On 2013年01月31日 03:36, John Ferlan wrote:
The 'dname' string was only filled in within the loop when available; however, the TRACE macros used it unconditionally and caused Coverity to compain about BAD_SIZEOF. Using a dnameptr keeps Coverity at bay and makes sure dname was properly filled before attempting the TRACE message. --- src/rpc/virnettlscontext.c | 8 +++++--- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/rpc/virnettlscontext.c b/src/rpc/virnettlscontext.c index 0f0ddff..29d1508 100644 --- a/src/rpc/virnettlscontext.c +++ b/src/rpc/virnettlscontext.c @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ /* * virnettlscontext.c: TLS encryption/x509 handling * - * Copyright (C) 2010-2012 Red Hat, Inc. + * Copyright (C) 2010-2013 Red Hat, Inc. * * This library is free software; you can redistribute it and/or * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public @@ -950,6 +950,7 @@ static int virNetTLSContextValidCertificate(virNetTLSContextPtr ctxt, unsigned int nCerts, i; char dname[256]; size_t dnamesize = sizeof(dname); + char *dnameptr = NULL;
memset(dname, 0, dnamesize);
@@ -1025,6 +1026,7 @@ static int virNetTLSContextValidCertificate(virNetTLSContextPtr ctxt, "[session]", gnutls_strerror(ret)); goto authfail; } + dnameptr = dname; VIR_DEBUG("Peer DN is %s", dname);
if (virNetTLSContextCheckCertDN(cert, "[session]", sess->hostname, dname, @@ -1062,14 +1064,14 @@ static int virNetTLSContextValidCertificate(virNetTLSContextPtr ctxt,
PROBE(RPC_TLS_CONTEXT_SESSION_ALLOW, "ctxt=%p sess=%p dname=%s", - ctxt, sess, dname); + ctxt, sess, dnameptr ? dnameptr : "(unknown)");
return 0;
authdeny: PROBE(RPC_TLS_CONTEXT_SESSION_DENY, "ctxt=%p sess=%p dname=%s", - ctxt, sess, dname); + ctxt, sess, dnameptr ? dnameptr : "(unknown)");
return -1;
I guess dname[0] is guaranteed to be not nul as long as gnutls_x509_crt_get_dn succeeded. If so, the patch can be simplified as: dname[0] ? dname : "(unknown)" Osier