2026 at 04:57:41AM -0400, Andrea Bolognani wrote:
On Mon, Mar 30, 2026 at 03:45:31AM -0500, Andrea Bolognani wrote:
On Mon, Mar 30, 2026 at 12:24:06PM +0530, Arun Menon wrote:
Hi Andrea,
Thank you for finding this.
On Sun, Mar 29, 2026 at 03:12:25PM -0500, Andrea Bolognani wrote:
On Tue, Feb 10, 2026 at 11:26:39PM +0530, Arun Menon via Devel wrote:
This commit sets the foundation for encrypting the libvirt secrets by providing a secure way to pass a secret encryption key to the virtsecretd service.
A random secret key is generated using the new virt-secret-init-encryption service. This key can be consumed by the virtsecretd service.
By using the "Before=" directive in the new virt-secret-init-encryption service and using "Requires=" directive in the virtsecretd service, we make sure that the daemon is run only after we have an encrypted secret key file generated and placed in /var/lib/libvirt/secrets. The virtsecretd service can then read the key from CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY. [1]
[...]
+++ b/src/remote/libvirtd.service.in @@ -12,6 +12,8 @@ After=libvirtd.socket After=libvirtd-ro.socket After=libvirtd-admin.socket Requires=virtlogd.socket +Requires=virt-secret-init-encryption.service +After=virt-secret-init-encryption.service Wants=virtlockd.socket After=virtlogd.socket After=virtlockd.socket @@ -29,6 +31,8 @@ Conflicts=xendomains.service Type=notify-reload Environment=LIBVIRTD_ARGS="--timeout 120" EnvironmentFile=-@initconfdir@/libvirtd +Environment=SECRETS_ENCRYPTION_KEY=%d/secrets-encryption-key +LoadCredentialEncrypted=secrets-encryption-key:@localstatedir@/lib/libvirt/secrets/secrets-encryption-key
A bit late to the party, sorry.
This change breaks the scenario in which the monolithic daemon is in use and the secret driver is not installed. The error messages is quite clear about what's wrong:
$ sudo systemctl start libvirtd.service Failed to start libvirtd.service: Unit virt-secret-init-encryption.service not found.
I thought I could fix things by weakening the Requires= into a Want=, which would feel appropriate for an optional component, however that doesn't work either:
systemd[1]: Starting libvirtd.service - libvirt legacy monolithic daemon... (libvirtd)[20437]: libvirtd.service: Failed to set up credentials: No such file or directory (libvirtd)[20437]: libvirtd.service: Failed at step CREDENTIALS spawning /usr/sbin/libvirtd: No such file or directory systemd[1]: libvirtd.service: Main process exited, code=exited, status=243/CREDENTIALS systemd[1]: libvirtd.service: Failed with result 'exit-code'.
Based on my reading of systemd.exec(5), there doesn't seem to be a way to make this conditional. ImportCredential= is supposed to behave gracefully when the credential doesn't exist, but I don't think it suits our needs otherwise.
We can change the Requires= to Wants=, like you mentioned, it will gracefully skip if the encryption service is not found.
Yeah, this part is easy.
Can we move the LoadCredentialEncrypted= and Environment= out of libvirtd.service.in in to a separate file, and then use meson.build to optionally install the new file to the configuration directory systemd/system/libvirtd.service.d/ if conf.has('WITH_SECRETS') is set?
That won't work, because when building distro packages all features get enabled at compile time. The decision about whether the rpm/deb/whatever containing the secret driver gets installed is made later, by the local admin, and is completely out of our control.
We could, however, ship that override snippet as part of the libvirt-daemon-driver-secret package. That seems to work:
$ grep -i secret /usr/lib/systemd/system/libvirtd.service
$ cat /usr/lib/systemd/system/libvirtd.service.d/secret.conf [Unit] Requires=virt-secret-init-encryption.service After=virt-secret-init-encryption.service
[Service] Environment=SECRETS_ENCRYPTION_KEY=%d/secrets-encryption-key LoadCredentialEncrypted=secrets-encryption-key:/var/lib/libvirt/secrets/secrets-encryption-key
$ sudo systemctl start libvirtd Failed to start libvirtd.service: Unit virt-secret-init-encryption.service not found.
Not the most elegant solution perhaps, but I can't come up with anything better. I wonder how many system packages ship systemd unit overrides this way. The mechanism clearly exists though...
I made an attempt to fix this. https://lists.libvirt.org/archives/list/devel@lists.libvirt.org/thread/DDS4C... I tested it by building the configuration files and then manually copying them to the respective unit directories. With -Ddriver_secrets=disabled, libvirtd starts just fine. If -Ddriver_secrets=enabled, the encryption service is called on starting libvirtd. It requires /var/lib/libvirt/secrets folder to be alredy present. Thank you again.
-- Andrea Bolognani / Red Hat / Virtualization
Regards, Arun Menon
On Sun, Mar 29, 2026 at 03:12:25PM -0500, Andrea Bolognani via Devel wrote:
On Tue, Feb 10, 2026 at 11:26:39PM +0530, Arun Menon via Devel wrote:
This commit sets the foundation for encrypting the libvirt secrets by providing a secure way to pass a secret encryption key to the virtsecretd service.
A random secret key is generated using the new virt-secret-init-encryption service. This key can be consumed by the virtsecretd service.
By using the "Before=" directive in the new virt-secret-init-encryption service and using "Requires=" directive in the virtsecretd service, we make sure that the daemon is run only after we have an encrypted secret key file generated and placed in /var/lib/libvirt/secrets. The virtsecretd service can then read the key from CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY. [1]
[...]
+++ b/src/remote/libvirtd.service.in @@ -12,6 +12,8 @@ After=libvirtd.socket After=libvirtd-ro.socket After=libvirtd-admin.socket Requires=virtlogd.socket +Requires=virt-secret-init-encryption.service +After=virt-secret-init-encryption.service Wants=virtlockd.socket After=virtlogd.socket After=virtlockd.socket @@ -29,6 +31,8 @@ Conflicts=xendomains.service Type=notify-reload Environment=LIBVIRTD_ARGS="--timeout 120" EnvironmentFile=-@initconfdir@/libvirtd +Environment=SECRETS_ENCRYPTION_KEY=%d/secrets-encryption-key +LoadCredentialEncrypted=secrets-encryption-key:@localstatedir@/lib/libvirt/secrets/secrets-encryption-key
A bit late to the party, sorry.
