On Tue, Dec 22, 2009 at 10:51:15AM +0100, Daniel Veillard wrote:
On Mon, Dec 21, 2009 at 07:09:08PM +0000, Daniel P. Berrange wrote:
> On Mon, Dec 21, 2009 at 02:27:18PM +0100, Jiri Denemark wrote:
> > When it is set to 'yes', some check whether a device is safe to be
> > assigned to a guest will be weakened.
>
> I think this is a rather ill-defined concept to be adding the guest XML,
> since there are many checks done for assignment, and this is only impacting
> one of them. Whether to allow a device beind a non-ACS enable switch to be
> used in a VM has implications beyond just the one VM it is assigned to. Thus
> is strikes me that the decision as to whether to allow use of devices behind
> non-ACS switches should be a host level attribute. eg a config item in the
> /etc/qemu/qemu.conf file
Agreed, it's a Host PCI implementation issue, and this should be
delt with in a host wide manner I think, a daemon setting, with the
defaulting being on the safe side sounds the best to me.
I'm having second thoughts about even a host daemon setting. I really
think we ought to be doing full checking ourselves, even with whitelists
if needed.
Daniel
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