On Tue, Dec 22, 2009 at 10:51:15AM +0100, Daniel Veillard wrote:
On Mon, Dec 21, 2009 at 07:09:08PM +0000, Daniel P. Berrange wrote:
On Mon, Dec 21, 2009 at 02:27:18PM +0100, Jiri Denemark wrote:
When it is set to 'yes', some check whether a device is safe to be assigned to a guest will be weakened.
I think this is a rather ill-defined concept to be adding the guest XML, since there are many checks done for assignment, and this is only impacting one of them. Whether to allow a device beind a non-ACS enable switch to be used in a VM has implications beyond just the one VM it is assigned to. Thus is strikes me that the decision as to whether to allow use of devices behind non-ACS switches should be a host level attribute. eg a config item in the /etc/qemu/qemu.conf file
Agreed, it's a Host PCI implementation issue, and this should be delt with in a host wide manner I think, a daemon setting, with the defaulting being on the safe side sounds the best to me.
I'm having second thoughts about even a host daemon setting. I really think we ought to be doing full checking ourselves, even with whitelists if needed. Daniel -- |: Red Hat, Engineering, London -o- http://people.redhat.com/berrange/ :| |: http://libvirt.org -o- http://virt-manager.org -o- http://ovirt.org :| |: http://autobuild.org -o- http://search.cpan.org/~danberr/ :| |: GnuPG: 7D3B9505 -o- F3C9 553F A1DA 4AC2 5648 23C1 B3DF F742 7D3B 9505 :|