This change breaks the scenario in which the monolithic daemon is in use and the secret driver is not installed. The error messages is quite clear about what's wrong:
$ sudo systemctl start libvirtd.service Failed to start libvirtd.service: Unit virt-secret-init-encryption.service not found.
I thought I could fix things by weakening the Requires= into a Want=, which would feel appropriate for an optional component, however that doesn't work either:
Every systemd dep has a reverse which you can put in the "other" unit file. IOW, in virt-secret-init-encryption.service we need RequiredBy: libvirtd.service which I think would give us the semantics we need, and (hopefully) is ignored when libvirtd.service is not present. With regards, Daniel -- |: https://berrange.com ~~ https://hachyderm.io/@berrange :| |: https://libvirt.org ~~ https://entangle-photo.org :| |: https://pixelfed.art/berrange ~~ https://fstop138.berrange.com :|
On Mon, Mar 30, 2026 at 09:22:39AM +0100, Daniel P. Berrangé wrote:
On Sun, Mar 29, 2026 at 03:12:25PM -0500, Andrea Bolognani via Devel wrote:
On Tue, Feb 10, 2026 at 11:26:39PM +0530, Arun Menon via Devel wrote:
This commit sets the foundation for encrypting the libvirt secrets by providing a secure way to pass a secret encryption key to the virtsecretd service.
A random secret key is generated using the new virt-secret-init-encryption service. This key can be consumed by the virtsecretd service.
By using the "Before=" directive in the new virt-secret-init-encryption service and using "Requires=" directive in the virtsecretd service, we make sure that the daemon is run only after we have an encrypted secret key file generated and placed in /var/lib/libvirt/secrets. The virtsecretd service can then read the key from CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY. [1]
[...]
+++ b/src/remote/libvirtd.service.in @@ -12,6 +12,8 @@ After=libvirtd.socket After=libvirtd-ro.socket After=libvirtd-admin.socket Requires=virtlogd.socket +Requires=virt-secret-init-encryption.service +After=virt-secret-init-encryption.service Wants=virtlockd.socket After=virtlogd.socket After=virtlockd.socket @@ -29,6 +31,8 @@ Conflicts=xendomains.service Type=notify-reload Environment=LIBVIRTD_ARGS="--timeout 120" EnvironmentFile=-@initconfdir@/libvirtd +Environment=SECRETS_ENCRYPTION_KEY=%d/secrets-encryption-key +LoadCredentialEncrypted=secrets-encryption-key:@localstatedir@/lib/libvirt/secrets/secrets-encryption-key
A bit late to the party, sorry.
This change breaks the scenario in which the monolithic daemon is in use and the secret driver is not installed. The error messages is quite clear about what's wrong:
$ sudo systemctl start libvirtd.service Failed to start libvirtd.service: Unit virt-secret-init-encryption.service not found.
I thought I could fix things by weakening the Requires= into a Want=, which would feel appropriate for an optional component, however that doesn't work either:
Every systemd dep has a reverse which you can put in the "other" unit file.
IOW, in virt-secret-init-encryption.service we need
RequiredBy: libvirtd.service
which I think would give us the semantics we need, and (hopefully) is ignored when libvirtd.service is not present.
That part is not really problematic, we could just use Want= instead of Requires=. It's the credential loading part that trips us up. But see the other sub-thread for a potential solution. -- Andrea Bolognani / Red Hat / Virtualization
From: Arun Menon <armenon@redhat.com> Now that we have the functionality to provide the secrets driver with an encryption key through a configuration file or using system credentials, and the newly introduced array to iterate over the encryption schemes, we can use the key to save and load secrets. Encrypt all secrets that are going to be saved on the disk if the 'secrets_encryption_key' path is set in the secret.conf file OR if a valid systemd generated credential exists. While loading secrets, identify the decryption method by matching the file extension of the stored secret against the known array values. If no matching scheme is found, the secret is skipped. If the encryption key is changed across restarts, then also the secret driver will fail to load the secrets from the disk that were encrypted with the former key. Signed-off-by: Arun Menon <armenon@redhat.com> Co-authored-by: Peter Krempa <pkrempa@redhat.com> --- src/conf/virsecretobj.c | 204 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------- src/conf/virsecretobj.h | 14 ++- src/secret/secret_driver.c | 18 +++- 3 files changed, 172 insertions(+), 64 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/conf/virsecretobj.c b/src/conf/virsecretobj.c index a3dd7983bb..b448be493a 100644 --- a/src/conf/virsecretobj.c +++ b/src/conf/virsecretobj.c @@ -31,6 +31,10 @@ #include "virhash.h" #include "virlog.h" #include "virstring.h" +#include "virsecret.h" +#include "virrandom.h" +#include "vircrypto.h" +#include "virsecureerase.h" #define VIR_FROM_THIS VIR_FROM_SECRET @@ -45,6 +49,16 @@ struct _virSecretObj { size_t value_size; }; +typedef struct _virSecretSchemeInfo { + const char *suffix; + virCryptoCipher cipher; +} virSecretSchemeInfo; + +virSecretSchemeInfo schemeInfo[] = { + { ".aes256cbc", VIR_CRYPTO_CIPHER_AES256CBC }, + { ".base64", -1 }, +}; + static virClass *virSecretObjClass; static virClass *virSecretObjListClass; static void virSecretObjDispose(void *obj); @@ -377,12 +391,14 @@ virSecretObjListAdd(virSecretObjList *secrets, if (!