On Thu, 2020-01-16 at 09:46 -0600, Eric Blake wrote:
On 1/10/20 5:32 PM, Jonathon Jongsma wrote:
> We have to assume that the guest agent may be malicious, so we
> don't want to
> allow any agent queries to block any other libvirt API. By holding
> a monitor
> job and an agent job while we're querying the agent, any other
> threads will be
> blocked from using the monitor while the agent is unresponsive.
> Because libvirt
> waits forever for an agent response, this makes us vulnerable to a
> denial of
> service from a malicious (or simply buggy) guest agent.
>
> Most of the patches in the first series were already reviewed and
> pushed, but a
> couple remain: the filesystem info functions. The problem with
> these functions
> is that the agent functions access the vm definition (owned by the
> domain). If
> a monitor job is not held while this is done, the vm definition
> could change
> while we are looking up the disk alias, leading to a potentional
> crash.
Did we ever hear back on a CVE assignment for the first series? And
do
any of the patches in this series also fall under the CVE umbrella?
Good question. I never did hear back about a CVE assignment. This
series is just a revision (and refactoring) of a couple of the patches
that were NACKed from the first series. So they are relevant to the
(potential) CVE.
Jonathon