On Mon, Mar 28, 2011 at 04:33:58PM -0600, Eric Blake wrote:
My earlier testing for commit 34fa0de0 was done while starting just-built libvirt from an unconfined_t shell, where the fds happened to work when transferring to qemu. But when installed and run under virtd_t, failure to label the raw file (with no compression) or the pipe (with compression) triggers SELinux failures when passing fds over SCM_RIGHTS to svirt_t qemu.
* src/qemu/qemu_migration.c (qemuMigrationToFile): When passing FDs, make sure they are labeled. ---
This copies the fd-labeling approach added in commit 34a19dda1.
With this patch, I tested both unconfined_t and virtd_t SELinux process labels for libvirtd (shell start vs. init start).
virsh managedsave dom/virsh start dom works for both raw and compressed save_image_format, both contexts
virsh save dom file/virsh restore file works for raw save_image_format, both contexts works for compressed with virtd_t context save fails for compressed with unconfined_t context, with the failure looking identical to the previously-reported failure for restore in the same settings (https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=691499)
So I'm reasonably confident that this is a good patch.
src/qemu/qemu_migration.c | 8 ++++++-- 1 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/qemu/qemu_migration.c b/src/qemu/qemu_migration.c index 98b9d01..43741e1 100644 --- a/src/qemu/qemu_migration.c +++ b/src/qemu/qemu_migration.c @@ -1304,8 +1304,12 @@ qemuMigrationToFile(struct qemud_driver *driver, virDomainObjPtr vm, if (qemuCaps && qemuCapsGet(qemuCaps, QEMU_CAPS_MIGRATE_QEMU_FD) && (!compressor || pipe(pipeFD) == 0)) { /* All right! We can use fd migration, which means that qemu - * doesn't have to open() the file, so we don't have to futz - * around with granting access or revoking it later. */ + * doesn't have to open() the file, so while we still have to + * grant SELinux access, we can do it on fd and avoid cleanup + * later, as well as skip futzing with cgroup. */ + if (virSecurityManagerSetFDLabel(driver->securityManager, vm, + compressor ? pipeFD[1] : fd) < 0) + goto cleanup; is_reg = true; bypassSecurityDriver = true; } else {
Based on the xplanations, that looks a reasonable patch, ACK, Daniel -- Daniel Veillard | libxml Gnome XML XSLT toolkit http://xmlsoft.org/ daniel@veillard.com | Rpmfind RPM search engine http://rpmfind.net/ http://veillard.com/ | virtualization library http://libvirt.org/