(obj = virSecretObjNew())) goto cleanup; - /* Generate the possible configFile and secretValueFile strings - * using the configDir, uuidstr, and appropriate suffix + * using the configDir, uuidstr, and appropriate suffix. + * Note that secretValueFile extension is not set here. It is determined + * based on a) existing availability of secret file (virSecretLoadValue) or + * b) target storage format (virSecretObjSaveData) */ if (!(obj->configFile = virFileBuildPath(configDir, uuidstr, ".xml")) || - !(obj->secretValueFile = virFileBuildPath(configDir, uuidstr, ".base64"))) + !(obj->secretValueFile = virFileBuildPath(configDir, uuidstr, NULL))) goto cleanup; if (virHashAddEntry(secrets->objs, uuidstr, obj) < 0) @@ -654,9 +670,15 @@ virSecretObjDeleteConfig(virSecretObj *obj) void virSecretObjDeleteData(virSecretObj *obj) { + size_t i; + /* The configFile will already be removed, so secret won't be * loaded again if this fails */ - unlink(obj->secretValueFile); + for (i = 0; i < G_N_ELEMENTS(schemeInfo); i++) { + g_autofree char *deleteFile = g_strconcat(obj->secretValueFile, schemeInfo[i].suffix, NULL); + + ignore_value(unlink(deleteFile)); + } } @@ -682,18 +704,69 @@ virSecretObjSaveConfig(virSecretObj *obj) int -virSecretObjSaveData(virSecretObj *obj) +virSecretObjSaveData(virSecretObj *obj, + bool encryptData, + uint8_t *secretsEncryptionKey, + size_t secretsKeyLen) { g_autofree char *base64 = NULL; + g_autofree char *filename = NULL; + size_t i; + g_autofree unsigned char *secretbuf = NULL; + const unsigned char *secret = NULL; + size_t secretLen = 0; if (!obj->value) return 0; - base64 = g_base64_encode(obj->value, obj->value_size); + /* Based on whether encryption is on/off, save the secret in either + * the latest encryption scheme or in base64 formats. + * Subsequently, delete the other formats of the same uuid on the disk. + */ + if (encryptData && secretsEncryptionKey) { + g_autofree uint8_t *encryptedValue = NULL; + size_t encryptedValueLen = 0; + const size_t ivlen = 16; + g_autofree unsigned char *ivbuf = g_new0(unsigned char, ivlen); + + filename = g_strconcat(obj->secretValueFile, schemeInfo[0].suffix, NULL); + + if (virRandomBytes(ivbuf, ivlen) < 0) + return -1; + + if (virCryptoEncryptData(schemeInfo[0].cipher, + secretsEncryptionKey, secretsKeyLen, + ivbuf, ivlen, + (uint8_t *)obj->value, obj->value_size, + &encryptedValue, &encryptedValueLen) < 0) + return -1; + + ivbuf = g_realloc(ivbuf, ivlen + encryptedValueLen); + memcpy(ivbuf + ivlen, encryptedValue, encryptedValueLen); + + secretbuf = g_steal_pointer(&ivbuf); + secret = secretbuf; + secretLen = ivlen + encryptedValueLen; + } else { + filename = g_strconcat(obj->secretValueFile, schemeInfo[G_N_ELEMENTS(schemeInfo) - 1].suffix, NULL); + secret = (unsigned char *) obj->value; + secretLen = obj->value_size; + } + + base64 = g_base64_encode(secret, secretLen); - if (virFileRewriteStr(obj->secretValueFile, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR, base64) < 0) + if (virFileRewriteStr(filename, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR, base64) < 0) return -1; + for (i = 0; i < G_N_ELEMENTS(schemeInfo); i++) { + g_autofree char *deleteFile = g_strconcat(obj->secretValueFile, schemeInfo[i].suffix, NULL); + + if (STREQ(filename, deleteFile)) + continue; + + ignore_value(unlink(deleteFile)); + } + return 0; } @@ -737,7 +810,10 @@ virSecretObjGetValue(virSecretObj *obj) int virSecretObjSetValue(virSecretObj *obj, const unsigned char *value, - size_t value_size) + size_t value_size, + bool encryptData, + uint8_t *secretsEncryptionKey, + size_t secretsKeyLen) { virSecretDef *def = obj->def; g_autofree unsigned char *old_value = NULL; @@ -753,7 +829,10 @@ virSecretObjSetValue(virSecretObj *obj, obj->value = g_steal_pointer(&new_value); obj->value_size = value_size; - if (!def->isephemeral && virSecretObjSaveData(obj) < 0) + if (!def->isephemeral && virSecretObjSaveData(obj, + encryptData, + secretsEncryptionKey, + secretsKeyLen) < 0) goto error; /* Saved successfully - drop old value */ @@ -807,60 +886,65 @@ virSecretLoadValidateUUID(virSecretDef *def, static int -virSecretLoadValue(virSecretObj *obj) -{ - int ret = -1, fd = -1; - struct stat st; - g_autofree char *contents = NULL; +virSecretLoadValue(virSecretObj *obj, + uint8_t *secretsEncryptionKey, + size_t secretsKeyLen) +{ + const size_t secretFileMaxLen = 10 * 1024 * 1024; /* more won't fit in the RPC buffer */ + size_t i; + + /* Find the file and match the storage scheme based on suffix. */ + for (i = 0; i < G_N_ELEMENTS(schemeInfo); i++) { + g_autofree char *filename = g_strconcat(obj->secretValueFile, + schemeInfo[i].suffix, NULL); + g_autofree char *filecontent = NULL; + int filelen = 0; + g_autofree unsigned char *decoded = NULL; + size_t decodedlen = 0; + + if (!virFileExists(filename)) + continue; - if ((fd = open(obj->secretValueFile, O_RDONLY)) == -1) { - if (errno == ENOENT) { - ret = 0; - goto cleanup; - } - virReportSystemError(errno, _("cannot open '%1$s'"), - obj->secretValueFile); - goto cleanup; - } + if ((filelen = virFileReadAll(filename, secretFileMaxLen, &filecontent)) < 0) + return -1; - if (fstat(fd, &st) < 0) { - virReportSystemError(errno, _("cannot stat '%1$s'"), - obj->secretValueFile); - goto cleanup; - } + filecontent = g_realloc(filecontent, filelen + 1); + filecontent[filelen] = '\0'; - if ((size_t)st.st_size != st.st_size) { - virReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR, - _("'%1$s' file does not fit in memory"), - obj->secretValueFile); - goto cleanup; - } + decoded = g_base64_decode(filecontent, &decodedlen); - if (st.st_size < 1) { - ret = 0; - goto cleanup; - } + virSecureErase(filecontent, filelen); - contents = g_new0(char, st.st_size + 1); + if (schemeInfo[i].cipher == -1) { + obj->value = g_steal_pointer(&decoded); + obj->value_size = decodedlen; + } else { + size_t ivlen = 16; + int rc; - if (saferead(fd, contents, st.st_size) != st.st_size) { - virReportSystemError(errno, _("cannot read '%1$s'"), - obj->secretValueFile); - goto cleanup; - } - contents[st.st_size] = '\0'; + if (decodedlen < ivlen) { + virReportError(VIR_ERR_INVALID_SECRET, + _("Encrypted secret size '%1$zu' is invalid"), + obj->value_size); - VIR_FORCE_CLOSE(fd); + virSecureErase(decoded, decodedlen); + return -1; + } - obj->value = g_base64_decode(contents, &obj->value_size); + rc = virCryptoDecryptData(schemeInfo[i].cipher, + secretsEncryptionKey, secretsKeyLen, + decoded, ivlen, /* initialization vector is stored at start of the buffer */ + decoded + ivlen, decodedlen - ivlen, + &obj->value, &obj->value_size); - ret = 0; + virSecureErase(decoded, decodedlen); - cleanup: - if (contents != NULL) - memset(contents, 0, st.st_size); - VIR_FORCE_CLOSE(fd); - return ret; + if (rc < 0) + return -1; + } + } + + return 0; } @@ -868,7 +952,9 @@ static virSecretObj * virSecretLoad(virSecretObjList *secrets, const char *file, const char *path, - const char *configDir) + const char *configDir, + uint8_t *secretsEncryptionKey, + size_t secretsKeyLen) { g_autoptr(virSecretDef) def = NULL; virSecretObj *obj = NULL; @@ -882,7 +968,7 @@ virSecretLoad(virSecretObjList *secrets, if (!(obj = virSecretObjListAdd(secrets, &def, configDir, NULL))) return NULL; - if (virSecretLoadValue(obj) < 0) { + if (virSecretLoadValue(obj, secretsEncryptionKey, secretsKeyLen) < 0) { virSecretObjListRemove(secrets, obj); g_clear_pointer(&obj, virObjectUnref); return NULL; @@ -894,7 +980,9 @@ virSecretLoad(virSecretObjList *secrets, int virSecretLoadAllConfigs(virSecretObjList *secrets, - const char *configDir) + const char *configDir, + uint8_t *secretsEncryptionKey, + size_t secretsKeyLen) { g_autoptr(DIR) dir = NULL; struct dirent *de; @@ -915,7 +1003,9 @@ virSecretLoadAllConfigs(virSecretObjList *secrets, if (!(path = virFileBuildPath(configDir, de->d_name, NULL))) continue; - if (!(obj = virSecretLoad(secrets, de->d_name, path, configDir))) { + if (!(obj = virSecretLoad(secrets, de->d_name, path, configDir, + secretsEncryptionKey, + secretsKeyLen))) { VIR_ERROR(_("Error reading secret: %1$s"), virGetLastErrorMessage()); continue; diff --git a/src/conf/virsecretobj.h b/src/conf/virsecretobj.h index 17897c5513..4e872f7b29 100644 --- a/src/conf/virsecretobj.h +++ b/src/conf/virsecretobj.h @@ -86,7 +86,10 @@ int virSecretObjSaveConfig(virSecretObj *obj); int -virSecretObjSaveData(virSecretObj *obj); +virSecretObjSaveData(virSecretObj *obj, + bool encryptData, + uint8_t *secretsEncryptionKey, + size_t secretsKeyLen); virSecretDef * virSecretObjGetDef(virSecretObj *obj); @@ -101,7 +104,10 @@ virSecretObjGetValue(virSecretObj *obj); int virSecretObjSetValue(virSecretObj *obj, const unsigned char *value, - size_t value_size); + size_t value_size, + bool encryptData, + uint8_t *secretsEncryptionKey, + size_t secretsKeyLen); size_t virSecretObjGetValueSize(virSecretObj *obj); @@ -112,4 +118,6 @@ virSecretObjSetValueSize(virSecretObj *obj, int virSecretLoadAllConfigs(virSecretObjList *secrets, - const char *configDir); + const char *configDir, + uint8_t *secretsEncryptionKey, + size_t secretsKeyLen); diff --git a/src/secret/secret_driver.c b/src/secret/secret_driver.c index 9b13772ad3..2f4ac60f5a 100644 --- a/src/secret/secret_driver.c +++ b/src/secret/secret_driver.c @@ -229,7 +229,10 @@ secretDefineXML(virConnectPtr conn, if (!objDef->isephemeral) { if (backup && backup->isephemeral) { - if (virSecretObjSaveData(obj) < 0) + if (virSecretObjSaveData(obj, + driver->configDir, + driver->config->secretsEncryptionKey, + driver->config->secretsKeyLen) < 0) goto restore_backup; } @@ -333,7 +336,10 @@ secretSetValue(virSecretPtr secret, if (virSecretSetValueEnsureACL(secret->conn, def) < 0) goto cleanup; - if (virSecretObjSetValue(obj, value, value_size) < 0) + if (virSecretObjSetValue(obj, value, value_size, + driver->configDir, + driver->config->secretsEncryptionKey, + driver->config->secretsKeyLen) < 0) goto cleanup; event = virSecretEventValueChangedNew(def->uuid, @@ -542,7 +548,9 @@ secretStateInitialize(bool privileged, if (!(driver->secrets = virSecretObjListNew())) goto error; - if (virSecretLoadAllConfigs(driver->secrets, driver->configDir) < 0) + if (virSecretLoadAllConfigs(driver->secrets, driver->configDir, + driver->config->secretsEncryptionKey, + driver->config->secretsKeyLen) < 0) goto error; return VIR_DRV_STATE_INIT_COMPLETE; @@ -564,7 +572,9 @@ secretStateReload(void) if (!(driver->config = virSecretDaemonConfigNew(driver->privileged))) return -1; - ignore_value(virSecretLoadAllConfigs(driver->secrets, driver->configDir)); + ignore_value(virSecretLoadAllConfigs(driver->secrets, driver->configDir, + driver->config->secretsEncryptionKey, + driver->config->secretsKeyLen)); return 0; } -- 2.51.1
From: Arun Menon <armenon@redhat.com> Adds `virCryptoDecryptDataAESgnutls` and `virCryptoDecryptData` as wrapper functions for GnuTLS decryption. These functions are the inverse of the existing GnuTLS encryption wrappers. This commit also includes a corresponding test case to validate data decryption. Signed-off-by: Arun Menon <armenon@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Peter Krempa <pkrempa@redhat.com> --- src/libvirt_private.syms | 1 + src/util/vircrypto.c | 126 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- src/util/vircrypto.h | 8 +++ tests/vircryptotest.c | 65 ++++++++++++++++++++ 4 files changed, 199 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/src/libvirt_private.syms b/src/libvirt_private.syms index d81b30f0b6..40af831070 100644 --- a/src/libvirt_private.syms +++ b/src/libvirt_private.syms @@ -2248,6 +2248,7 @@ virConfWriteMem; # util/vircrypto.h +virCryptoDecryptData; virCryptoEncryptData; virCryptoHashBuf; virCryptoHashString; diff --git a/src/util/vircrypto.c b/src/util/vircrypto.c index 3ce23264ca..00f723bb75 100644 --- a/src/util/vircrypto.c +++ b/src/util/vircrypto.c @@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ virCryptoHashString(virCryptoHash hash, } -/* virCryptoEncryptDataAESgntuls: +/* virCryptoEncryptDataAESgnutls: * * Performs the AES gnutls encryption * @@ -233,3 +233,127 @@ virCryptoEncryptData(virCryptoCipher algorithm, _("algorithm=%1$d is not supported"), algorithm); return -1; } + +/* virCryptoDecryptDataAESgnutls: + * + * Performs the AES gnutls decryption + * + * Same input as virCryptoDecryptData, except the algorithm is replaced + * by the specific gnutls algorithm. + * + * Decrypts the @data buffer using the @deckey and if available the @iv + * + * Returns 0 on success with the plaintext being filled. It is the + * caller's responsibility to clear and free it. Returns -1 on failure + * w/ error set. + */ +static int +virCryptoDecryptDataAESgnutls(gnutls_cipher_algorithm_t gnutls_dec_alg, + uint8_t *deckey, + size_t deckeylen, + uint8_t *iv, + size_t ivlen, + uint8_t *data, + size_t datalen, + uint8_t **plaintextret, + size_t *plaintextlenret) +{ + int rc; + uint8_t padding_length; + gnutls_cipher_hd_t handle = NULL; + gnutls_datum_t dec_key = { .data = deckey, .size = deckeylen }; + gnutls_datum_t iv_buf = { .data = iv, .size = ivlen }; + g_autofree uint8_t *plaintext = NULL; + size_t plaintextlen; + + if ((rc = gnutls_cipher_init(&handle, gnutls_dec_alg, + &dec_key, &iv_buf)) < 0) { + virReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR, + _("failed to initialize cipher: '%1$s'"), + gnutls_strerror(rc)); + return -1; + } + + plaintext = g_memdup2(data, datalen); + plaintextlen = datalen; + if (plaintextlen == 0) { + virReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR, "%s", + _("decrypted data has zero length")); + goto error; + } + rc = gnutls_cipher_decrypt(handle, plaintext, plaintextlen); + gnutls_cipher_deinit(handle); + if (rc < 0) { + virReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR, + _("failed to decrypt the data: '%1$s'"), + gnutls_strerror(rc)); + goto error; + } + /* Before encryption, padding is added to the data. + * The last byte indicates the padding length, because in PKCS#7, all + * padding bytes are set to the padding length value. + */ + padding_length = plaintext[plaintextlen - 1]; + if (padding_length > plaintextlen) { + virReportError(VIR_ERR_INVALID_SECRET, "%s", + _("decrypted data has invalid padding")); + goto error; + } + *plaintextlenret = plaintextlen - padding_length; + *plaintextret = g_steal_pointer(&plaintext); + return 0; + error: + virSecureErase(plaintext, plaintextlen); + return -1; +} + +/* virCryptoDecryptData: + * @algorithm: algorithm desired for decryption + * @deckey: decryption key + * @deckeylen: decryption key length + * @iv: initialization vector + * @ivlen: length of initialization vector + * @data: data to decrypt + * @datalen: length of data + * @plaintext: stream of bytes allocated to store plaintext + * @plaintextlen: size of the stream of bytes + * Returns 0 on success, -1 on failure with error set + */ +int +virCryptoDecryptData(virCryptoCipher algorithm, + uint8_t *deckey, + size_t deckeylen, + uint8_t *iv, + size_t ivlen, + uint8_t *data, + size_t datalen, + uint8_t **plaintext, + size_t *plaintextlen) +{ + switch (algorithm) { + case VIR_CRYPTO_CIPHER_AES256CBC: + if (deckeylen != 32) { + virReportError(VIR_ERR_INVALID_ARG, + _("AES256CBC decryption invalid keylen=%1$zu"), + deckeylen); + return -1; + } + if (ivlen != 16) { + virReportError(VIR_ERR_INVALID_ARG, + _("AES256CBC initialization vector invalid len=%1$zu"), + ivlen); + return -1; + } + return virCryptoDecryptDataAESgnutls(GNUTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC, + deckey, deckeylen, iv, ivlen, + data, datalen, + plaintext, plaintextlen); + case VIR_CRYPTO_CIPHER_NONE: + case VIR_CRYPTO_CIPHER_LAST: + break; + } + + virReportError(VIR_ERR_INVALID_ARG, + _("algorithm=%1$d is not supported"), algorithm); + return -1; +} diff --git a/src/util/vircrypto.h b/src/util/vircrypto.h index 5f079ac335..2e8557839d 100644 --- a/src/util/vircrypto.h +++ b/src/util/vircrypto.h @@ -61,3 +61,11 @@ int virCryptoEncryptData(virCryptoCipher algorithm, uint8_t **ciphertext, size_t *ciphertextlen) ATTRIBUTE_NONNULL(2) ATTRIBUTE_NONNULL(6) ATTRIBUTE_NONNULL(8) ATTRIBUTE_NONNULL(9) G_GNUC_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT; + +int virCryptoDecryptData(virCryptoCipher algorithm, + uint8_t *deckey, size_t deckeylen, + uint8_t *iv, size_t ivlen, + uint8_t *data, size_t datalen, + uint8_t **plaintext, size_t *plaintextlen) + ATTRIBUTE_NONNULL(2) ATTRIBUTE_NONNULL(6) + ATTRIBUTE_NONNULL(8) ATTRIBUTE_NONNULL(9) G_GNUC_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT; diff --git a/tests/vircryptotest.c b/tests/vircryptotest.c index 9ffe70756e..864fa8838d 100644 --- a/tests/vircryptotest.c +++ b/tests/vircryptotest.c @@ -62,6 +62,14 @@ struct testCryptoEncryptData { size_t ciphertextlen; }; +struct testCryptoDecryptData { + virCryptoCipher algorithm; + uint8_t *input; + size_t inputlen; + uint8_t *plaintext; + size_t plaintextlen; +}; + static int testCryptoEncrypt(const void *opaque) { @@ -101,6 +109,44 @@ testCryptoEncrypt(const void *opaque) return 0; } +static int +testCryptoDecrypt(const void *opaque) +{ + const struct testCryptoDecryptData *data = opaque; + g_autofree uint8_t *deckey = NULL; + size_t deckeylen = 32; + g_autofree uint8_t *iv = NULL; + size_t ivlen = 16; + g_autofree uint8_t *plaintext = NULL; + size_t plaintextlen = 0; + + deckey = g_new0(uint8_t, deckeylen); + iv = g_new0(uint8_t, ivlen); + + if (virRandomBytes(deckey, deckeylen) < 0 || + virRandomBytes(iv, ivlen) < 0) { + fprintf(stderr, "Failed to generate random bytes\n"); + return -1; + } + + if (virCryptoDecryptData(data->algorithm, deckey, deckeylen, iv, ivlen, + data->input, data->inputlen, + &plaintext, &plaintextlen) < 0) + return -1; + + if (data->plaintextlen != plaintextlen) { + fprintf(stderr, "Expected plaintexlen(%zu) doesn't match (%zu)\n", + data->plaintextlen, plaintextlen); + return -1; + } + + if (memcmp(data->plaintext, plaintext, plaintextlen)) { + fprintf(stderr, "Expected plaintext doesn't match\n"); + return -1; + } + + return 0; +} static int mymain(void) @@ -155,7 +201,26 @@ mymain(void) #undef VIR_CRYPTO_ENCRYPT +#define VIR_CRYPTO_DECRYPT(a, n, i, il, c, cl) \ + do { \ + struct testCryptoDecryptData data = { \ + .algorithm = a, \ + .input = i, \ + .inputlen = il, \ + .plaintext = c, \ + .plaintextlen = cl, \ + }; \ + if (virTestRun("Decrypt " n, testCryptoDecrypt, &data) < 0) \ + ret = -1; \ + } while (0) + + VIR_CRYPTO_DECRYPT(VIR_CRYPTO_CIPHER_AES256CBC, "aes256cbc", + expected_ciphertext, 16, secretdata, 7); + +#undef VIR_CRYPTO_DECRYPT + return ret == 0 ? EXIT_SUCCESS : EXIT_FAILURE; + } /* Forces usage of not so random virRandomBytes */ -- 2.51.1
From: Arun Menon <armenon@redhat.com> A new configuration file called secret.conf is introduced to let the user configure the path to the secrets encryption key. This key will be used to encrypt/decrypt the secrets in libvirt. By default the path is set to the runtime directory /run/libvirt/secrets, and it is commented in the config file. After parsing the file, the virtsecretd driver checks if an encryption key is present in the path and is valid. If no encryption key is present in the path, then the service will by default use the encryption key stored in the CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY. Add logic to parse the encryption key file and store the key. It also checks for the encrypt_data attribute in the config file. The encryption and decryption logic will be added in the subsequent patches. Signed-off-by: Arun Menon <armenon@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Peter Krempa <pkrempa@redhat.com> --- include/libvirt/virterror.h | 1 + libvirt.spec.in | 3 + po/POTFILES | 1 + src/secret/libvirt_secrets.aug | 40 ++++++ src/secret/meson.build | 19 +++ src/secret/secret.conf.in | 14 ++ src/secret/secret_config.c | 179 +++++++++++++++++++++++++ src/secret/secret_config.h | 40 ++++++ src/secret/secret_driver.c | 11 ++ src/secret/test_libvirt_secrets.aug.in | 6 + src/util/virerror.c | 3 + 11 files changed, 317 insertions(+) create mode 100644 src/secret/libvirt_secrets.aug create mode 100644 src/secret/secret.conf.in create mode 100644 src/secret/secret_config.c create mode 100644 src/secret/secret_config.h create mode 100644 src/secret/test_libvirt_secrets.aug.in diff --git a/include/libvirt/virterror.h b/include/libvirt/virterror.h index f02da046a3..c1cac7a3dd 100644 --- a/include/libvirt/virterror.h +++ b/include/libvirt/virterror.h @@ -353,6 +353,7 @@ typedef enum { command within timeout (Since: 11.2.0) */ VIR_ERR_AGENT_COMMAND_FAILED = 113, /* guest agent responded with failure to a command (Since: 11.2.0) */ + VIR_ERR_INVALID_ENCR_KEY_SECRET = 114, /* encryption key is invalid (Since: 12.1.0) */ # ifdef VIR_ENUM_SENTINELS VIR_ERR_NUMBER_LAST /* (Since: 5.0.0) */ diff --git a/libvirt.spec.in b/libvirt.spec.in index 34a47d689c..0ba7bf4197 100644 --- a/libvirt.spec.in +++ b/libvirt.spec.in @@ -2251,6 +2251,9 @@ exit 0 %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/libvirt/virtsecretd.conf %{_datadir}/augeas/lenses/virtsecretd.aug %{_datadir}/augeas/lenses/tests/test_virtsecretd.aug +%{_datadir}/augeas/lenses/libvirt_secrets.aug +%{_datadir}/augeas/lenses/tests/test_libvirt_secrets.aug +%config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/libvirt/secret.conf %{_unitdir}/virtsecretd.service %{_unitdir}/virt-secret-init-encryption.service %{_unitdir}/virtsecretd.socket diff --git a/po/POTFILES b/po/POTFILES index c78d2b8000..0042ddad08 100644 --- a/po/POTFILES +++ b/po/POTFILES @@ -232,6 +232,7 @@ src/rpc/virnetsshsession.c src/rpc/virnettlscert.c src/rpc/virnettlsconfig.c src/rpc/virnettlscontext.c +src/secret/secret_config.c src/secret/secret_driver.c src/security/security_apparmor.c src/security/security_dac.c diff --git a/src/secret/libvirt_secrets.aug b/src/secret/libvirt_secrets.aug new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..8dda373e62 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/secret/libvirt_secrets.aug @@ -0,0 +1,40 @@ +(* /etc/libvirt/secret.conf *) + +module Libvirt_secrets = + autoload xfm + + let eol = del /[ \t]*\n/ "\n" + let value_sep = del /[ \t]*=[ \t]*/ " = " + let indent = del /[ \t]*/ "" + + let array_sep = del /,[ \t\n]*/ ", " + let array_start = del /\[[ \t\n]*/ "[ " + let array_end = del /\]/ "]" + + let str_val = del /\"/ "\"" . store /[^\"]*/ . del /\"/ "\"" + let bool_val = store /0|1/ + let int_val = store /[0-9]+/ + let str_array_element = [ seq "el" . str_val ] . del /[ \t\n]*/ "" + let str_array_val = counter "el" . array_start . ( str_array_element . ( array_sep . str_array_element ) * ) ? . array_end + + let str_entry (kw:string) = [ key kw . value_sep . str_val ] + let bool_entry (kw:string) = [ key kw . value_sep . bool_val ] + let int_entry (kw:string) = [ key kw . value_sep . int_val ] + let str_array_entry (kw:string) = [ key kw . value_sep . str_array_val ] + + let secrets_entry = str_entry "secrets_encryption_key" + | bool_entry "encrypt_data" + + (* Each entry in the config is one of the following three ... *) + let entry = secrets_entry + let comment = [ label "#comment" . del /#[ \t]*/ "# " . store /([^ \t\n][^\n]*)?/ . del /\n/ "\n" ] + let empty = [ label "#empty" . eol ] + + let record = indent . entry . eol + + let lns = ( record | comment | empty ) * + + let filter = incl "/etc/libvirt/secret.conf" + . Util.stdexcl + + let xfm = transform lns filter diff --git a/src/secret/meson.build b/src/secret/meson.build index b69abe32ab..cfcc861f4f 100644 --- a/src/secret/meson.build +++ b/src/secret/meson.build @@ -1,5 +1,6 @@ secret_driver_sources = [ 'secret_driver.c', + 'secret_config.c', ] driver_source_files += files(secret_driver_sources) @@ -27,6 +28,24 @@ if conf.has('WITH_SECRETS') ], } + secret_conf = configure_file( + input: 'secret.conf.in', + output: 'secret.conf', + copy: true + ) + virt_conf_files += secret_conf + + virt_aug_files += files('libvirt_secrets.aug') + + virt_test_aug_files += { + 'name': 'test_libvirt_secrets.aug', + 'aug': files('test_libvirt_secrets.aug.in'), + 'conf': files('secret.conf.in'), + 'test_name': 'libvirt_secrets', + 'test_srcdir': meson.current_source_dir(), + 'test_builddir': meson.current_build_dir(), + } + virt_daemon_confs += { 'name': 'virtsecretd', } diff --git a/src/secret/secret.conf.in b/src/secret/secret.conf.in new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..a231c48f8d --- /dev/null +++ b/src/secret/secret.conf.in @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +# +# Configuration file for the secrets driver. +# +# The secret encryption key is used to override default encryption +# key path. The user can create an encryption key and set the secret_encryption_key +# to the path on which it resides. +# The key must be 32-bytes long. +#secrets_encryption_key = "/run/libvirt/secrets/secret-encryption-key" + +# The encrypt_data setting is used to indicate if the encryption is on or off. +# 0 indicates off and 1 indicates on. By default it is on +# if secrets_encryption_key is set to a non-NULL +# path, or if a systemd credential named "secrets-encryption-key" exists. +#encrypt_data = 1 diff --git a/src/secret/secret_config.c b/src/secret/secret_config.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..4e11bca1b6 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/secret/secret_config.c @@ -0,0 +1,179 @@ +/* + * secret_config.c: secret.conf config file handling + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1-or-later + */ + +#include <config.h> +#include <fcntl.h> +#include "configmake.h" +#include "datatypes.h" +#include "virlog.h" +#include "virerror.h" +#include "virfile.h" +#include "virutil.h" +#include "virsecureerase.h" +#include "secret_config.h" + + +#define VIR_FROM_THIS VIR_FROM_SECRET + +VIR_LOG_INIT("secret.secret_config"); + +static virClass *virSecretDaemonConfigClass; +static void virSecretDaemonConfigDispose(void *obj); + +static int +virSecretConfigOnceInit(void) +{ + if (!VIR_CLASS_NEW(virSecretDaemonConfig, virClassForObject())) + return -1; + + return 0; +} + + +VIR_ONCE_GLOBAL_INIT(virSecretConfig); + + +int +virSecretDaemonConfigFilePath(bool privileged, char **configfile) +{ + if (privileged) { + *configfile = g_strdup(SYSCONFDIR "/libvirt/secret.conf"); + } else { + g_autofree char *configdir = NULL; + + configdir = virGetUserConfigDirectory(); + + *configfile = g_strdup_printf("%s/secret.conf", configdir); + } + + return 0; +} + + +static int +virSecretLoadDaemonConfig(virSecretDaemonConfig *cfg, + const char *filename) +{ + g_autoptr(virConf) conf = NULL; + int res; + + if (virFileExists(filename)) { + conf = virConfReadFile(filename, 0); + if (!conf) + return -1; + res = virConfGetValueBool(conf, "encrypt_data", &cfg->encryptData); + if (res < 0) { + return -1; + } else if (res == 1) { + cfg->encryptDataWasSet = true; + } else { + cfg->encryptDataWasSet = false; + } + + if (virConfGetValueString(conf, "secrets_encryption_key", + &cfg->secretsEncryptionKeyPath) < 0) { + return -1; + } + } + return 0; +} + + +static int +virGetSecretsEncryptionKey(virSecretDaemonConfig *cfg, + uint8_t **secretsEncryptionKey, + size_t *secretsKeyLen) +{ + VIR_AUTOCLOSE fd = -1; + int encryptionKeyLength; + + if ((encryptionKeyLength = virFileReadAll(cfg->secretsEncryptionKeyPath, + VIR_SECRETS_ENCRYPTION_KEY_LEN, + (char**)secretsEncryptionKey)) < 0) { + return -1; + } + if (encryptionKeyLength != VIR_SECRETS_ENCRYPTION_KEY_LEN) { + virReportError(VIR_ERR_INVALID_ENCR_KEY_SECRET, + _("Encryption key length must be '%1$d' '%2$s'"), + VIR_SECRETS_ENCRYPTION_KEY_LEN, + cfg->secretsEncryptionKeyPath); + return -1; + } + + *secretsKeyLen = (size_t)encryptionKeyLength; + return 0; +} + + +virSecretDaemonConfig * +virSecretDaemonConfigNew(bool privileged) +{ + g_autoptr(virSecretDaemonConfig) cfg = NULL; + g_autofree char *configdir = NULL; + g_autofree char *configfile = NULL; + g_autofree char *rundir = NULL; + const char *credentialsDirectory; + + if (virSecretConfigInitialize() < 0) + return NULL; + + if (!(cfg = virObjectNew(virSecretDaemonConfigClass))) + return NULL; + + if (virSecretDaemonConfigFilePath(privileged, &configfile) < 0) + return NULL; + + if (virSecretLoadDaemonConfig(cfg, configfile) < 0) + return NULL; + + credentialsDirectory = getenv("CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY"); + + if (!cfg->secretsEncryptionKeyPath && credentialsDirectory) { + cfg->secretsEncryptionKeyPath = g_strdup_printf("%s/secrets-encryption-key", + credentialsDirectory); + if (!virFileExists(cfg->secretsEncryptionKeyPath)) { + g_clear_pointer(&cfg->secretsEncryptionKeyPath, g_free); + } + } + + if (!cfg->encryptDataWasSet) { + if (!cfg->secretsEncryptionKeyPath) { + /* No path specified by user or environment, disable encryption */ + cfg->encryptData = false; + } else { + cfg->encryptData = true; + } + } else { + if (cfg->encryptData) { + if (!cfg->secretsEncryptionKeyPath) { + /* Built-in default path must be used */ + rundir = virGetUserRuntimeDirectory(); + cfg->secretsEncryptionKeyPath = g_strdup_printf("%s/secrets/encryption-key", + rundir); + } + } + } + VIR_DEBUG("Secrets encryption key path: %s", NULLSTR(cfg->secretsEncryptionKeyPath)); + + if (cfg->encryptData) { + if (virGetSecretsEncryptionKey(cfg, + &cfg->secretsEncryptionKey, + &cfg->secretsKeyLen) < 0) { + return NULL; + } + } + return g_steal_pointer(&cfg); +} + + +static void +virSecretDaemonConfigDispose(void *obj) +{ + virSecretDaemonConfig *cfg = obj; + + virSecureErase(cfg->secretsEncryptionKey, cfg->secretsKeyLen); + g_free(cfg->secretsEncryptionKeyPath); +} diff --git a/src/secret/secret_config.h b/src/secret/secret_config.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..888acf272b --- /dev/null +++ b/src/secret/secret_config.h @@ -0,0 +1,40 @@ +/* + * secret_config.h: secret.conf config file handling + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1-or-later + */ + +#pragma once + +#include "internal.h" +#include "virinhibitor.h" +#include "secret_event.h" +#define VIR_SECRETS_ENCRYPTION_KEY_LEN 32 + +typedef struct _virSecretDaemonConfig virSecretDaemonConfig; +struct _virSecretDaemonConfig { + virObject parent; + /* secrets encryption key path from secret.conf file */ + char *secretsEncryptionKeyPath; + + /* Store the key to encrypt secrets on the disk */ + unsigned char *secretsEncryptionKey; + + size_t secretsKeyLen; + + /* Indicates if the newly written secrets are encrypted or not. + */ + bool encryptData; + + /* Indicates if the config file has encrypt_data set or not. + */ + bool encryptDataWasSet; +}; + +G_DEFINE_AUTOPTR_CLEANUP_FUNC(virSecretDaemonConfig, virObjectUnref); + +int virSecretDaemonConfigFilePath(bool privileged, char **configfile); +virSecretDaemonConfig *virSecretDaemonConfigNew(bool privileged); +int virSecretDaemonConfigLoadFile(virSecretDaemonConfig *data, + const char *filename, + bool allow_missing); diff --git a/src/secret/secret_driver.c b/src/secret/secret_driver.c index 04c3ca49f1..9b13772ad3 100644 --- a/src/secret/secret_driver.c +++ b/src/secret/secret_driver.c @@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ #include "secret_event.h" #include "virutil.h" #include "virinhibitor.h" +#include "secret_config.h" #define VIR_FROM_THIS VIR_FROM_SECRET @@ -70,6 +71,10 @@ struct _virSecretDriverState { /* Immutable pointer, self-locking APIs */ virInhibitor *inhibitor; + + /* Require lock to get reference on 'config', + * then lockless thereafter */ + virSecretDaemonConfig *config; }; static virSecretDriverState *driver; @@ -454,6 +459,7 @@ secretStateCleanupLocked(void) VIR_FREE(driver->configDir); virObjectUnref(driver->secretEventState); + virObjectUnref(driver->config); virInhibitorFree(driver->inhibitor); if (driver->lockFD != -1) @@ -518,6 +524,8 @@ secretStateInitialize(bool privileged, driver->stateDir); goto error; } + if (!(driver->config = virSecretDaemonConfigNew(driver->privileged))) + goto error; driver->inhibitor = virInhibitorNew( VIR_INHIBITOR_WHAT_NONE, @@ -553,6 +561,9 @@ secretStateReload(void) if (!driver) return -1; + if (!(driver->config = virSecretDaemonConfigNew(driver->privileged))) + return -1; + ignore_value(virSecretLoadAllConfigs(driver->secrets, driver->configDir)); return 0; diff --git a/src/secret/test_libvirt_secrets.aug.in b/src/secret/test_libvirt_secrets.aug.in new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..1bb205e0f2 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/secret/test_libvirt_secrets.aug.in @@ -0,0 +1,6 @@ +module Test_libvirt_secrets = + @CONFIG@ + + test Libvirt_secrets.lns get conf = +{ "secrets_encryption_key" = "/run/libvirt/secrets/secret-encryption-key" } +{ "encrypt_data" = "1" } diff --git a/src/util/virerror.c b/src/util/virerror.c index abb014b522..b7d23f81c7 100644 --- a/src/util/virerror.c +++ b/src/util/virerror.c @@ -1296,6 +1296,9 @@ static const virErrorMsgTuple virErrorMsgStrings[] = { [VIR_ERR_AGENT_COMMAND_FAILED] = { N_("guest agent command failed"), N_("guest agent command failed: %1$s") }, + [VIR_ERR_INVALID_ENCR_KEY_SECRET] = { + N_("Invalid encryption key for the secret"), + N_("Invalid encryption key for the secret: %1$s") }, }; G_STATIC_ASSERT(G_N_ELEMENTS(virErrorMsgStrings) == VIR_ERR_NUMBER_LAST); -- 2.51.1
On Thu, Feb 12, 2026 at 05:10:35PM +0100, Peter Krempa wrote:
On Tue, Feb 10, 2026 at 23:26:37 +0530, Arun Menon via Devel wrote:
Libvirt secrets are stored unencrypted on the disk. With this series we want to start encrypting the secrets.
Series:
Reviewed-by: Peter Krempa <pkrempa@redhat.com>
and pushed.
Hi Peter, Thank you for taking the time to review, improve and merging it into the tree. Regards, Arun Menon
participants (4)
-
Andrea Bolognani -
Arun Menon -
Daniel P. Berrangé -
Peter Krempa